Category Last Days of the Luftwaffe

Initially it seemed that the Henschel designed Schmetterling had better prospects than other concepts. It was a subsonic, remote-controlled flak rocket with combined ailerons/rudder integral to the wings and was fired at a steep angle along a launch trailer on a light revolving chassis. Take-off was assisted by two solid-fuel boosters and a powerful liquid-fuel engine provided the cruising stage. After extensive research in 1942, Henschel received a contract for a pre-series ‘S’ in August 1943. The technical problems could not be overcome during that winter, and the first experimental rocket S V-l was first fired on 15 February 1944. Three of the first four starts that spring were failures. To put the development on a firmer footing, close cooperation developed between Henschel and the Askania, Bosch and Siemens companies. It was expected that 150 missiles would have to be fired to identify and eliminate all weaknesses before the project was ripe for series production.

An assessment in November 1944 on the launches so far reported that the small payload of S 1 had an effective destructive area which was too limited, but in the short term Schmetterling would be more effective than Wasserfall because the launch equipment was manoeuvrable. The RLM set great store by the fact that Schmetterling had a proven control system which would not require a long trial phase. By mid-November 1944 there had been 15 air launches from an He 111 H-6 for stability testing and flight attitude control while 21 were fired from the ground. The first two of these had no remote control; the others were fitted with a flight control unit.

On 21 December 1944, Oberst von Giildenfeldt of the Flakwaffe General Staff reported to the Chief-TLR that the first emplacements protecting armaments factories important for the war effort had been chosen for the Schmetterling. By the end of December 1944 another 23 Hs 117s had been produced; this was repeated in January 1945 and another 20 were planned for February, and after that nobody could predict because high-value raw materials for the envisaged series production were in very short supply.

Henschel was also planning an improved series version, the S 2, which resulted in three different and promising designs, S 2a, S 2b and S 2c. Despite the grave war situation, further Schmetterling testing continued. In test launches in January 1945, the rocket reached an altitude of 9,000 metres and had a range of 25 kilometres (30,000 ft/15 miles). Six more air launches followed at the beginning of February, and 38 from the ground. Only 28 of the 59 starts were satisfactory, in the others, as the report states, ‘some area of the rocket’ failed.

There were serious problems regarding the envisaged series run. The Chief – TLR War Diary entry for 21 January 1945 reports that BMW would not be able to supply engines for the Hs 117 on time. Delays of at least three months were anticipated. New variants such as the TV-guided Hs 117 H were cancelled on 6 February by Kammler, while all other designated work on the rocket had to be completed as soon as possible so that production of the basic S 1 design could follow at location B3 in the Harz. The war situation prevented the plans being realised, and the building work on the subterranean factory was abandoned in March 1945. The War Diary also indicates that the SG 45 solid-fuel engine for the Hs 117 was not supplied on time despite repeated reference to the Fiihrer’s standing order. More delays of at least three weeks ensued.

Mittelwerk was to house the production, and on 27 February the SS requested all relevant files from Henschel. A start date in March was not possible, however. On 13 March Himmler and the Dornberger team agreed a new date in May from when 300 Schmetterling would be produced monthly instead of the originally planned 3,000. The collapse in fuel production reduced fuel availability to one tenth the requested level. Once the rocket was deleted from the Fiihrer Emergency Programme, the series was downgraded on Himmler s order.

By 15 March only 140 rockets had been produced. Of these 80 were fired, but none operationally. The other 60 lacked a motor or parts of the remote-control equipment and were held back at the factory or test centres. After the Henschel development division relocated to the Harz in early 1945, development activity was resumed on a small scale and for a short time only in the incomplete under­ground complex at Himmelberg (B3a) at Woffleben. Meanwhile US armoured forces had advanced through the Harz, taking village after village with relatively little opposition. On 5 April rocket technicians in the Bad Sachsa-Bleichrode- Nordhausen area were shipped out to Upper Bavaria, where they ended the war. On 11 April US Special Forces captured Hs 117 parts in an underground gallery near Woffleben and these were spirited away to the United States before the arrival of the Soviet ally.

he end of the era of the piston-engined fighter coincided with the end of the Second World War. In the second half of 1944 the Luftwaffe turned its hopes increasingly to the twin-turbine Me 262 A-la jet fighter. Even though only relatively few Geschwader enjoyed its use, that does nothing to alter the fact that in 1945 this machine was the fastest jet fighter in the world to be operational in large numbers.

