Category Last Days of the Luftwaffe

any though not all OKL hopes were vested in the He 162 Volksjager from the summer of 1944. This new machine was meant to transform Germany’s fortunes in the air from 1945. Together with the Me 262 this jet fighter of the simplest construction would, in the eyes of the Luftwaffe chiefs, re-establish the Luftwaffe in the skies above the Reich.

The available fighter Geschwader equipped with Bf 109 G-14 and K-4, and the Fw 190 A-9 and D-9, were no longer able to make inroads into the enemy’s aerial hordes. Fuel shortages limited operational opportunities for the daylight units over the Reich itself. The solution for the future was to be quality instead of quantity. Only aircraft superior to the Allied machines could win significant victories and so seize back, at least for a time, the initiative. What was necessary here was not only a Luftwaffe with more powerful aircraft, but the fanaticism of its younger pilots. This was the thinking behind the creation of the so-called Volksjager Geschwader equipped mainly with the He 162 A-l or A-2.

When the fortunes of war began to favour the Allies, National Socialist ideology became the important thing for those who did not shrink from replacing proper training with fanaticism. More frequent thought was given to forming new elite units such as the fighter Geschwader Hitler Jugend. Superior technology paired with the uncompromising use of pilots was to guarantee air supremacy over the

Reich. Surviving a mission was gradually replaced by the concept of the extreme operation and ‘self sacrifice’. Goring spoke out against these unsoldierly intentions, recognising that the reservoir of future pilots had to be protected against the designs of Himmler and the WafFen-SS. He feared moreover that his personal standing with Hitler would be lost if the SS succeeded in taking over part of the Reich air defence. For this reason in the summer of 1944 the idea matured of training very young volunteers in the classic manner for subsequent drafting to JG 1 Oesauy from which developed the Nachwuchsgruppe (recruit group) Oesau proposed by Oberst Hannes Traudoft, former Hider Youth leader and classmate of General Dietrich Peltz and Wernher von Braun. Traudoft advocated forming an elite fighter Geschwader of volunteers, principally from the Hider Youth, using Flieger-HJ trained youths as pilots in the Reich air defence. Although this did not come to fruition, members of the Flieger-HJ were used almost as a fighter pilot reserve once they had successfully passed out from glider training.

In the general collapse, many long-term plans could no longer be realised, and this included the Volkssturmgeschwader. Personnel of JG 1 at Sagan were called upon to assist in the formation of a lesser Volkssturmstaffel. The idea of forming such a Staffel using the HJ came to nothing because JG 1 could not be re-trained for the He 162 A-1 and A-2 in time, and too few aircraft would be available. Furthermore the general situation prevented the conclusion of the ‘Special Purposes’courses, and the loss ofTrebbin and Sagan rendered these plans purposeless.

Chapter Seven

This flying machine designed by Bachem at Waldsee was basically a manned rocket, a term which shows the direction the planning was taking. Because of the very tight raw materials situation it was a surprise that, despite Julia, the Natter should now arrive on the scene. Although vaunted as disposable, after a mission the main components of the aircraft could be saved by parachute. Natter – pilot training was only 20 hours and limited to learning how to steer the machine and fly it into the enemy bomber fleet. The Waffen-SS was very keen on the Natter because of its speed, while the SS-FHA believed that the rocket aircraft could be used in bad weather, poor visibility and at night.

Everything was to be done to make Natter a lethal opponent for enemy bombers. The design of Gerat N, the title of the original rough sketch, was presented to the SS-FHA. Work to manage the technical side was assigned by OKL and the Chief-TLR. From the shadows the SS provided the logistical support: the SS-FHA (Amt X) was responsible for personnel, transport and other materials. Above all OKL brought to the project the technicaland tactical lessons learnt from the Me 163. Amt X was responsible for SS-Sonder – kommando ‘N’ as well as the Natter work group.

It was not very long before the Sonderflugzeuge (‘special aircraft’) Develop­ment Commission expressed grave reservations about machines such as the Natter. Director Robert Liisser, previously at Fieseler, was appointed by the Commission to head Biiro Liisser whose objective was to ensure that the Natter was quickly ready for series production. He was also responsible for maintaining contact with the individual research centres. In the late summer of 1944 he resigned to work with Heinkel on the Julia since in his opinion the vertical launch of the Natter was far less suitable for engaging enemy bombers than the less dangerous catapult launch of the Heinkel machine.

Liisser s departure caused a crisis for the Natter. In the short term, the Chief – TLR could find no suitable replacement for Liisser, nor were sufficient technical staff available for the project. Although the tactical possibilities were relatively good and the financial investment not large, the development of Julia, and a litde later Natter, were suspended by the Commission, although apparently the order was ignored and work proceeded as though nothing had been said. Through the influence of the SS-FHA the number of staff at Bachem Werke plus the SS special commando rose in stages to 475, and then 600, although there was still a shortage of aeronautical engineers to speed up the work on the Natter.

At the beginning of September 1944 flight testing of the Natter was laid down as follows. After successful tests with the Liegekranich and Habicht gliders by the NSFK, the DVT would make a thorough evaluation of the ‘flying-while-lying’ position by means of the Berlin B9 and FS 17. The Reich Gliding Training School atTrebbin would convert Kranich gliders from the upright to the recumbent-pilot position. A short flight programme would investigate the practical flight possibilities. At Trebbin, starts by winch and inclined ramps would also be tested. Experienced test-parachutists from the Rechlin E5 department would make several jumps from a Natter fuselage (classified as risky). A DFS 230 would be used as a Natter-Mistel to see how the Natter behaved when air-launched.

At the Travemiinde test centre ways were sought to save the lives of future Natter pilots by a new kind of ejector seat. In mid-1944 it was not clear how this could be effected for a pilot in the recumbent position. The engine tests were to be completed with the help of the Walter Werke, where the Natter engine had also been installed experimentally into an Me 163. During tests at altitude, courageous DVL specialists were to investigate if it were possible to reach 10,000 metres (33,000 ft) at a rate of climb of 200 m/sec (650 ft/sec) without oxygen equipment, remain for 30 seconds at the operational height and then endure the life-saving fall at over 250 m/sec (820 ft/sec). After the conclusion of the preliminaries an He 177 would be set up as a Natter-cainer to extend the radius of operations although as a rule the Natter would be ground-launched to intercept incoming marauders. These tests and firing the rockets in the nose were seen as extremely important.

The pilot’s position now changed from Erich Bachem’s first sketch, which had the pilot recumbent, to a crouching figure and then finally a pilot seated in the normal manner. The operational flight-test programme would consist of only five unmanned starts from a ramp, followed by 12 manned starts. For the subsequent firing programme, 10 Natters were planned.

Initially OKL wanted to instal a battery of RZ 65 spin-stabilised rockets of

65- mm calibre in the nose. The tests showed that these were woefully inaccurate – at the Tarnewitz test centre against a Bristol Blenheim fuselage at 200 metres range only one light hit was achieved from 20 rockets fired. The 19 misses were

up to 20 metres wide. Accordingly the RZ 65 idea was dropped and two MK108 guns considered instead, but the final armament remained long in doubt.

For trials of the new fighter and night flying by KdE test pilots or operational fliers at least 30 Natters were to be made available. In September 1944 an order was issued to build 15 ‘BP 20 aircraft’. The work was to be forced ahead by SS – Obersturmfuhrer Flessner, an engineer recovering from a wound, who began work with Bachem on 20 September 1944. As Himmler’s special charge d’affaires, SS-Obersturmfuhrer Gerhard Schaller was sent to the Heuberg to observe the initial Natter vertical starts.

By October 1944 the final Natter shape had crystallised. The completion diagrams of the BP 20, meanwhile re-designated 8-349 by the RLM, consisted of a disposable nose segment, a re-usable central fuselage section and the tailplane with rocket motor, both the latter being parachute-equipped. Propelled by an HWK 109-509 A-2 rocket motor, the machine was designed for sustained speeds up to 800 km/hr (500 mph) and a top speed of 1,100 km/hr (680 mph). Launch was to be from a tower or vertical ramp. Four SR 34 (later known as SG 34) rockets were to be located in pairs on either side of the fuselage to assist take-off. Before these could be used, a long list of technical and constructional problems had to resolved.

