Category Last Days of the Luftwaffe

ardly any subject in modern history contains as much explosive potential as the end of the Second World War in Europe. It was an epoch of complete social, cultural and technological upheaval. After the fall of National Socialism and its allies a new age began in Western Europe. In the realm of military and aviation history this period was revolutionary. The eclipse of the piston engine and the introduction of electronic detection equipment, rockets and airborne weapons in previously unknown quantities changed the face of air warfare. The tragic course of the wars final months in the aviation sector left its traces not only in Germany. Allied forces thrusting to the heart of Germany were followed closely by scientific units and headhunters, who formed an important part of the team, for it was essential not only to disarm the enemy, to deprive Hitler s Germany of its last chance of resistance, but also to grab as much of its military and technical know­how as possible. The aviation and motor industries had numerous surprises ready. In the final chaotic weeks of the war, lorry-loads of secret files disappeared along the road to the legendary Alpine Redoubt – and specialist firms such as Mauser with its newest revolver-cannons, or the Heinkel development offices in Bavaria, insofar as their whereabouts were known, were well worth locating. Many of the discoveries came as a complete surprise when the excellent camouflage concealing them was unveiled. Now that the fifty-year mark has been passed, the time has arrived to begin the disclosure of the top secret files of the wartime German aviation industry, and many a surprise certainly awaits us.

Plans to regain air supremacy by the use of modern fighter aircraft were drawn up at Messerschmitt Augsburg and later Oberammergau. The Messerschmitt

works had been relocated in a bombproof subterranean gallery near the abandoned Gebirgsjager barracks not far from the latter market town. At Augsburg the main factory was increasingly targeted by Allied bombers. Me PI 101 project was conceived in the summer of 1944. A simple method of construction with easily obtained materials was sought. All machines were required to have excellent flight characteristics and be capable of a short take-off. OKL had also demanded good armament and easy maintenance in the field. By October 1944 the planned machine had been wind-tunnel tested intensively with various wing configurations. After the construction of several prototypes, these would then be tried out with two MK 108s. Turbine was to be either a Jumo 004B or HeS Oil. Take-off from even small runways would be rocket – assisted. The Me PI 101 was offered to the Rustungsstab as a fighter-bomber, interceptor and all-weather aircraft.

The first rig, Me Pi 101 V-l, on which Me 262 A-la outer wing sections were used, had its wings swept back 40 degrees. The second set of wings was manufactured in February in the Autobahn tunnel at Leonberg, and tests could only be carried out on the ground, not during flight because the behaviour of variable wing geometries remained to be determined.

In February work proceeded intensively to prepare for Me PI 101 series production, the basic planning being concluded on 22 February 1945. Development was continued in the Upper Bavarian Research Institute at

The Messerschmitt Me P 1110 was a futuristic design for a single-seat jet fighter with single HeS Oil turbine and outstanding armament.

Oberammergau. The final modifications in March 1945 involved improved control surfaces, completing the equipment and armament, and preparing the first series run of the single-seater.

When work on the prototype was close to completion and a mock-up of an HeS Oil powerplant had been installed, the machine was damaged, or possibly sabotaged, by marauding forced labourers or Messerschmitt personnel. Lodged finally in Hall 615, on 7 May 1945 it came under the scrutiny of American experts. On 21 May 1945, 85 men of the Bell Corporations field team arrived. The documentation was found by British, French and American military and scientific teams and confiscated. Later the Bell Corporation turned out two experimental aircraft (X-5) based on the Me Pi 101, trials of which continued into the early 1950s.

An almost forgotten chapter of the air war was the enforced use of multi-seater night fighters as Jabos (fighter-bombers). On account of the lack of operational aircraft for night operations at the end of 1944, the gap was bridged by the plentiful night-fighter arm.

The Ju 88 G-7 ‘Mosquito-hunter’was only built as an experimental machine.

During the Ardennes Offensive of December 1944-January 1945 IV./NJG 3 crews had flown operations along the southern flank of the attack near Metz and Nancy to seal off the battlefield. Night low-level attacks on railway targets were of special interest. In addition to IV./NJG 3, I./NJG 4 and I. and IV./NJG 6 were redeployed, enabling 32 machines to attack Bastogne convoy traffic. Between 17 December 1944 and 1 January 1945 the two NJG 6

Gruppen flew ten fighter-bomber operations using SD 1,10,15, 50, 500 and SC 500 release containers. During one attack an American Northrop P-60 Black Widow night fighter was shot down. NJG 6 lost nine crews during the nightly low-level missions.

