Category Last Days of the Luftwaffe

Acknowledgements

My research into the documents stretches back to 1981 when I received a copy of A. 1.2(g) Report No. 2382 German Aircraft, New and Projected Types dated January 1946 and addressed to USAF HQH realised that there were far more extensive plans and projects than was admitted at the time. Over the next few years I found ever more hidden reports and secret files which led to a much broader picture. In the months following the war’s end, the Allied staffs, faced by this flood of new information, must have been taken aback by the extent of the

captured material. My research led me to draw provisional conclusions.

Without the collaboration of many friends and acquaintances interested in aviation history this work could probably not have been finished. This applies equally to the assistance I received from public archives, firms and government offices. I would like especially to thank the Bundesarchiv for their broad support for my endeavour. Similarly, help came from the staff of the German Museum at Munich. I also owe thanks to the staff of NARA at Washington DC, and the former PRO (now the National Archives) in London who provided active assistance in clarifying areas of doubt and assembled very convincing material. The Bundeswehr Procurement Office (BWB) helped out in questions of weaponry, and the German Study Bureau for Aviation with general information. Finally I must mention the help of the staff at the Bundeswehr Reference Library, Mainz, in obtaining and evaluating literature.

The work was supported additionally by the Technical University of Munich, to whose employees I offer my warmest thanks. Details of the development history of the BMW Motor Works were provided in large quantities by BMW AG. Valuable information came from EADS, Daimler-Chrysler and many other organisations of renown. I am also indebted to the Junkers Works and Bernburg military airfield.

Support also came from many enthusiasts and acknowledged experts in the field of German aviation, and I mention above all contributors Boehme; Cords; Dipl. Ing. Cohausz; Creek; Crow; Dabrowski; Dr Hiller; Edelhofer; Foedrowitz; Franzke; M. and H. Handig; Hafner; Herwig; Hildebrandt; Hofling; Jarski; Jayne; Jurleit; Dip. Ing. Kossler; Dr Koos; Krieg; Kudlikow; Lachler; Lang; Lange; Dipl. Ing. Lommel; Lutz jr.; Dr Mankau; Marchand; Meyer; Mombek; Miiller; Pawlas; Petrick; Dr Price; Radinger; Ransom; Regel; Riediger; Ricco; Rosch; Schliephake; Schmidt; Schmitt; Obering. I. R. Schreiber; Selinger; Sengfleder; Smith; Sommerfeld; Mag. jur. Stuber; Thiele; Trenkle; Vajda; Wagner; Walter and Dipl. Ing. Zucker. All shared their knowledge or made available useful photos or files. Without their selfless assistance a volume of this extent would not have been possible. Despite all efforts nevertheless many helpers remain hidden by the mists of time in my intensive research work since 1980.

I am always grateful for indications as to inaccuracies and error, and also for constructive criticism. I can be contacted for that purpose at <manfredgriehl@ t-online. de>.

I owe especial thanks to my wife Monika who read through the manuscript and gave me great encouragement.

Manfred Griehl Mainz, 2009

Postfach 2162, D-55011 Mainz

Final Decisions

Besides the aircraft already described, numerous other projects were in hand at the beginning of 1945. On 22 February Goring issued a personal order reducing

these to two: the TL Project Fighter and the TL Project Reconnaissance aircraft, Bomber, Night fighter and Fighter bomber.

Подпись: The Messerschmitt Me P 1112 was a combination of the P 1110 and P 1111 and was the final advance in German jet fighter design at the war’s end.
The emboldened pursuit of these projects resulted from Heinkel-Hirth’s great strides on the HeS Oil turbine giving rise to great optimism that early series production (HeS Oil A-0) would begin shordy. Chief-TLR was reckoning on beginning mass production of HeS ОН A-l in April or May 1945, and therefore the manufacture of a suitable fuselage was given a much higher priority than previously. On 25 February Oberammergau research centre and Willy Messerschmitt himself undertook an evaluation for the new 1 TL Fighter

Подпись: This wooden mock-up of the Me P 1112 was captured undamaged by US forces near Oberammergau.
including the plans of Blohm Sc Voss, Focke-Wulf, Heinkel and Junkers. The work almost completed preparations for a quick decision by EH К to select the best designs for mass production submitted by industry. Most projects as a rule had a speed between 900 and 1,050 km/hr (560-650 mph).The calculated rates of climb ranged from 22 to 30 m/sec (70-100 ft/sec).The best design on paper appeared to be the He P 1078, followed by the Me Pi 101 and the PI 110 to PI 112. The performance of these projects differed little from those of the Focke – Wulf jet fighter I and II (Та 183).