Testing of the first three Natter machines was set for 16 October 1944 between Bachem and the DFS at Ainring/Salzburg. The first airworthy unit, BM-1, was tried under tow to examine its general performance in flight, after which the tug pilot detached the Natter to parachute down. The unmanned second machine, BM-2, was taken up by an He 111 H and released by parachute. The third Natter had a tricycle undercarriage and could be tested extensively in flight. Bachem finally received the official contract for the Natter in the second half of October, after which steps were taken to build the launch tower at Karlshagen the following month, but the test centre was over-booked and an alternative in Mecklenburg was sought for ‘Test Group N The centre would be used for weapons testing for the future operational versions. Armament initially would be two MK 108 guns, 24 R4M or 48 Fohn rockets in the fuselage. While the final choice of gun was still under consideration, the fuselage of the fourth test machine, M4, was fitted with two MK 108s for trials, although as mentioned it could not be fitted as a standard to the series run because the weapon was in short supply and those there were went to the Me 262 A-la. The alternative was the spin-stabilised R4M rocket. The firm of Curt Hebei designed a lightweight firing assembly to fit 34 rockets into the Natter nose, and a Natter fuselage was brought to Reichenbach aerodrome firing ground at Schussenried for the tests. The Chief-TLR considered that the armament should be 28 and not the 34 R4Ms requested. From the late summer of 1944 work was carried out on the so- called ‘barrel-battery’, a fixed assemblage of 64 MK 108 barrels, this number being later reduced to 32 to save weight.

In a report from the Chief-TLR dated at the end of October 1944, differences of opinion were discussed respecting the operational possibilities of the Natter. Most experts believed that a Natter would be less at risk passing through an enemy bomber formation than a traditional piston-engined fighter. To shoot down a four-engined bomber it would require 60 rounds of З-cm ammunition fired in a long burst from two MK 108 guns, or 28 R4M air-to-air rockets, or fire from the 32 barrels of the barrel-battery. Range was between 200 and 500 metres for the MK 108,400 metres for the R4M and 250 metres for the barrel-battery.

The provisional firing trials at Schussenried on 10 November 1944 showed that the arrangement of the weapons installation was unsatisfactory for series production and a few days later the files for the MK 108 and barrel-battery were made available to DFS for further appraisal. It had been decided not to proceed with the R4M since these rockets were needed for other jet aircraft. More testing followed on 15 November. Ninety MK 108 rounds fired at a range of 100 metres gave a group of 0.7 square metres. After a revision by Rheinmetall the weapons installation worked flawlessly. It was also announced that day that Rheinmetall would need a Natter fuselage as soon as possible for the installation of a barrel – block drum from which 46 Fohn projectiles could be fired in a salvo.

The first two trial machines were to be completed by the end of November 1944 by Ebnerspacher of Esslingen near Stuttgart. On 30 October three Natter variants were being worked on. Variant A had a top speed of 880 km/hr (550 mph) though its operational ceiling of9,000 metres (29,500 ft) was inferior to Variant B. Variant C matched the speed and had longer range. After receiving the documents and several favourable opinions, on 27 November the Jagerstab ordered the first 50 trial aircraft. These were not to be suicide machines. Even in an attack at point-blank range, the substantial cabin armour would give the pilot a good chance of surviving defensive fire from numerous 0.5-inch guns. The Natter could operate up to a ceiling of 16,000 metres (52,500 ft). After the attack the pilot would dive to 3,000 metres (10,000 ft) from where he and the machine would descend to the ground by their respective canopies.

In December 1944 the first prototype, BP 20 M-l, was completed with a trolley undercarriage while the second and third prototypes had a fixed chassis. The first vertical start of an unmanned Natter, assisted by take-off rockets, took place on 8 December. Despite the unequal thrust of the four rockets the machine rose to 700 metres. On 14 December 1944 the first successful tow was made at Neuburg/Danube. Flight testing of the first two prototypes showed that the first assessments had been good although the aircraft attitude at release left something to be desired. The first vertical launch attempt on the Heuberg at Stelten am Kalten Markt used an upright start rail attached to a tower of metal scaffolding. On 18 December 1944 the test machine burned to a crisp when the arrest gear failed to disengage.

On 21 December Bachem Werke received a telex from the SS-FHA’s SS-Standartenfuhrer Fritz Czolbe, who had approved the highest priority for the Natter development, requesting all SS service centres, authorities and firms to support the project. The next day on a second unmanned launch the aircraft reached 750 metres despite an engine defect. The tail canopy deployed, the dummy pilot fell out and the rear segment of the aircraft descended to the ground by parachute. Acceleration during the launch procedure was calculated at 2.2G. The rate of climb was 700 km/hr (435 mph).

Progress was visible, and on 28 December 1944 SS-Untersturmfiihrer Minzloff of the SS Propaganda Company took photographs of the Natter to present Himmler with a more reliable impression of the new aircraft. Next day SS-Obersturmfuhrer Walter Klockner reported that the development did not have the speed specified by the SS-FHA. The head of Amt X was responsible for the work. Despite his influence, the frequent requests for technical personnel for the firm of Bachem Waldsee had not been met satisfactorily. The starting rockets continued to give problems. SS-Obersturmfuhrer Heinz Flessner, engineer and commander of SS-Sonderkommando ‘N’, made repeated demands for fuel for transport vehicles, but even everyday items such

as service insignia for the Sonderkommando and special identity documents were most difficult to procure.

At the Heuberg meanwhile the vertical take-off trials continued. The third start on 28 December 1944 was made primarily to test the booster rockets. Prototype BP 20 M-17 was the first to reach an altitude of 3,000 metres, but the machine was destroyed in a heavy landing due to partial parachute failure. From 4 January 1945 orders were given that Natter trials were to be carried out at Neuburg/Danube, Horsching/Linz and Ainring/Salzburg, but there was nothing to be gained at this stage by rushing the development, and a second launch tower was planned at Ohrdruf in Thuringia to match the first at Heuberg. This work was under the direction of SS-Untersturmfiihrer Bodensteth. A shortage of200 sacks of cement for the foundations of the Ohrdruf tower caused substantial delay.

On 5 January 1945 the Riistungsstab cancelled the Natter and next day the Me 163. Testing of the Me 263 (Ju 248) was to proceed. At Bachem the

cancellation notice was not taken very seriously, since the He P 1077 Julia had been dealt the same blow. All these projects had been pursued provisionally as ideas to be looked at within the framework of existing possibilities. A fire at Brodenbach where the starting rockets were manufactured caused a bottleneck in supply in January, however. To alleviate the situation, several simple wooden launch trolleys were devised to do away with fixed emplacements. Obersturm – fiihrer Klockner of the SS-Sonderkommando asked Obersturmfiihrer Kersten at SS-FHA Amt X for more men and a few cars and lorries. These were necessary for the transport of materials and supplies between Waldsee and the Heuberg.

By 20 January the requested workforce had still not arrived at Waldsee nor the supply of coke to heat the Bachem factory. The MK 108 barrel-battery and Fohn honeycomb launcher were to have been tested from 23 January on the Heuberg but, despite all efforts by Amt X, the ammunition failed to arrive. There was also a shortage of cement needed to improve the ramp on the Heuberg. Towing trials continued, the tug used on 27 January being the DFS aircraft He 111 H-6 (DG#RA).

Meanwhile the SS-Sonderkommando and Bachem Werke were working all out for the imminent Operation Crocus. This involved setting up ten mast ramps and preparing 15 Natter A-Is each with a Fohn launcher in the nose. Each installation fired a single rocket from a honeycomb of 24 cells. Most of the munitions for the first operation had not arrived by 27 January. The first firing position was set up close to the Autobahn at Holzmaden. The first Natter used against the Allied bombers was to be launched on 1 March 1945.

The machine factory at Esslingen was to supply the first three mast ramps by 20 February. After the only available Natter at Neuburg/Danube had been damaged, the flight test group was transferred from there to DFS at Ainring/Salzburg. Another free-flight machine had been completed and fitted out for tests while work continued round the clock on the Ba 349 A-l for Operation Crocus. It was hoped to have the first machine ready by 17 February; at one new machine per day the last would be ready by 3 March. To help out, the Waffen-SS sent another 12 technical workers, and Bachem Werke also received 11 experienced carpenters and mechanics.