On the night of 1 January, IV./NJG 3 scored some successes during assaults on railways in the west despite repeated encounters with Black Widows. As these were easy to out-manoeuvre, the highly skilled Ju 88 pilots saw them as inoffensive provided they were spotted in time. The Allied medium AA fire, however, continued to exact its toll of Ju 88 G-6 bombers.

After V./NJG 2 completed night-fighter training in January 1945, night Jabo training commenced. For this purpose Ju 88 G-6 night fighters were made available. The radar aerial installation was removed and the machines fitted with bomb-release gear. Training began on 3 January at Neubiberg. From mid – February flight training was cut back for shortage of fuel. In March 1945 flying was only possible on four days. The Reichsbahn provided two decommissioned locomotives for gunnery practice.

On the night of 9 April, five Ju 88 night fighters left Schleissheim to attack ground targets in the Karlsruhe-Mannheim-Oppenheim-Kirn-Landstuhl area. More than 20 heavy lorries were left in flames. These low-level operations were very dangerous because the convoys were well protected by AA. On 10 April five Bf 110 G-4s attached to 7./NJG 6 searched the Mannheim-Strasbourg – Pirmasens area and set afire numerous heavy lorries, little defence being offered. On 11 April night-fighter crews sought targets in the Eisenach-Ohrdruf-Erfurt area. A number of enemy supply transports driving with headlights were bombed and strafed with machine-gun fire. No aircraft were lost. These attacks were little

Drawing of the mixed-propulsion Do 335 B-6 night fighter. Expensive projects of this kind had no prospect of being realised after 1944.

At the end of 1944 the Do 350 was one of two jet versions being planned as the successor to the planned piston-driven Do 335 night fighter.

more than nuisance raids and no significant interruption of the enemy traffic was to be expected with so few aircraft.

Constant attacks by low-flying Allied aircraft against airfield dispersal areas caused increasing losses of Luftwaffe machines. Although these were well protected by machine guns and light flak, it was risky to be in the open around the airfields. Allied aircraft repeatedly attacked planes parked on the airfield boundaries. On the night of 14 April Thuringia was the main target for the night fighters. Crews of I./NJG 6 for example attacked ground positions in the Augsburg area. On 20 April several night fighters were sent to bomb a small bridge near Rastatt. The result is not recorded. Several attacks were made from Neubiberg against enemy airfields in Alsace. Major Siebel of IV./NJG 6 failed to return from probably the last of these on the night of 30 April. The other crews were made prisoner over the next few days. In view of the losses sustained it is clear that these operations did not inflict any grievous damage on the enemy. The night raids disrupted supply traffic to a minor extent, but this was of such a size in 1945 that it scarcely mattered.

Cannon Fodder

The desire for small or midget fighters which were cheap to turn out led from the summer of 1944 to a stream of suggested solutions, amongst them Arado’s Ar E 381 project for a small, well-armoured parasite design (that is one carried in the early stages of its flight by a ‘mother’aircraft). These small rocket-propelled aircraft with narrow fuselage cross-section and recumbent pilot not only provided enemy air gunners with little to aim at, but the protection was proportionately lighter than with full-size aircraft. This armour was mainly designed to protect the cockpit and the rocket unit. The Ar E 381 design of 1 December 1944 was for a machine only 4.95 metres (16 ft 3 in) long with an 8.5-metre (27 ft 10 in) wingspan. Two dismantled aircraft could be transported in the back of a long lorry. Because of the small size there was not much room for a fuel tank in the fuselage and probably only one attack could have been flown. For this reason Arado suggested that the fighter should be carried to its operational altitude by an Ar 234 C jet bomber. Once released the Ar E 381 would glide away, then build up speed under rocket propulsion, before diving into an Allied bomber formation at high velocity.

The Ar 234 C would follow in support of the parasite fighter whose attack would be made with a single MK 108 gun (45 rounds) located on the upper fuselage. The gunsight was a Revi 16 reflector sight or alternative. The pilot was protected by a massive armoured windshield. Contact with the mother aircraft was by EiV intercom radio unit.

