Category Last Days of the Luftwaffe

Another flak rocket which failed to meet expectations was the Rheinmetall Rheintochter. Despite great investment and its own test centre at Leba on the Baltic, the rocket was never ready for series production. Early in the autumn of 1941, Generalmajor von Renz, Dr Heinrich Klein (Rheinmetall-Borsig) and the Director of Radar Research at Telefunken, Professor Leo Brand, agreed on an initial specification for a flak rocket. After Goring spoke in favour of subsonic designs on 1 September 1942, Rheinmetall reworked an earlier type (F-Pl) into F-P2 and F-P3, which had an operational ceiling of 18,000 metres (59,000 ft). On 7 December 1943, the HWA awarded Rheinmetall a contract to develop all three versions. In the spring of 1943 the entire project, except for the design office at Leba, was transferred from Berlin to Zittau. By the summer of 1943, several missiles had been built at 1:2.5 scale, all but the first being tested later at Leba using a provisional starting procedure so as to judge how the rocket would fly in practice. On 3 June 1943 Rheinmetall presented its newest designs, R 1 to R 3. Since the manufacturer could not work on all three simultaneously, the RLM favoured for R 3 but Rheinmetall kept working on the others. From December 1943 the R 1 and R 2 versions were test fired at Leba: between February and October 1944 there were 43 test starts in all and some ground trials. Most tests involved the R 1, since R 2 was not yet so far advanced.

An R 3 was first test-fired in October 1944. The prototype had no second- stage motor and served as a test vehicle for the start procedure. Aiter seeing an

R1 demonstrated on 30 October 1944, Goring authorised a continuation of tests in the hope of finding greater efficiency. When on 1 November the 51st solid – fuel R 1 was tested, the R 3 was almost ready. The missile had no cruising motor, since these were far from completion, the thrust jets not having been delivered on time for the first 20 engines. After the liquid-fuel engines designed by Professor Beck of the Technical University were tested and found to be under­powered, the planners fell back temporarily on the solid-fuel alternative.

The next stage of work was discussed at a conference in Karlshagen on 19 November 1944. The endless postponements of set dates and problems with liquid-fuel engines gave a pessimistic oudook on the future. On 18 December the first R3 was fired successfully using a solid-fuel engine. Despite the successful demonstration to the Reichsmarschall, there were still some doubts, and even the super-optimistic Rheinmetall spokesman did not expect even to receive the liquid-fuel engine ordered by the Chief-TLR before the New Year. In mid- January a number of the latest Type HV 10 gyro sets were ordered for Rheintochter testing from February onwards. In January 1945 tests the rocket
flew for 120 seconds. The range was established at 12.7 km (7.9 miles), the operational ceiling 9,650 metres (31,600 ft). By 5 February inclusive, 5 R 3s had been test fired, 51 R Is, and 7 R 2s. Only 24 hours later the Rheintochter project was cancelled by Gruppenfiihrer Kammler since he did not believe it would be ready within a reasonable time.

The Rammjager went one step further. The idea was that, should the enemy aircraft attacked not be mortally wounded by gun fire, it was to be finished off by ramming. The loss of air superiority goaded a small group at OKL into taking these drastic measures. For some time the tactic was rejected by many unit commanders, and also by some pilots asked to undertake it. General der Jagd – flieger Adolf Galland opposed it and was relieved of office on 23 January 1945 by Goring, his replacement being the more committed Oberst Gordon Gollob. At the same time Goring appealed to all fighter pilots ‘inspired by holy fire, being conscious of the struggle for a just cause, to give everything’.

Galland had favoured conventional fighter tactics, if possible from a numerically superior position. As a means of downing whole bomber formations, he wanted to send up a thousand fighters at a time. For this reason in the autumn

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of 1944 he had tried to re-equip and re-staff the exhausted fighter units. On 18 November 1944 he accumulated 18 fighter Geschwader and 3,700 pilots for ‘The Big Blow’, but despite long preparations the concentrated attack never came, so strong by then were the Allied air raids and their penetration to the heardand of the Reich.

This was therefore the prevailing sorry state of affairs from which Oberst Hajo Hermann revived his idea of the mass ramming operation. Even Hider, despite all his reservations, approved the concept, ‘if unwillingly’, as his Luft­waffe adjutant Oberst von Below reported later. When Oberst Hermann seized the opportunity to make his proposal at the Reich Chancellery in January 1945, Hider replied that he would not order it, but nor would he stand in the way of those who wanted to volunteer for it.

