Category Last Days of the Luftwaffe

Shortly before the war ended the development of costly flak rockets such as Wasserfall had come to nothing. The last remaining hope was simple projectiles under construction which could be turned out in large numbers in various versions. These included the Fohn and Taifun. The latter was an unguided, arrow – shaped stabilised flak-rocket shell of 10-cm diameter. Easy to produce, it was propelled by either a solid-fuel or liquid-fuel motor and was stabilised by four tail fins. 1.98 metres (variant F) or 2.10 metres (variant P) in length (6 ft 6 in or 6 ft 11 in), the projectile could hit at 10,000 metres (33,000 ft) altitude. Salvoes of up to 48 rounds could be fired at a time from a multiple launcher on an 8.8-cm Flak 36 or 37 mounting. Taifun was an independent development of the Elektro – mechanische Werke (EW).

Development began at the beginning of 1944. On 14 September 1944 80 were ordered from EW and another 420 from Benteler Werke at Bielefeld. In October 1944, in order to speed up the development, the Taifun work-group was established. Problems with materials went hand in hand with a shortage of experienced specialists and technicians. The shortage of expert workers led in December 1944 to a postponement of the desperately needed ballistic testing for a month. The powerplant also caused concerns in the initial phase.

By January 1945 flight testing had shown that the projectile tender to wander about its axis if the start velocity was too slow, and as a remedy longer rails were introduced on the starting launch trailer. Structural changes also stopped Taifun rockets exploding on tests. On 13 January the first examples were fired with live warheads. Although these exploded satisfactorily when the clockwork stopped, the liquid-fuel rockets were widely dispersed. For simplicity of construction solid – fuel rockets seemed preferable, and the first test with a rocket of this kind was not long delayed, the first being fired at Torgelow and – according to visual observations – followed a good flight path. By the end of January, 11 Taifun F had been fired with good results, although in another test 6 of 20 exploded in mid-air without a reason being found. Constant problems hampered progress in the subsequent weeks, and by the end of March 1945 neither had the Taifun P made its test debut at the front nor had series production of the F version begun, even though both F and P were listed on the Fiihrer Emergency Programme.

Therefore all-last minute efforts to series – produce the Taifun were in vain. By the war’s end only 100 rockets had been completed.

The only flak rocket ever used against enemy bombers was the primitive Fohn, which existed in numerous variations and had been subjected to some practical tests. A spin-stabilised Fohn projectile was tested experimentally in the armaments factory at Brno in October 1943. The intention was that salvoes of between 18 and 48 rockets would be used to bring down low-flying enemy aircraft. One month later the new Flak Emergency Programme foresaw the production of 1,000 Fohn by the end of April 1945, while construction of a multiple launcher, Fla-R-Werfer 44, for use against low-flying aircraft was also begun; 25 of these were scheduled for delivery by late October 1944.

The first projectiles built in November 1944 were used for evaluation purposes by Rheinmetall at the Unterliiss range. It was found that a five-man crew was sufficient. The first salvo of 5.5-cm rockets was fired at Wischau on 26 November 1944. The later series was of 7.3-cm calibre. In operational testing up to the end of 1944, 15,000 had been fire at enemy aircraft, but only one was shot down. In December 1944, 5,000 were fired in 70 salvoes at enemy machines at ranges between one kilometre and 1,500 metres, two hits being reported.

The principal drawback of the Fohn launcher was its short range of only 1,250 metres. At the beginning of 1945 the first of three experimental batteries from Flugabwehrschule (Flak-school) 2 were brought from Rerik on the Baltic to the Western Front. Flak-Lehr und Versuchsabteilung (Flak Instruction and Testing Unit) 900 commanded by Major Ehm was later composed of three batteries: I./900 railway flak on flat wagons, II./900 partially motorised, III./900 fixed localities and operational testing. On 28 February 1945,59 mobile 7.3-cm flak rocket launchers were available for training and operations, together with 24 permanent units mainly for training.

At the beginning of February 1945, III./900, consisting of three companies with a total of 120 men under the command of Oberleutnant Karl-Heinz Peters, arrived in the Remagen area on detachment to the local Flakfuhrer for tactical purposes. Over the next few weeks the rocket battery engaged a number of enemy aircraft, particularly single-engined fighter bombers, without success. The unit had 21,000 projectiles and plentiful reserves but only a single 3-tonne lorry. III./900 at Remagen was split into two halves, one stationed on the west bank, the other on the east bank of the Rhine.

On 7 March, Allied units advanced into the area in strength to capture the bridge over the Rhine. That morning the battery crews on the west bank crossed to the east after having destroyed their rockets and the sight mechanism on the launcher. The batteries were abandoned because there were no towing vehicles available. Following this incident, a flying court-martial was set up by Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring on 10 March. Oberleutnant Peters was sentenced to death and executed by firing squad in a wood near Rimbach on the 13th. Generalmajor Adolf Erhard, Commander 7. Flakdivision, committed suicide in protest against the sentence on the 14th. Whether there were any engagements involving the use of the launcher on the east bank is unknown.