The DVL evaluated the submissions and decided at the end of February 1945 that the new Messerschmitt fighters had the greatest development potential, while warning of the problems of turbine non-deliveries, unprotected fuel tanks and engine spaces. DVL specialists were against tailless aircraft, such as the flying wing projects, but did not condemn them outright. In their opinion the future ‘standard fighter’ should have a relatively spacious fuselage, principally to accommodate more powerful turbines.

It was finally resolved on 28 February that DVL would not recommend series production, but that the Me Pi 101 already being built as a ‘study aircraft’ should be finished urgently and flight-tested. The same applied to other designs at an advanced stage, such as those at Focke-Wulf. In any case the future speed was to
be about 200 km/hr (125 mph) faster than the 850 km/hr (530 mph) average of the Me 262 A-la in order to maintain a tactical advantage in combat against Allied jets once they appeared. After this, Chief-TLR designated the Та 183 as ‘the immediate solution’and the Me Pi 112 as the optimum solution.

On 23 March 1945 the Department for Aircraft Development discussed with EHK at Bad Eilsen the future procedures for the 1 TL Fighter. Meanwhile the Fiihrer’s Plenipotentiary for Jet Aircraft, Dr Kammler, had become involved and ruled that neither the Та 183 project nor those of Messerschmitt were to go through: all further work should be devoted to the EF 128 since this design seemed to him the most advanced. On 12 March the Chief-TLR and the Riistungsstab ordered that the 1 TL Fighter was to be abandoned.

Aviator Training for Special Purposes

F

rom 1943 the Luftwaffe found itself in a predicament. The offensives on all fronts had petered out, and the high command had been forced on the back foot for the first time. A number of engineers were given the task at the beginning of 1944 of devising a way to regain air superiority from the Allies. Using every possibility to the full, with the harshest employment of forced labour and concentration camp slaves, it should be possible, so they reasoned, not only to increase armament production to previously unheard-of levels, but also to bring completely new aircraft into mass production very quickly, be it the midget fighter, whose many parts could be made at a number of different manufacturers, or ‘special aircraft’which promised the pilot little chance of survival.

In the closing phase of the war, OKL tried not only inadequately developed designs such as the Volksjager, but also completely new concepts. Having the pilot recumbent, for example, would enable him to perform flight manoeuvres at very high speeds and so win him a tactical advantage over enemy machines. In the steepest turns, they calculated, it should be possible to out-manoeuvre even the most agile Allied fighter aircraft to shoot them down. Other ideas gained ground, particularly ramming. Using the Reichenberg (a manned V-l), a particular target could be destroyed in a ‘total mission, a euphemism for suicide operations. Young pilots, imbued with National Socialist ideology, understood that any means was right and justified for Endsieg (‘final victory’), and this led in 1945 to the adoption of kamikaze tactics. The fact was not openly declared to that section of German youth which, from 1944 onwards, wanted to make its contribution to the victory of the German Reich by volunteering for ‘Aviator Training for Special Purposes’.

Victory Lying Down

Throughout their period in power the Nazi authorities attached great importance to the earliest possible basic training of youth, especially the Hitler Youth, as a source of supply to the Wehrmacht and SS. In May 1944 there were over 210 glider camps in which 10,000 Hitler Youth and a few older NSFK (National Socialist Flying Corps) men served, and were trained to fly various gliders. Not

Подпись:
for want of trying by the training staff it was found impossible to make a pilot of everybody, and the number of young men found suitable for the Luftwaffe successfully completing basic NSFK aviator training was modest. Some 500 of the 10,000 glider-trained Hider Youth were considered for continuation training as operational fighter pilots.