Rammkommando Elbe was set up at the beginning of March, with control being placed in Gollob’s hands. The first volunteers were assembled at Stendal aerodrome and lodged in an enclosure with a double security perimeter. At the end of the month, about a week before the start of the ramming operations, Anglo-American land forces were already at Gotha, Kassel and Munster, and approaching Erfurt, Halle, Hannover and Wurzburg. In the East the Red Army
was preparing for the final assault on Berlin. Nevertheless on 31 March Oberst Hermann called on his pilots ‘to fight to the uttermost’. His vision was that Ramming Unit Werwolf s pilots would destroy coundess Allied bombers at the selfless expenditure of their own lives, to such affect that the USAF would be forced to break off its bombing operations. This was obviously an illusion.

The training course at Stendal was basically theoretical for shortage of fuel. The pilots were kept in good humour with plentiful meals, cognac and chocolate which, unlike the fuel, seemed available in unlimited quantities. There was also a shortage of unit commanders with front-line experience since these knew only too well what this kind of operation would demand of them. Therefore they were commandeered from the ranks of IX. Flieger-Division( J) to build the framework for the young pilots who had volunteered for ramming operations in the hoped – for numbers.

On the night of 5 April 1945,30 pilots were driven from Stendal to Delitzsch, Eilenburg, Gardelegen, Sachau, Salzwedel and Stolpe. For psychological reasons OKL did not want to delay the operations too long and had set 7 April as the opening date. Many of the pilots had too little experience with the Bf 109. Fighter protection was to be Me 262s of Stab and III./fG 7 from Brandenburg- Briest. The ramming aircraft were to assemble over Magdeburg and climb to 11,000 metres (36,000 ft). Spurred on by heroic words and military marches they would receive the order to attack – ‘To all vultures and falcons – attack at will! Sieg Heilfln all 184 Bf 109 ram-fighters and 51 Me 262 escorts, of which 48 eventually took off, were to be deployed. The tactical inexperience of the attackers resulted in the mission of Sonderkommando Elbe not proceeding as hoped. The Eighth AF bomber formations were at 7,000 metres (23,000 ft) altitude and their fighter escort was quickly in attendance. The Bf 109s were only able to engage singly or in small groups, and the bomber losses remained within acceptable limits.

At the end of the engagement, 77 mosdy young pilots had been shot down. The Luftwaffe had lost 133 machines, numerous others were damaged to a greater or lesser degree by enemy defensive fire, and many of these crash-landed. On the plus side 23 heavy bombers, most attached to 3rd Air Division, were destroyed by ramming or the Me 262s of JG 7. Others got back to England, tailplanes ribboned, wings damaged. Overall the long-planned operation had not brought OKL the desired result.

Nevertheless Oberst Hermann would not give in. He wanted better preparations for a second try; next time the 80 remaining pilots of Sonder­kommando Elbe would attack the bomber formations over their bases. But time ran out. Apart from individual instances of ramming Allied aircraft, towards the end there were some sporadic suicide missions on the pilot s own initiative by those who realised that the war was lost and did not wish to survive it.

Because of the constant delays, JG 1 had not become active again until mid – March after its earlier problems. The Auffangsstaffel was subsequently reformed as Stabstaffel/JG 1: at the same time I./JG 1 transferred to Ludwigslust and II./JG 1 to Garz, countermanding a previous order to fly to Warnemiinde. Not until 8 April did the first two machines reach I. Gruppe from the central

German production. By 11 April conversion training was being carried out with up to 16 He 162s, but the fuel shortage kept training flights down to 10 or 12 per day. Even so, 30-40 pilots had had their first flying experience with the jet. During this training the Gruppe lost several pilots, amongst them Ober – feldwebel Stenschke and two Unteroffizier, Enderle and Werner. Despite all its protests, II./JG 1 had no He 162s; its conversion training got under way finally on 20 April.

On 14 April I./JG 1 led by Oberleutnant Demuth, transferred from Ludwigslust to Leek with a refuelling stop at Husum because the Gruppe did not have enough fuel for a non-stop flight. During this flight, Leutnant Rudolf Schmidt encountered a Spitfire which was shot down, but the victory was credited to a flak battery which also fired on the RAF aircraft. During the continuation flight to Leek, Allied fighters appeared, but the ten-strong formation escaped at high speed. On 18 April the greater part of the ground staff arrived at Leek from Warnemiinde.