Another interesting weapon was the HASAG Fliegerfaust in which the Riistungsstab had set great hopes in the spring of 1945. The Fliegerfaust was a simply produced but powerful weapon which enabled the individual infantryman on the battlefield to defend himself against low-flying aircraft. It was made up of nine 2-cm barrels and could be used against aerial targets at a range of 500

metres. The first version appeared on 15 December 1944. Almost ready by the end of the year, 10,000 weapons and 4 million rounds were expected in January. A problem preventing the early introduction of the Fliegerfaust was vibration after firing. On 21 January 1945 the first hundred of the pre-series were ready. Problems with ammunition included difficulties in manufacturing machinery to produce porcelain nozzles for the rounds. On 4 February the weapon was designated ‘FF I and IT. According to Oberleutnant Jorg Muller when in US Third Army captivity, in mid-March there was a short test period at Saar – briicken. The large number of FF required could not be met.

The claim attributed to Hermann Goring ‘The technology must obey me!’ showed how litde the Luftwaffe leadership understood the development of new weapons. They designed numerous, basically futuristic, flak rockets and other very good ideas, but the general situation ensured that these were only available at best as examples.

The first Me 262 A-la series aircraft were built for test purposes at the Messerschmitt Works, Augsburg Haunstetten, from March 1944. Five prototypes had been constructed first, Me 262 S-l to S-5, and then S-6 to S-10 and the first Me 262 A-las at Leipheim. As assembly there was threatened by air attack, a large complex was set up in woods at Horgau. These were large, well camouflaged hangars, screened by numerous trees, and in a short time the production lines were running smoothly, as was also the case for the final assembly at Hasenbiihl near Schwabisch Hall. By the end of July 1944, 99 completed Me 262s had been turned out.

The Jagerstab conference of 22 July 1944 ordered that production must be accelerated in order to fulfill more of the Luftwaffe requirement. More factories

were erected such as the Donau Moorkultur AG at Neuburg/Danube or REIMAG at Kahla. A gigantic underground production facility was set up in the nearby Walpersberg in 1944. On the ridge of the mountain was an airstrip accessible by a precipitous cable-lift from the mountain flank. A new assembly centre for parts was built in Brandenburg-Briest by November 1944 while production and assembly shops sprang up at Berlin Staaken, Wenzdorf/ Hamburg, Eger/Bohemia, at Memmingen and Kitzingen. The most brutal methods were employed to construct the gigantic production bunkers at Kaufering and Gusen in record time using innumerable concentration camp inmates. Regardless of the countless casualties, by 31 December 1944 568 Me 262 A-ls and A-2s had been turned out. Because of numerous breakdowns and losses during transfers to the front-line units, only a limited proportion arrived. Meanwhile failures in the electricity supply and problems with turbines and the shortage of parts began to show how threadbare things were becoming due to the incessant air raids. Little changed before the spring of 1945, and thus the dream of having several fighter Geschwader equipped with the jet by March

evaporated. Only at JG 7, KG(J) 54 and Blitzbomber Geschwader KG 51 were Me 262s present in numbers. In January 1945 the QM-General had 108 machines to distribute. Besides 15 for I./JG 7 and 11 for III./JG 7, 36 went to EKG(J), 2 to III./KG(J) 6, 6 to III./KG(J) 54, 3 to the Welter night-fighter commando and 8 to industrial protection flights (ISS 1 and 2).

Deliveries of the Me 262 A-la rose, but not to the levels hoped for. Only 155 aircraft became available for distribution in February. Of these, I. and II. Gruppen at JG 7 received 42, while KG(J) 54 acquired 58. One machine went to JV 44 and another to ferry Geschwader FIUG 1. In March 1945 JG 7 received about 75 new Me 262s and JV 44 ten. The other units had to make do with repairs.

Finally 85 Me 262 A-la training machines remained to be distributed. Besides ten apportioned to III./EJG 2, II./KG(J) 54 got 6, FIUG 1 and JV 44 had two each, Chief-TLR and III./JG 7 received one each. The remaining three were listed for II./EKG 1.

