Category Last Days of the Luftwaffe

The Messerschmitt Enzian gave rise to great hopes. It was a subsonic, remote- controlled flak rocket for use against aerial targets at high altitude. Powerplant was an efficient liquid-fuel engine with four solid-fuel rocket boosters to aid take-off. The squat body was tailless, there being four large swept-back wings mid-fuselage having combined aileron/rudders.

After numerous early studies a full-size mock-up was begun in January 1944, the first experimental E 1 being completed at Augsburg in February 1944. After the factory was bombed that same month, production transferred to Holzbau Kissing at Sonthofen, this area being considered safer. After the first missile was delivered to Peenemiinde, it was test fired at Greifswalder Oie in mid-April 1944, the second on 29 April. On completion of the 38th test, Messerschmitt

considered the basic test series complete. After watching a demonstration at Peenemiinde West on 30 October 1944, Goring spoke out expressly in favour of Enzian since the equally prioritised Schmetterling was not yet ready.

By 1 November 1944,15 Enzian had been test fired. In a surprise move the entire project was then transferred to the Bavarian Alps under Dr Wurster, and the planning office set up on a farm at Schloss Lindhof. Two other Enzian (E 2) variants made in early summer 1944 to the earlier FR-6 design were fired from Greifswalder Oie in mid-November, but a really reliable flak rocket system still seemed far off. The Walter Werke motor rocket division at Beerburg was informed at the end of 1944 that their motor fell 35 per cent below the specified values: for this reason Enzian would receive the Rheintochter engine. A more efficient engine (on paper) designed by Professor Conrad of the Technical University of Berlin was also being considered: a first test run was expected in January 1945, but the date could not be met.

A 550-kg warhead was planned for Enzian. Dynamit Nobel of Hamburg supplied the first of these. Various detonators had been examined including the
modern Dogge. The project now fell well behind the RLM timetable, for the acute shortage of high-value metals prevented series production. On 19 December 1944 the Commission for Rocketry argued with the Chief-TLR against introducing Enzian because of the woeful technical problems, but despite this objection Askania was given a contract to provide new control mechanisms. It was hoped to test these from February 1945. With effect from 17 January 1945 OKL ordered the termination of the project since other developments were more promising and 450 man-hours per unit was excessive. On 6 Februarv Himmler withdrew his permission for further work on Enzian.

As the Red Army advanced, Greifswalder Oie was abandoned, the installations being prepared for destruction. Work on documenting the test reports was cut short at Schloss Lindhof in mid-March. A total of 60 Enzian rockets were completed and at least 24 test fired at Greifswalder Oie. The failure rate of these was relatively high at 70 per cent. Another 10 served for ground testing, 15 were blown up on 25 April at Sonthofen to prevent their capture. Almost all the remainder existed only in component parts. Most of the technical data were found by the Allies in underground galleries at Oberammergau and carted away.

On 13 October 1943 all personnel of IV./JG 3 paraded on the apron at Neubiberg to hear Reichsmarschall Goring hold forth on the operational record of his fighter pilots. The Gruppe’s Bf 109 G-6 fighters were now to operate with Sturmstaffel 1 as its escort. These assault Gruppen had the task of attacking enemy bomber formations, protected by escort fighters, at close quarters. For this purpose the aircraft had been provided with armour protection against heavy machine-gun fire. The protection covered at least the cockpit, the pilot’s seat and ammunition magazine. Few machines returned without damage after engaging B-17 formations with their immense fire power.

After suffering a period of heavy losses, the unit participated in the Ardennes campaign before arriving at Stargard on 25 January 1945, and from 31 January flew mainly low-level Jabo missions in support of German ground troops. In February the Gruppe received a few Fw 190 D-9s for the first time, but low-level work continued into March when orders came to assume the escort role. The task involved engaging the ever-larger Soviet fighter and light bomber swarms. On 11 March Oak Leaves holder Major Schroer, JG 3 Kommodore, shot down his 104th to 106th victims, and on 15 March he increased his tally to 109. From April 1945 operational readiness at IV.(Sturm)/JG 3 fell drastically. Little enthusiasm could be drummed up for suicide missions, and following sorties in defence of Berlin the survivors fell back to Westerland/Sylt on 2 May.

Learning from the experience of Sturmstaffel 1, OKL applied the basic operational principles to larger groupings, but the assault unit formed from parts

of JG 4 was always fighting a losing battle because of Allied air supremacy. In September 1944 the pilots of II.(Sturm)/JG 4 flew numerous assault missions against the Allied bomber fleets, escorted by III./JG 4’s Fw 190 A-8s. In these often very costly operations the individual assault groups were usually escorted by two Gruppen of Bf 109s. After the Ardennes campaign JG 4 was subordinated to Luftflotte Reich and defended the ever-contracting airspace over the western Reich. On 5 February 1945 Stab and II./JG 4 were at Neuhausen near Cottbus; I./JG 4 at Guben; III. and IV./JG 4 shared Drewitz aerodrome. In March JG 4 had a total of 158 Bf 109s and Fw 190s, often up to 95 per cent operational but short of fuel. For protection III./JG 4 at Berlin Schonefeld and IV.(Sturm)/JG 4 had around 100 blast pens. This latter Gruppe in particular achieved excellent results in its operations against heavy bombers. Of 376 victories claimed, 194 were heavy bombers. The other Gruppen of JG 4 shot down another 205 aircraft of which about 150 were heavy bombers. At the conclusion of the fighting on the Oder, JG 4 pulled back to northern Germany where all Gruppen were disbanded on 1 May.

