Category Last Days of the Luftwaffe

Towards the end of 1943, the SS-RSHA (Reich Main Security Office) began to document all imaginable command structure weakness in the Luftwaffe and aviation industry. Obergruppenfiihrer Kaltenbrunner’s enquiries eventually produced two comprehensive dossiers which concluded, as had been hoped, that ‘the Luftwaffe has lost quantitative and qualitative superiority in the air on account of incorrect measures taken by the RLM.’Most responsible officers at

the SS-RSHA were secretly convinced that only the SS could bring about a favourable change in the air war, only the SS (as they saw it) had the necessary brutality and commitment to score important victories in the shortest time frame. In the summer of 1944 SS-Standartenfuhrer Dr Martin Brustmann, a veteran in aviation affairs, began advocating an ‘SS air arm’. Under SS auspices, extremely fast flying-wing aircraft would be built as soon as possible in factories both above and below ground. In view of the shortage of raw materials SS-WHA had to accept substitutes: steel plating for aluminium, and in particular wood for high performance machines. SS-Obergruppenfiihrer Hans Jiittner, whom Himmler had appointed Deputy Chief of Army Armaments on 21 July 1944, was considered the man to take over air armaments for the SS. He enlisted the cooperation of SS-Hauptsturmfiihrer Kurt May, whose furniture factory at Tamm near Stuttgart would initially produce 12 Ho IXs. It seems that the idea must have been to check its development potential as a fighter. The first 12 would be trainers. After Himmler approved the project, Jiittner started producing the

Ho III, but progress was slow because May was increasingly involved in procuring wood for He 162 production and was in charge of the Stuttgart – Esslingen assembly region for Volksjager wooden parts. Work on the Ho III remained below manufacturing targets and at the beginning of 1945 the Horten design dropped out of the picture.

After Kammler was appointed to head all development, testing and completion of jet aircraft on 27 March 1945, he found he was unable to achieve miracles. Even though all Horten designs being worked on now received greater impetus than before, nothing came of hopes that the Но IX could regain air superiority. Despite the SS s determination to set up a fanatical SS air corps, there was no progress, not even with recruitment. SS losses on all fronts were so high that ensigns commanded companies. Assembling sufficient men suitable for training as fighter pilots was impossible, and even the omnipotent SS service centres were frustrated in their self-appointed task of bringing air armaments under SS control. Nevertheless, in apparent ignorance of how the war was going, at conferences involving the Riistungsstab and Chief-TLR, almost utopian ideas and projects continued to be discussed.

Messerschmitt and Junkers both designed powerful jet bombers in the flying-wing configuration. The Me P 1108, for example, would have been capable of carrying four SC 1800 bombs over long distances.

Once the situation on the Eastern Front had become completely hopeless during April 1945, volunteers for suicide operations – more committed than ever before – made themselves available. Every effort now seemed justified if only to buy a few more days. Whether this might allow time for the ‘Miracle Weapon to be ready was irrelevant. Towards the end of January 1945 when the Red Army had reached the Oder, the Luftwaffe had been told to ‘exhaust every means’ to halt the enemy advance. When the offensive against Berlin began on 16 April 1945, the German pilots took off on previously planned missions against bridge targets.

For this purpose ‘suicide squads’ stood ready at the Altes Lager airfield Magdeburg and on other airfields near Jiiterbog in mid-April 1945. About 40 volunteers with varied operational experience and flying knowledge had gathered there and in the face of the Russian offensive were ready to do and die. Generalmajor Fuchs gave SO Group A their orders on the evening of 15 April after briefly explaining the general situation. In the late afternoon of the next day, pilots of III./JG 3 flying Bf 109 F, G and К fighters led the way east for the suicide squad. The SO Group machines were each armed with a 500-kg bomb. Since there were too few single-engined machines available for all pilots, those without an aircraft were transferred to SO Group B. The objectives were the pontoon bridges over the Oder at Kiistrin and Frankfurt. Young officers and

NCOs dived their aircraft into the targets. The pilots of the escort machines saw impact explosions. These ‘total missions’, as described later in the War Diary, resulted in numerous hits on the bridges, air reconnaissance reporting an 80- metre long gap between sections in one of them.

On 19 April 1945 a total of 36 ‘SO’ single-engine machines took off for the Oder. A number of volunteers fell victim to Soviet fighters or anti-aircraft fire. Because of the prevailing weather conditions and smoke screening the bridges, three pilots could not find the target and returned to base. That night the Luftwaffe Command Staff put a stop to the operations. Since pontoon bridges could be repaired or replaced almost overnight, supply lines to the Red Army forward units were not seriously affected. The operations and their toll in Luftwaffe dead had little effect on events.

The Red Army was now advancing on a broad front from Cottbus towards Berlin and reached the Jiiterbog area on 24 April. The last 13 pilots of SO Groups A and В received orders by telex to transfer to II./SG 2 Immelmann which remained in action under Oberst Rudel to the end. Most men got through to the airfield at Kummer am See in Bohemia and reported to their new unit. Their operations lasted until 7 May.