Me 262 A-la

The introduction of the Me 262 jet was hindered initially by reverses. The BMW turbines failed to live up to their promise. Even the change-over to Jumo 004 T-ls and T-2s brought no quick breakthrough. General der Jagd-

The Luftwaffe believed that the Me 262 A-la would revolutionise air warfare. Production in fits and starts prevented the deployment of the jet fighter in the numbers desired by OKL.

flieger Adolf Galland declared the machine ready for operations after his trial flight in the V-4 prototype, but the euphoria was soon dispelled when the new technology with all its attendant problems delayed completion and delivery of the first pre-series run into the spring of 1944. During testing new defects came to light almost daily, causing ever more postponements. New delays followed the Blitzbomber idea which had been accepted without protest by Goring, and on 25 May 1944 the aircraft was transferred to the jurisdiction of the General der Kampfflieger for future use mainly as a fighter-bomber.

Nevertheless the development of the single-seat fighter was continued. In December 1943 a test commando had been established at Lechfeld and from May 1944 the pilots of III./ZG 26 underwent conversion training for jets. Although one of the most influential advocates of the Me 262, Hauptmann Thierfelder, was shot down in his machine, the first victories were achieved during the operational testing period. On 26 September 1944 Kommando Nowotny was founded. Major Walter Nowotny and his pilots proved from 8 August 1944 how efficient the Me 262 A-la was in aerial combat: Nowotny himself, a highly decorated commander, lost his life when shot down on 8 November 1944. Before being incorporated into JG 7, the Kommando obtained at least 17 victories.

Despite great efforts, the number of Me 262s available remained small. This was because of the advanced technology and the air raids on the assembly lines at Augsburg. The relocation of these to forests, or the construction of underground assembly facilities were both necessary, but meant fewer aircraft being produced than originally planned. Even at the end of the war the relocation of plants for Me 262 A-la assembly was incomplete. Delays in the delivery of new aircraft to individual units in the spring of 1945 prevented a smooth change­over to the Me 262, and OKL succeeded in equipping only a few fighter Gruppen, especially those ofJG 7 and KG(J) 54, with reasonable numbers.

ffensive operations were naturally to the forefront in Luftwaffe tactical thinking. In view of the enemy superiority piston-engined aircraft such as the Ju 87 and Fw 190 were ever less suitable to relieve pressure on German troops and to strike hard at the enemy. Knowing this Hider had decided that he needed aircraft able to combat a numerically superior enemy in the case of invasion. The solution appeared to him to be the Blitzbomber. These would be machines such as the Ar 234 or Me 262 which, by virtue of their great speed, would be able to operate even over regions where the enemy had aerial superiority. Because these machines were not available until the summer of 1944, and far too few Blitzbombers were on hand, their pilots’ tactical successes were modest.

Fighter Bombers

The need to engage Soviet tank groups assumed particular importance from mid-1944 once the Red Army had begun to undermine the foundations of the Eastern Front, and not only Army Group Centre was staring at disaster. An even greater material superiority was making its presence felt on the Western Front.

Despite the comparatively high achievements of the single-seater Fw 190, in the final phase of the war attacks at dusk or in the early morning were more numerous than in broad daylight and were confined mainly to areas with poor AA defences or few enemy fighters. The Fw 190 was still a very dangerous opponent in skilled hands. Its fixed weapons were normally two MG 131s built into the fuselage, and two MG 151/20s in the wing roots. Pilots would sometimes unship some of the guns to save weight.

Fw 190s would often attack the more rewarding targets in a restricted area in a ‘rolling attack’. As in anti-tank operations some of the attacking machines would tie down the enemy defences by dropping anti-personnel bombs from disposable containers. This could be either an ETC 501, 502 or 503 bomb container below the fuselage and four ETC 50s or ETC 71s below the wings. These made it possible to use all standard types of bomb. Used with small HE or hollow-charge bombs they could be extremely destructive against enemy

vehicles, whether stationary or mobile. The potential was obviously greater the larger the formation. Occasionally all machines of a Gruppe would be involved, but when few aircraft were operational a number would fly nuisance raids and perform reconnaissance or weather-reporting duty on subsequent flights.

At the beginning of 1945, SG 4 succeeded in assembling over 100 Fw 190 F-8s to hold back the Allied advance using low-level techniques. Many were lost during the flight to the target while air raids on airfields in western Germany also caused losses. Most Fw 190 fighter-bombers were grouped in three Geschwader, SG 1, SG 4 and SG 10. SG 1 had up to 115 machines; at the beginning of the year SG 10 had over 70. Major Jabo operations were carried out as a massed unit, in formation for the outward and return flights but with individual attacks.