An extraordinary effort was invested in Operation Crocus. Besides the urgently needed 6,500 litres of fuel for road vehicles, 2,500 litres of C-fuel and 5,000 litres ofT-fuel were required for the rockets. SS-Obersturmfiihrer Strasser was to obtain all this at the earliest opportunity using a Waffen-SS tanker. SS- Obersturmfiihrer Flessner attempted to procure at least seven tonnes of brown coal to keep the work going at Waldsee.

On 14 February works pilot Unteroffizier Hans Ziibert took off in prototype M-8 for the first free flight in a Natter Ba 349. He released from the He 111 H tug at 5,500 metres and began a free glide. His speed at 3,600 metres was 600 km/hr (12,000 ft/370 mph) and he landed safely in a soft field near the banks of the Danube at Neuburg. Test report No. 11 of 22 February mentions another unmanned test machine, M-22, due to fly that day, and M-23 scheduled for a manned flight from the ramp 24 hours later, but both starts were cancelled when M-22 was damaged. A problem-free launch with complete separation and dummy pilot ejection followed on 25 February. By the end of the month, the SS preparation for Crocus had advanced, due mainly to the arrival at the Waldsee workshops of an expert in electrical supply and heating from SS-FHA Amt X. Latent problems with the Natter steering and rocket motor were being overcome by the Siemens LGW (Aviation Equipment Works) and specialists sent by Walter Werke respectively.

Early in 1945 Major Edmund Gartenfeld, Kommandeur I./KG 200, began the groundwork for the Crocus unit. This included selecting the operational airfield and setting up the ground infrastructure. A flak officer was appointed for target finding and aircrew instruction. The aim now was for a test operation of at least ten Natter over the Stuttgart area by 20 March at the latest. A larger operation would have to await completion of the Ba 349 B-l. This variant, of which only one machine was being built when work was halted, had longer range than the A-l and double the armament.

On 1 March technical development of the Natter was handed over to the Luftwaffe Flak Development Division in close cooperation with the Waffen- SS. That day a first manned Natter launch was scheduled on the Ochsenkopf. That morning veteran Luftwaffe pilot Lothar Sieber climbed into Natter M-23 upright at the starting tower. Sieber had been at Bachem as a ‘test pilot’since 22 December 1944 and knew the risk he was taking. The former Leutnant Sieber had been reduced to the ranks for an offence against military discipline by a court-martial in the Moscow Luftgau jurisdiction. He had survived numerous dangerous assignments subsequently. At the end of November 1944 after one such mission Generaloberst Ritter von Greim had given Sieber his own Iron Cross First Class as a token of his admiration and promoted him to Ober – leutnant. Sieber was the world’s first pilot to achieve a vertical take-off but it cost his life. He may have dislocated a cervical vertebra as he threw off the cockpit cover in an attempt to bale out after losing orientation in low cloud. In the Waffen-SS Sonderkommando report of 2 March, SS-Obersturmfuhrer Schaller thought that he might have wrenched his head against the cockpit cover at launch. Because of this tragedy it was decided to suspend manned vertical take­offs until an almost fully automatic Natter operation was possible. On 8 March, M13 flew an unmanned automated test followed on 10 March by M-34, and it was hoped that the A-l series production could now proceed.

At the beginning of March, M-25 was ready for use as the second manned aircraft with rocket motor, M-33 would be the unmanned test. Other Natters such as M-31 were being equipped with Siemens LGW steering. Of these aircraft, seven were launched from the 9.5 metre ‘telephone pole’ ramp, the first being the unmanned M-32. Apart from testing on the Ochsenkopf, work to make the Natter operational at the beginning of March 1945 went full out despite the severe shortage of rocket fuel. Through the SS-FHA, Bachem had attempted to obtain a higher priority for raw materials for Natter construction and the works’ cars and lorries, and more rocket fuel to enable flight testing to be continued, and to plan the first operational missions. On Kammler’s orders, Sonderkommando ‘N’ was to receive all conceivable support. Intensive
construction of the Natter continued at Hirth and in the Thuringian Forest, but the extra workers requested urgently by Bachem from the Luftwaffe and SS never found their way to Waldsee.

For the imminent Crocus operation, the SS was planning to use machines M-51 to M-65 against Allied bombers over Wurttemberg. On 8 March at a Natter conference attended by representatives from OKL and the Chief-TLR and aides of the Reichsfiihrer-SS it was agreed that the Luftwaffe would take over management of the project because the SS-FHA lacked technical expertise and Natter trials ‘in action in the coming weeks would not be possible in view of the existing problems. How the situation on the ground would look then was anybody’s guess. On 13 March Himmler ordered, with immediate effect, that enough fuel must be made available for 20 Natter starts monthly. Should all go well until July 1945 he would argue for much more, although in any case there was enough C-fuel and T-fuel for the next six months, he thought.

Probably the last interim report on the Natter development was that dated 23 March 1945 mentioning the Malsi equipment which had a target-finding range of 21 kilometres up to a ceiling of 12 kilometres.

A Natter launch was to proceed in the following manner. On detection of the enemy approach by the flak command post the director equipment would be tuned

in. On receipt of the signal the Natter pilot would switch on his on-board systems, flying controls and turbine. He would then report himself ready with the words: ‘Meldung, fertigf (‘Announcement: ready!’)- When the attack bearing had been calculated, the ramp would be traversed accordingly. On the command ‘Achtung 1’, the crew would secure the chassis and take cover. The pilot would then unlock the autopilot and code in the flying time to target on the clock. After working up the motor slowly for four to five seconds he would make a final check of the control stick and pedals. At the commands ‘Achtung’ and ‘Start’ the pilot pushed the ignition button and grasped the handgrips in the cockpit. The Natter would then fly a direct course to the enemy. This never happened in practice.

On 28 March Generalmajor Walter Dornberger, head of Arbeitsstab Domberger at Peenemiinde, ordered the cessation of the Natter project. This did not go down well with the Waffen-SS, and the SS-FHA demanded its continuation with some vehemence, new vertical take-off trials having been prepared on the Ochsenkopf. On 2 April 1945 the unmanned M-52 was launched, and after a brief flight dived into the ground near Bensingen village. Probably the last Natter rose on 10 April and came down near Ebingen (Albstadt). The dummy pilot and machine components were retrieved with their parachutes.

As Allied forces advanced, personnel of the Ochsenkopf test ground were evacuated to Bad Worishofen on 15 April for a possible transfer to Bavaria. In mid-April an attempt was made to remove the Bad Waldsee operation to Bad Worishofen. On 24 April the first French tanks arrived at Waldsee, where engineer Zacher had sunk 15 rocket motors in the Waldsee. American troops found most of the project files and four Natters at St Leonhard in Austria. A damaged tug aircraft was impounded at Aiming. At Bachem about 30, mostly Ba 349 A-ls, left the Hirth workshops, while one of ten pre-series machines was being manufactured at Nabern-Teck. This run was an А-series conversion with improved armament. Only one was near completion by March 1945. A variant in the advanced planning stage with demountable wings to be series-built as Ba 349 C was never realised although the wings were reported to be under manufacture at the war’s end.

One last Natter may have been fired from the mast at Ohrdruf just before the capitulation but the machine did not rise far and was apparently crushed after leaving the ramp. Allied troops then occupied the area and the military depot.

By mid-April 1945 there had been 18-20 vertical starts and at least five successfixl flights under tow, some with a release of the warp and a problem-free parachute landing. In trials ten Natters were lost to accidents, two machines to rocket-motor fires and a third to fire on the launch mast.

deas for flak rockets originated before the Nazi seizure of power in 1933. The commander of Lehrstab III, the Reichswehr department responsible for flak artillery research, and the later Inspector of Flak Artillery, Oberst Gunther Riidel, made secret studies before submitting their proposals to revolutionise air defence in a memorandum to the Army Weapons Office (HWA). It is interesting to observe how the Weimar government was often left in the dark on new weapons ideas such as this, the HWA being a culpable party in this respect. Though it found the idea of powerful flak rockets attractive, the HWA was wary of innovations, and the project advanced only slowly, solid-fuel rockets not being seriously considered until 1935. In the early summer of 1941, Oberst Walter Dornberger and Dr Wernher von Braun sketched a small-scale version of the A-4 (later V-2) as a flak rocket, but this seemed less important at the time than a powerful weapon in the offensive role which against which there was no defence.

n the spring of 1945 the war was as good as lost. The Allied armies were within the old Reich borders and the Soviets were heading for Berlin. Resistance on the various fronts was in a state of collapse. Yet, on the aviation production front, the design bureaux pressed on, churning out plans which had no hope of realisation. What use were these paper tigers with no bauxite, chrome, manganese, electric current, hardly any fuel and chaos in communications? Many decision-makers seem to have been ignorant of the problems. They continued to make plans as in the glory days of the Luftwaffe and the Blitzkrieg. The dreaming did not end even in April 1945.