Despite the numerous improvements the Volksjager was still not completely safe in all flight situations. On 20 April Leutnant Schmitt needed the ejector seat to save himself and three days later Unteroffizier Steeb of L/fG 1 was forced to jump out after his ejector seat failed to work. On 24 April the commander of II./JG 1, Hauptmann Dahne, killed himself by operating the ejector seat without having first opened the cabin hood. Other fatalities in flying accidents with the He 162 between 20 and 26 April were Fahnrich Halmel and two Unteroffiziere, Fendler and Rechenbach. All were buried in Leek cemetery. The number of operational machines was few because of fuel shortage. Hauptmann Ludewig and his wingman, Feldwebel Gehrlein, were forced to make emergency landings for lack of fuel.

During the last weeks of the war the main focus of fighter operations over northern Germany was against RAF low-level aircraft. This included operational units of JG 1. From 25 April some He 162s were therefore used in this role over the Flensburg-Heide-Schleswig area. A pair from I. Gruppe attempted unsuccessfully to intercept an RAF Mosquito. There were no successes reported the following day, although Leutnant Gerhard Hanf attacked an RAF Typhoon. By 29 April Hanf had flown a further six sorties with his Volksjager. On 27 April the remainder of II./JG 1 arrived at Leek from Mecklenburg after refuelling at Kaltenkirchen. The number of training and operational flights in the next few days fell off for the lack of new aircraft and shortage of fuel. On 2 May the Kommodore, Oberstleutnant Herbert Ihlefeld, arrived at Leek with the Geschwaderstab.

On 4 May OKL merged I. and II. Gruppen under the Kommodore of I.(EG)/fG l. The first and second operational Staffeln led by Major Zober and Hauptmann Ludewig were then merged into the new Gruppe. All who had sufficient experience with the He 162 to engage low fliers over northern Germany were now assembled in this Gruppe.

Despite the war situation flights continued when fuel allowed, between one and three operations for two to four machines daily. These resulted in a few flying accidents shortly before the war’s end. Feldwebel Oskar Kohler ran out of landing strip at Leek and folded his He 162 A-2, being pulled free from the wreck by Oberleutnant Demuth at the last moment. Leutnant Schmitt flew some of the last operations. According to his flight log, his fifth patrol was on 4 May in ‘White Ґ when he caught up with an RAF Typhoon and scored hits. The aircraft crashed, but was credited to a flak unit on the basis of the captured RAF flier s report. The latter spent the last few days of the war in the JG 1 mess waiting for the Allies to arrive.

Shortly before the war’s end it was decided to send the operational Gruppe to northern Denmark or southern Norway, which proved impossible for lack of fuel, and on 5 May the aircraft were rigged with explosives to prevent their

capture. Towards midnight the Kommodore ordered the charges removed and a few hours later the Germans surrendered to a British armoured car which arrived at the airfield. One of the British guards was killed shortly afterwards while fooling with the ejector seat of an He 162. The remnants of JG 1 remained at Leek until 15 May. On the 21st they arrived at Schorholm and were then given quarters at Hennstadt. A period in PoW camps terminated within a year in repatriation.

JG 400 was never equipped with the machine.

According to QM-General (6. Division) statistics, 116 completed He 162 aircraft were produced. The delivery of 60 of these can be proven. In total about 180 He 162s were ready for delivery. Fuselages, wings and tailplanes were in preparation for another 500. The majority of the serviceable machines in May 1945 were on the airfield at Leek. Of the 31 machines there, about 20 were airworthy to some extent. Of these, 5 went to the USA and France and 12 to Britain. Ten unserviceable machines were scrapped. Trials of the light fighter continued in France until 1948, and longer in the United States. It was accepted that the concept was well in advance of contemporary Allied standards.

The first rocket to engage heavy four-engined bombers was the 4-kg (8.8-lb) spin-stabilised solid-fuel R4M with folding tail-unit. It was designed at Osterode/Harz by the firm of Heber, and DWM of Liibeck-Schlutup. After short and highly encouraging trials, 20,000 were ordered almost immediately, but only 12,000 were turned out, the manufacturers being DWM, Schneider KG and LGW Hakenfelde. EKdo 25, later JGr 10 under Major Chrisd, carried out extensive tests proving that the R4M reached 540 m/sec (1,770 ft/sec) in only 0.8 seconds. Operational range was 500-600 metres. The mine-type warhead would bring down a heavy bomber even with a near-miss.