In April 1945 JG 7 and JV 44 took receipt of more than 50 Me 262s, but these were too few to equip all four Gruppen at JG 7. With the termination of
all work on the Bf 109, Fw 190 and Do 335 on 22 March 1945, Me 262 production was forced to the forefront. On Hitler’s order, all production, excepting the Ar 234 jet bomber, was now to be concentrated in the fighter sector. As a result of the war situation, the instruction was only met to a limited extent as work at Messerschmitt and Focke-Wulf on piston-engined fighters had to be completed before winding down, which would last several weeks. A statistical document issued by OKL shows delivery of all versions of the Me 262 from Blitxbomber% to fighters, reconnaissance aircraft and night fighters as at 10 April 1945:

This was how at least 1,049 Me 262 A-ls, A-2s, B-ls and B-2s were distributed within the Luftwaffe. At the war’s end another 400 Me 262s were either ready for delivery, or virtually complete but lacking parts necessary for operational readiness. A further 500 were at a more or less advanced stage of construction. The shortage of engines, radio/radar equipment and increasingly MK 108 guns was making itself felt. J-2 fuel for delivery flights was also critical. The production of smaller jet fighters with a more powerful HeS 011 A-l jet turbine was therefore seen as a rational alternative to the Me 262 A-la.

Besides the inadequate numbers of Blitzbombers, much lighter machines were designed. In the long run dwindling supplies of materials prevented the mass production of machines such as the Me 262. What was needed was a far cheaper solution which could be made operational in large numbers. OKL was thinking here principally of small, nimble aircraft which would be difficult for enemy AA defences, fighter pilots and air gunners to sight. Quite a few ideas were thus in the wind at the end of 1944. Mass producing mixed construction He 132s and giving the Junkers EF 126 its chance were proposals which accompanied thoughts of using the He 162 as a Jabo or arming the future Та 183 with bomb containers. No stone was to be left unturned.

Henschel Hs 132

Without doubt the Hs 132, a new kind of one-man bomber powered by a BMW 003-1 (Hs 132A), Jumo 004 B-2 (Hs 132B) or the far more powerful HeS Oil A-l (Hs 132C), was amongst the most advanced designs at the beginning of 1945. Of mixed materials, the planned machine would have carried the pilot in the prone position and protected by a massive 75-mm armoured glass plate direcdy before him. The pilot s tub was well armoured against hits from below, and could be lowered to enable him to enter and leave the machine comfortably once on the ground. If necessary the pilot had space to bale out through the tub opening. In the course of a wheels-up landing only a relatively small escape hatch on the upper side of the cabin was available, a less favourable option.

In order to reduce Hs 132 production costs, only the fuselage was to be built using expensive light metals. The wings were to be steel or wood. Main armament was to be two MG 15 l/15s with 250 rounds each. A 500-kg bomb could be carried easily below the fuselage. In action as a Jabo against less well – armoured targets two 50-kg bombs in disposable containers could be mounted outboard. If an HeS 011 powerplant had been available, the fixed weaponry would have been four MG 151s and a bomb of up to 1,000 kg. The use of

General arrangement drawing of the Hs 132 A-l. Its planned series production was abandoned as the end neared.

Panzerblitz rockets fired from simple wooden racks was also considered. The development of the Hs 132 began as project study HsP 123 in the summer of 1943. At the beginning of April 1944 a full-scale mock-up of the proposed short- range aircraft was inspected closely by RLM and KdE representatives. At the end of August it was decided that the aircraft should be used as a Jabo.

By November 1944 the fuselage of the first test aircraft was almost complete, and the wind-tunnel studies were carried out at Gottingen aerodynamic test institute (AVA) using a one-sixth scale model. These tests showed that the planned aircraft, at least in its original form, would be nose-heavy, and a prone pilot would probably have had no chance of escaping his narrow cabin in the event of an emergency. Work on the first experimental aircraft was under way by the end of 1944, and the first of these, Hs 132 M-l, was scheduled for testing at Schonefeld in March. After the Henschel design bureau was transferred to Silesia, and the wing/tailpane factory in Saxony damaged by bombing, series production became less likely, and in the spring of 1945 testing was postponed indefinitely.

The Red Army impounded the partially complete but lightly damaged fuselage of Hs 132 Ml at Berlin Schonefeld. As neither the Heinkel turbines nor the wings from Dresden ever arrived because the factories had been captured, the prototype remained a wingless fuselage, as did two other specimens at the Berlin manufacturer. In July 1946 these were discovered in a cellar in their component parts and packed in cases. The fuselage of the third prototype, complete but for wooden wings and tailplane, made the best impression on Russian engineers. Hs 132 M-3 was shipped off to the Soviet Union where its subsequent fate, and that of the other parts, is unknown. Possibly they were scrapped at the end of the 1940s. A similar fate was met by the other light jet, Ju EF 126, due to join the Luftwaffe ranks in the summer of 1945. It was simpler than the Hs 132, and was therefore even more suitable for mass production.