On 10 January 1945, only SG 4, consisting of the Geschwaderstab and I. to III. Gruppen flying Fw 190s, and the night-attack Gruppen NSGr 1,2 and 20 were attached to Luftflotte Reich. Far more low-level units were distributed along the Eastern Front. With Luftflotte 6 were III./SG 3 and NSGr 3. These were equipped with only obsolete auxiliary aircraft such as the slow Ar 60 and Go 145. SG 2 and 10, and IV./SG 9 were operational at Luftflotte 4. IV./SG 9 had more than ten machines mostly Fw 190s and Ju 87s. I. and II. Gruppen had 66 Fw 190s between them. Ju 87 Ds were still being flown by III./SG 2, while SG 10 had all Fw 190 As and Fs. On 10 January 1945 another 65 of these aircraft became available.

Luftflotte 6 provided the defensive force in the central section of the Eastern Front with three Jabo Geschwader equipped with Fw 190s. SG 1 and SG 2 had two Gruppen each, SG 77 had three relatively strong Gruppen and included the specially equipped night unit NSGr 4 with 60 Ju 87s and Si 204 Ds.

By the end of January 1945 Russian armies in East Prussia had occupied virtually the whole area between Konigsberg (Kaliningrad) and Lotzen (Gyzycko) and were heading north for the Frisches Haff. Graudenz (Grudziadz) and Thorn (Toruri) were encircled and Elbing (Elblag) came under threat after strong units crossed the Narev. Further attack wedges were moving simultaneously for the territories along the Warthe and in Upper Silesia. On 1 February numerous Jabo Gruppen were operating against the Soviets in the Luftflotte 6 region. SG 1 Geschwaderstab had three Fw 190 F-8s and another 104 in I. and III. Gruppen, although only half the machines were operational. SG 2 had only two Gruppen: II./SG 2 flew the Fw 190 F-8 with anti-tank rockets, III./SG 2 the Ju 87 D-5. In SG 3,4 and 77, Fw 190 F-8s were used on operations, each having a Staffel of 12 aircraft equipped with Panzerblitz or Panzerschreck rockets.

Besides the operational Geschwader there were up to six Jabo formations consisting mostly of fighter and night-fighter units. The largest were two units of JG 300 and JG 301. The first was composed of I., II. and IV./JG 300 and 3./JGr 10, which had 109 Bf 109s and 46 Fw 190s; fighter-bomber unit JG 301 was three Gruppen plus II./ZG 76. Gefechtsverband (Battle Unit) Major Enders had been drawn up from Stab, Training SG 104 and II./SG 151, while Gefechtsverband Oberstleutnant Robert Kowaleski had crews from KG 76 plus the test commando of the Air Navigation School, Straussberg. This unit had only eight Ju 188s and five He Ills, but the crews were veterans.

At the end of January, the Soviets had assembled strong forces and surrounded Posen. The final battle against hopeless odds was fought out in the city centre between 19 and 23 February. From 13 February fighting raged at Glogau/Oder, but with air support the Germans held out until 2 April. At the beginning of February the Red Army had crossed the Oder between Kiistrin (Kostrzyn) and Frankfurt at several points and established bridgeheads on the western bank. Another strongpoint was north of Fiirstenburg. The Russians had gained ground east of Stettin (Szczecin) although the German strongpoint at Altdamm held initially. At Lauban (Lubari), German Panzers won a victory at the beginning of March after wiping out large sections of 7th Guards Armoured Corps assisted by Jabos. Between 6 and 12 March, Russian divisions broke through towards Danzig and Stolpmiinde (Ustka), being held temporarily only with the greatest effort just short of their objective.

Despite all restrictions, between 1 and 31 March 1945 1. Fliegerdivision alone flew 2,190 sorties over the Eastern Front. 172 Russian tanks and more than 250 lorries were claimed destroyed, another 70 tanks damaged. Luftwaffe Staffeln shot down 110 enemy aircraft and damaged 21 others. At 4. Fliegerdivision SG 1 flew 619 missions, SG 3 66 and SG 77 123 in March 1945. Pilots of SGI dropped 295 tonnes of bombs and 36 tonnes of disposable containers of bombs, and though few tanks and lorries were destroyed at least 26 direct hits on bridge targets were claimed.