Symptomatic of the situation were talks attended by high-ranking officers on 10 February 1945 in Berlin. For the first time they were forced to acknowledge, with no ifs and buts, that nearly all hydro-electric plant had been wrecked by bombing, and that no more fuel was forthcoming until the end of March.

Fuel production in underground or bombproof factories could not be expected until the autumn, and even then the output would be small. The Wehrmacht could rely on 50,000 tonnes of oil from underground centres in January 1946. But of what use would that be to facilities such as the underground works at Ebensee (Traunsee), now under hasty construction, if no more oil was arriving for refining? Even the last oilfields near Zistersdorf north of Vienna had meanwhile been seized by the Red Army.

The stark reality was that between February and the autumn of 1945 only 16,000 tonnes of B-4 and C-3 fuel, and 43,000 tonnes of J-2, would become available. This represented a

monthly output of 2,300 tonnes for piston-aircraft (B-4 and C-3) and 6,000 tonnes for jets (J-2) and would not suffice for even the most essential operations. Aircraft production was to be pruned down to the As 234, He 162, Me 262 and Та 152 only. Even Bf 109 and Fw 190 production was to cease, the production line to be run down as fast as Me 262s and Та 152s became available to replace them. Even Ju 88 production was to come to a halt in the late autumn of 1945 so as to maintain material reserves.

From the early summer of 1945,500 He 162s and Me 262s, 370 Та 152s and 50 As 234s would roll off the lines monthly. Such numbers spelled closure for most operational Geschwader and the remaining tactical forces could expect no better output of new machines than replacements for losses. At the beginning of 1945, reconnaissance aircraft, fighters and Jabos were given priority in the queue for fuel. Bombing missions no longer entered the picture. Several fighter Geschwader were also in line for the chop, and many of the remainder, including KG 76, would have been reduced. In the summer air transport capacity was to have been cut to six Gruppen. By the end of 1945, transport and parachute operations would not be possible and pilot training would also have come to an end.

With a resumption of production and assembly in underground plant the planners hoped to reinstate the disbanded units perhaps from the beginning of 1946. In the meantime there would have been fuel enough for some reconnaissance missions and a maximum of 75 Me 262 flights daily, not much to cope with the Allied bomber fleets.

Anybody who knew the true facts must have realised before the beginning of 1945 that because of Allied air superiority over the Reich, and the great industrial and manufacturing strength of the Allies, the time for anything other than local defence was past, yet even in the spring the effort was still being made to produce extreme high performance and therefore very costly aircraft in numbers. This included light jets, well-armoured Jabos and

multi-seater all-weather bombers with up to four jet turbines. That the production of the core He 162 and Me 262 jets was hamstrung by desperate logistical problems appears not to have struck the decision-makers.

One must therefore ask why they could not see that the war was lost. Was it from loyalty to the German leader, from a desire not to recognise the facts, or for personal reasons? There is really only one answer. From the generals down to the simple soldier, the belief existed that the end of the war would be a rough period and then things would go on as before. They recalled the motto at the 1918 Armistice: ‘The Kaiser goes, the generals remain.’ The Fiihrer and those who bore too high a burden of guilt would have to depart. Aviation, the Luftwaffe, would survive, perhaps with restrictions and prohibitions. In time new aircraft designs would be needed, for already the first cracks between the Allies were visible. Most of the Luftwaffe leadership had not been involved in war crimes and had only done their duty. Now they and everybody else stood before the abyss.

The dream of building the most powerful air force in the world was shattered, a fact scarcely

perceived in the spring of 1945. As long as the possibility of producing a single new aircraft still existed, work continued; and as long as a single drop of fuel could be obtained, flying continued. In desperation, pilots dived on bridges or rammed enemy bombers. The majority of the crews waited on the ground. It might make sense to try to avoid being killed at the last moment – too many had already been lost – or to try not to become involved in the vortex of the final battles, defending a trench impossible to hold. This went also for the Home Front. Many ‘adventurous’projects came into being simply to protect the planners against being drafted into the Volkssturm. This was often a decision taken by firms. War factory owners could see the time ahead when they would become free entrepreneurs, and their businesses would need a core of experienced workers and an intact management team. So it came about that project departments and design offices, such as at Heinkel-Siid, were kept going as long as possible. When the time came to shift, the staff were evacuated with their assignments and loaded into trains for shipping off to ‘safe’backwaters as yet unoccupied. The situation for forced labour and prisoners was of course quite different.

From a numerically very inferior position Luftwaffe pilots attacked Allied fighter and bomber formations over the Reich without regard to their own lives and despite increasing heavy losses. Aiter an initial daylight raid on Wilhelmshaven in January 1943 by 55 B-17 bombers, air raids by the Eighth AF became more frequent. On 28 July 1943 its bombers attacked the Fieseler aircraft works at Kassel and the important industrial centre of Magdeburg. Many more examples of carpet bombing were to follow until Germany lay in rubble.

Although the defences scored significant victories against raiders over Schweinfurt and Nuremberg, the immensity of the enemy potential was only too obvious, and the Luftwaffe leadership was forced to recognise that more efficient fighters were urgendy needed. At the time availability was limited to the Bf 109 G-6.

On 14 October 1943 German defenders shot down 77 of 291 Allied machines attacking the important ball-bearing factories at Schweinfurt, but more major attacks on industrial centres were soon having their effect. The number of fighters could only be maintained with difficulty. As a rule the air defences were only successful in daylight engagements against bombers crossing the Reich to distant targets without a fighter escort. This changed within a few months when, from the beginning of 1944, P-51 Mustang long-range fighters began to escort Eighth AF bomber fleets. As a result of the mass of bombers arriving by day and night, the Reich fighter force continued to decline. The Bf 109 G-6 standard fighters with which most fighter Staffeln were equipped were increasingly used in the role of pursuer, and were prevented by numerous escort fighters from reaching their objective, the bombers. Of the long awaited Me 262 A-la jets there was still no sign. The general development, especially of turbines, had progressed slower than anticipated, and OKL now expected the aircraft to be available in reasonable

numbers from August 1944. The Bf 109 and Fw 190 therefore remained indispensable for the air defence of Germany until the end.

In 1943 and 1944 the Bf 109 G provided the backbone of the defence by day. This variant was the high point of the breed. Better performance than with the Bf 109 G-10 and G-14 was not to be expected, and since the development of substantially more efficient engines could not reach the hoped-for level, the emergency solution became urgent. The Daimler Benz DB 605L was suitable for both the Fw 190 and Bf 109 but it remained on the test stand and was a long way from series production. As an alternative an attempt was made to improve the DB 605 AS and DB 605 D by the use of a supplementary fuel injection system which it was hoped would provide the Bf 109 G with a slight advantage over the P-51 fighter.

The Bf 109 К was the last of the series to appear in quantity. The design office had chosen the DB 605 L engine with two-stage supercharger to provide a ceiling of about 9,500 metres (31,000 ft) at full pressure, but work was still proceeding to perfect it. The final mass-production programme had been started

at the end of 1942, but not until 1944 were a few fighter Gruppen equipped with this variant. The highly experienced engineer Ludwig Bolkow handled the proceedings from start to finish. The Bf 109 K, together with a fine tuning of other G-variants, was to become the new standard piston-engined fighter. To avoid any risks ten prototypes were ordered on 9 August 1943 to run a brief period of tests. A mock-up was built to check and evaluate all weapons and radio equipment and other components.