The increasing air raids on targets in the occupied territories and against cities and industrial complexes in the Reich caused ever higher casualties. German losses rose swifdy month by month. Possibly decisive for the further course of the war would be locally based protection of industrial installations, particularly oil refineries. A fast-climbing rocket fighter with relatively limited range would provide them with a minimum of cover. To fly these awkward machines required well-trained pilots. The use of glider pilots after only a short tactical course and training in aerial gunnery was not promising. Hitler Youth applicants for evaluation were required initially to furnish an A, В or C certificate in gliding. From thousands of applicants only a few hundred suitable for further training would be selected and sent on to development centres. Upon successful completion of a selection course, those who had passed were then transferred to Brno for the ‘Fighter Pilot Recruitment Course for Special Purposes’.

Aviator Training for Special Purposes

Towards the end of the war the Luftwaffe was no longer so fussy about personnel. ‘Foreign pilots’of many ethnic backgrounds were being trained from 1944.

After their arrival at Trebbin, Laucha and other training establishments, the short introductory period was followed by flying training on the Kranich. Nothing was to be known about future operational machines. All young pilots were sworn to secrecy and forbidden to photograph the very unusual glider.

In mid-September 1944 it seemed probable that Erich Bachem’s vertical take-off BP 20 Natter local fighter would be ready for trials by the end of the year. So that the makeshift aircraft might enter service as soon as possible, training was begun in the late summer of 1944. It was agreed between Bachem and the RLM that 50 recumbent seats planned for the earlier version of the Natter would be manufactured and delivered to Grunau for the first Liegekranich gliders. The firm of Schneider would convert the training aircraft on hand accordingly. The contract was awarded on 29 September 1944. Ludwig Hofmann was selected to prepare the training course for future Natter pilots at Trebbin. For this purpose Oberst Gollob permitted him to take part in Me 163 training from the end of September.

Bachem had stipulated in his specification for the Natter that the normally most dangerous flight phase, landing, was not difficult, and consequently future pilots would need only basic flying knowledge, the В-licence being sufficient, covering the ability to fly in three dimensions with special instruction in Natter technique tacked on. A two-seater trainer with the flight characteristics of the Natter would be provided, special emphasis being placed on familiarizing the pilot with the unusual pilot seat. Later the young pilot would be shown the flight characteristics of the machine and how it behaved at high speed. Approaches would follow against moving targets. The approach itself would be a kind of dog­leg. Great importance was attached to the final shooting phase, for the limited flight time of the Natter did not provide for a second opportunity.

The training aircraft had room for the pilot to squat. The instrumentation and control unit were identical to the later operational aircraft. The flight instructor would handle take-off and landing in the two-seater. In order to impart flying knowledge earlier it was planned to have a lower wing loading than the operational version. A powerful winch was provided for take-off. Touch­down speed was 80 km/hr (50 mph). The pilot would round off the session by firing a Schmeisser at a mock-up of a bomber. It was thought that this would arouse his sporting instincts and enable him to acquit himself swifdy in this area of the training programme.

After completing the shooting and basic flight requirements, the pilot would then fly a training machine with greater wing loading. The winch would be replaced by an aircraft tug to reach greater altitudes for further exercises in shooting and closing in on enemy bombers. Next would come flights in a training Natter with pulse jet astern. Rocket-assisted starts and approaches towards moving targets now came to the fore. Whether a flight in a series-produced Natter was to have followed is not known: it is suspected that upon passing out of training, the young pilots were to have been made operational immediately and thrown in at the deep end. Since the Natter never did become operational, what happened in effect was that the successful candidates were merely told that they would pilot some kind of flying machine from the recumbent position. The courses were broken off earlier than planned, however, and the Hitler Youth candidates were packed off to perform their compulsory six-month RAD (Reich Labour Service) obligation.

Work on the Natter was not completed to plan and operations were never contemplated. Continuation training, at least of pilots intended for the Natter, scarcely emerged from the theoretical stage. Since using very young pilots to fly the Me 163 was doubtful since there was no fuel, and series production of the Но IX was a long way off, all efforts were in vain, while the development and building of the Me 163 В was suspended on 5 January 1945 on the orders of the armaments controllers and the Chief-TLR.

As the Red Army headed for Berlin, its advance forced a halt to training at Brno on 19 March 1945, and its transfer to the Reich Glider School at Trebbin. Initial flight training was diverted to Laucha, but never got under way. So that students would pass smoothly to a rocket fighter, part of the training during the second phase was with the Stummelhabicht. After completing glider training it was intended that applicants selected for the Me 163, Natter or similar aircraft should undergo a short course of flight training in a motorised aircraft (Bii 181) at Leipzig, but this idea was abandoned, mainly for shortage of fuel.