The last assault Gruppe to be mentioned here was II.(Sturm)/JG 300 whose target was bombers. During the defence of the Reich in 1944, the Gruppe flew many missions with 3. Jagd-Division, and was transferred to 1. Jagd-Division in February. The Stabsstaffel was then at Jiiterbog-Waldlager, II.(Sturm)/JG 300 at Lobnitz, from where it covered central Germany. At the end of 1944 OKL decided that blind-flying training at JG 300 should be discontinued since the unit was to receive the Me 262. On 20 March 1945 OKL decided to disband I. Gruppe immediately and equip the former II.(Sturm)/JG 300 instead with Bf 109 K-4s since there was now a shortage of jets.

On 19 April II. Gruppe moved to Holzkirchen with its 33 Fw 190 D-9s and. D-lls of which only 20 were airworthy. The surviving Fw 190s remained at JG 300 until 3 May 1945, their last flights being over the foothills of the Alps. The assault group concept had great success against Allied bomber formations but the toll in lives was too high. The nature of the operation required pilots to attempt to combat the enemy at very close quarters before turning away sharply

to flee the incoming fighters at the last moment. In employing this tactic many Luftwaffe pilots acted above and beyond the call of duty with disregard for their own fives.

By the OKL decision, JG 1, recendy tested in the fighting on the Eastern Front, became the standard bearer for the new aircraft. Stabsstaffel/JG 1 would take over the tactical trials and training and would therefore be direcdy accountable to KdE. On 11 February the Stabsstaffel was placed under the jurisdiction of KdE by order of the Luftwaffe organisation staff. According to the plans, I./JG 1 was to be brought up to strength by personnel from II. and III./JG 1. At the same time Luftkommando 6 telexed I./JG 1 that the unit was now deemed to be resting and all its Fw 190s were to be handed over to II./JG l. The latter was also to send its own advance party to Vienna Aspern for the later transfer there of the He 162. Nothing came of this because the end was so near. The entire Geschwader, however, was to prepare itself immediately for the Volksjager on orders of OKL.

On 25 January the situation of JG 1 did not look favourable. I./fG 1 had 13 Fw 190 A-8 and A-9 aircraft return from the Eastern Front under Oberleutnant Demuth. A little later the remaining aircraft of II./JG 1 followed. III./JG 1 existed only on paper. During the retreat before the Soviet advance in East Prussia, the unit had been almost completely wiped out. Until the beginning of February the remaining Fw 190s were used as Jabos before II./JG 1 transferred to Rostock-Marienehe. The Red Army was then engaged from the Heinkel Works airfield. While this was in progress, on 9 February I./fG 1 support section arrived at Parchim. The remnants of both Gruppen would now form two Auffangsstaffeln (‘intercept squadrons’) on the He 162, these being l./JG 1 at Marienehe and Bernburg, and 2./JG 1 at Heidfeld/Vienna.

On 24 February, 2. Staffel led by Leutnant Hachtel transferred to Heidfeld, and two days later OKL ordered III./JG 1 to Parchim immediately. As there were no He 162s available there, most of the Staffel went to Vienna instead, where for some time He 162 M-19 had been the only machine ready for use by JG 1, provisionally as a trainer. As no other He 162s were expected immediately, parts of II. and III./JG 1 returned to Parchim. Instruction using one machine at Vienna was a lengthy business, and by 7 March only eight pilots of I./JG 1 had been conversion-trained for the Volksjager. A number of flight restrictions were in force: in particular it was forbidden to exceed 500 km/hr (310 mph) for longer

than 15 minutes on account of the susceptibility of the BMW turbines to breakdown. The situation was no better at Heidfeld because there were insufficient ground staff trained for the He 162.

In central Germany the ubiquitous shortages ensured that He 162 production advanced only slowly. There were too few skilled personnel and technical staff to service the Volksjager, since most trained servicemen were at the front. It was not possible to call upon Heinkel staff or their flight trials organisation because it had long been overburdened with work. The shortage of В-4 (benzine) cut back flying time. The conversion of BMW 003 turbines to J-2 (kerosene) had proved far more difficult than expected and could not be implemented for the time being. The combination of all these problems was destroying any hope that the Volksjager would be able to change the course of the air war over the Reich in the foreseeable future. Only Hitler and a few of the Luftwaffe commanders in their bunkers thought it possible to introduce positive changes fast. The ever more hasty forward planning reaching the Geschwader from March onwards took no account of the everyday major technical problems and ever worsening difficulty of fuel supply.