Towards the end of 1943, the SS-RSHA (Reich Main Security Office) began to document all imaginable command structure weakness in the Luftwaffe and aviation industry. Obergruppenfiihrer Kaltenbrunner’s enquiries eventually produced two comprehensive dossiers which concluded, as had been hoped, that ‘the Luftwaffe has lost quantitative and qualitative superiority in the air on account of incorrect measures taken by the RLM.’Most responsible officers at

the SS-RSHA were secretly convinced that only the SS could bring about a favourable change in the air war, only the SS (as they saw it) had the necessary brutality and commitment to score important victories in the shortest time frame. In the summer of 1944 SS-Standartenfuhrer Dr Martin Brustmann, a veteran in aviation affairs, began advocating an ‘SS air arm’. Under SS auspices, extremely fast flying-wing aircraft would be built as soon as possible in factories both above and below ground. In view of the shortage of raw materials SS-WHA had to accept substitutes: steel plating for aluminium, and in particular wood for high performance machines. SS-Obergruppenfiihrer Hans Jiittner, whom Himmler had appointed Deputy Chief of Army Armaments on 21 July 1944, was considered the man to take over air armaments for the SS. He enlisted the cooperation of SS-Hauptsturmfiihrer Kurt May, whose furniture factory at Tamm near Stuttgart would initially produce 12 Ho IXs. It seems that the idea must have been to check its development potential as a fighter. The first 12 would be trainers. After Himmler approved the project, Jiittner started producing the

Ho III, but progress was slow because May was increasingly involved in procuring wood for He 162 production and was in charge of the Stuttgart – Esslingen assembly region for Volksjager wooden parts. Work on the Ho III remained below manufacturing targets and at the beginning of 1945 the Horten design dropped out of the picture.

After Kammler was appointed to head all development, testing and completion of jet aircraft on 27 March 1945, he found he was unable to achieve miracles. Even though all Horten designs being worked on now received greater impetus than before, nothing came of hopes that the Но IX could regain air superiority. Despite the SS s determination to set up a fanatical SS air corps, there was no progress, not even with recruitment. SS losses on all fronts were so high that ensigns commanded companies. Assembling sufficient men suitable for training as fighter pilots was impossible, and even the omnipotent SS service centres were frustrated in their self-appointed task of bringing air armaments under SS control. Nevertheless, in apparent ignorance of how the war was going, at conferences involving the Riistungsstab and Chief-TLR, almost utopian ideas and projects continued to be discussed.

Messerschmitt and Junkers both designed powerful jet bombers in the flying-wing configuration. The Me P 1108, for example, would have been capable of carrying four SC 1800 bombs over long distances.

Once the situation on the Eastern Front had become completely hopeless during April 1945, volunteers for suicide operations – more committed than ever before – made themselves available. Every effort now seemed justified if only to buy a few more days. Whether this might allow time for the ‘Miracle Weapon to be ready was irrelevant. Towards the end of January 1945 when the Red Army had reached the Oder, the Luftwaffe had been told to ‘exhaust every means’ to halt the enemy advance. When the offensive against Berlin began on 16 April 1945, the German pilots took off on previously planned missions against bridge targets.

For this purpose ‘suicide squads’ stood ready at the Altes Lager airfield Magdeburg and on other airfields near Jiiterbog in mid-April 1945. About 40 volunteers with varied operational experience and flying knowledge had gathered there and in the face of the Russian offensive were ready to do and die. Generalmajor Fuchs gave SO Group A their orders on the evening of 15 April after briefly explaining the general situation. In the late afternoon of the next day, pilots of III./JG 3 flying Bf 109 F, G and К fighters led the way east for the suicide squad. The SO Group machines were each armed with a 500-kg bomb. Since there were too few single-engined machines available for all pilots, those without an aircraft were transferred to SO Group B. The objectives were the pontoon bridges over the Oder at Kiistrin and Frankfurt. Young officers and

NCOs dived their aircraft into the targets. The pilots of the escort machines saw impact explosions. These ‘total missions’, as described later in the War Diary, resulted in numerous hits on the bridges, air reconnaissance reporting an 80- metre long gap between sections in one of them.

On 19 April 1945 a total of 36 ‘SO’ single-engine machines took off for the Oder. A number of volunteers fell victim to Soviet fighters or anti-aircraft fire. Because of the prevailing weather conditions and smoke screening the bridges, three pilots could not find the target and returned to base. That night the Luftwaffe Command Staff put a stop to the operations. Since pontoon bridges could be repaired or replaced almost overnight, supply lines to the Red Army forward units were not seriously affected. The operations and their toll in Luftwaffe dead had little effect on events.

The Red Army was now advancing on a broad front from Cottbus towards Berlin and reached the Jiiterbog area on 24 April. The last 13 pilots of SO Groups A and В received orders by telex to transfer to II./SG 2 Immelmann which remained in action under Oberst Rudel to the end. Most men got through to the airfield at Kummer am See in Bohemia and reported to their new unit. Their operations lasted until 7 May.

The concurrent attacks of the Mistel combinations of II./LG 1 resulted mosdy in near misses, the immense groupings of Russian anti-aircraft batteries around the bridges preventing accurate bomb-aiming.