Allied air reconnaissance had detected that the WNF Works at Wiener Neustadt in Austria was one of the most important production plants for piston – engined fighters, and on 13 August US bombers attacked the factory. Some 500 workers were killed. Although assembly work was set back for a long period, numerous drawings, plans and assembly files were saved. By the end of 1944, the entire works had been relocated in the Burgenland. The WNF assembly plant, subsidiaries and numerous other firms were co-opted for fighter production, and a number of‘final assembly circuits’ set up in the Vienna-Wiener Neustadt – St Polten area, in Karnten, in the so-called Czech Protectorate and Hungary. Some of the work, such as the railway tunnel Objekt 217 B-C atTischnowitz in

the Protectorate was given a protective roof and turned out the Bf 109 in series production without fear of Allied bombing.

Meanwhile a full-size mock-up for the future Bf 109 K-l had been built by the WNF development team located near the bombed-out plant, and was ready in basic outline in September 1943. On 1 October 1943 the improved G-fuselage was presented to representatives of the KdE and closely inspected. Only a few minor details needed to be improved by WNF. Orders to implement full production of the Bf 109 K-l followed the final inspection of the wooden mock – up on 12 October 1943.

A Bf 109 G-6 (Works No. 18136 BF+QH) from the Erla production line was fitted with a modified airframe and engine for initial test purposes. The early Bf 109 К differed from previous variants by its use of wooden parts, such as for the tail section designed by Wolf Hirth GmbH of Nabern/Teck, and a more powerful engine, the DB 605 AS or D with MW 50 unit. Under licence to the Messerschmitt Works, Hirth GmbH developed wooden wings with integral MK 108 cannon but both here and in the tailplane there were structural problems to be overcome. While building the prototypes it was found that the technology was uneconomic because of the expense in working metal and wood, while a wooden undercarriage was deemed unsuitable for a high performance piston – engined fighter. The crash tests at Augsburg led to the scrapping of the remaining prototype wings and tooling. Shortly before the year’s end the contract for 3,995 pairs of wooden wings was cancelled in favour of the usual metal wings for better stability.

At the beginning of 1944 more talks were held regarding the installation of the MW 50 and GM-1 systems in the fuselage. These systems had been checked with regard to finding a simplified method of construction, and tested by specialists from the Rechlin and Tarnewitz test centres. During the conference with GLZM Milch on 2 March 1944 the continuation of Bf 109 G production and large-scale introduction of the Bf 109 К were discussed.

Whether the initial run of the К variant would be proceeded with was uncertain from the summer of 1944 after Messerschmitt had presented the first plans for the Bf 109 K-4. During the conference of 3 and 4 October 1944 chaired by engineer Roluf Lucht, it was claimed that the series-produced Bf 109 K-4 would be 35 km/hr (22 mph) faster than the later Bf 109 G versions, and accordingly it was decided to stop or cancel some Bf 109 G and К production lines since it was not known when major deliveries of the Me 262 were to be expected. Only the faster Bf 109 models would now have a chance of mass production. The first cancellation was the Bf 109 K-l, a single-seat fighter with the MK 108 cannon, deleted before the July 1944 planned run. The K-2 was also sacrificed because production of its MK 108 and MG 151/20 cannon at Posen (Poznan) was falling and the manufacturer could not meet production targets.

It had been intended to initiate a parallel mass-production run at Erla near Leipzig and in the Messerschmitt works at Regensburg from February 1944, and WNF was to begin production of the new fighter as from April 1944 using a less powerful version of the DB 605 than the L type. After opting for the more powerful Bf 109 K-4, the RLM cancelled the K-2, of which only a single model existed. This machine had served as a trial model for the wooden wings made by Hirth GmbH. The K-2 (Works No. 600056) had an MK 108 gun and was tested at Tarnewitz in the late summer of 1944. The machine was delivered without fixed aileron rods and was grounded after the first flight.

The Bf 109 K-4 was a mass-produced ‘light fighter’with a 9.92 metre (32 ft 6 in) wingspan. Its length was 9.01 metres (29 ft 7 in). Most machines of this type had a DB 605 DCM engine. The right-handed airscrew was manufactured by VDM and had an electro-mechanical auto unit which adapted revolutions to load pressure. Engineers expected a larger reserve at higher speeds by enlarging the cooling system, thus delaying overheating the DB 605 and promising an increase in speed of 15-20 km/hr (9-12.5 mph).

The Bf 109 K-4 had an FuG 16 ZY homing receiver with target acquisition and friend-or-foe FuGa recognition unit. Two MG 131 13-mm guns each with

300 rounds fired through the propeller arc. The 30-mm MK 108 motorised cannon had 65 rounds. The former Revi 16B gunsight was to be replaced by the futuristic gyro-stabilised EZ 42 at the instigation of the Chief-TLR. The first prototype Bf 109 K-4 had an MG 151/20 instead of the MK 108. This machine (Works No. 330112) was completed at Regensburg in October 1944 and shown to KdE representatives who had arrived from Tarnewitz. Afterwards it was to be flown there, but the pilot was forced to make an emergency landing at Brandis with a defect in the cooling system and the machine remained there for some time for lack of spares.

On 30 November 1944 OKL assembled a number of high-performance aircraft including the Bf 109 K-4 at Rechlin. Because the test centre was overwhelmed with more important projects, particularly jets, KdE only carried out basic tests of the K-4 and held back on the weapons testing. It was proposed to combine the trials with those of the K-6, and investigation of the speed potential, the streamlined upper wing design and other modifications were also postponed even though Oberst Edgar Petersen of KdE predicted that the modifications would make the K-4 50-60 km/hr (30-40 mph) faster. The other advantage of the K-4 was that from the outset only tried and tested components had been used, so that long drawn out trials were not necessary.

Immediately after the initial trial the first Bf 109 K-4s were delivered to III./JG 27 in October 1944. The first was lost on 19 October 1944 during delivery. The first engagements occurred at the beginning of November and shortly afterwards IV./JG 27, III./JG 4 and III./JG 77 all received their first K-4s. The K-4 variant with the pressurised cabin requested by pilots and Milch was never provided because the alterations were too expensive.

By the beginning of 1945 the development of the Bf 109 K-6 was relatively well advanced. This variant of‘Karl’was on the WNF drawing boards in the summer of 1944 and was designed to be better armed than the K-4. Besides the two MG 131s it was planned to carry an MK 109 gun together with two MK 108s or MG 151/20s in the wings. A section of the new wing was tried out on a Bf 109 G-6 atTarnewitz on the test stand and in flight. After a number of problems had been resolved, at the end of October 1944Tarnewitz gave the go – ahead for weapons to be mounted in February 1945. Soon afterwards the provisional machine received an EZ 41 reflector gunsight and was released to 1. Flieger-Division for trials on operations with a fighter unit. The performance calculations for the Bf 109 K-6 with DB 605 ASCM/DCM engines worked out at 600 km/hr (372 mph) near ground level and 730 km/hr at 8,000 metres (454 mph at 26,250 ft), but data recorded for a similarly equipped machine were restricted to 530 km/hr and 700 km/hr (330 and 435 mph) respectively. Operational ceiling was calculated to be 12,500 metres (41,000 ft), range about 575 kilometres (360 miles).

It was planned to produce the Bf 109 K-6 in reasonable numbers in the Wiener Neustadt area with the new weapons as from the summer of 1945. The Bf 109 K-4 was to be manufactured at Regensburg and Leipzig. The Messerschmitt Works offered the Bf 109 K-8 as a single-seat short range reconnaissance aircraft. This was welcomed at once by General von Barsewisch, the head of air reconnaissance, as a ‘fast reconnaissance machine with pressure cabin, and met the performance specifications set on 20 January 1944 replacing the Bf 109 G-8, which had meanwhile been judged to be under-powered. An Rb 50/30 camera unit was to be fitted in the fuselage and a BSK camera below the wings. According to the blueprints the Bf 109 K-8 was designed to have an additional 300-litre tank and an MK 108 cannon. No other weapons were planned, in order to keep the weight down. Whether a K-8 prototype was built by the beginning of 1945 is unlikely. Even the Bf 109 K-10, a fighter equipped with two MK 103s in the wing roots, never left the planning stage because the heavy 30-mm guns would not be available in sufficient quantity and were needed more urgently for the Do 335 В Jabo.