The reorganisation of JG 1, at least on paper, was on hand at QM-General level. Besides the 16 He 162s with the Stabstaffel, three Gruppen of 52 Volksjager each were projected for May 1945, a plan beyond the scope of reality. The QM – General could distribute his aircraft as he saw fit, but before they arrived they would often fall foul of Allied fighters or bombing raids. Equally, some very mundane reason might prevent completion of aircraft: a piece of equipment might not be delivered because of production hold-ups, although most often it would be shortage of fuel or a turbine problem, perhaps because a spanner had literally been dropped in the works by a forced labour saboteur. When the turbine was test-run it would be ruined, and it would be necessary to wait for a replacement. A repair would often not be possible for insufficient spare parts.

QM-General would not be deterred and ordered series aircraft 1-5 to Heidfeld, 6-13 were to be held back for tactical trials at Lechfeld, 14-20 were planned for tactical trials at Roggenthin/Rechlin. In fact no machines had ever been available for flying trials. Auffangsstaffel 2./JG 1 for example had still received no He 162s by 21 March.

On 26 March all the scheduling was revised. The first 18 series machines were to go to Heidfeld. Only afterwards would the tactical and operational trials begin. Nevertheless by 30 March no He 162s had yet landed at either Lechfeld or Rechlin. The first two machines, ЕЗФ51 and ЕЗФ52 finally arrived at Rechlin in mid-April. The emergency trials programme ended a few days later, not on account of the Allied advance but for organisational reasons.

Meanwhile the development and production of all kinds of aircraft had undergone an ominous change on 26 March when Hitler gave SS-General

Kammler wide-ranging plenipotentiary powers. All powers relating to jet aircraft invested hitherto in Reich Minister Speer passed to the SS, while Hitler also subordinated Goring’s General Plenipotentiary for Jet Aircraft to Kammler for the speedy execution of the portfolio. While Kammler familiarised himself with his new area of jurisdiction, the provisional instructions for the production and flying of the He 162 remained in force.

The Soviet advance to the gates of Vienna had led Heinkel-Siid to recognise that the airfields and production facilities in the Vienna region would only remain available for a short period. In secret they began removing files and equipment to the west. As far as possible completed machines were brought to safety at Langenlebarn west of Vienna. From there the majority of pilots took their Volksjager to Horsching/Linz. Here a number of non-airworthy Volksjager remained behind because there were no maintenance facilities for jets. The others were flown to Munich-Riem and Lechfeld. During this operation on 31 March Heinkel works pilot Huldreich Kemnitz crashed during the transfer flight and lost his life. At Lechfeld an attempt to begin operational training was abortive. Only a few test flights were undertaken there before it became necessary to head east for Munich as US ground forces came up.

At the beginning of April the opposing ground forces, German and Russian, clashed before Vienna. By 5 April it was obvious that the front would not hold. Russian tanks rolled into the heart of Vienna and crushed the last resistance of the SS and Hitler Jugend. Flight trials had long been forgotten. Gradually all airfields around Vienna fell into Russian hands. The last death in testing the He 162 occurred on 6 April 1945 when works pilot Wolfgang Liiddemann crashed. Schwechat (Heidfeld) airfield was being abandoned and Liiddemann attempted to fly out with the last airworthy Volksjager and failed.

Meanwhile Kammler had involved himself in the development and production of the Ar 234 and He 162 jets and ordered that all manufacturing of piston-engined aircraft was to cease while the production of the He 162 was to be greatly accelerated. The instruction was expressed in similar terms in an OKL telex of 4 April 1945:

Continuing with the He 162 means persevering with an aircraft which deserves acceptance having regard to its stage of testing – in short a good modern fighter aircraft, if with little flying time, whose final cost is substantially less than for Me 262 and which makes lesser demands on the ground organisation. Moreover, it is expected that this aircraft will bring successes in the battle against the oppressive fighter-bomber plague.

General Karl Roller, Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, asked Kammler on 4 April to reconsider his decision regarding the He 162. Whether the SS – General, who had struck out nearly all Hitler’s newest air armaments with a stroke of the pen, answered or not is not recorded. Whatever was said at the top, conversion training at JG 1 went on to the extent that it was possible.

The R 100 air-to-air Rheinmetall-Borsig spin-stabilised rocket was heavier than the WGr 21. Its fragmentation effect was very destructive even against large targets because of the powerful explosive charge. First prototypes capable of Mach 1.5 were developed from 1943 as R 100 M (mine warhead). Several improved versions followed.

The projectiles were fired from a simple AG 140 device below the ETC 50 which if necessary could be jettisoned. A Neptun range­measuring device was installed. Faun and Elfe equipment could be fitted for automatic firing of the rocket. The R 100 was first fired successfully in December 1944 without an explosive charge. In January 1945 500 were ordered for initial tactical tests. Up to five R 100s were to be carried by the Me 262, six by the Me 410 and 16 by the Ar 234, the latter two carrying their load mounted below the wings.

A report from Rheinmetall-Borsig at Berlin – Marienfelde dated 15 January 1945 considered that the RBI00 BS rocket would be very efficient against any Allied aircraft of the time.

It distributed some 400 red-hot splinters per 56 grams of mass over an area of between 115 and 1,000 square metres. The explosive charge was a 1-kg (2.2-lb) shrapnel mine-type explo­sive. The splinters would pierce the fuel tanks of an aircraft under attack, their heat then igniting the fuel.