Pilots of anti-tank special Staffeln also apparently participated in what amounted to suicide actions. Many committed themselves to especially risky missions by a simple handshake. Some of the Вії 181 aircraft at Magdeburg were converted into makeshift bombers by removing the right-hand seat, cutting a hole in the fuselage with saw and shears and inserting a tube to hold a 50-kg bomb. Six of the 14 mosdy young pilots who took off on 20 April 1945 failed to return: Leutnant Schwarzer, Fahnriche (Ensigns) Bethe, Hauber and Fleisch – mann, Unteroffiziere Kleemann and Scholl. Some of the Bii 181s from Magdeburg carried two 50-kg bombs, and the pilots dived into the target to ensure that they exploded simultaneously. No further details are known.

owards the end of the 1944, the German night-fighter arm was in crisis.

The efficient He 219 had not been introduced in numbers. Problems also persisted with on-board radar. From 1945 some units could expect to receive more high performance piston aircraft, or Me 262 and Ar 234 jets. Well – equipped night- and all-weather fighters were already under construction, but few thought the time would come when they would be flown.

Radar

Ever larger formations of RAF night bombers over the Reich in 1944 had asked a lot of the night-fighter arm. The Bf 110 and Do 217, and increasingly the Ju 88 G-l and G-6 were too slow and their radar equipment inadequate. The German

command centres, and individual crews, knew how susceptible the radar was to chaff and powerful jamming techniques at which the enemy excelled. Even the most modern versions of the once highly praised FuG 220 Lichtenstein were experiencing interference across the wavebands. Since Allied equipment used centimetric frequencies, all later Ju 88 G-6 night fighters were equipped with an FuG 350Zb to detect this range and so obtain advance warning of the arrival of enemy bombers.

The workshops of Deutsche Lufthansa also handled assembly work of the Wurzburg radar during the war.

The real improvement occurred at the end of 1944 when, after a long and technically difficult phase of research and testing, the first centimetric sets began to filter through to operational units. These were modern 9-cm FuG 240 and FuG 244 radars. Their disguised parabola aerial was fitted alongside the conspicuously long aerials of the SN-2 unit at the nose. The bearing of the target was indicated by a tube on the FuG 240/1 Berlin N1 using a frequency around 3,500 MHz with a maximum range of 9,000 metres; 25 of the order for 100 of these Telefunken devices were delivered by the end of March 1945 and ten installed in Ju 88 G-6s of III./NJG 2 operating from Giitersloh. The unit had a working range of 5,000 metres down to 350 metres, and produced more precise data than the SN-2. The FuG 240/2 was similar to the Berlin N1 but had an improved panoramic screen showing successive sectors. Two different variants, Berlin D1 and D2, were under development, their frequencies ranging from 8,350 to 9,400 MHz.

The N2 and N3 centimetric-waveband equipment never left the laboratories and FuG 240/4 Berlin N4 was produced in 1945 as a contact keeper for wide-ranging night operations or long-distance chases. FuG 244 Bremen 0 had a powerful beam transmitter for the longer ranges to be expected in future. The equipment was fighter and more compact than the Berlin series and was scheduled to replace SN-2 radar within a few months, but a reported problem was masking of the field by the tailplane and wings. The single set of 100 ordered was at Diepensee under test early in April 1945.

Relatively few Ju 88 G-6s were fitted experimentally with Berlin N1 radar from the end of 1944 for operations over northern Germany. Their use contributed to ten RAF aircraft shot down by the end of March 1945. A few
others from the Gruppenstabe at I. and II./NJG 4 also carried the FuG 240. This provided the Luftwaffe with an on-board radar of equal value to Allied developments in the night-fighter sphere, supplemented by a system of field observers, air reconnaissance and radar.

After the war took an even less favourable turn for Germany at the end of 1944, the Riistungsstab made greater efforts to design an aircraft for Reich air defence which could be turned out faster, and in greater numbers. The development of the He 162, based on revised plans for a more costly jet fighter, was seen as the solution. In the medium term better equipped and armed fighters, if possible with an HeS Oil A-l turbine, would take their place alongside the Me 262. All known aircraft manufacturers now became involved in the various attempts to produce stopgap designs for a powerful, single-turbine jet aircraft. As might have been expected the engines could not be supplied. The ambitious project came to grief before the first prototypes were available, and only models and a full-scale mock-up in wood served Chief-TLR and the Riistungsstab for inspection purposes. The 1 TL Fighter was never actually thought of as a replacement for the Me 262 A-la, but rather as a way to stretch the available resources as far as possible. It would consume considerably less fuel than the twin Jumo 004 В engines of the Me 262 A-la, and therefore economise on the
restricted fuel supplies: the same applied to the raw materials required for series production. As there was a limit to aluminium availability, a hard look was taken at easily manufactured steel plating and possibly wooden parts for various sections of the aircraft structure. In submitting their suggestions, firms had to take this into account.