To spare expense the parasite fighter was slung below the fuselage bay of the

Ar 234 and for this reason the pilot had to be recumbent. On returning to the ground the aircraft would deploy a parachute to soften the skid impact, enabling landings on even small areas. The pilot would land by preference near a highway, a glider landing field or a meadow. The fighter was easy to dismantle for quick return to its airfield. The demountable assembly consisted of three parts: the wings, the fuselage with cockpit and engine, and the tailplane. For ground maintenance the weapon and cover, perspex nose, skid and engine plant with cover could all be removed.

The low production cost of the parasite fighter, the ease of assembly and the separate involvement of fighter and parent aircraft favoured the Ar E 381/ Ar 234 C-3 combination. On 5 December 1944 Arado submitted a project proposal to the Chief-TLR for approval, but as all Ar 234 developments took second place behind the He 162 A-l and A-2, and the Me 262 A-l and A-2

by virtue of the Fuhrer-edict of 27 March 1945, further work on the Ar E 381 was suspended.

As the operational targets became ever more distant and ever greater payloads were being carried, the Mistel arrangement became more complicated. One idea in August 1944 was to convert 100 He 177 A-З or A-5 to Mistel bombs for dropping on pin-point targets. The order for 98 of the 100 conversions was cancelled, however, in September 1944. In a conference on 20 November 1944 attended by General-Engineer Rudolf Hermann, the future use of the He 177 was discussed and Heinkel asked for a timetable to be set for the two machines. Each conversion required 7,500 man-hours. At the end of November Heinkel stated that, if so instructed, the first He 177 Mistel could be ready for testing in ten days, the second in fifteen. The first machine would be completed on 6 December and the other on 14 December 1944. The only foreseeable problem was the finked guidance system.

For the series conversion of 50 machines, Heinkel-Siid at Eger Werke estimated at first four to eight weeks, then four months ‘provided they were given

the necessary labour’. On 2 December it seemed clear that from the beginning of 1945 only 20 conversions could be started. RLM required only two machines definitely, however, and the first was promised to be ready for transfer to Nordhausen on 8 December. This date was not met.

On 8 January the Technical Directorate at Heinkel set the completion date for the first He 177 Mistel for 1 February, and 15 February for the second, but the two He 177/Fw 190 Misteh were already doubtful in early January. Some of the construction hangars at Zwolfaxing could not be heated for shortage of coal. All energy was being concentrated for He 162 production at Heidfeld to guarantee the night shift would be able to work, although the frequent power cuts made work almost impossible at Heinkel Slid. On 28 January the Mistel project was suspended indefinitely ‘for lack of coal’. The He 162 enjoyed unrestricted priority over all work at Heinkel Vienna. On 12 March the ‘Great Mistel’ was abandoned and the only existing guidance control system for the pairing shipped away. The majority of the Heinkel workers on the Mistel project were reallocated to the Volksjager.

At the end of 1944 OKL returned to the idea of the long-range night intruder. This was a tactic which had been tried out some years previously but discontinued on the instructions of higher authority. The idea was for multi­engined night fighters to lurk near enemy airfields and shoot down enemy bombers in the act of landing following their return from missions. The first and last such operation of this kind, in 1945, was Operation Gisela. It had been postponed so often between November 1944 and February 1945 that enemy intelligence got wind of it, and the Allied propaganda radio station Soldatensender Calais would regularly play the hit song ‘Tonight I Dance Only with Gisela’ to unsettle the German crews listed to take part.

The operational plan was for German night fighters to infiltrate a bomber stream returning from Germany and attack over the RAF home airfields, following up with strafing attacks on parked aircraft or other rewarding ground targets. Category I crews from I. to III./NJG 2, IV./NJG З, I. to III./NJG 4 and III./NJG 5 were chosen. On the night of the operation the remaining night fighter units intercepted a heavy Allied formation, shooting down nine bombers. Of these, Hauptmann Greiner claimed three (his 49th to 51st victories) and Major Schnaufer two (his 117th and 118th victories). After 200 RAF bombers had attacked Munster, they turned for home pursued by Ju 88 G-6s, and headed for Flamborough Head to be vectored home. The German night fighters were observing radio silence and had orders not to attack the bombers over the sea thus retaining the element of surprise. Shortly before reaching the coast the Ju 88 pilots released chaff to foil the RAF early-warning system. Near the airfields German crews noticed impact fires as aircraft damaged by flak over the Reich and unable to land crashed into the ground.