When shown a training film on the Me 163, the young pilots swifdy expressed doubts as to whether they could handle it, and the same occurred at courses where pilots would fly their machines in the recumbent position. Even instructors had problems flying the converted gliders of the Habicht and Kranich types while recumbent, because they were difficult to control generally.

Heinkel P1077Julia

The Julia project was developed by Heinkel-Siid Vienna under the designation He P 1068. Initially, as with the Natter, the pilot was to fly the aircraft from the recumbent position and take-off vertically. Experiments with scale models in 1944 had shown the general feasibility of a vertical start for small rocket fighters. Julia was devised by engineers Wilhelm Benz and Dr Gerloff in the spring of 1944. On 19 August 1944 they presented their provisional drawings. The development of the first experimental specimen designated He P 1068 was scheduled for completion within six to eight weeks based on a detailed proposal from Benz on 8 September 1944. Heinkel-Siid s research division, recently re­settled at Neuhaus an der Triesting, was headed by engineer Jost. Some of the technical calculations were done by Professor Schrenk and engineer Kottner of the Technical University of Vienna. Work progressed slower than hoped because
of technical problems, although at the beginning of September 1944 the RLM placed a definite order for 20 prototypes.

The contract for a series run of300 machines followed on 22 September 1944 under the designation He P 1077, the various component parts being farmed out to diverse firms so that Heinkel could devote itself to the Volksjager. On 15 October 1944 Heinkel-Siid announced a Julia variant, a local midget fighter propelled by a Walter HWK rocket motor with four solid-fuel rockets as take-off boosters. The pilot steered sitting up. Heinkel also had a ramjet version, Romeo.

A number of ideas were tested exhaustively for the Julia take-off, from a vertical start using a disposable undercarriage to a launch trailer similar to that used to fire the Enzian flak rocket. After the visit of Director Robert Liisser to Heinkel Vienna on 26 October 1944, proposals were put forward to modify Julia in line with Natter. These envisaged a new outline, a change to the tailplane and the pilot sitting upright, which ruled out the vertical take-off. Reworking the design cost valuable time and in October 1944 the first wooden mock-up of Julia was destroyed in an Allied air raid on Vienna.

On 12 November 1944 Heinkel tested the first one-eighth scale model of Julia in the large DVL wind tunnel. All the data for the project were now assembled and on 16 November 1944 the files were sent to the Chief-TLR.

Heinkel P1077Julia

The Heinkel He P 1077, here a computer graphic, was to have been built in the St Polten-Krems-Vienna area. None were produced because of the He 162 priority programme.

Ernst Heinkel was hoping at the beginning of December that no more than the original 20 prototypes would be requested. The first five of these were to be manufactured by Potzel, the remainder at smaller factories. The NSFK in Vienna was to handle the final assembly work.

During the development conference on 21 and 22 November 1944 it was agreed that all project studies for local-defence fighters had to be subject to the usual priorities. Especially important to the Chief-TLR was the development of the Me 262 with one or two additional rocket motors. The building and trials of Julia took second place to this. Third came the further development of the Me 163 while the Ju 248 was downgraded because it was more expensive than the others to build. The Bachem BP 20 Natter was in fourth place at the end of November 1944.

On 28 November 1944 a comprehensive project portfolio was sent to Professor Hertel of the EHK. The files showed a pressurised cockpit allowing ascents to 15,000 metres (49,000 ft). Armament would be either two MK 108s with 40 rounds each or a Fohn battery with Marz automatic target-seeking equipment. The cockpit capsule weighed 60 kg. The fuel tanks were unprotected, and being of aluminium had no surrounding layer of rubber. Engineer Jost planned to use the approved 109-509 fuel mixture. A radio unit was considered unnecessary because the aircraft would operate locally to its ground base and the target.

Подпись: The 30 mm MK 108 was planned as the standard armament of all modern German bombers. Its rounds had a highly destructive effect.
Between 27 November and 19 December the wing drag forces and various load effects were worked out and the polar and resistance coefficient calculations

begun./w//# was wind-tunnel tested at AVA from 5 December 1944. There seem to have been no major problems, and the blueprints for prototypes V-l and V-2 were completed on 13 December 1944 so that Heinkel could forecast delivery of the first machine for 24 January. By 20 December 1944, despite the immense problems, Heinkel-Slid had succeeded not only in completing the development material for the He 162 and producing prototypes, but was close to completing the development of Julia too.