An automatic firing-solution computer, ‘Oberon Process’, developed by Arado engineer Kurt Bornemann was used for aiming. In combination with the EZ 42 gyro-reflex sight attacks were also possible in a pursuit curve at angles up to 30 degrees. The first R 100 BS tests took place atTarnewitz test ground in February 1945, but by the month’s end there were too few rockets left for continuation testing in flight.

Tests in a Me 262 A-la (Works No. 111994) using the R 100 BS saw the rocket being condemned as unsafe and not sufficiently advanced for operational use in the spring of 1945. By 3 March tests had come to a standstill because

the rockets supplied to Tarnewitz were incomplete, and work on an improved firing installation had been set back in an air raid on the assembly plant at Berlin-Marienfelde. Once EZ 42 production at Dresden and the manufacture of the FuG 217 Elfe unit fell by the wayside, the entire venture passed into history at the latest during March 1945.There is no record of any further trials before the test centre fell on 2 May.

In an extensive evaluation of air-to-air rockets produced just before the war’s end, an R 100 fitted with infra-red equipment and an acoustic fuse was reported close to operational readiness but its manufacture was now menaced by the advancing front. Rockets featured in the various weapons systems on which Ober – gruppenfuhrer Kammler set such store. In the end the production of prototypes was modest. Only a few R 100 rockets survived the end phase of the war to be confiscated by British scientific teams in May 1945.

As the early jet turbines had not lived up to expectations, efforts were made from 1942 to increase thrust substantially. For this purpose the BMW P3390 TLR engine was developed. The Me 262 C-2b version of the Me 262 A-la was confirmed on 28 April 1944, but work on the engine plant was still well short of completion. On 20 December Messerschmitt began conversion work for the first C-2b once Works No. 170074 (V-074) arrived at Lechfeld. On 8 January 1945 the aircraft flew under turbine power but without using the rocket motor.

After metal fragments were found in the port turbine and a defect discovered in the drive bearings, the aircraft was grounded and the jet engines did not attain the prescribed levels of output until 24 February. Next day the starboard combustion chamber exploded, seriously damaging the whole turbine. At the end of March another defect was found in the port turbine, which had to be replaced. Because of shortage of В-4 fuel, works pilot Karl Baur did not fly Heimatschiitzer II from Lechfeld until 26 March when the thrust of two BMW 003 turbines and the two rocket motors (burn time 40 seconds) provided the prototype with a tremendous rate of climb. In the second and last flight of V-074 on 29 March, a switching fault prevented the rocket engine being used. The cause could not be found for a time because no fuel was available to run the turbines. V-074, the only Me 262 C-lb to have flown, was captured intact by US ground forces at Lechfeld on 27 April 1945, but it did not interest the

Side profile of the He 162 ‘Protector of the Homeland’with BMW 003 R propulsion unit. Unlike the Me 262 C-2b the rocket motor was not mounted directly on the turbine but under the fuselage.

Americans and was discarded behind a hangar for scrap. After month-long testing it was clear that the TLR turbines were far from suitable for series – produced aircraft, and they were not used for the Ar 234, He 162 or the Focke-Wulf Flitzer.

Me 262 C-3

This was almost an emergency design once it was realised from the Me 262 C-la and C-2b track record that a series-produced TLR fighter was still far off. By the beginning of February 1945 plans were placed before the Chief-TLR for the Me 262 C-3. By mid-February design work for the first prototype was complete and a full-size mock-up ordered. Messerschmitt calculated that the project bureau and factory annexe at Oberammergau would have the first fuselage ready for testing with an HWK 109-509 S2 rocket motor by 10 March. The rocket fuel was to be carried in two large 600-litre disposable tanks below the forward fuselage. Ultimately only one engine unit was made and the conversion work was never started. US troops captured many of the project studies and future aircraft plans.

As with all other rocket aircraft, the Me 262 variants had shown that the technology could not be mastered under the prevailing war conditions. This was true as much for the various rocket fighters (Me 163 and Ju 248) as for the Me 262 Homeland Protectors and the numerous emergency solutions which left the drawing boards from the summer of 1944.

Another flak rocket which failed to meet expectations was the Rheinmetall Rheintochter. Despite great investment and its own test centre at Leba on the Baltic, the rocket was never ready for series production. Early in the autumn of 1941, Generalmajor von Renz, Dr Heinrich Klein (Rheinmetall-Borsig) and the Director of Radar Research at Telefunken, Professor Leo Brand, agreed on an initial specification for a flak rocket. After Goring spoke in favour of subsonic designs on 1 September 1942, Rheinmetall reworked an earlier type (F-Pl) into F-P2 and F-P3, which had an operational ceiling of 18,000 metres (59,000 ft). On 7 December 1943, the HWA awarded Rheinmetall a contract to develop all three versions. In the spring of 1943 the entire project, except for the design office at Leba, was transferred from Berlin to Zittau. By the summer of 1943, several missiles had been built at 1:2.5 scale, all but the first being tested later at Leba using a provisional starting procedure so as to judge how the rocket would fly in practice. On 3 June 1943 Rheinmetall presented its newest designs, R 1 to R 3. Since the manufacturer could not work on all three simultaneously, the RLM favoured for R 3 but Rheinmetall kept working on the others. From December 1943 the R 1 and R 2 versions were test fired at Leba: between February and October 1944 there were 43 test starts in all and some ground trials. Most tests involved the R 1, since R 2 was not yet so far advanced.