Due to problems of supply caused by air raids on industry and the collapsing infrastructure, all manufacturers of the Bf 109 K-4 encountered serious difficulties. Even so, from the end of 1944 the Messerschmitt line set up at

Regensburg in September was well into production, though only after several weeks’delay because of modifications made to the tailplane. Most of the Bf 109 K-4s produced were assembled and flight-tested at Regensburg. By 31 December 1944 857 machines had left the final assembly area, including 221 in November 1944 and 325 the following month. This was only possible using coundess PoWs, foreign labourers and concentration camp inmates. In the nine months to October 1944, more than 80 Bf 109s, about 10 per cent of production, were lost in crashes attributed to sabotage during test and delivery flights.

From 1 January 1945 to 25 April, when American ground forces reached the Danube at Regensburg, more than 300 Bf 109 K-4s were completed there. Some production was also achieved until March at Vilseck and Cham. Most of Bf 109 K-4s had works numbers between 330105 and 335210. In all, 10,888 Bf 109s were built at Regensburg of which barely 900 were К-versions, far fewer than planned. In mid-April the Bf 109 K-4 was to be found at the following units:

a) III./JG 3: 47 K-4s and G-14s. (Major Karl-Heinz Langer: Luftflotte Reich).

b) III./JG 4: 61, plus Bf 109 G-14s and K-14s. (Hauptmann Gerhard Strasen).

c) II. and III./JG 27: 48 assorted Bf 109s (Luftwaffenkommando West).

d) Stab, I. and II./JG 52: 91 Bf 109 G-14s and K-4s. (Oberst Hermann Graf, Luftflotte 6, East Front).

e) III./JG 53: 40 K-4s of which 24 were operational (Hauptmann Siegfried Luckenbach).

f) Three Gruppen of JG 77:100 Bf 109s on 9 April 1945 including Bf 109 G-14s and K-4s of which 81 were operational despite the precarious fuel situation although few flights were possible.

The development of this aircraft dated back earlier than 1944 and 1945. From the summer of 1943 Heinkel had begun to design, in concert with other aircraft manufacturers, a light jet fighter with a single turbine above or below the fuselage. For the mass production of a machine simpler than the Me 262 A-la, the main considerations were the least use of materials and the greatest use of substitutes such as wood and steel plating. This would make production possible in underground factories in enormous numbers at the earliest opportunity.

The Heinkel design office, relocated to Vienna from 1943 under the designation Heinkel-Siid, devoted itself increasingly from the spring of 1944 to this task. By 10 July Project He P 1073 ‘Fast Jet’ had been completed on the drawing board. The machine would have two HeS Oil turbines or failing that Jumo 004Cs. As it was evident to Dr Ernst Heinkel that all He 111 and He 177 production would be stopped, he therefore proposed to Goring the production of a powerful fighter with two HeS Oil turbines. The nimble aircraft would be

armed with three machine guns and make a very difficult opponent. The design was simple to build and the Heinkel development team thought it would be an early success. Time was of the essence. The mock-up was scheduled for completion on 1 October 1944, the first experimental aircraft by 1 December, while mass production could begin simultaneously with the first prototype trials from 1 January.

Heinkels prior work on the design meant that the study was ready within a few days. On 12 July 1944 Obersdeutnant Siegfried Knemeyer of KdE spoke out in its favour and on 8 September the Chief-TLR, Oberst Ulrich Diesing, issued precise guidelines for the T TL-Fighter’, henceforth to be known as the Volksjager. Heinkel-Siid submitted a precise description of the design for the new aircraft which coincided in nearly every respect with the RLM specifications.

The contract was awarded in September 1944 and work commenced ‘with the greatest vigour’. As HeS Oil production at Stuttgart was proceeding haltingly, Chief-TLR decided to fit the original design with the unreliable

BMW 003. The Jumo 004 turbine would have been better, but these were needed more urgently for the Me 262 A. On 15 September Chief-TLR and RLM rejected the design for lack of flying hours of the BMW 003, weak armament and poor operational range. The problems with the BMW turbines were decisive because the engines had already come under scrutiny for their poor reliability. Brushing aside the violent protests of Heinkel director Karl Franke, Chief-TLR now favoured the Blohm & Voss BV P211.01. In the almost daily conferences subsequently, the BV fighter was well promoted, but the Reichsmarschall was provisionally for the Heinkel machine. Shortly after the conference of 21 September 1944 chaired by Roluf Lucht in which progress at Heinkel-Siid was discussed, an improved full-scale mock-up of the He P1073 (designated He 500 from 25 September) was shown to a commission under the chairmanship of Professor Hertel in the presence of Lucht. The pilot would now have far better visibility than in the former version. Except for minor changes in equipment, the Heinkel design had already been cleared at the RLM. The pendulum swung back to the Heinkel design because of aerodynamic problems that had arisen after revisions to the BV P211.02. These were only reservations but came in useful for Heinkel. On 29 September the Jagerstab ordered ‘an immediate start to the Heinkel design. No other competitor awaiting evaluation had a chance.

The Volksjager was not accepted wholeheartedly by General Galland, nor by the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, General Werner Kreipe. Both considered that the Me 262 A-la offered the only possibility of regaining air supremacy over the Reich, even partially. This view was opposed by the Reichsmarschall and Chief of Staff of the Jagerstab, Saur. Wedded to NSDAP ideals, Saur believed that fanatical young pilots of the future Volksjager squadrons would turn the tide of the air war. In view of the losses to be expected and the lack of raw materials, the change-over to easily obtained replacements such as wood or steel plating was also important.

More conferences sought a consensus. The decisions taken to date seemed hasty. Nobody could estimate exacdy when the fighter would be ready for series production, and not until 30 September was the production department in a position to predict that the first mass-production run with the He 162 A-2 could be expected by February 1945. Despite the simplicity of the design, numerous questions and details remained to be resolved, including the installation of the BMW 003 turbine, the form of the wings and tail, the type of undercarriage and the fuel tank unit, all of which were changed again and again to enhance efficiency. There was also in-fighting between Messerschmitt and Heinkel, the former arguing for the monopoly of the Me 262. By October the design had fathered at least 19 different project studies of which the 18 th and 19th were the direct forerunners of the later He 162 A-1.

Requests for modifications continued to arrive from the Chief-TLR, however. After the final inspection of the 1:1 mock-up of the ‘smallest fighter’ by Major Grasser and Fliegerstabsingeneur Rauchensteiner, both with the Galland’s staff, it was agreed that the design work could be rounded off, at least insofar as the first two versions, A-l and A-2, were concerned. The work at Heinkel-Siid would now begin. To make up for the delays staff were putting in up to 100 hours work per week. They slept at their drawing boards and were close to exhaustion. Meanwhile Heinkel had an order for 1,000 He 162s, and this even before a single prototype had flown. To be reasonably sure that the construction would be successful, wind-tunnel trials were undertaken from September 1944 at AVA Gottingen. This was only possible thanks to the great efforts of research engineers. The deadlines for closing reports were very short. This applied also to the final submission of the documentation by 20 October 1944. Nevertheless only 35 per cent of the BMW 003 drawings for the He 162 had been submitted by then. All involved were aware that the BMW 003 was no more than a temporary solution. Though HeS Oil turbines were favoured from the start, work on them was at a standstill and not until March 1945 did the breakthrough come. Unfortunately this coincided with American teams of specialists preparing their own evaluations from the files found in underground storage locations.

By 1 November the project files for the BMW 003-equipped version were completed, and the entire design was to be concluded by 10 December. The optimists reckoned on having the first prototype by 20 January: a second would follow on 1 February. At the end of October 1944 the advent of the Volksjager was announced under the slogan ‘The Fiihrer Fights Back!’ A groundswell of hope surged up. On 30 October the staff at Heinkel-Siid were told: ‘The Heinkel firm will build the aircraft which is to sweep our skies clear of the flying terrorists!’

The infrastructure to achieve such an aim was still lacking. A transport area was prepared, a field railway to Hinterbriihl at Modling (Languste Works) begun and sufficient space made available for a satellite unit of Mauthausen concentration camp near Hinterbriihl, Vienna. Some 2,400 prisoners were to be shipped into the underground Languste facility. This was built on several levels, with the Volksjager metal fuselages to be produced safe from Allied bombing. The SS-WHA (SS Main Office for Industry) played a major role in the project. The wings would be produced at several factories with massive SS support. Human considerations played no role in the underground factories. The limiting factor was the preparation of the necessary raw materials which at that time – unlike forced labour — were only available in limited quantities. The SS had sufficient people, skilled or unskilled, to realise its ambitious plans.