Night fighters now bombed and gunned British airfields. All navigation lights at the bases were extinguished. The night-fighter ‘raider’warning was broadcast. A B-17 arriving and showing navigation lights was shot down from underneath by the upward-firing guns. IV./NJG 3 came across Lancaster bombers coming in to land and made several attacks from below. The burning bombers thus crashed near their home airfields. Incoming British aircraft now extinguished all lights. Once the Ju 88 G-6s had expended all ammunition the aircraft headed for the German North Sea coast, a flight of 600 kilometres, and after five next morning most landed safely at the nearest airfield with fuel tanks almost dry.

At debriefing it was decided that the raid had paid off. Feldwebel Morenz (III./NJG 2) alone had claimed four bombers; Hauptmann Raht and Hauptmann Hissbach both had two. The other crews shared 12 between them. The RAF admitted the loss of 22 bomber aircraft. The Luftwaffe had sustained heavy losses, however. The Kommandeur of IV./NJG 3 baled out with his crew over northern Germany and was seriously injured, paralysis from the waist down

being the consequence. His crew landed safely. The Staffelkapitan of 12./NJG 3 and his crew were not heard from again. Unteroffizier Lohse failed to return. Several crew were killed when a Ju 88 G-6 crashed at Marx with engine fire. Hauptmann Dreher’s D5#AX of 13./NJG 3, a Ju 88 G-6, was shot down over Elvington just after attacking a Halifax bomber landing at Pocklington. In an attack on a vehicle on the ground, a Ju 88 G-6 struck a tree and finally crashed into a farmhouse. While attempting to shoot down from below a В-24 Liberator ofTransport Command flying at 100 metres altitude at Metfield, the machine of Oberfeldwebel Leo Zimmermann (II./NJG 4) touched the ground and crashed, killing all aboard. Feldwebel Conze of III./NJG 5 attacked a car being driven by a member of the Home Guard at Welton. His Ju 88 G-6 hit telephone wires and crashed on top of the car. RAF night fighters stationed at Coltishall took off and shot down three Ju 88 G-6s, amongst them a Ju 88 G-6 of II./NJG 3 in the Welton area. 3C+KN of V./NJG 5 and one other aircraft failed to return that night. In this operation the Luftwaffe lost three other aircraft over England and 12 crews in crash-landings in Germany.

The operation did not have the success claimed for it. The number of aircraft committed to Gisela was too few for a major success. The action did show that direct attacks on enemy airfields would probably tie down RAF forces on the ground and in the air, and interfere with the timetable of Bomber Command flights, but even in the autumn of 1944 the Luftwaffe was simply not in a position to make such attacks. The fuel reassigned for Gisela meant that some night-fighter operations over the Reich had to be cancelled. The German night – fighter squadrons paid the price for the Luftwaffe failure at the beginning of the war to build and develop aircraft and radar to protect German-occupied territory in western Europe and over the Reich.

My research into the documents stretches back to 1981 when I received a copy of A. 1.2(g) Report No. 2382 German Aircraft, New and Projected Types dated January 1946 and addressed to USAF HQH realised that there were far more extensive plans and projects than was admitted at the time. Over the next few years I found ever more hidden reports and secret files which led to a much broader picture. In the months following the war’s end, the Allied staffs, faced by this flood of new information, must have been taken aback by the extent of the

captured material. My research led me to draw provisional conclusions.

Without the collaboration of many friends and acquaintances interested in aviation history this work could probably not have been finished. This applies equally to the assistance I received from public archives, firms and government offices. I would like especially to thank the Bundesarchiv for their broad support for my endeavour. Similarly, help came from the staff of the German Museum at Munich. I also owe thanks to the staff of NARA at Washington DC, and the former PRO (now the National Archives) in London who provided active assistance in clarifying areas of doubt and assembled very convincing material. The Bundeswehr Procurement Office (BWB) helped out in questions of weaponry, and the German Study Bureau for Aviation with general information. Finally I must mention the help of the staff at the Bundeswehr Reference Library, Mainz, in obtaining and evaluating literature.

The work was supported additionally by the Technical University of Munich, to whose employees I offer my warmest thanks. Details of the development history of the BMW Motor Works were provided in large quantities by BMW AG. Valuable information came from EADS, Daimler-Chrysler and many other organisations of renown. I am also indebted to the Junkers Works and Bernburg military airfield.

