“The Phantom of Absolute Cognition”

The continuity between Frank’s ideas, developed in the 1930s, and the more recent work in the sociology of scientific knowledge was noted by the phi­losopher Thomas Uebel in his paper “Logical Empiricism and the Sociology of Knowledge: The Case of Neurath and Frank.”71 Uebel concluded (I think rightly) that Frank had anticipated all the methodological tenets of the Strong Program (147), but he insists that there is an important difference: the advo­cates of the Strong Program are “relativists,” whereas Frank “did not accept the relativism for which the Strong Programme is famous” (149). This state­ment is incorrect. The similarity does not break down at this point. Frank was also a relativist. I first want to establish this fact and then I shall use Frank’s relativism to illuminate some examples of aerodynamic knowledge.

Frank’s relativism was implicit, but clearly present, in his paper on the acceptance of theories, for example, in his assertion that there was no such thing as “perfect” simplicity. He meant that there is no absolute measure of simplicity that could exist in isolation from the circumstances and perspec­tives of the persons constructing and using the theory. If there is no absolute measure, then all measures must be relative, that is, relative to the contingen­cies and interests that structure the situation. Recall also the trade-off be­tween simplicity and predictive power. Frank said this meant there was no such thing as “the truth” because there was no absolute, final, or perfect com­promise. The relativist stance is epitomized by Frank’s comparison between assessing a theory and assessing an airplane. Talk about an “absolute aircraft” would be nonsense. All the virtues of an aircraft are relative to the aims and circumstances of the user. If the process of scientific thinking has an instru­mental character, and theories are technologies of thought, then talk about an absolute theory, or the absolute truth of a theory, is no less nonsensical.

Frank made his relativism explicit in a book called Relativity: A Richer Truth.72 Einstein wrote the introduction, and the book contains a number of examples drawn from Einstein’s work, but the book is not primarily about relativity theory. It is a discussion of the general status of scientific knowl­edge and its relation to broader cultural concerns. Frank’s purpose is much clearer in the title of the German edition, Wahrheit—Relativ oder absolut? (Truth—relative or absolute?),73 which poses the central question of the book. Does science have any place within it for absolutist claims? Frank said no. No theory, no formula, no observation report is final, perfect, beyond revision or fully understood. The world will always be too complicated to permit any knowledge claim to be treated as absolutely definitive. In devel­oping this argument Frank draws out the similarities between relativism in the theory of knowledge and relativism in the theory of ethics. Are there any moral principles that must be understood as having an absolute character? The claim is often made, but Frank argues that if close attention is paid to the actual employment of a moral principle, it always transpires that qualifica­tions and complications enter into their use. “For this so-called doctrine of the ‘relativity of truth’ is nothing more and nothing less than the admission that a complex state of affairs cannot be described in an oversimplified lan­guage. This plain fact cannot be denied by any creed. It cannot be altered or weakened by any plea or admonition on behalf of ‘absolute truth.’ The most ardent advocates of ‘absolute truth’ avail themselves of the doctrine of the ‘relativists’ whenever they have to face a real human issue” (52).

The book on relativism was written during the 1940s after Frank had left Prague. It was a response to a systematic attack on science by theological writ­ers in the United States. They blamed science for the ills of the time, such as the rise of fascism, the threat of communism, the decline in religious belief, and the loss of traditional values. The critics said that science encouraged relativism and relativism was inimical to responsible thinking. Frank con­fronted the attack head on. He did not seek to evade the charge by arguing that scientists were not relativists (and therefore not guilty); indeed, he said that scientists were relativists (and should be proud of the fact). The danger to rational thought and moral conduct came, he said, not from relativism but from absolutism. If we try to defend either science or society by making absolutist claims, we will merely find ourselves confronted by rival creeds making rival, absolute claims. If we take the issue outside the realm of reason, we must not be surprised if it is settled by the forces of unreason (21). Relativ­ism, he argued, is the only effective weapon against totalitarianism and has long been instrumental in the progress of knowledge. It has been made “a scapegoat for the failures in the fight for democratic values” (20).

Frank alluded to the many caustic things that critics said about relativism and then added, “this crusade has remained mostly on the surface of scientific discourse. In the depths, where the real battle for the progress of knowledge has been fought, this battle has proceeded under the very guidance of the doctrine of the ‘relativity of truth.’ The battle has not been influenced by the claim of an ‘absolute truth,’ since the legitimate place of this term in scientific discourse has yet to be found” (20-21). Notice that Frank placed the words “absolute truth” in quotation marks because, as a positivist, he would have been inclined to dismiss the words as meaningless. For him they had no real content and no real place in meaningful discourse. The claims of the absolut­ists were to be seen as similar to the claims of, say, the theologian. But if the best definition of relativism is simply the denial that there are any absolute truths, and if relativism is essentially the negation of absolutism, then relativ­ism is meaningless as well. The negation of a meaningless pseudoproposi­tion is also a meaningless pseudoproposition. Relativism would, likewise, be revealed as an attempt to say what cannot be said. This may explain why Frank also placed the words “relativity of truth” in quotation marks. There is much to recommend this analysis. It might be called the Tractatus view of relativism.74 Where, however, does this analysis leave Frank’s book? Does it not render the book meaningless and pointless? The answer is no. The reason is that absolutism, like theology, has practical consequences, and whatever the status of its propositions, the language is woven into the fabric of life. It provides an idiom in which things are done or not done. Even for the strictest positivist this penumbra of practical action has significance.

What is done, or not done, in the name of absolutism? The answer that Frank gave is clear. Absolutism inhibits the honest examination of the real practices of life and science. It is inimical to clear thinking about the human condition. The meaningful task of the relativist is grounded in this sphere. It is to be expressed by combating obscurantism and fantasy and by replacing them with opinions informed by empirical investigation. That is the “richer truth” referred to in the title of the English-language edition of Frank’s book. This down-to-earth orientation also provides the answer to another prob­lem that may appear to beset Frank’s relativist position. What is scientific knowledge supposed to be relative to? The answer is that it is relative to what­ever causes determine it. There are as many “relativities” as there are causes. That is the point: knowledge is part of the causal nexus, not something that transcends it. Knowledge is not a supernatural phenomenon, as it would have to be if it were to earn the title of “absolute.” Knowledge is a natural phenomenon and must be studied as such by historians, sociologists, and psychologists.

Frank’s relativism, and the relativist thrust of the positivist tradition, seems to have been forgotten.75 A number of prominent philosophers paid a moving tribute to Frank after his death in 1966, but they did not mention his relativism.76 In the course of this forgetting, a strange transformation has taken place. In his Kleines Lehrbuch des Positivismus, von Mises spoke of “the phantom of absolute cognition.”77 That phantom still stalks the intellectual landscape, but in Frank’s day it was scientists who were accused of relativism, whereas today it is scientists, or a vocal minority of scientists, who accuse others of relativism. From being the natural home of relativism, science has been polemically transformed into the abode of antirelativism and hence of absolutism. A significant role in this transformation has been played by phi­losophers of science who are today overwhelmingly, and often aggressively, antirelativist in their stance. The involvement of analytic philosophers should have ensured that the arguments for and against relativism were studied with clarity and precision. This has not happened. The philosophical discussion of relativism is markedly less precise today than when Frank addressed it fifty years ago and provided his simple and cogent formulation of what was at stake.