The output rate for Volksjager production was to be increased from 1,000 to 2,000 monthly once several completion shops started up. The SS-FHA (SS Main Office for Management) put SS-Hauptsturmfiihrer Kurt May in charge of resolving all problems relating to obtaining wood and making the wooden parts. Elsewhere the underground Mittelwerk in the Kohnstein mountain (Harz near Nordhausen) was given orders at the beginning of November 1944 to produce another 1,000 He 162 and 2,000 BMW 003 turbines. At first only fuselages were to be turned out, later whole aircraft. Other sections would be produced in large numbers at Heinkel Rostock and Junkers near Stassfurt (Saxony-Anhalt).

o the end of the war, the Messerschmitt Bf 109 G-lOs, G-14s and K-4s, together with the Focke-Wulf 190 A-8s, A-9s and D-9s were the single – engined fighters still operating in large numbers. Of these about 4,800 were delivered to the units between 1 January 1945 and the capitulation. About 3,000 were Bf 109s and 1,800 Fw 190s. The Та 152 C and H played an increasingly minor role once their production centres were overrun by the Red Army. Only Та 152 H-Os continued to run off the assembly lines. The Me 262 A-la grew in significance. By April 1945,1,400 had been turned out, but not all reached Luftwaffe units. During the last three months of the war a second jet, the He 162 Volksjager, was certified operational by OKL. Industry produced 180 of these machines while roughly another 400-500 were still under construction. Powerful armament proved the value of this machine in later operational work, but the entanglement of the SS in armaments was disadvantageous. Himmler reduced the role of the SS-WHA under Gruppenfiihrer Oswald Pohl, a move welcomed by Gruppenfiihrer Jiittner, head of the SS-FHA, and by Gruppenfiihrer Kammler. The latter had proven himself an outstanding success in connection with SS planning and he seemed a suitable choice to handle far more difficult assignments. After being given control of production of V-weapons, Kammler enlarged his sphere of influence within the SS to cover armament procurement as a whole. When he was given additional far-reaching powers by Hitler, the SS could begin to draw up demarcation lines quite openly for its presumed zones, the intention being that it would eventually ensnare in the medium term all aircraft, weapons and especially rocket production.

At the end of 1944, Rheinmetall-Borsig at Unterliiss made initial drawings for a manned Rheintochter flak rocket. This single-seat jet-and-rocket propelled

projectile would have a ceiling of 12,000 metres (39,000 ft). Two variants were planned. The first design had four equal-sized wings and a pair of BMW turbines integral in two of the wings as horizontal propulsion, the other had three wings and an HeS 011 engine below the fuselage. Armament would have been two MK 108 guns or a honeycomb of 32 R4M rockets or four barrel-block rotary magazines containing air-to-air rockets. The first variant would require a launch assembly, the other a disposable chassis. What became of these plans is unknown.

The Unterliiss report is dated 23 June 1947 and was put together by Dr Klein, head of the C-team for the British occupying power.

On 29 October 1941 the first concrete plans for new anti-aircraft weapons were put before the RLM. The flak rocket had an important advocate in Generalmajor Walther von Axthelm, commander of I. Flakkorps, but a number of technical problems prevented a breakthrough. In December 1941 Goring intervened personally against the idea. Along with many of his Great War contemporaries, he believed that Bf 109-equipped fighter squadrons and plenty flak guns were all that would ever be necessary for the air defence of the Reich. At the end of 1941, Generalleutnant Otto Wilhelm von Renz, Commander I. Flakdivision, reported to the HWA that the amount of ammunition expended per enemy aircraft destroyed was disproportionately high, and would deteriorate further as the enemy built faster machines. For each victory, German flak needed: 16,000 8.8-cm (Flak 36) rounds, or 6,000 10.5-cm (Flak 39) rounds, or 3,000 12.8-cm (Flak 40 rounds).

Replacing this wastage, each single flak rocket would either damage or destroy an aircraft. General von Renz was aiming to abandon range/height prediction

formulae in favour of target blanketing, and radar – or radio-controlled flak rockets. In a conference on 6 December 1941 at the Ministry of Aircraft Supply, however, it was decided that rocket-powered interceptor fighters such as the

Fi 166 should be the standard anti-aircraft weapon. Only when a rocket was perfected with a 100 per cent certainty of a hit could this decision be reviewed.

In March 1942 the Flak Rocket Division was set up at Flak Defence Group under Oberstleutnant Dr Haider, and on 5 March Reichsminister Speer called for flak rocket development to be forced through with all energy. This led a month later to the first flak programme to include flak rockets. Because of the rapid growth in Allied aircraft production, the General Inspector of Flak Artillery, General der Flakwaffe von Axthelm, made emphatic demands for flak rockets on the grounds that both the war, and flak rocket development, were likely to be lengthy.

On 5 May 1942 Speer spoke out again on the importance of carrying through the flak programme to completion, and especially flak rocket development. Since new weapons were often greeted with scepticism at the highest level, and in the summer of 1942 it was known that the flak rocket production plan was not presently practical because it required more raw materials than were available, the deliberations were therefore drawn out. Design work on individual projects, interim testing and test-stand trials all made slow progress. Nevertheless, on 1 September 1942 Goring signed the Flak Development Programme which for the first time included rockets for air defence. These were initially spin-stabilised solid-fuel rockets: later some kind of guidance element would be introduced and finally an independent target-finding system. Although General von Axthelm was made project head, Goring appointed himself the ultimate arbiter and gave the OKL command staff the job of drawing up the tactical and technical guidelines for the future weapon. By now Goring was of the opinion that in three to five years the flak rocket would probably be the only ground-based defensive weapon of use against long-range bombers.

On 10 October 1942, a good five years after anti-aircraft rockets were first seriously discussed, the development programme came to HAP (Homeland Artillery Park) 11 at Peenemiinde, and was explained to Wernher von Braun two days later. On 22 October OKL made known its tactical and technical require­ments for the flak rocket. They wanted a target-seeking flak rocket which homed in on the aircraft when near it or better still a radio-controlled, two-stage solid-fuel rocket with a 100-kg warhead. Although no experimental models were available, on 27 October a flak rocket test command was established at Peenemiinde responsible to the Army Experimental Institute (HVA).

Meanwhile Braun and Dornberger had given thought to flak rocket types, leading to the concept of a midget A-4 designated Wasserfall. In a conference on 5 November 1942, General von Axthelm convinced his audience of the importance of the flak rocket. The greatest problem was guidance. Procedures using the Lichtenstein radar, infra-red and passive homing using emissions from electronic equipment aboard enemy aircraft were all mentioned. General von

Renz reported on problems constructing the test stand because supplies of building steel had not increased. On 5 February 1943 a new contract was placed for the supply, and on 17 February Goring approved the construction of Test Stand IX following talks with General von Axthelm. The project was awarded a high priority which attracted funds, and two days later OKL budgeted RM.500,000. A further controversy hindered progress when the RAD (Reichsarbeitsdienst) unit handling the construction was withdrawn in April at short notice. Wrangling ensued over whether another RAD unit or forced labour from the east should be employed, and work did not resume until mid-July. The authorities were concerned that too few staff were employed on the target­seeking rocket, and on 6 August 1943 after arguments between OKH and OKL had been resolved, a number of Army personnel engaged on developing the A-4 (V-2) were switched to the Luftwaffe project.

After the devastating air attack on Peenemiinde on the night of 18 August 1943, an urgent discussion considered evacuating the entire flak rocket

development away from Peenemiinde for security reasons, but as the infrastructure was in place it was decided to remain. Most of the technical staff needed by the experimental commando arrived at Karlshagen near Peenemiinde at the beginning of September 1943. What the specialists were to concentrate on was not clear, and further talks with Milch produced no solution on what guidance system was to be developed. On 13 September Milch received the Plenipotentiary for Remote Guidance Research, Professor Friedrich Gladenbeck, who advised that work on the ground-to-air rocket should be abandoned because the air-to-air rocket was simpler and cheaper to produce. But since nobody could decide for certain between two theoretical ideas, the research was instead allowed to proceed down both avenues.