Amongst the most important units on defensive operations in April were SG 1 with over 89 Ju 87s and Fw 190s in all. 91 Fw 190 A-8s and F-8s were operational at SG 2. Stab and II./SG 3 had about 40 Fw 190 F-8s: SG 77 had 99 operational machines in its three Gruppen. An obstacle to large numbers of operations was the shortage of fuel, as so often, and a fair number of these aircraft were to be found parked on the airfield fringes at any given time.

In a successful attack by SG 1 on 11 April, 17 Fw 190 pilots dropped the usual SC 500s, plus five SC 500s with an experimental explosive filling and 16 SD 70s on railway and bridge targets near Rathstock. On 16 April two Fw 190 F-8s were lost to Russian AA fire, but the remaining pilots destroyed a number of vehicles. During these weeks Luftflotte 6 had around 250Jabos, mostly Fw 190

F-8s, and relatively few Ju 87 Ds. This force was able to call on well over 100 Bf 109s of JG 4,JG 52 and JG 77 for protection.

Meanwhile the war had moved closer to the heart of Germany as merged German divisions, Volkssturm and reserve units could do little to stop the Allied advance. On the Autobahn at Radeberg, German pilots destroyed three tanks and blocked traffic for some time. Over Cottbus-Finsterwalde-Lubben, 62 Jabos flew numerous attacks against enemy artillery and bombed an airfield occupied by the Russians.

On 24 April VIII Fliegerkorps had four Gruppen of SG 2 and SG 77 while 3. Luftwaffen-Division had additionally three Gruppen from SG 4 and SG 9 and an anti-tank Staffel. Fw 190 pilots scored noteworthy successes. Even from positions of great numerical inferiority they were able to strike hard against the Russians in ground attacks in support of Army Group Schorner.

In the last few nights of April 1945, crews of SG 1, who had been at Gatow/Mecklenburg until 26 April, sortied to relieve the pressure on Berlin. They flew as a rule twenty operations daily over the burning city. The strength of the enemy had become overwhelming: on the night of 1 May some of the 39 Fw 190 F-8s attached to III./KG 200 dropped containers of supplies to the defenders.

Despite the precarious situation, on 3 May the Luftwaffe could still call on a number of Jabo units although operations were now greatly limited by lack of fuel and bombs. Luftflotte 4, responsible for the air support of Axmy Group

South and the Commander-in-Chief South-East, had I./SG 10 at Budweis and II./SG 10 at Weis, where the remnants of SG 9 were stationed on anti-tank duty.

I. /SG 2 pilots at Graz-Thalerhof engaged enemy forces advancing from the Alps: two more Jabo units served Seventeenth Army, these being Jabo unit Weiss with 3./NSGr 4 and II./SG 77 for night and daylight attacks respectively. Gefechts- verband Rudel, most of which was at Niemes-Sud, was composed of II./SG 2 and 10. Anti-tank Staffel. Its commander, Oberst Hans-Ulrich Rudel, had been awarded the Gold Oak Leaves to his Knight’s Cross on 29 December 1944.

II. /JG 6 flew fighter escort for his machines.

Luftwaffenkommando West (from 1 May 1945 Luftwaffen-Division North Alps) was made up of remnants of disbanded night-fighter units and sections from JG 27, 53 and 300, and was used increasingly at the end for low-level attacks. Although hostile operations against the Western Powers were terminated on 6 May, there was no let-up in the fight against the Russians. Strikes against their supply lines in the rear and against forward units were flown almost to the very end. When the general fuel situation at the excellent Prague aerodromes deteriorated drastically, the last aircraft there were destroyed by their pilots, although a few managed to fly out and surrender to the Americans.

Despite the successful change-over at many anti-tank Staffeln from the Ju 87 G-2 to the faster Fw 190 F-8, and the introduction of efficient rockets

such as the Panzerblitz, the collapse of the infrastructure and the lack of fuel and ammunition meant there was no possibility of holding the Western Allies at the Rhine and the Red Army at the Oder.

At times it seemed possible that Jabo jets might be the way to improve matters, but the number of available Ar 234s and Me 262s was insufficient. It is, however, worth examining the role played by these aircraft.