An R 3 was first test-fired in October 1944. The prototype had no second- stage motor and served as a test vehicle for the start procedure. Aiter seeing an

R1 demonstrated on 30 October 1944, Goring authorised a continuation of tests in the hope of finding greater efficiency. When on 1 November the 51st solid – fuel R 1 was tested, the R 3 was almost ready. The missile had no cruising motor, since these were far from completion, the thrust jets not having been delivered on time for the first 20 engines. After the liquid-fuel engines designed by Professor Beck of the Technical University were tested and found to be under­powered, the planners fell back temporarily on the solid-fuel alternative.

The next stage of work was discussed at a conference in Karlshagen on 19 November 1944. The endless postponements of set dates and problems with liquid-fuel engines gave a pessimistic oudook on the future. On 18 December the first R3 was fired successfully using a solid-fuel engine. Despite the successful demonstration to the Reichsmarschall, there were still some doubts, and even the super-optimistic Rheinmetall spokesman did not expect even to receive the liquid-fuel engine ordered by the Chief-TLR before the New Year. In mid- January a number of the latest Type HV 10 gyro sets were ordered for Rheintochter testing from February onwards. In January 1945 tests the rocket
flew for 120 seconds. The range was established at 12.7 km (7.9 miles), the operational ceiling 9,650 metres (31,600 ft). By 5 February inclusive, 5 R 3s had been test fired, 51 R Is, and 7 R 2s. Only 24 hours later the Rheintochter project was cancelled by Gruppenfiihrer Kammler since he did not believe it would be ready within a reasonable time.

The Rammjager went one step further. The idea was that, should the enemy aircraft attacked not be mortally wounded by gun fire, it was to be finished off by ramming. The loss of air superiority goaded a small group at OKL into taking these drastic measures. For some time the tactic was rejected by many unit commanders, and also by some pilots asked to undertake it. General der Jagd – flieger Adolf Galland opposed it and was relieved of office on 23 January 1945 by Goring, his replacement being the more committed Oberst Gordon Gollob. At the same time Goring appealed to all fighter pilots ‘inspired by holy fire, being conscious of the struggle for a just cause, to give everything’.

Galland had favoured conventional fighter tactics, if possible from a numerically superior position. As a means of downing whole bomber formations, he wanted to send up a thousand fighters at a time. For this reason in the autumn

3

of 1944 he had tried to re-equip and re-staff the exhausted fighter units. On 18 November 1944 he accumulated 18 fighter Geschwader and 3,700 pilots for ‘The Big Blow’, but despite long preparations the concentrated attack never came, so strong by then were the Allied air raids and their penetration to the heardand of the Reich.

This was therefore the prevailing sorry state of affairs from which Oberst Hajo Hermann revived his idea of the mass ramming operation. Even Hider, despite all his reservations, approved the concept, ‘if unwillingly’, as his Luft­waffe adjutant Oberst von Below reported later. When Oberst Hermann seized the opportunity to make his proposal at the Reich Chancellery in January 1945, Hider replied that he would not order it, but nor would he stand in the way of those who wanted to volunteer for it.

Rammkommando Elbe was set up at the beginning of March, with control being placed in Gollob’s hands. The first volunteers were assembled at Stendal aerodrome and lodged in an enclosure with a double security perimeter. At the end of the month, about a week before the start of the ramming operations, Anglo-American land forces were already at Gotha, Kassel and Munster, and approaching Erfurt, Halle, Hannover and Wurzburg. In the East the Red Army
was preparing for the final assault on Berlin. Nevertheless on 31 March Oberst Hermann called on his pilots ‘to fight to the uttermost’. His vision was that Ramming Unit Werwolf s pilots would destroy coundess Allied bombers at the selfless expenditure of their own lives, to such affect that the USAF would be forced to break off its bombing operations. This was obviously an illusion.

The training course at Stendal was basically theoretical for shortage of fuel. The pilots were kept in good humour with plentiful meals, cognac and chocolate which, unlike the fuel, seemed available in unlimited quantities. There was also a shortage of unit commanders with front-line experience since these knew only too well what this kind of operation would demand of them. Therefore they were commandeered from the ranks of IX. Flieger-Division( J) to build the framework for the young pilots who had volunteered for ramming operations in the hoped – for numbers.

On the night of 5 April 1945,30 pilots were driven from Stendal to Delitzsch, Eilenburg, Gardelegen, Sachau, Salzwedel and Stolpe. For psychological reasons OKL did not want to delay the operations too long and had set 7 April as the opening date. Many of the pilots had too little experience with the Bf 109. Fighter protection was to be Me 262s of Stab and III./fG 7 from Brandenburg- Briest. The ramming aircraft were to assemble over Magdeburg and climb to 11,000 metres (36,000 ft). Spurred on by heroic words and military marches they would receive the order to attack – ‘To all vultures and falcons – attack at will! Sieg Heilfln all 184 Bf 109 ram-fighters and 51 Me 262 escorts, of which 48 eventually took off, were to be deployed. The tactical inexperience of the attackers resulted in the mission of Sonderkommando Elbe not proceeding as hoped. The Eighth AF bomber formations were at 7,000 metres (23,000 ft) altitude and their fighter escort was quickly in attendance. The Bf 109s were only able to engage singly or in small groups, and the bomber losses remained within acceptable limits.