Meanwhile some advances had been made in the technology, and by 15 December 1943 the launchers for the Enzian, Schmetterling, Rheintochter and Wasserfallrockets had been designed. Before the years end both a Feuerlilie (F 25) and a Rheintochter (R 1) had been test-fired, the latter at Test Stand IX. Test firings of the Schmetterling and Enzian were scheduled for the coming weeks. During this critical phase, jurisdiction in armaments was vested in Speer as Minister for Armaments and War Production, who thus became responsible for all air armament projects. The Army, Luftwaffe and armaments groups struggling for more power were now joined by Reichsfuhrer-SS Himmler. He began his campaign at Peenemiinde on 21 February 1944 by attempting to recruit Wernher von Braun to the SS and so expand SS influence on rocket production generally. This move would have isolated General Dornberger. Brauns refusal led to his arrest by the Gestapo on 15 March 1944 for ‘suspected sabotage of V-weapons’. He was detained for a fortnight, but jurisdiction remained with the Army and Luftwaffe.

In April 1944 the experimental Enzian was test-fired from Stand IX at Peenemiinde followed by the first test-firing of Feuerlilie (F 55) on the Greifswalder Oie. The two Feuerlilie versions, F 25 and F 55, were considered to have great promise for future development. The project was revised in the summer of 1944 at Karlshagen with particular emphasis on the problems of control, and on 26 June 1944 an organisational plan worked out. For security reasons HAP 11 was given the cover name ‘Elektromechanische Werke GmbH Karlshagen and provided with virtual autonomy.

On 1 August 1944 a conference with Reichsminister Speer considered the rounds per kill ratio of traditional flak artillery. The extremely high cost of shooting down an enemy aircraft by artillery as against the hypothetical possibility of destroying one bomber with every target-seeking rocket, with all its attendant savings in raw materials was found compelling. On 8 August a comparison was made between the 12.8-cm Flak 40 gun and the as yet most expensive, liquid-fuelled flak rocket Wasserfall. Greater effort was now invested

in the infrastructure for batteries of flak rockets, and on 18 August OKL submitted its design for a cabling system while experts worked to design automatic devices to home in on Allied H2S or H2X ground-mapping radar.

On 9 August 1944 the Completion Committee for Flak Rocket Construction decided that the Schmetterling and Wasserfall were the most promising projects and their pace of development should be stepped up while the Committee would be kept informed regarding Enzian, Rheintochter (R 3) and various other missiles. In order to guarantee production, the Buchenwald satellite camp Mittelbau was made independent at Nordhausen and in time 30 outworker parties assembled. These prisoners were to create the infrastructure for V-2 and flak-rocket production in large underground workshops in the Himmelberg (Woffleben) and Kohnstein (Niedersachswerfen). Thousands of prisoners died in the appalling conditions.

On 30 October 1944 at Peenemiinde Speer witnessed the firing of flak rockets for the first time. After watching the start of two Wasserfall from Stand IX, he decided immediately that the project should be continued together with research into the supersonic possibilities. He also said that Rheintochter should be further tested although he had not seen this rocket fired. The two subsonic missiles, Enzian and Schmetterling, on the other hand should be completed as soon as

possible and made operational. Another prospect was the Taifun, which to everybody’s surprise Goring had classified as important. On 4 November 1944 in compliance with Hider’s order work was stepped up on the production of flak ammunition and new rockets, while Speer (and later Himmler) received instructions to guarantee individual types. To consolidate the ground organisation for the various rocket designs, a number of modifications were introduced: for example, from mid-November 1944 the same launcher could be used for the Enzian or Rheintochter. The Wasserfall launcher did not have a revolving turntable, and for the comparatively light Hs 117 Schmetterling only a very light firing assembly was needed.

It was clear that the protective screen of flak rockets would not extend to cover the whole area of the Reich and for this reason on 6 December 1944 the order was given to erect emplacements in central Germany to protect important industrial installations, particularly oil refineries and the synthetic fuel factories. A limited number of cities would also be included in the screen. Despite the ever-worsening situation no decision had been taken by the end of December as

to which flak rockets should be produced, even though some were bound to be abandoned for lack of raw materials. Because of reservations about Schmetterling, OKL decided to press forward with Wasserfall, since this was based on the already proven A-4 artillery rocket.

On 5 January 1945 Speer decreed immediate measures for air defence in which, besides the greatest possible increase in the production of flak guns and ammunition of all kinds, preparations should be made for flak rocket mass production, and Arbeitsstab Dornberger was formed on 12 January to push ahead with flak rocket development. Based at Schwedt on the Oder, it was to provide coordination. On 14 January Gruppenfuhrer Kammler took overall charge of V-weapons production on Hitler’s order, this being Himmler’s first step in his attempt to bring all ‘high-technology weapons’ under his own control. On 27 January Arbeitsstab Dornberger met to choose whichever rocket would be readied first, and next day Himmler ordered all flak rocket work to be concentrated at Mittelwerk near Nordhausen in order to protect the programme in the underground factories there. The transfer caused a four-week delay before the schedule resumed, but the need for the measure spoke for itself.

When Peenemiinde and Karlshagen were partially evacuated on 31 January 1945, Himmler gave Kammler command of Armeekorps zbV (‘for special purposes’) which now became the overseer of all rocket warfare. At the beginning of February Arbeitsstab Dornberger was forced by the military situation to remove from Schwedt to Bad Sachsa. As an immediate measure OKL relinquished 5. Flakdivision to the Waffen-SS to begin flak rocket operations. For this purpose the ‘Luftwaffe Staff to Break the Air terror’ was formed and transferred to the Harz Trutzgau, the ‘Defensive region of the Reich’. On 6 February Himmler issued a comprehensive order regarding the use of giant rockets (like the V-2) and the further development of flak rockets. All projects not close to final testing were to be discontinued. Only a smaller version of Wasserfall, the basic Schmetterling and the non-guided, spin-stabilised Taifun thus survived.

Riistungsstab leader Saur went to Mittelwerk in mid-February 1945 to help coordinate flak-rocket development. Besides moving Elektromechanische Werke GmbH from Karlshagen to Nordhausen, he ordered the motor department of the Hellmuth Walter firm to transfer to Bleichrode in the southern Harz. On 17 February 1945 the evacuation of Peenemiinde began in earnest and the first train to leave the installation headed for Nordhausen. Despite these steps, it was obvious from the Reich Research Council conference on 26 February, when the possibilities of overcoming the ‘air terror’ were discussed, that no flak rocket would be operational until late summer 1945, should the fronts hold that long. Nevertheless, development went on, and on 28 February Arbeitsstab Dornberger met to consider the use of rangefinders and target computers although the possibility of turning out this kind of complex equipment was very doubtful.

In March the transfer of HVA Peenemiinde and the Karlshagen annexe was concluded with the evacuation of the remaining technical personnel. All development work on flak rockets was now abandoned except for the non-guided Taifun and the radio-controlled Wasserfall, Schmetterling and Enzian having been struck from the Fiihrer-Programme. SS-Gruppenfuhrer Kammler accumulated more titles when, in addition to his other offices, he was made ‘Commissioner for Jet Aircraft’and on 17 March ‘Fiihrer’s Commissioner to Break the Bombing Terror’. This meant that Himmler had reached his goal of directing and controlling air armaments, on paper at least, so far as the situation allowed.

On 3 April 1945 Arbeitsstab Domberger moved from Bad Sachsa to Ober – ammergau in Upper Bavaria. Next day probably the last Jagerstab conference was chaired by Saur. The talk was centred on jet aircraft and the hopes for flak rockets in the short term. In view of the collapsing fronts there was little optimism. The same day in a heavy air raid on Nordhausen and the surface area of Mittelwerk there was serious loss of life amongst townspeople and camp prisoners, and serious material damage. As a result, 24 hours later a start was made to transfer the most important rocket and weapons specialists from Nordhausen to Oberammergau and other destinations in Bavaria. Leading scientists moved for the last time aboard the ‘Reprisal Express’as they jokingly termed it. On 10 April 1945 American forces arrived at Bleichrode and occupied the ruins of Nordhausen. Next day they stood before the open gates of the formerly top secret Mittelwerk.