Support also came from many enthusiasts and acknowledged experts in the field of German aviation, and I mention above all contributors Boehme; Cords; Dipl. Ing. Cohausz; Creek; Crow; Dabrowski; Dr Hiller; Edelhofer; Foedrowitz; Franzke; M. and H. Handig; Hafner; Herwig; Hildebrandt; Hofling; Jarski; Jayne; Jurleit; Dip. Ing. Kossler; Dr Koos; Krieg; Kudlikow; Lachler; Lang; Lange; Dipl. Ing. Lommel; Lutz jr.; Dr Mankau; Marchand; Meyer; Mombek; Miiller; Pawlas; Petrick; Dr Price; Radinger; Ransom; Regel; Riediger; Ricco; Rosch; Schliephake; Schmidt; Schmitt; Obering. I. R. Schreiber; Selinger; Sengfleder; Smith; Sommerfeld; Mag. jur. Stuber; Thiele; Trenkle; Vajda; Wagner; Walter and Dipl. Ing. Zucker. All shared their knowledge or made available useful photos or files. Without their selfless assistance a volume of this extent would not have been possible. Despite all efforts nevertheless many helpers remain hidden by the mists of time in my intensive research work since 1980.

I am always grateful for indications as to inaccuracies and error, and also for constructive criticism. I can be contacted for that purpose at <manfredgriehl@ t-online. de>.

I owe especial thanks to my wife Monika who read through the manuscript and gave me great encouragement.

Manfred Griehl Mainz, 2009

Postfach 2162, D-55011 Mainz

Besides the aircraft already described, numerous other projects were in hand at the beginning of 1945. On 22 February Goring issued a personal order reducing

these to two: the TL Project Fighter and the TL Project Reconnaissance aircraft, Bomber, Night fighter and Fighter bomber.

The emboldened pursuit of these projects resulted from Heinkel-Hirth’s great strides on the HeS Oil turbine giving rise to great optimism that early series production (HeS Oil A-0) would begin shordy. Chief-TLR was reckoning on beginning mass production of HeS ОН A-l in April or May 1945, and therefore the manufacture of a suitable fuselage was given a much higher priority than previously. On 25 February Oberammergau research centre and Willy Messerschmitt himself undertook an evaluation for the new 1 TL Fighter

including the plans of Blohm Sc Voss, Focke-Wulf, Heinkel and Junkers. The work almost completed preparations for a quick decision by EH К to select the best designs for mass production submitted by industry. Most projects as a rule had a speed between 900 and 1,050 km/hr (560-650 mph).The calculated rates of climb ranged from 22 to 30 m/sec (70-100 ft/sec).The best design on paper appeared to be the He P 1078, followed by the Me Pi 101 and the PI 110 to PI 112. The performance of these projects differed little from those of the Focke – Wulf jet fighter I and II (Та 183).

The DVL evaluated the submissions and decided at the end of February 1945 that the new Messerschmitt fighters had the greatest development potential, while warning of the problems of turbine non-deliveries, unprotected fuel tanks and engine spaces. DVL specialists were against tailless aircraft, such as the flying wing projects, but did not condemn them outright. In their opinion the future ‘standard fighter’ should have a relatively spacious fuselage, principally to accommodate more powerful turbines.

It was finally resolved on 28 February that DVL would not recommend series production, but that the Me Pi 101 already being built as a ‘study aircraft’ should be finished urgently and flight-tested. The same applied to other designs at an advanced stage, such as those at Focke-Wulf. In any case the future speed was to
be about 200 km/hr (125 mph) faster than the 850 km/hr (530 mph) average of the Me 262 A-la in order to maintain a tactical advantage in combat against Allied jets once they appeared. After this, Chief-TLR designated the Та 183 as ‘the immediate solution’and the Me Pi 112 as the optimum solution.

On 23 March 1945 the Department for Aircraft Development discussed with EHK at Bad Eilsen the future procedures for the 1 TL Fighter. Meanwhile the Fiihrer’s Plenipotentiary for Jet Aircraft, Dr Kammler, had become involved and ruled that neither the Та 183 project nor those of Messerschmitt were to go through: all further work should be devoted to the EF 128 since this design seemed to him the most advanced. On 12 March the Chief-TLR and the Riistungsstab ordered that the 1 TL Fighter was to be abandoned.

rom 1943 the Luftwaffe found itself in a predicament. The offensives on all fronts had petered out, and the high command had been forced on the back foot for the first time. A number of engineers were given the task at the beginning of 1944 of devising a way to regain air superiority from the Allies. Using every possibility to the full, with the harshest employment of forced labour and concentration camp slaves, it should be possible, so they reasoned, not only to increase armament production to previously unheard-of levels, but also to bring completely new aircraft into mass production very quickly, be it the midget fighter, whose many parts could be made at a number of different manufacturers, or ‘special aircraft’which promised the pilot little chance of survival.