The Blitzbomber

The immense numerical superiority of the enemy appeared to have only one solution, which was to equip all fighter-bomber squadrons with jets. The only bomber Geschwader to be equipped and operational with the Me 262 Blitzbomber was KG 51 Edelweiss. Pilots of the single-seater ‘fast bomber’ used mainly explosive anti-personnel Red ^ anti. aircraft batteries clustered bombs or AB 250 or AB 500 containers against around ground targets caused increasingly pin-pointed targets and troop concentrations serious problems for Ju 87 crews,

behind the Western Front. On 20 July 1944

Einsatzkommando Edelweiss began attacking Allied troop formations in Normandy. In Operation Bodenplatte on 1 January 1945 during the Ardennes Offensive the unit bombed the airfields at Eindhoven and s’Hertogenbosch successfully, and maintained an offensive presence to the end of the campaign, covering the German divisions as they retreated. From mid-January they attacked targets west of the Rhine.

On 7 January the Geschwaderstab at Rheine (Major Wolfgang Schenk) had 4 Blitzbombers while I./KG 51 had 30, with 9 more on the way. II. Gruppestab had 3, but the inventory of the entire Gruppe was only 10, and 10 pilots.

III. Gruppe had been disbanded in September 1944 while IV./KG 51 had been re-designated IV.(Erg)/KG 51. This was a pilot supply Gruppe which had been at Erding since January and was disbanded in April. Only I. and II./KG 51 carried out operations. A few days after 7 January the total of Me 262s available was 58. Despite a heavy air raid at Rheine airfield, Me 262 attacks continued against targets in the Rhineland and western Ruhr. In attacks on ground targets around Kleve, 55 Me 262s of Stab and I./KG 51 took part. These massed operations failed to hold back the endless British columns. By the end of the month the attacks were ebbing for lack of fuel.

J

On 22 February, 34 Me 262s of KG 51 set out for Kleve protected by over 100 piston-engined fighters. Several KG 51 pilots were lost on this operation while a number of aircraft dropped out with turbine defects. The expected operational life of 40 hours for these engines was optimistic. Poor maintenance and inexperienced ground staff contributed to avoidable losses amongst the Edelweiss pilots.

After the bridge at Remagen fell almost intact into US hands on 7 March, early next morning the Reichsmarschall called KG 51 operations room to request volunteers to sacrifice their lives by diving bomb-carrying Me 262s into the bridge. Two pilots stepped forward but were dissuaded by their squadron commanders at the last moment. Between 13 March and 20 April, I./KG 51 used the Autobahn between Leipheim and Neu-Ulm as its operational base. Since the delivery unit of the Kuno assembly works (a factory hidden in woods near Burgau), and a similar plant near Leipheim aerodrome were nearby, this offered some limited opportunity for engine overhauls. At least two operations were flown from Giebelstadt against armour heading for Mainz, one of these against the important railway bridge at Bad Munster am Stein on 18 March 1945. These few operations fell well short of doing anything to change the situation or stop the Allied advance.

On 30 March Kammler ordered all available Blitzbombers, transferred to IX. Fliegerkorps. General der Flieger Josef Kammhuber intervened and diverted two-thirds to JG 7 and the other third to KG (J) 54 on the orders of the Luftwaffe General Staff once the Reichsmarschall had refused to hand Kammler unlimited power over IX Fliegerkorps. On 31 March jet bombers at KG 51 totalled 79, of which a number had come direct from the Leipheim production line near the Autobahn. A little later Kammler’s decision to disband the Jabo unit was overturned when Hitler ordered the resumption of ground attacks by Blitzbombers. KG 51 then received more of the aircraft, but from mid – March ever fewer were operational for lack of parts and above all fuel. The number of low-level attacks dropped, and most Allied columns arrived at their destinations unmolested.

On 18 April seven Me 262s of KG 51 attacked enemy lorries near Nuremberg, and in a skirmish with eight P-5 Is shot down one without loss. Two days later the Geschwader evacuated south as Allied troops menaced its airfields. On 20 April I./KG 51 relocated from Leipheim to Memmingen. Next day, together with JG 53 fighter pilots, a massive low-level raid was flown against long convoys near Gottingen. On 23 April two pilots attacked the bridge over the Danube at Dillingen which had been turned into a hub for the Allied advance. At this time I./KG 51 had only 12 Blitzbombers for its 43 pilots. On 25 April the last nine

airworthy Me 262s moved to Munich-Riem, and on the 26th KG 51, after taking over nine Me 262s of the stock of 44 at JV 44, fell back on Holzkirchen where it was intended to disband the Geschwader, no further missions being considered possible.