The first successful firing of an R4M was achieved from an Me 262 with a makeshift rack on 2 November 1944. The first use in action was on 18 March 1945 by JG 7. Between operational flights, the Knight’s Cross holder Oberstleutnant Heinz Bar, then commander of III./EJG 2 flew trials with an Me 262 fitted with a modified R4M firing rack. Because the rockets tended to jam in the rack, the installations were continually being modified even when carried operationally by Me 262s. On 31 March a Staffel, some of them equipped with R4M rockets, claimed 17 RAF Lancaster bombers.

The R4M rocket was of great importance in the defence against Allied bombers. It weighed 4 kg, had solid-fuel propulsion and a mine warhead.

R4M racks were fitted to Ju 87 D-5s and Fw 190 D-9s as well as the Me 262 A-la, as seen here. The racks were of wood and therefore easy to manufacture in quantity.

On 5 April JGr 10, a test Gruppe and Messerschmitt works personnel were instructed to fit out 20 Me 262s of JV 44 at Munich-Riem with R4M racks to increase the aircraft’s fighting power, and even General Galland, JV 44 commanding officer, was credited with two kills of В-26 Marauder medium bombers just before the war’s end when he fired a salvo of 24 R4M rockets into a formation over Bavaria. An operation against a formation of 425 B-17 Flying Fortresses counts amongst the greatest victories achieved by the Me 262 fighter: 25 bombers were shot down by R4M rockets and MK 108 guns.

Experimental ‘automatic rockets’ (RA) which appeared just before the war’s end came too late. The racks with the firing gear were to be fitted below the wings of the Ar 234 or the forward section of the Me 262 fuselage. The engine works at Esslingen/Neckar produced several of the honeycomb-like devices for firing the R4M and other spin-stabilised rockets such as were fitted later to the Ba 349 Natter. At the capitulation only about 60 Me 262 fighters had been fitted with two simple racks with rails for eight, then twelve R4M rockets. Six other Me 262 A-las tried out 24-rail racks. Together with four MK 108 guns in the nose, this was a very successful combination of weapons for intercepting heavy bombers.

ecause of many poor decisions by the policy-makers from Reichsmarschall Goring down, the air war was ending in catastrophe for Germany. To bring about any transformation in this situation, fanatical efforts by pilots and crews would be necessary. As there were insufficient aircraft to hold off the Allies, it was now time to consider operations whose execution would inevitably result in the death of the pilot. In the end, Luftwaffe crews would aim their aircraft at Soviet pontoon bridges over the Oder and fight tanks with Panzerfaust rockets.

Self-Sacrifice or Final Salvation?

A secret report of October 1943 from the Academy for Aviation Research (LFA) entided ‘Suggestion on Assembling a Luftwaffe Formation for Effective Pin – Point Bombing’ considered at length the possibility of operations in which the pilot had only a 50 per cent chance of survival. The volunteers would draw their targets by lot. The primary source of recruitment was to be amongst glider pilots although members of the formation could be drawn from all arms of service. The new aircraft would be the manned V-l. Any sacrificial pilot who lost the will to carry through his mission to completion ‘will be shot immediately’, the document recommended.

At the beginning of February 1944 the manned bomb idea was considered at a working conference of the LFA, and ground rules set out for the future development. These concerned not only the likely type of target, but also the machine. For the greatest possible damage, bomb-loads such as the PC 1800 and heavy ‘torpedo bombs with aerial’ (guided bombs) seemed appropriate. In the two-month training period the future suicide pilots would receive training in a flight simulator and be taught to recognise all important warship types. With purpose-built 5-metre long practice bombs, the men would then make gliding approaches to training targets, baling out by parachute shortly before the collision. The later operational machines would have no means of escape, a letter dated 21 February 1945 from a Rechlin flight surgeon to the RLM explained. The main reason for publicising this was to reduce the expected large number of

volunteers for the project. The idea had a life of its own, however, and was taken up by the Geschwaderstab at KG 200 from where, in March 1944, an approach was made to Generalfeldmarschall Milch and the Chief of the Luftwaffe Command Staff which coincided in virtually all respects with the ideas promulgated at the LFA conferences.