In the closing phase of the war, OKL tried not only inadequately developed designs such as the Volksjager, but also completely new concepts. Having the pilot recumbent, for example, would enable him to perform flight manoeuvres at very high speeds and so win him a tactical advantage over enemy machines. In the steepest turns, they calculated, it should be possible to out-manoeuvre even the most agile Allied fighter aircraft to shoot them down. Other ideas gained ground, particularly ramming. Using the Reichenberg (a manned V-l), a particular target could be destroyed in a ‘total mission, a euphemism for suicide operations. Young pilots, imbued with National Socialist ideology, understood that any means was right and justified for Endsieg (‘final victory’), and this led in 1945 to the adoption of kamikaze tactics. The fact was not openly declared to that section of German youth which, from 1944 onwards, wanted to make its contribution to the victory of the German Reich by volunteering for ‘Aviator Training for Special Purposes’.

Victory Lying Down

Throughout their period in power the Nazi authorities attached great importance to the earliest possible basic training of youth, especially the Hitler Youth, as a source of supply to the Wehrmacht and SS. In May 1944 there were over 210 glider camps in which 10,000 Hitler Youth and a few older NSFK (National Socialist Flying Corps) men served, and were trained to fly various gliders. Not

for want of trying by the training staff it was found impossible to make a pilot of everybody, and the number of young men found suitable for the Luftwaffe successfully completing basic NSFK aviator training was modest. Some 500 of the 10,000 glider-trained Hider Youth were considered for continuation training as operational fighter pilots.

The increasing air raids on targets in the occupied territories and against cities and industrial complexes in the Reich caused ever higher casualties. German losses rose swifdy month by month. Possibly decisive for the further course of the war would be locally based protection of industrial installations, particularly oil refineries. A fast-climbing rocket fighter with relatively limited range would provide them with a minimum of cover. To fly these awkward machines required well-trained pilots. The use of glider pilots after only a short tactical course and training in aerial gunnery was not promising. Hitler Youth applicants for evaluation were required initially to furnish an A, В or C certificate in gliding. From thousands of applicants only a few hundred suitable for further training would be selected and sent on to development centres. Upon successful completion of a selection course, those who had passed were then transferred to Brno for the ‘Fighter Pilot Recruitment Course for Special Purposes’.

After their arrival at Trebbin, Laucha and other training establishments, the short introductory period was followed by flying training on the Kranich. Nothing was to be known about future operational machines. All young pilots were sworn to secrecy and forbidden to photograph the very unusual glider.

In mid-September 1944 it seemed probable that Erich Bachem’s vertical take-off BP 20 Natter local fighter would be ready for trials by the end of the year. So that the makeshift aircraft might enter service as soon as possible, training was begun in the late summer of 1944. It was agreed between Bachem and the RLM that 50 recumbent seats planned for the earlier version of the Natter would be manufactured and delivered to Grunau for the first Liegekranich gliders. The firm of Schneider would convert the training aircraft on hand accordingly. The contract was awarded on 29 September 1944. Ludwig Hofmann was selected to prepare the training course for future Natter pilots at Trebbin. For this purpose Oberst Gollob permitted him to take part in Me 163 training from the end of September.

Bachem had stipulated in his specification for the Natter that the normally most dangerous flight phase, landing, was not difficult, and consequently future pilots would need only basic flying knowledge, the В-licence being sufficient, covering the ability to fly in three dimensions with special instruction in Natter technique tacked on. A two-seater trainer with the flight characteristics of the Natter would be provided, special emphasis being placed on familiarizing the pilot with the unusual pilot seat. Later the young pilot would be shown the flight characteristics of the machine and how it behaved at high speed. Approaches would follow against moving targets. The approach itself would be a kind of dog­leg. Great importance was attached to the final shooting phase, for the limited flight time of the Natter did not provide for a second opportunity.