At the end of the engagement, 77 mosdy young pilots had been shot down. The Luftwaffe had lost 133 machines, numerous others were damaged to a greater or lesser degree by enemy defensive fire, and many of these crash-landed. On the plus side 23 heavy bombers, most attached to 3rd Air Division, were destroyed by ramming or the Me 262s of JG 7. Others got back to England, tailplanes ribboned, wings damaged. Overall the long-planned operation had not brought OKL the desired result.

Nevertheless Oberst Hermann would not give in. He wanted better preparations for a second try; next time the 80 remaining pilots of Sonder­kommando Elbe would attack the bomber formations over their bases. But time ran out. Apart from individual instances of ramming Allied aircraft, towards the end there were some sporadic suicide missions on the pilot s own initiative by those who realised that the war was lost and did not wish to survive it.

Because of the constant delays, JG 1 had not become active again until mid – March after its earlier problems. The Auffangsstaffel was subsequently reformed as Stabstaffel/JG 1: at the same time I./JG 1 transferred to Ludwigslust and II./JG 1 to Garz, countermanding a previous order to fly to Warnemiinde. Not until 8 April did the first two machines reach I. Gruppe from the central

German production. By 11 April conversion training was being carried out with up to 16 He 162s, but the fuel shortage kept training flights down to 10 or 12 per day. Even so, 30-40 pilots had had their first flying experience with the jet. During this training the Gruppe lost several pilots, amongst them Ober – feldwebel Stenschke and two Unteroffizier, Enderle and Werner. Despite all its protests, II./JG 1 had no He 162s; its conversion training got under way finally on 20 April.

On 14 April I./JG 1 led by Oberleutnant Demuth, transferred from Ludwigslust to Leek with a refuelling stop at Husum because the Gruppe did not have enough fuel for a non-stop flight. During this flight, Leutnant Rudolf Schmidt encountered a Spitfire which was shot down, but the victory was credited to a flak battery which also fired on the RAF aircraft. During the continuation flight to Leek, Allied fighters appeared, but the ten-strong formation escaped at high speed. On 18 April the greater part of the ground staff arrived at Leek from Warnemiinde.

Despite the numerous improvements the Volksjager was still not completely safe in all flight situations. On 20 April Leutnant Schmitt needed the ejector seat to save himself and three days later Unteroffizier Steeb of L/fG 1 was forced to jump out after his ejector seat failed to work. On 24 April the commander of II./JG 1, Hauptmann Dahne, killed himself by operating the ejector seat without having first opened the cabin hood. Other fatalities in flying accidents with the He 162 between 20 and 26 April were Fahnrich Halmel and two Unteroffiziere, Fendler and Rechenbach. All were buried in Leek cemetery. The number of operational machines was few because of fuel shortage. Hauptmann Ludewig and his wingman, Feldwebel Gehrlein, were forced to make emergency landings for lack of fuel.

During the last weeks of the war the main focus of fighter operations over northern Germany was against RAF low-level aircraft. This included operational units of JG 1. From 25 April some He 162s were therefore used in this role over the Flensburg-Heide-Schleswig area. A pair from I. Gruppe attempted unsuccessfully to intercept an RAF Mosquito. There were no successes reported the following day, although Leutnant Gerhard Hanf attacked an RAF Typhoon. By 29 April Hanf had flown a further six sorties with his Volksjager. On 27 April the remainder of II./JG 1 arrived at Leek from Mecklenburg after refuelling at Kaltenkirchen. The number of training and operational flights in the next few days fell off for the lack of new aircraft and shortage of fuel. On 2 May the Kommodore, Oberstleutnant Herbert Ihlefeld, arrived at Leek with the Geschwaderstab.

On 4 May OKL merged I. and II. Gruppen under the Kommodore of I.(EG)/fG l. The first and second operational Staffeln led by Major Zober and Hauptmann Ludewig were then merged into the new Gruppe. All who had sufficient experience with the He 162 to engage low fliers over northern Germany were now assembled in this Gruppe.

Despite the war situation flights continued when fuel allowed, between one and three operations for two to four machines daily. These resulted in a few flying accidents shortly before the war’s end. Feldwebel Oskar Kohler ran out of landing strip at Leek and folded his He 162 A-2, being pulled free from the wreck by Oberleutnant Demuth at the last moment. Leutnant Schmitt flew some of the last operations. According to his flight log, his fifth patrol was on 4 May in ‘White Ґ when he caught up with an RAF Typhoon and scored hits. The aircraft crashed, but was credited to a flak unit on the basis of the captured RAF flier s report. The latter spent the last few days of the war in the JG 1 mess waiting for the Allies to arrive.