On 22 December the EH К recommended the Chief-TLR to suspend all work on Julia and Natter and to concentrate effort into developing the Me 262 with additional propulsion, and the Me 263. The Commission believed that the risks inherent in the envisaged speeds for machines built of mixed construction methods were too great. On 5 January 1945 Heinkel-Siid was ordered to stop work on Julia. At the time a model made by the Schaffer company at Linz was being tested by the SS-LFA at the Braunschweig wind tunnel. In the hope of keeping the door open, Heinkel-Siid approached the Chief-TLR on 27 January, pointing out that besides two versions to be tested as gliders, the next two would have rocket motors. General-Engineer Lucht came back within four days repeating the OKL instruction that the entire project be abandoned and the mock-up room at Neigaus closed down. All staff, especially the carpenters and joiners, were to work forthwith building the He 162 trainer.

It seems that Heinkel ignored him and allowed the work on Julia at the sub­contracted firms to continue. At Wiener Metallwerken a 1:4 scale model of Julia was completed at the end of January. Near St Polten several acute-angle starts were made using rocket-propelled models. The three full-size prototypes built by Schaffer of Linz in January were scheduled for transport to Karlshagen for trials if possible by 20 February. However, the test centre there was wound up in March, and it is doubtful if the tests were made.

On 14 February 1945 Dr Heinkel mentioned during a conference that he had received the order of the Chief-TLR to suspend ah work on Julia but he had pressed ahead. This came to the ears of the Chief-TLR two days later, and a new instruction then arrived at Heinkel-Siid leading to an agreement to limit production to four Julia of which two would be rocket-propelled. On 17 February 1945 Heinkel took the unilateral decision to begin steep-angle launches of the full-size aircraft.

Although the order to suspend all work on Julia was repeated on 21 February, the Chief-TLR allowed the Geppert company at Krems/Danube to begin assembly work on two unpowered Julia (MZ) at the beginning of March. Shortly before the war’s end the machines were completed by Dr Gerloff after being signed off, but whether they were flight-tested with solid-fuel rockets is doubtful.

On 3 March the Heinkel-Siid technical management decided that the Julia test machine should be completed and delivered ‘as per contract’. The two rocket – powered machines (M4) were to be assembled by Schaffer of Linz without delay. The serviceable aircraft were destroyed by forced labourers upon the approach of US forces, however, and Russian troops at Triesting seized most of the Julia documentation for further assessment.

The Jet Misteb

The Mistel story proceeded into the jet age. Design M 4 juggled a Ju 88/Me 262 combination. The idea was soon scrapped by OKL. The Ju 88 was to have had an additional pair of jet turbines under the wings guzzling fuel for poor range. Top speed would have been greater than the various Ju 88 M 3 combinations, but the decisive factor against it was the desperate need for jet fighters to defend the Reich.

The Mistel M 5 and M 6 proposed by Junkers in January 1945 pointed to the ease of interception of the relatively slow combinations even over the Eastern Front and so advocated a jet fighter as the guidance aircraft. The Ju 88 would either have two turbines or none. These modern Mistel would have a range of 1,600 kilometres (1,000 miles) and a speed up to 820 km/hr at 6,000 metres (510 mph at 20,000 ft), providing invulnerability to some extent from Russian fighter attack. Work on the combination began in the late summer of 1944. The intended armament was a 2-tonne bomb with thick casing for use against merchant ships up to 15,000 tons, or with thin casing and additional flammable liquids for use against ground targets.

On 7 December 1944 Arado completed the design specifications for the Ar E 377/E 377a bomb using an Ar 234 bomber as control aircraft. Since the range of 1,300 kilometres and the speed of 720 km/hr (447 mph) at 6,000 metres was less than the M 5, the Ar 234 idea was rejected. In any case these bombers were needed for long range reconnaissance work with KG 76. Another idea using an Me 262 A-la as the guidance aircraft and a utility machine filled with a very explosive mixture was worked on at the beginning of 1945 but never realised.