The training aircraft had room for the pilot to squat. The instrumentation and control unit were identical to the later operational aircraft. The flight instructor would handle take-off and landing in the two-seater. In order to impart flying knowledge earlier it was planned to have a lower wing loading than the operational version. A powerful winch was provided for take-off. Touch­down speed was 80 km/hr (50 mph). The pilot would round off the session by firing a Schmeisser at a mock-up of a bomber. It was thought that this would arouse his sporting instincts and enable him to acquit himself swifdy in this area of the training programme.

After completing the shooting and basic flight requirements, the pilot would then fly a training machine with greater wing loading. The winch would be replaced by an aircraft tug to reach greater altitudes for further exercises in shooting and closing in on enemy bombers. Next would come flights in a training Natter with pulse jet astern. Rocket-assisted starts and approaches towards moving targets now came to the fore. Whether a flight in a series-produced Natter was to have followed is not known: it is suspected that upon passing out of training, the young pilots were to have been made operational immediately and thrown in at the deep end. Since the Natter never did become operational, what happened in effect was that the successful candidates were merely told that they would pilot some kind of flying machine from the recumbent position. The courses were broken off earlier than planned, however, and the Hitler Youth candidates were packed off to perform their compulsory six-month RAD (Reich Labour Service) obligation.

Work on the Natter was not completed to plan and operations were never contemplated. Continuation training, at least of pilots intended for the Natter, scarcely emerged from the theoretical stage. Since using very young pilots to fly the Me 163 was doubtful since there was no fuel, and series production of the Но IX was a long way off, all efforts were in vain, while the development and building of the Me 163 В was suspended on 5 January 1945 on the orders of the armaments controllers and the Chief-TLR.

As the Red Army headed for Berlin, its advance forced a halt to training at Brno on 19 March 1945, and its transfer to the Reich Glider School at Trebbin. Initial flight training was diverted to Laucha, but never got under way. So that students would pass smoothly to a rocket fighter, part of the training during the second phase was with the Stummelhabicht. After completing glider training it was intended that applicants selected for the Me 163, Natter or similar aircraft should undergo a short course of flight training in a motorised aircraft (Bii 181) at Leipzig, but this idea was abandoned, mainly for shortage of fuel.

When shown a training film on the Me 163, the young pilots swifdy expressed doubts as to whether they could handle it, and the same occurred at courses where pilots would fly their machines in the recumbent position. Even instructors had problems flying the converted gliders of the Habicht and Kranich types while recumbent, because they were difficult to control generally.

The Julia project was developed by Heinkel-Siid Vienna under the designation He P 1068. Initially, as with the Natter, the pilot was to fly the aircraft from the recumbent position and take-off vertically. Experiments with scale models in 1944 had shown the general feasibility of a vertical start for small rocket fighters. Julia was devised by engineers Wilhelm Benz and Dr Gerloff in the spring of 1944. On 19 August 1944 they presented their provisional drawings. The development of the first experimental specimen designated He P 1068 was scheduled for completion within six to eight weeks based on a detailed proposal from Benz on 8 September 1944. Heinkel-Siid s research division, recently re­settled at Neuhaus an der Triesting, was headed by engineer Jost. Some of the technical calculations were done by Professor Schrenk and engineer Kottner of the Technical University of Vienna. Work progressed slower than hoped because
of technical problems, although at the beginning of September 1944 the RLM placed a definite order for 20 prototypes.

The contract for a series run of300 machines followed on 22 September 1944 under the designation He P 1077, the various component parts being farmed out to diverse firms so that Heinkel could devote itself to the Volksjager. On 15 October 1944 Heinkel-Siid announced a Julia variant, a local midget fighter propelled by a Walter HWK rocket motor with four solid-fuel rockets as take-off boosters. The pilot steered sitting up. Heinkel also had a ramjet version, Romeo.

A number of ideas were tested exhaustively for the Julia take-off, from a vertical start using a disposable undercarriage to a launch trailer similar to that used to fire the Enzian flak rocket. After the visit of Director Robert Liisser to Heinkel Vienna on 26 October 1944, proposals were put forward to modify Julia in line with Natter. These envisaged a new outline, a change to the tailplane and the pilot sitting upright, which ruled out the vertical take-off. Reworking the design cost valuable time and in October 1944 the first wooden mock-up of Julia was destroyed in an Allied air raid on Vienna.