Shortly before the war’s end it was decided to send the operational Gruppe to northern Denmark or southern Norway, which proved impossible for lack of fuel, and on 5 May the aircraft were rigged with explosives to prevent their

capture. Towards midnight the Kommodore ordered the charges removed and a few hours later the Germans surrendered to a British armoured car which arrived at the airfield. One of the British guards was killed shortly afterwards while fooling with the ejector seat of an He 162. The remnants of JG 1 remained at Leek until 15 May. On the 21st they arrived at Schorholm and were then given quarters at Hennstadt. A period in PoW camps terminated within a year in repatriation.

JG 400 was never equipped with the machine.

According to QM-General (6. Division) statistics, 116 completed He 162 aircraft were produced. The delivery of 60 of these can be proven. In total about 180 He 162s were ready for delivery. Fuselages, wings and tailplanes were in preparation for another 500. The majority of the serviceable machines in May 1945 were on the airfield at Leek. Of the 31 machines there, about 20 were airworthy to some extent. Of these, 5 went to the USA and France and 12 to Britain. Ten unserviceable machines were scrapped. Trials of the light fighter continued in France until 1948, and longer in the United States. It was accepted that the concept was well in advance of contemporary Allied standards.

The first rocket to engage heavy four-engined bombers was the 4-kg (8.8-lb) spin-stabilised solid-fuel R4M with folding tail-unit. It was designed at Osterode/Harz by the firm of Heber, and DWM of Liibeck-Schlutup. After short and highly encouraging trials, 20,000 were ordered almost immediately, but only 12,000 were turned out, the manufacturers being DWM, Schneider KG and LGW Hakenfelde. EKdo 25, later JGr 10 under Major Chrisd, carried out extensive tests proving that the R4M reached 540 m/sec (1,770 ft/sec) in only 0.8 seconds. Operational range was 500-600 metres. The mine-type warhead would bring down a heavy bomber even with a near-miss.

The first successful firing of an R4M was achieved from an Me 262 with a makeshift rack on 2 November 1944. The first use in action was on 18 March 1945 by JG 7. Between operational flights, the Knight’s Cross holder Oberstleutnant Heinz Bar, then commander of III./EJG 2 flew trials with an Me 262 fitted with a modified R4M firing rack. Because the rockets tended to jam in the rack, the installations were continually being modified even when carried operationally by Me 262s. On 31 March a Staffel, some of them equipped with R4M rockets, claimed 17 RAF Lancaster bombers.

The R4M rocket was of great importance in the defence against Allied bombers. It weighed 4 kg, had solid-fuel propulsion and a mine warhead.

R4M racks were fitted to Ju 87 D-5s and Fw 190 D-9s as well as the Me 262 A-la, as seen here. The racks were of wood and therefore easy to manufacture in quantity.

On 5 April JGr 10, a test Gruppe and Messerschmitt works personnel were instructed to fit out 20 Me 262s of JV 44 at Munich-Riem with R4M racks to increase the aircraft’s fighting power, and even General Galland, JV 44 commanding officer, was credited with two kills of В-26 Marauder medium bombers just before the war’s end when he fired a salvo of 24 R4M rockets into a formation over Bavaria. An operation against a formation of 425 B-17 Flying Fortresses counts amongst the greatest victories achieved by the Me 262 fighter: 25 bombers were shot down by R4M rockets and MK 108 guns.

Experimental ‘automatic rockets’ (RA) which appeared just before the war’s end came too late. The racks with the firing gear were to be fitted below the wings of the Ar 234 or the forward section of the Me 262 fuselage. The engine works at Esslingen/Neckar produced several of the honeycomb-like devices for firing the R4M and other spin-stabilised rockets such as were fitted later to the Ba 349 Natter. At the capitulation only about 60 Me 262 fighters had been fitted with two simple racks with rails for eight, then twelve R4M rockets. Six other Me 262 A-las tried out 24-rail racks. Together with four MK 108 guns in the nose, this was a very successful combination of weapons for intercepting heavy bombers.

ecause of many poor decisions by the policy-makers from Reichsmarschall Goring down, the air war was ending in catastrophe for Germany. To bring about any transformation in this situation, fanatical efforts by pilots and crews would be necessary. As there were insufficient aircraft to hold off the Allies, it was now time to consider operations whose execution would inevitably result in the death of the pilot. In the end, Luftwaffe crews would aim their aircraft at Soviet pontoon bridges over the Oder and fight tanks with Panzerfaust rockets.

Self-Sacrifice or Final Salvation?

A secret report of October 1943 from the Academy for Aviation Research (LFA) entided ‘Suggestion on Assembling a Luftwaffe Formation for Effective Pin – Point Bombing’ considered at length the possibility of operations in which the pilot had only a 50 per cent chance of survival. The volunteers would draw their targets by lot. The primary source of recruitment was to be amongst glider pilots although members of the formation could be drawn from all arms of service. The new aircraft would be the manned V-l. Any sacrificial pilot who lost the will to carry through his mission to completion ‘will be shot immediately’, the document recommended.