It was decided to produce 5,000 Me 328 wooden midget aircraft for the project, and woodworking began in mid-March 1944. Carpenters and other woodworkers at small and medium-sized concerns were exempted from conscription to protect the project. Behind the scenes heated discussions continued about ‘self sacrifice’. The situation was clarified in a session of 27 March 1944 attended by Flugkapitan Hanna Reitsch and senior officers from OKL. It was agreed that a piloted bomb was the best way to destroy major warships – a PC 1400 or ВТ 1800 bomb might even sink a battleship – and the aircraft for the job was the Me 328. Other machines such as the Bf 109, Me 163 and Fw 190 were considered before being ruled out as more essential for

Reich air defence. In conclusion it was decided to accelerate Me 328 testing and force through the production of prototypes leading to early series production; later the piloted V-l would also be considered.

The first drawings for project Go P 55 were completed at Gotha on 17 April 1944. This was a modification of the ВТ 3000, a flying bomb with rudimentary wings proposed despite the decision of the research team leaders on 27 March 1944 to go for the Me 328. The KG 200 Kommodore considered that an Fw 190 F-8 carrying an SC 1800 was adequate and suggested rejecting the Go P 55 and other suicide aircraft. The advocate of the latter, Oberleutnant Lange, of whom more later, was not to be deterred, and pursued the self-sacrifice concept inherent in the Gotha machine.

Me 328

The first aircraft fully suitable for suicide operations was the Me 328, a small machine with ramjet propulsion conceived originally as a parasite fighter to be

carried by a long-range bomber, or later used in the local anti-bomber role. The veteran DFS test pilot Erich Klockner said after the war that flying the Me 328 was not a pleasure. In a towed start the aircraft was difficult to handle and it was even worse under ramjet power. Although this was well known, in March 1944 serious thought was being given to a manned Me 328 with a 1,600-kg bomb – load. To ensure accuracy the pilot would sacrifice himself or bale out as close as he could to the target once the aircraft was certain to collide with it. The idea was top secret. A part of the development was handled by DFS Ainring near Bad Reichenhall in Bavaria where the technical preparations were taken hastily in hand.

The machine had begun life on 14 December 1942 when the Technical Office ordered ten experimental aircraft (Me 328 V-l to V-10) for testing at DFS Ainring. An option for a further ten was not taken up. At that time there was no call for them since Germany had no giant strategic bombers, and tests of the А-prototypes did not proceed. Me 328 В was a variant ‘Special Development for the Fast Bomber Role’. These would be low-level attacks on important targets made by ‘flying coastal artillery’ against the Allied invasion fleets on the French coast when the invasion came. The planning provided expressly for a Mistel take­
off, DFS Ainring favouring the Do 219 M-l as the parent aircraft since it was 10 per cent more powerful than the earlier Do 217 E variants.

After lengthy wind-tunnel tests work started on Me 328 В V-l and V-2. Prototype V-l arrived at the DFS annexe at Horsching/Linz on 18 May 1944 and after vibration tests was put on the test flight programme for the summer. In June 1944 the Kittelberger firm of Hochst/Bregenz took over construction of the second prototype after Jakobs-Schweyer Flugzeugbau GmbH received orders to build the wooden tail section for the Me 262.

A two-seat Me 328 trainer development was abandoned in the summer of 1944 because of the expense. The possibility of using the Me 328 as the parent aircraft of a Mistel pair was given up because it did not have the range for the return flight, nor the speed to evade enemy fighters in a long pursuit. Its only use therefore was as a ‘piloted bomb’, the former ‘Fast Bomber’ now being loaded down with a 2,500-kg bomb. Attacks would be made in a gliding approach. The Me 328 would be towed to operational height by a Ju 88 S-3 or Ju 388 K-l.

On 3 June 1944, Me 328 V-II, the converted second prototype, was probably flown by engineer ‘Gretchen’ Ziegler in a Mistel arrangement with a Do 217 K-03. A final flight under ramjet propulsion is also credited to Ziegler, although he was forced to bale out after engine vibrations broke the aileron control rods. Me 328 V-II was a total loss. Besides the two completed machines, a third was

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More or less how the planned Me 328 would have looked. Its primary purpose was the destruction of pin-point targets. The idea was to carry an HE bomb of up to 500 kg below the fuselage.

under construction (Me 328 V-3) but no flights were attempted and the project was abandoned. All attention was now to be concentrated on the Reichenberg, the piloted V-l.