On 12 November 1944 Heinkel tested the first one-eighth scale model of Julia in the large DVL wind tunnel. All the data for the project were now assembled and on 16 November 1944 the files were sent to the Chief-TLR.

Ernst Heinkel was hoping at the beginning of December that no more than the original 20 prototypes would be requested. The first five of these were to be manufactured by Potzel, the remainder at smaller factories. The NSFK in Vienna was to handle the final assembly work.

During the development conference on 21 and 22 November 1944 it was agreed that all project studies for local-defence fighters had to be subject to the usual priorities. Especially important to the Chief-TLR was the development of the Me 262 with one or two additional rocket motors. The building and trials of Julia took second place to this. Third came the further development of the Me 163 while the Ju 248 was downgraded because it was more expensive than the others to build. The Bachem BP 20 Natter was in fourth place at the end of November 1944.

On 28 November 1944 a comprehensive project portfolio was sent to Professor Hertel of the EHK. The files showed a pressurised cockpit allowing ascents to 15,000 metres (49,000 ft). Armament would be either two MK 108s with 40 rounds each or a Fohn battery with Marz automatic target-seeking equipment. The cockpit capsule weighed 60 kg. The fuel tanks were unprotected, and being of aluminium had no surrounding layer of rubber. Engineer Jost planned to use the approved 109-509 fuel mixture. A radio unit was considered unnecessary because the aircraft would operate locally to its ground base and the target.

Between 27 November and 19 December the wing drag forces and various load effects were worked out and the polar and resistance coefficient calculations

begun./w//# was wind-tunnel tested at AVA from 5 December 1944. There seem to have been no major problems, and the blueprints for prototypes V-l and V-2 were completed on 13 December 1944 so that Heinkel could forecast delivery of the first machine for 24 January. By 20 December 1944, despite the immense problems, Heinkel-Slid had succeeded not only in completing the development material for the He 162 and producing prototypes, but was close to completing the development of Julia too.

On 22 December the EH К recommended the Chief-TLR to suspend all work on Julia and Natter and to concentrate effort into developing the Me 262 with additional propulsion, and the Me 263. The Commission believed that the risks inherent in the envisaged speeds for machines built of mixed construction methods were too great. On 5 January 1945 Heinkel-Siid was ordered to stop work on Julia. At the time a model made by the Schaffer company at Linz was being tested by the SS-LFA at the Braunschweig wind tunnel. In the hope of keeping the door open, Heinkel-Siid approached the Chief-TLR on 27 January, pointing out that besides two versions to be tested as gliders, the next two would have rocket motors. General-Engineer Lucht came back within four days repeating the OKL instruction that the entire project be abandoned and the mock-up room at Neigaus closed down. All staff, especially the carpenters and joiners, were to work forthwith building the He 162 trainer.

It seems that Heinkel ignored him and allowed the work on Julia at the sub­contracted firms to continue. At Wiener Metallwerken a 1:4 scale model of Julia was completed at the end of January. Near St Polten several acute-angle starts were made using rocket-propelled models. The three full-size prototypes built by Schaffer of Linz in January were scheduled for transport to Karlshagen for trials if possible by 20 February. However, the test centre there was wound up in March, and it is doubtful if the tests were made.

On 14 February 1945 Dr Heinkel mentioned during a conference that he had received the order of the Chief-TLR to suspend ah work on Julia but he had pressed ahead. This came to the ears of the Chief-TLR two days later, and a new instruction then arrived at Heinkel-Siid leading to an agreement to limit production to four Julia of which two would be rocket-propelled. On 17 February 1945 Heinkel took the unilateral decision to begin steep-angle launches of the full-size aircraft.

Although the order to suspend all work on Julia was repeated on 21 February, the Chief-TLR allowed the Geppert company at Krems/Danube to begin assembly work on two unpowered Julia (MZ) at the beginning of March. Shortly before the war’s end the machines were completed by Dr Gerloff after being signed off, but whether they were flight-tested with solid-fuel rockets is doubtful.

On 3 March the Heinkel-Siid technical management decided that the Julia test machine should be completed and delivered ‘as per contract’. The two rocket – powered machines (M4) were to be assembled by Schaffer of Linz without delay. The serviceable aircraft were destroyed by forced labourers upon the approach of US forces, however, and Russian troops at Triesting seized most of the Julia documentation for further assessment.