At the beginning of February 1944 the manned bomb idea was considered at a working conference of the LFA, and ground rules set out for the future development. These concerned not only the likely type of target, but also the machine. For the greatest possible damage, bomb-loads such as the PC 1800 and heavy ‘torpedo bombs with aerial’ (guided bombs) seemed appropriate. In the two-month training period the future suicide pilots would receive training in a flight simulator and be taught to recognise all important warship types. With purpose-built 5-metre long practice bombs, the men would then make gliding approaches to training targets, baling out by parachute shortly before the collision. The later operational machines would have no means of escape, a letter dated 21 February 1945 from a Rechlin flight surgeon to the RLM explained. The main reason for publicising this was to reduce the expected large number of

volunteers for the project. The idea had a life of its own, however, and was taken up by the Geschwaderstab at KG 200 from where, in March 1944, an approach was made to Generalfeldmarschall Milch and the Chief of the Luftwaffe Command Staff which coincided in virtually all respects with the ideas promulgated at the LFA conferences.

It was decided to produce 5,000 Me 328 wooden midget aircraft for the project, and woodworking began in mid-March 1944. Carpenters and other woodworkers at small and medium-sized concerns were exempted from conscription to protect the project. Behind the scenes heated discussions continued about ‘self sacrifice’. The situation was clarified in a session of 27 March 1944 attended by Flugkapitan Hanna Reitsch and senior officers from OKL. It was agreed that a piloted bomb was the best way to destroy major warships – a PC 1400 or ВТ 1800 bomb might even sink a battleship – and the aircraft for the job was the Me 328. Other machines such as the Bf 109, Me 163 and Fw 190 were considered before being ruled out as more essential for

Reich air defence. In conclusion it was decided to accelerate Me 328 testing and force through the production of prototypes leading to early series production; later the piloted V-l would also be considered.

The first drawings for project Go P 55 were completed at Gotha on 17 April 1944. This was a modification of the ВТ 3000, a flying bomb with rudimentary wings proposed despite the decision of the research team leaders on 27 March 1944 to go for the Me 328. The KG 200 Kommodore considered that an Fw 190 F-8 carrying an SC 1800 was adequate and suggested rejecting the Go P 55 and other suicide aircraft. The advocate of the latter, Oberleutnant Lange, of whom more later, was not to be deterred, and pursued the self-sacrifice concept inherent in the Gotha machine.

Me 328

The first aircraft fully suitable for suicide operations was the Me 328, a small machine with ramjet propulsion conceived originally as a parasite fighter to be

carried by a long-range bomber, or later used in the local anti-bomber role. The veteran DFS test pilot Erich Klockner said after the war that flying the Me 328 was not a pleasure. In a towed start the aircraft was difficult to handle and it was even worse under ramjet power. Although this was well known, in March 1944 serious thought was being given to a manned Me 328 with a 1,600-kg bomb – load. To ensure accuracy the pilot would sacrifice himself or bale out as close as he could to the target once the aircraft was certain to collide with it. The idea was top secret. A part of the development was handled by DFS Ainring near Bad Reichenhall in Bavaria where the technical preparations were taken hastily in hand.

The machine had begun life on 14 December 1942 when the Technical Office ordered ten experimental aircraft (Me 328 V-l to V-10) for testing at DFS Ainring. An option for a further ten was not taken up. At that time there was no call for them since Germany had no giant strategic bombers, and tests of the А-prototypes did not proceed. Me 328 В was a variant ‘Special Development for the Fast Bomber Role’. These would be low-level attacks on important targets made by ‘flying coastal artillery’ against the Allied invasion fleets on the French coast when the invasion came. The planning provided expressly for a Mistel take­
off, DFS Ainring favouring the Do 219 M-l as the parent aircraft since it was 10 per cent more powerful than the earlier Do 217 E variants.

After lengthy wind-tunnel tests work started on Me 328 В V-l and V-2. Prototype V-l arrived at the DFS annexe at Horsching/Linz on 18 May 1944 and after vibration tests was put on the test flight programme for the summer. In June 1944 the Kittelberger firm of Hochst/Bregenz took over construction of the second prototype after Jakobs-Schweyer Flugzeugbau GmbH received orders to build the wooden tail section for the Me 262.

A two-seat Me 328 trainer development was abandoned in the summer of 1944 because of the expense. The possibility of using the Me 328 as the parent aircraft of a Mistel pair was given up because it did not have the range for the return flight, nor the speed to evade enemy fighters in a long pursuit. Its only use therefore was as a ‘piloted bomb’, the former ‘Fast Bomber’ now being loaded down with a 2,500-kg bomb. Attacks would be made in a gliding approach. The Me 328 would be towed to operational height by a Ju 88 S-3 or Ju 388 K-l.

On 3 June 1944, Me 328 V-II, the converted second prototype, was probably flown by engineer ‘Gretchen’ Ziegler in a Mistel arrangement with a Do 217 K-03. A final flight under ramjet propulsion is also credited to Ziegler, although he was forced to bale out after engine vibrations broke the aileron control rods. Me 328 V-II was a total loss. Besides the two completed machines, a third was

I——————————————————

More or less how the planned Me 328 would have looked. Its primary purpose was the destruction of pin-point targets. The idea was to carry an HE bomb of up to 500 kg below the fuselage.

under construction (Me 328 V-3) but no flights were attempted and the project was abandoned. All attention was now to be concentrated on the Reichenberg, the piloted V-l.