Initially it seemed that the Henschel designed Schmetterling had better prospects than other concepts. It was a subsonic, remote-controlled flak rocket with combined ailerons/rudder integral to the wings and was fired at a steep angle along a launch trailer on a light revolving chassis. Take-off was assisted by two solid-fuel boosters and a powerful liquid-fuel engine provided the cruising stage. After extensive research in 1942, Henschel received a contract for a pre-series ‘S’ in August 1943. The technical problems could not be overcome during that winter, and the first experimental rocket S V-l was first fired on 15 February 1944. Three of the first four starts that spring were failures. To put the development on a firmer footing, close cooperation developed between Henschel and the Askania, Bosch and Siemens companies. It was expected that 150 missiles would have to be fired to identify and eliminate all weaknesses before the project was ripe for series production.

An assessment in November 1944 on the launches so far reported that the small payload of S 1 had an effective destructive area which was too limited, but in the short term Schmetterling would be more effective than Wasserfall because the launch equipment was manoeuvrable. The RLM set great store by the fact that Schmetterling had a proven control system which would not require a long trial phase. By mid-November 1944 there had been 15 air launches from an He 111 H-6 for stability testing and flight attitude control while 21 were fired from the ground. The first two of these had no remote control; the others were fitted with a flight control unit.

On 21 December 1944, Oberst von Giildenfeldt of the Flakwaffe General Staff reported to the Chief-TLR that the first emplacements protecting armaments factories important for the war effort had been chosen for the Schmetterling. By the end of December 1944 another 23 Hs 117s had been produced; this was repeated in January 1945 and another 20 were planned for February, and after that nobody could predict because high-value raw materials for the envisaged series production were in very short supply.

Henschel was also planning an improved series version, the S 2, which resulted in three different and promising designs, S 2a, S 2b and S 2c. Despite the grave war situation, further Schmetterling testing continued. In test launches in January 1945, the rocket reached an altitude of 9,000 metres and had a range of 25 kilometres (30,000 ft/15 miles). Six more air launches followed at the beginning of February, and 38 from the ground. Only 28 of the 59 starts were satisfactory, in the others, as the report states, ‘some area of the rocket’ failed.

There were serious problems regarding the envisaged series run. The Chief – TLR War Diary entry for 21 January 1945 reports that BMW would not be able to supply engines for the Hs 117 on time. Delays of at least three months were anticipated. New variants such as the TV-guided Hs 117 H were cancelled on 6 February by Kammler, while all other designated work on the rocket had to be completed as soon as possible so that production of the basic S 1 design could follow at location B3 in the Harz. The war situation prevented the plans being realised, and the building work on the subterranean factory was abandoned in March 1945. The War Diary also indicates that the SG 45 solid-fuel engine for the Hs 117 was not supplied on time despite repeated reference to the Fiihrer’s standing order. More delays of at least three weeks ensued.

Mittelwerk was to house the production, and on 27 February the SS requested all relevant files from Henschel. A start date in March was not possible, however. On 13 March Himmler and the Dornberger team agreed a new date in May from when 300 Schmetterling would be produced monthly instead of the originally planned 3,000. The collapse in fuel production reduced fuel availability to one tenth the requested level. Once the rocket was deleted from the Fiihrer Emergency Programme, the series was downgraded on Himmler s order.

By 15 March only 140 rockets had been produced. Of these 80 were fired, but none operationally. The other 60 lacked a motor or parts of the remote-control equipment and were held back at the factory or test centres. After the Henschel development division relocated to the Harz in early 1945, development activity was resumed on a small scale and for a short time only in the incomplete under­ground complex at Himmelberg (B3a) at Woffleben. Meanwhile US armoured forces had advanced through the Harz, taking village after village with relatively little opposition. On 5 April rocket technicians in the Bad Sachsa-Bleichrode- Nordhausen area were shipped out to Upper Bavaria, where they ended the war. On 11 April US Special Forces captured Hs 117 parts in an underground gallery near Woffleben and these were spirited away to the United States before the arrival of the Soviet ally.