Chief-TLR staff had great hopes for the light Ju EF 126 Jabo at the beginning of 1945. The Junkers Elli was one of the few new ideas at Junkers still being worked on with determination in April 1945. Ju EF 126 was a completely revolutionary design for a light, wood-built single-seat Jabo. Initially it had a fully retractable undercarriage, but diminishing resources eventually argued for the skid. By 14 February 1945 the rudder and weight calculations had been made. The machine, due for mass production in 1945, had a take-off weight of 2,800 kg (6,170 lb), 110 kg (243 lb) of this being the armament. It was to take-off using two rocket boosters or by compressed-air catapult launch. All development work was carried out at Junkers Dessau. The performance calculations gave a top speed of780 km/hr, or 680 km/hr (485/420 mph) with an external load. Powerplant was the Argus As 109-044 pulse jet used for the V-l flying bomb. Operational ceiling would be at least 7,000 metres (23,000 ft), range relatively short at 320 km (200 miles).

Junkers wanted to arm the new Jabo with 2-cm weapons (MG 151/20s each with 180 rounds) which would be housed level with the cockpit as with the Volksjager. Two sets of six Panzerblitz rockets would be carried in wooden racks below the wings or a firing installation for WK 14s fitted. Racks for spin – stabilised rockets were designed and manufactured by Kurt Heber GmbH at Osterrode/Harz. Besides the rockets a 500-kg bomb-load in four AB 70 or two larger AB 250 containers was envisaged.

According to a conference note of December 1944 progress on the Hs 132 did not take the course wanted by the Chief-TLR because of planning delays. The general war situation would not allow a completion of the first prototypes until at least mid-1945. After the Main Development Commission (EHK) had expressed doubts about the performance data of the EF 126 in January, the General der Kampfflieger was obliged to ask DVT to review the figures for Elli submitted by Junkers.

Work on the prototype was halted from February. After an air raid on 16 January, and another on Dessau on the night of 8 March, the Jumo factory was moved out to Muldenstein. At that time a mock-up of the Ju EF 126 existed but the prototypes ordered by the Chief-TLR were forgotten as the fronts then crumbled. The Volkssturm were called into Dessau on 10 April to man the outlying tank obstructions. Work in the development bureau was quiet but the arrival of RLM officials at Dessau in mid-April with orders to convert 20 Ju 290s to long-range bombers brought an unexpected brief period of relief from the prevailing indolence. On 21 April American tanks rolled past the development office on the way to Dessau town centre.

After a few chaotic days while the Americans were plundering the factory and removing documents, the situation quietened and in the summer of 1945, when US troops left, the Russian occupying force built the first prototype after taking over the Junkers works. The EF 126 was tested in the Soviet Union, where the fifth prototype made a maiden flight using a Russian engine on 16 March 1947. Testing continued into 1948 when the design was abandoned.

Along with Alexander Lippisch, the brothers Reimar and Walter Horten were the most influential proponents of the flying-wing principle in Germany. The various Nurfliigel gliders, and also the later twin-jet Но IX, predestined the development team to create far larger aircraft. The work was headed by engineer Naul, aeronautical designers Bollmann and Briinne designed the wings and Piitzer the undercarriage.

In the autumn of 1944 an RLM conference with Horten, Junkers and Messerschmitt called for far more powerful aircraft able to reach targets on the US East Coast and return to Europe without refuelling. AJ1 design offices became involved. At a three-day conference at RLM subsequently it was admitted that neither the Ju 287 with enlarged range had that radius of action, nor did the aircraft planned by Horten and Messerschmitt, although the Horten design had a 60 per cent greater range than all its competitors. Although no contract had been awarded by November 1944, Horten decided to develop the

Но VIII for preliminary tests. Exact details could not be provided to the RLM without the mathematical data and wind-tunnel tests. As provisional engine plant for the future Но VIII it was planned to integrate into the wing six Argus As 10 motors with long-shaft propellers. Using the development details of earlier designs, Horten believed the work could be finished within six months. With a relatively light wing loading of only 53 kg/sq. m (1,250 lb/sq. ft), Но VIII was to be the training aircraft for the heavier, but almost equal sized ultra-long range bomber. Work began in mid-December 1944 and took shape surprisingly quickly during the next three months.