Besides the R4M, the Me 262 A-la was suitable for carrying the RZ 65 7.3-cm calibre air-to-air Fohn solid-fuel rocket successfully tested aboard the Fw 190 A. The first Me 262 trials with the weapon were held at Tarnewitz in the early spring of 1945 under Flight-Staff Engineer Heinz Pfister. After delays for bad weather, on 25 April he flew an Me 262 from the test centre to JV 44 at Munich- Riem but finding the airfield cratered and two P-5 Is approaching he abandoned the project and headed for Neubiberg. Fohn rockets were now overtaken by events as American troops occupied Munich.

X-4

The wire-guided Ruhrstahl X-4 designed by Dr Max Kramer was a highly valuable weapon scheduled to replace most spin-stabilised rockets at the earliest opportunity. On 30 October 1944 Reich Minister Speer ordered its immediate development. Relatively expensive-looking even from the planning stage, 5,000 Type 8-344 A-l were to be mass-produced monthly at the Ruhrstahl AG works Brackwede near Bielefeld. Fritz Hahn reported that eventually 950 were produced at Bielefeld and the Stargard factory in Pomerania. BMW Berlin – Spandau aimed to turn out 1,500 liquid-propellant motors by April 1945, but few came off the lines complete. On 6 February Kammler ordered X-4 development work concluded as soon as possible to enable the manufacturer to press ahead with the Dogge automatic aiming device. In February 1945 it was still

hoped to arm all operational jet aircraft, including Ar 234 B-2s, C-3s and the Me 262 A-la with the X-4. Numerous tests were made using a converted Ju 88 G. At the beginning of 1945 Messerschmitt works pilot Gerd Lindner made at least one flight aboard an Me 262 A-la (Works No. 111994) carrying

two X-4s below the wings, but they were never fired in combat. The intention for operations was to have two or four X-4s suspended below the wings from an ETC 70/C1. After an air raid destroyed the assembly plant for the BMW 109-548 motor, and the necessary components could not be supplied in the desired quantities, the Riistungsstab accepted that series production in adequate numbers would not be possible. A large number of prototypes survived, and in March 1945 Kammler ordered 300 X-4s. Nothing came of this despite continuing tests at Karlshagen, mainly for the lack of experienced technical staff. Once it was evident that series production was out of the question, the Riistungsstab went for the RM4 instead.

Hs298

The Riistungsstab conference of 5 November 1944 decided that the X-4 should be followed by the air-to-air Hs 298, two or three being carried below the wings of an Me 262 and fired from simple retaining rails. The Hs 298 had been under development at Henschel since 1943. An order was placed for 100 units of the prototype Hs 298 V-l series, to be followed by the V-2 series. The first completely successful launch occurred on 22 December 1944 from a Ju 88 G-l night fighter, and OKL then ordered Henschel to manufacture a pre-series run of 2,000. Although flight and remote-control trials proved promising in early 1945, a disadvantage of the weapons was thought to be its expense. Production

of the first 135 continued into the spring of 1945, however. The rocket had some notable innovations in that it was the first to be built in modular form. It was the first guided missile to be fired from a rail, a method only used previously for spin-stabilised rockets. It had no need for batteries, power being supplied by an on-board generator.

The Hs 298 V-2 series had a 45-kg (100-lb) warhead and a range of 5,500 metres (6,000 yd). Speed calculated in 1945 was around 250 m/sec (820 ft/sec). By mid-April 1945 more than 100 of the first 135 prototypes were ready but were destroyed together with the remainder to prevent their capture by Russian forces as the latter neared the Wansdorf factory outside Berlin. Accordingly, with the exception of the R4M, all efforts of the SS to introduce accurate air-to-air rockets over the Reich came to nothing.

The suicide aircraft Reichenberg originated from a suggestion by Flugkapitan Hanna Reitsch to Hitler at the Berghof on 28 February 1944. She merely stated that the targeting characteristics of the V-l flying bomb were not good and requested permission to fly a V-l to see if the defects could not be improved. At first Hitler demurred, pointing to the more efficient jet aircraft which would soon be available to the Luftwaffe in large numbers. Suddenly, Hitler seemed to turn the matter over in his mind and surprisingly gave her his approval for a small experimental batch.

A senior aeronautical engineer at KdE, Heinz Kensche, was given the task of working on the complex problems. He decided that the development should proceed in five stages:

Re 1 single-seater, landing skid, trainer without engine.

Re 2 two-seater, landing skid, trainer without engine.