Miracle Weapons

T

he dream of the miracle weapon, the final twist in the Nazi Gotterdammerung, foresaw a dramatic turn away from total collapse to seize glorious victory in early 1945. Unstoppable offensive weapons such as guided bombs and missiles were to be created, and there was an arsenal of chemical and bacteriological bombs should they be required in retaliation.

Other than the Mistel attacks, fuel shortages meant that in 1945 bombing was limited on the German side to SD 500 bombs carried by the Ar 234 B-2 jet bomber, or disposable container loads under Fw 190 F-8s dropped to support embattled front-line troops. The new ultimate weapons were of a quite different nature, being the wishful thoughts of the Nazi leadership needing only to take on material form to turn defeat, at even ‘one minute past twelve’ as Hitler promised, into victory.

Large Bombs and Guided Missiles

Most bombs available to the Luftwaffe at the end of 1944 could fit into the roomy bomb-bays of the planned long-range carriers. Nearly all thin – and thick – cased explosive and shrapnel bombs from SC 50 to SC 1800 were in stock in Luftwaffe arsenals. From the end of 1942, heavier bombs capable of inflicting great damage were made, such as the SB 2500 A-l or SC 2500 B-l, but only about 100 were available. Even bigger was the SC 5000 which could not be series-produced for lack of capacity. This 5.2-metre long mine was intended to destroy city blocks and large industrial concerns. A few SA 4000 had been built, and a few tested, but as the air attacks on England died away, the SA 4000, SC 2500 and SC 5000 were all cancelled. The special hollow-charge SHL 6000 bomb designed for use against large warships, major bridges and extensive industrial installations carried a much larger charge than even the Ju 88 Misteln.

The largest conventional bombs ever planned in Germany were 10- to 30- tonners, designed for use from Dr Eugen Sanger’s rocket bomber, and which would have caused enormous damage when dropped from a height of 100 miles up. The largest would have blasted a crater 100 metres deep, or burrowed through

Miracle Weapons

Very heavy bombs, such as the 2.5-tonne SB 5000 illustrated here, lost their significance from the autumn of 1944 when most of the Luftwaffe’s bomber units were disbanded.

10 metres of reinforced concrete. These bombs had a design length of 11.2 metres and a diameter of 1.4 metres. The megabomb and a comparatively light 1-tonne model for dropping from great altitudes existed only on paper.

The various free-fall glider bombs, PD 1400X or the more powerful PD 2500X, were envisaged as remote-controlled weapons systems for the projected long-range bombers. Together with improved TV-guided Hs 293s and Hs 294s they were intended for pin-point targets. Great progress had been made towards remote-steering free-fall heavy bombs and air-launched rockets such as the BV 246, forerunners of the modern cruise missile. Although about 1,050 units were built between 1943 and 1945, only the short-range version entered service, on 15 August 1944. By then KdE crews had launched 119 BV 246s, but guidance problems limited their use to ground targets. Another 2,300 В V 246s were ordered in January 1945, these having automatic target-seeking equipment, although the OKL thought about having them as poison gas carriers should the need arise. Since most of these bombs were only of use at short ranges, and fuel for the carrier aircraft such as the He 111 or Ju 188 was short, the BV 246 saw litde action.

From January 1945, Hs 293 operations were almost non-existent since fuel that might have gone to carrier aircraft was more urgendy required for air defence of the Reich. At the beginning of 1945 the last KG 100 Gruppe, almost fully equipped for guided weapons operations at Aalborg in Denmark, abandoned its

Miracle Weapons

The testing ol in – inds of bomb continued into the spring of 1945 but with a low

priority. Bomb – lining new battlefield gases were amongst those tested.

 

machines for p. Besides the problem of finding fuel for even the most

important flic operations in the west and south were continually hampered

 

by Allied electronic disruption. For this reason radio control was replaced by wire guidance. For operations over the Eastern Front the older Hs 293 A versions available in large numbers were used because the Red Army had no jamming equipment. Instead massed AA guns of all calibres defended important ground targets against air attack.

KG 200 alone was in a position until the end of April 1945 to launch the last glider-bomb attacks in reasonable numbers, mainly against the Oder bridges. All other bomber Gruppen were used in the transport role flying supplies to besieged cities and towns surrounded by the Red Army in the German hinterland which had become the Eastern Front.