On 12 March 1945 Goring instructed Horten and the commander of Kommando IX to build the first long-range flying-wing bomber, but set no firm completion date. However, this was the order for the Но VIII. When US troops arrived in April 1945, the design work was almost 100 per cent complete, the first

fuselages 50 per cent ready. On 12 March 1945, SS-FHA Amt X is said to have ordered the Но XVIII built. By 23 March the Horten Works had drawn up a project outline for presentation in Berlin, and work on the Но VIII developed from the Но XVIII long-range aircraft continued to the end of March 1945. This three-seater would have had a maximum range of 13,000 kilometres (8,000 miles), inclusive of a 1,000 kilometre reserve. With four SC or SD 1000 bombs, Horten considered that an operational range of 4,000 kilometres was possible, with only one bomb considerable more. Six Jumo 004B turbines were planned to be installed in the wings after calculations showed that the alternative of four BMW 003s would be under-powered. Fuel tanks would hold 16 tonnes. It was also considered giving the Но XVIII two efficient propeller-turbines. A payload of 4 tonnes would have provided an all-up weight of 32 tonnes. For an attack on the United States the bomb-load would have been reduced to one tonne or less to provide an operational reserve of fuel. For short-range work the

bombs would have been carried in a central bay below the fuselage and in two others between the engine blocks and outer wing. On long-range operations part of the bomb bay space would have been given over to disposable fuel tanks. The aircraft could have been refuelled by a Ju 290 in flight as originally planned. Top speed in horizontal flight was thought to be 820 km/hr (510 mph), maximum possible speed of the steel skeleton/wood configuration 900 km/hr (560 mph). Since considerable preliminary work remained to be done as Allied ground forces approached, on 1 April 1945 the Chief-TLR transferred the development to the Harz, but when the time came to place the firm order, the Allies had overrun practically all production centres. In the last few days of the war most of those involved in the Но XVIII projects gave their lives in the defence of the Third Reich. The Но XVIII and the smaller Но VIII remained incomplete. Neither Kammler nor the SS had been able to force through either project as the Reich collapsed.

A second gigantic project, the four-jet Development Aircraft (Entwicklungs – flugzeug) EF 130, the competitor to all designs (including the Но XVIII) submitted to the Chief-TLR, had a powerplant of four HeS Oil jet turbines. The estimated 38-tonne aircraft had a 24-metre (78 ft) wingspan and a large wing surface of 120 square metres (1,300 sq. ft). Because of lack of capacity at Junkers at the beginning of 1945, it was transferred at least partially to DFS. In contrast to the Horten development, the EF 130 would have had a metal fuselage and large wooden wings. The bomb bay had capacity for 4 tonnes and several armoured fuel tanks. The three-seater cockpit was designed as a roomy pressure cabin from where the gunner operated the two remote-controlled defensive barbettes in the fuselage. Initially it was planned to fit four HeS 011 turbines. These were not sufficiently reliable at the beginning of 1945 and four BMW 003 C-l engines were considered instead but were scarce. Top speed would have been 950 km/hr (590 mph) but the maximum flight even with only one 1-tonne bomb was only 7,500 kilometres (4,650 miles), not enough to reach the US coast and return. The EF 130 was abandoned in March 1945 by the Chief-TLR in favour of the Horten design.

Exhortations to step up the pace to build a large jet bomber in March 1945 resulted from the dreams of a leadership blind to the unstoppable approach of defeat. Although no high-value construction materials were available, many lives were sacrificed to force through a senseless project. The excavation of ever more galleries and underground production centres in the spring of 1945 led to an until then unimaginable death rate amongst concentration camp prisoners and forced labourers engaged on the work, but the SS held firm. Not until a day or so before Allied forces reached the bombed-out factories or tunnels in which production had been concentrated did the last SS men give up, throwing down their weapons and leaving to their own devices the slaves who had survived.

Berlin had been declared a ‘fortress’ on 1 February 1945 and martial law was introduced on 9 April. Anything usable as a weapon was made ready. All available

aircraft were to take part in a low-level attack in the Baruth area. These included 14 pilots who had volunteered for suicide missions. Their motives were various: many had lost family or a partner in the air raids, some wanted to save Germany, others were lost for an explanation.

On 1 April 1945 a number of volunteers in the Berlin Brandenburg area were sent to Magdeburg-Slid and given special identity papers as part of 8. Panzerjagd-Sonderstaffel, a Luftwaffe special anti-tank squadron. Several Вії 181 were prepared on a former Deutsche Lufthansa airfield with construction hangars, on or about 15 April 1945. This low-wing aircraft with dual side-by – side seating was actually a trainer and therefore unarmed. A Hirth HM 500 piston engine provided a speed a little over 200 km/hr or up to 350 km/hr (125/220 mph) in a steep glide. These aircraft would now be used in the anti­tank role at very low level. In the assembly hangar each wing was fitted with two wooden racks to hold a total of four Panzerfaust rockets. The weapons were fired by tugging on a steel wire leading over or below the wing to the control stick. The rudder was steel plated since in tests with the Panzerfaust it tended to fracture. A simple circular sight mounted on the engine cowling served as a primitive aiming device. At 80 metres range and 100 metres height it was possible to draw a bead on enemy tanks and fire down on them obliquely with some accuracy.