Re 3 two-seater, landing skid, trainer, with As 014 ramjet Re 4 single-seater, operational machine, with As 014 ramjet Re 5 single-seater, trainer, short fuselage, with As 014 ramjet

The plan was to give operational versions a thin-shelled SC 800 aerial mine for land objectives and a torpedo warhead for shipping targets. The development lasted from the summer of 1944 to at least March 1945, but no missions were flown with a piloted V-l. A small development team was assembled under the cover name ‘Segelflug GmbH Reichenberg. This had the cooperation of the SS and consisted of three engineers and 15 experienced supervisors and technical staff. Henschel made available a small hangar for the secret construction. Series production was scheduled at Gollnow (Goleniow) near the large Altendamm aerodrome at Stettin. The machines would be made from large sub-assemblies made at Gottartowitz/Upper Silesia (Gotarowice) and Konigsberg, with new cabin and nose components being added. The team started work at once, converting an existing V-l flying bomb to see if it could be flown manually. It had to be simple and based substantially on the standard Fi 103 to spare all unnecessary costs. Above the spartan cockpit was an Argus-Schmidt As 014 ramjet. As a rule the machine would be brought close to the target by a parent aircraft but on release could fly up to 300 kilometres under ramjet power. Once the design was completed, the drawings were forwarded to the manufacturer.

In August 1944 Henschel received a technical proposal for the development and construction of 250 prototypes with ramjet. The Commissioner for the

Reichenberg, Engineer Oberst Platz, also ordered 21 two-seater trainers. Large components supplied to Henschel were to be modified and completed with its in-house parts. The final assembly would be at Gollnow in December 1944, although presumably not on the airfield there, since this lay well to the east, and in the end Dannenberg was chosen instead.

Re 1 was to be the only version with a detachable skid. This enabled quick drainage of the fuel. Re 1 V-l was completed by the beginning of September 1944 and transported to Larz near Rechlin. The glider was carried to 4,000 metres by a Rechlin test centre He 111 and released. Pilot on this first flight was engineer Willy Fiedler, who had played a major role in the development. A second pilot, engineer Rudolf Ziegler, injured his spine when making a hard landing on uneven ground near Rechlin and had to retire from the roster. He was replaced by senior engineer Herbert Pangratz who was also seriously injured when forced to make an emergency landing after the cockpit canopy came free.

At the beginning of October 1944 the first Re 2 versions arrived at Larz. Senior engineer Heinz Kensche and Unteroffizier Schenk made the maiden

flight in the two seater Re 2 V-l. At midday on 12 October the machine was released from an He 111 H at altitude and returned safely. The next two flights from Larz took place on 13 and 19 October when Schenk partnered pilot Kachel. On further flights from Rechlin, Augstein, Meisner and Pfannenstein occupied the narrow cockpit. During the flight trials in which Hanna Reitsch was involved she crashed two Reichenbergs. It was almost impossible to escape from the aircraft, especially at high speed in gliding flight, the chances of doing so successfully being rated at 100-1.

The first and possibly only Re 3, a two-seater with As 014 ramjet propulsion, flew three times on 4 and 5 November 1944 with Heinz Kensche at the controls. The first two flights were relatively problem-free and lasted about eight minutes. On the third flight, on 5 November, the port wing began to disengage in flight forcing Kensche to bale out at 450 km/hr (280 mph). Only with the greatest difficulty did he manage to free himself from the cockpit and get past the engine. He landed in the Miiritz and swam to the bank. The cause of the defect was
heavy vibrations emitted by the ramjet which affected the fuselage. The aircraft was a write-off.

On 28 November Kensche and Leutnant Walter Starbati flew an Re 2 twice at Larz. Starbati had previously been detached to the Zeppelin Luftschiffbau as a test pilot, and at Rechlin he appears to have received the order to test the Reichenberg personally. On 16 January 1945 Starbati flew the series-produced Re 3 (Works No. 10). After reaching speeds between 620 and 650 km/hr at 2,600 metres altitude (385—

404 mph at 8,500 ft) he detected slight reverberations in the hull although otherwise the flight attitude was no different from the Re 2. On landing, the ramjet nozzle was found to be damaged which probably accounted for the shuddering in flight. Another long circuit in an Re 3 followed on 17 February, the aircraft picking up speed at 2,000 metres. In the 17- minute flight Leutnant Starbati reached a speed of540 km/hr, repeated in a 16-minute flight the following day.

On 4,22 and 25 February Starbati also flew the Re 4 V-10, the planned operational version of the piloted V-l. After a brief period in the air the fuel system began to leak, making Starbati dizzy. He broke off the flight and ground staff found that he had lost 335 litres of the original 600 litres of fuel since he took off

At this stage the Reichenberg was useless for operations because of instability in flight and needed constant corrections to maintain course but the flight trials at Larz continued.

At the beginning of 1945 the Rechlin-Larz test centre began to consider suitable variants for pin-point attacks by suicide pilots and in the training versions. Leutnant Starbati played a major role. However, he met his fate in a short wingspan Re 3 on 5 March 1945. After reaching a speed between 400 and 500 km/hr at 2,800 metres, as he turned to port both wings detached one after the other. Under ramjet propulsion the fuselage entered a steep dive. Starbati could not open the cockpit hood and died when the machine hit the Nebelsee near Sewekow. After Unteroffizier Schenk also lost his life in a Reichenberg, the Chief-TLR noted in the War Diary on 15 March that, at the suggestion of the Rechlin test centre, OKL and the Kommodore of KG 200 had decided to terminate the project after the most recent fatal accident. Most

Reichenberg aircraft were then put into store at the Neu-Tramm Luftwaffe arsenal since there was no further use for them. On 23 April Major Fritz Hahn surrendered all 700 V-ls and the last 54 secret suicide machines to US forces which had occupied the Muna.

Towards the end of the war the Peenemiinde EV Wasserfall design was considered to have the best chance of winning back for Germany air supremacy over the Reich. It was a remote-controlled, single stage, liquid-fuel supersonic rocket designed to engage enemy aircraft at the highest altitudes. Its wings and fins had a cruciform arrangement and it was fired vertically. Simultaneous with work on the single-stage variant W 1 – also known as С 1 – at the beginning of 1942 work was started on the two-stage C 3 version. On 15 June and 12 July 1942 OKL placed orders with Rheinmetall to handle the C 3 development. As the results promised early military use, on 12 March 1943 series production was

scheduled for mid-1944. From June 1944, 250 would be turned out monthly, from September 1944 1,000, from December 2,500, and from March 1945 7,500 monthly, according to the RLM and Armaments Ministry figures. Only two experimental rockets, W 1/1 and W 1/2 would be built of the С 1 version, the C-2 version would generate all further test rockets and the first operational series-produced rockets. Apart from difficult technical problems which remained to be resolved, there was little capacity to produce the C 2, too little by way of raw materials, and above all too litde space. It was therefore impossible to predict the date when the Luftwaffe would have its effective defence against Allied bombers. To find a useful solution, in July 1943 it was decided to equip the first 1,000 rockets with control-stick steering and then 5,000 with radio control.

Testing of Wasserfall proceeded only slowly. In November 1943 it was announced that the first two experimental rockets would be fired from Peenemunde in March, five others in June and another 20 by the end of September 1944.100 were to have been produced by the beginning of 1945. In January 1944 it was expected that the shortage of graphite from the third quarter of the year 1945 would result in rocket production being severely cut back. This would be accompanied by procurement problems, serious transport and delivery hold-ups and not least bureaucracy.

On 8 January 1944 Wasserfall W 1/1 exploded on the ground during a test. In February 1944 there were further problems with the fuel regulator and combustion chamber valves. Despite all difficulties W 1/2 was fired successfully

on 29 February 1944. In order to skirt the materials bottleneck, on 17 April 1944 the number of experimental rockets required was reduced. After 80 for testing and 20 for ground and materials investigation, 400 C 2s were to be produced as soon as possible for operational testing. In June 1944 the first two Wasserfall of the second series (W 2) were fired from Test Stand IX on Usedom Island, Peenemiinde.

Operational use against Allied aircraft was still a distant prospect. Other C 2 starts, some disastrous, were made in September from Test Stands P II, P II South and P IV, but on 9 October 1944 Wasserfall C 2 was declared ‘risk – free’since the majority of 110 test starts had proceeded without problems. By 12 November there had been 14 more firings to test missile stability, flight control and the rocket motors.

Development of the flight control system was considered complete by the beginning of 1945. In February the motor was certified reliable and production was listed for the end of February, or the latest at the beginning of March, in the bombproof tunnels at Kohnstein/Nordhausen. By 18 February, 28 Wasserfall rockets had been fired, all fitted with remote control except for the basic prototype. Five of these were blown up at take-off or shortly after. Despite this, the Emergency Programme of 13 March 1945 scheduled the further development of 20 new A 10 variants monthly from April 1945, far too few to bring about any change in the air war over the Reich.