Apart from courage the operation required skill in low-level flying since the Bii 181 was intended to engage tanks with all four rockets during a shallow dive close to the ground. An alternative was an almost horizontal approach followed by a fast turn away. A third tactic involved an approach at less than 50 metres height, rise to 50 metres just short of the target, depress the nose, fire the Panzerfaust rockets and then use whatever ground cover was available to get clear. The aircraft might be hit by anti-aircraft fire at any time between the approach and the escape. Ground troops would also respond with light arms fire if not sheltering from splinter bombs. German losses were disproportional to the number of Soviet tanks destroyed.

Operation Bienenstock was born of despair in the second half of April 1945. This idea was to attack Allied aircraft by Luftwaffe sabotage operations against airfields using explosives or the Panzerfaust. One such squad headed for Weis in a decrepit lorry to find 16 new Fw 190 D-9s with Jumo 213 E-l engines needing maintenance work. Orders came to fly the machines to Halle/Saale with virtually no ammunition. No enemy aircraft were seen and all arrived safely bar Oberleutnant Merkel, who baled out shortly after take-off when his aircraft caught fire. From Halle the 15 survivors reached Wallersdorf airfield. Here the unit commander was advised that his sabotage squad could not be used as ground troops, but shortly afterwards American fighter-bombers attacked the airfield and destroyed their aircraft.

Six selected pilots were sent along the Autobahn to the nearest aerodrome. After surviving an air raid at Rosenheim in the railway station bunker the men got to Salzburg where they found various single and two-seater aircraft drawn up in large numbers on an airfield. They were informed that these light aircraft were to be made operational against the Allies.

On 5 May the men were assembled and received orders to cross the Alps to attack Allied bombers parked on airfields in northern Italy. The following night it snowed and the operation was cancelled. Another special mission was ordered. The men were arranged in small groups. Feldwebel Hans Unmack, who had flown 129 missions, was given a young pilot to assist in navigation to the target. They flew their Fw 44 at tree-top height towards Franconia. Near Nuremberg they easily avoided American anti-aircraft fire by dodging between the bursts – the guns could not adjust to the slow-flying aircraft. When the fuel ran out they landed in pasture in the Steigerwald. After sinking their explosives in a nearby stream they set off on foot for the American lines, and Unmack at least got there.

On 16 April 1945 some of the pilots who had outlived the 7 April suicide mission were ordered to Pocking to be decorated by Oberst Hajo Hermann with the Iron Cross First Class or the German Cross. Further ramming attacks were no longer possible because of the lack of suitable aircraft. There were no useful machines at Pocking. Fifty men now moved off to Neubiberg and then Fiirstenfeldbruck near Munich where they discovered at least four Panzerfaust – armed Bu 181s and other training machines including three new Si 204 D-l night fighter-bombers. A number of flight instructors flew the converted Bii 181 anti-tank aircraft from Trebbin, all but one being shot down by Russian ground fire. In the evening Panzerjagdkommando General Keller was pitched into the fray south of Trebbin. This unit was made up of Aviation Hitler Youth. Next morning they were wiped out. While Goring set off from Berlin for the Alps along the last highway still open from the capital, it was left to flight instructors and pupils with Panzerfausts to hold off a vasdy superior enemy.

On 27 April three sabotage squads left Fiirstenfeldbruck by air for Metz with explosive charges to destroy parked Allied heavy bombers. One of the three machines crashed shortly after take-off. Nothing more was ever heard of the other two Si 204 D-ls. It is possible that the pilots made the right decision for themselves and their passengers. Four Bii 181s were sent to Schwandorf to attack parked American aircraft. Other crews were selected to blow up the bridges over the Danube at Regensburg. Unfortunately it was not known at Fiirstenfeldbruck that engineers had already done the job. All men sent on the missions disappeared. Two Fi 156s with highly decorated pioneer troops aboard crashed when the undercarriage legs broke during landing on swampland near Dillingen behind the American lines. Two men escaped and avoided captivity, at least for the time being.

On 26 April Bienenstock commandos from Fiirstenfeldbruck and Pocking assembled at Zollfeld airfield near Klagenfurt for an operation to attack parked Allied bombers in northern Italy. Forty small aircraft and 80 crew were on hand. In the first mission, involving 20 pilots, only two crews returned to Klagenfurt, and both had a man dead or injured. The target for the attacks had been changed at the last minute from Italy to Hungary. Further desperate flights followed on 5 May to Papa in Hungary and next day to Warasdin. The few surviving machines took off on their final missions on 8 May 1945. Meanwhile Oberst Hermann had been advised of the capitulation by telex. After parading his men for the last time he disbanded the unit. Nearly all crews succeeded in flying, driving or walking to the Allied lines or directly to Germany. In the north, the Hitler Youth remnants of Panzerjagdkommando General Keller retreated before the Red Army towards Schwerin, and from there to Flensburg. Together with General Keller, his staff, some senior NSFK leaders and 150 Fliegerkorps men, they surrendered to the British on the road to North Frisia.