The concurrent attacks of the Mistel combinations of II./LG 1 resulted mosdy in near misses, the immense groupings of Russian anti-aircraft batteries around the bridges preventing accurate bomb-aiming.

Pilots of anti-tank special Staffeln also apparently participated in what amounted to suicide actions. Many committed themselves to especially risky missions by a simple handshake. Some of the Вії 181 aircraft at Magdeburg were converted into makeshift bombers by removing the right-hand seat, cutting a hole in the fuselage with saw and shears and inserting a tube to hold a 50-kg bomb. Six of the 14 mosdy young pilots who took off on 20 April 1945 failed to return: Leutnant Schwarzer, Fahnriche (Ensigns) Bethe, Hauber and Fleisch – mann, Unteroffiziere Kleemann and Scholl. Some of the Bii 181s from Magdeburg carried two 50-kg bombs, and the pilots dived into the target to ensure that they exploded simultaneously. No further details are known.

owards the end of the 1944, the German night-fighter arm was in crisis.

The efficient He 219 had not been introduced in numbers. Problems also persisted with on-board radar. From 1945 some units could expect to receive more high performance piston aircraft, or Me 262 and Ar 234 jets. Well – equipped night- and all-weather fighters were already under construction, but few thought the time would come when they would be flown.

Radar

Ever larger formations of RAF night bombers over the Reich in 1944 had asked a lot of the night-fighter arm. The Bf 110 and Do 217, and increasingly the Ju 88 G-l and G-6 were too slow and their radar equipment inadequate. The German

command centres, and individual crews, knew how susceptible the radar was to chaff and powerful jamming techniques at which the enemy excelled. Even the most modern versions of the once highly praised FuG 220 Lichtenstein were experiencing interference across the wavebands. Since Allied equipment used centimetric frequencies, all later Ju 88 G-6 night fighters were equipped with an FuG 350Zb to detect this range and so obtain advance warning of the arrival of enemy bombers.

The workshops of Deutsche Lufthansa also handled assembly work of the Wurzburg radar during the war.

The real improvement occurred at the end of 1944 when, after a long and technically difficult phase of research and testing, the first centimetric sets began to filter through to operational units. These were modern 9-cm FuG 240 and FuG 244 radars. Their disguised parabola aerial was fitted alongside the conspicuously long aerials of the SN-2 unit at the nose. The bearing of the target was indicated by a tube on the FuG 240/1 Berlin N1 using a frequency around 3,500 MHz with a maximum range of 9,000 metres; 25 of the order for 100 of these Telefunken devices were delivered by the end of March 1945 and ten installed in Ju 88 G-6s of III./NJG 2 operating from Giitersloh. The unit had a working range of 5,000 metres down to 350 metres, and produced more precise data than the SN-2. The FuG 240/2 was similar to the Berlin N1 but had an improved panoramic screen showing successive sectors. Two different variants, Berlin D1 and D2, were under development, their frequencies ranging from 8,350 to 9,400 MHz.

The N2 and N3 centimetric-waveband equipment never left the laboratories and FuG 240/4 Berlin N4 was produced in 1945 as a contact keeper for wide-ranging night operations or long-distance chases. FuG 244 Bremen 0 had a powerful beam transmitter for the longer ranges to be expected in future. The equipment was fighter and more compact than the Berlin series and was scheduled to replace SN-2 radar within a few months, but a reported problem was masking of the field by the tailplane and wings. The single set of 100 ordered was at Diepensee under test early in April 1945.

Relatively few Ju 88 G-6s were fitted experimentally with Berlin N1 radar from the end of 1944 for operations over northern Germany. Their use contributed to ten RAF aircraft shot down by the end of March 1945. A few
others from the Gruppenstabe at I. and II./NJG 4 also carried the FuG 240. This provided the Luftwaffe with an on-board radar of equal value to Allied developments in the night-fighter sphere, supplemented by a system of field observers, air reconnaissance and radar.

After the war took an even less favourable turn for Germany at the end of 1944, the Riistungsstab made greater efforts to design an aircraft for Reich air defence which could be turned out faster, and in greater numbers. The development of the He 162, based on revised plans for a more costly jet fighter, was seen as the solution. In the medium term better equipped and armed fighters, if possible with an HeS Oil A-l turbine, would take their place alongside the Me 262. All known aircraft manufacturers now became involved in the various attempts to produce stopgap designs for a powerful, single-turbine jet aircraft. As might have been expected the engines could not be supplied. The ambitious project came to grief before the first prototypes were available, and only models and a full-scale mock-up in wood served Chief-TLR and the Riistungsstab for inspection purposes. The 1 TL Fighter was never actually thought of as a replacement for the Me 262 A-la, but rather as a way to stretch the available resources as far as possible. It would consume considerably less fuel than the twin Jumo 004 В engines of the Me 262 A-la, and therefore economise on the
restricted fuel supplies: the same applied to the raw materials required for series production. As there was a limit to aluminium availability, a hard look was taken at easily manufactured steel plating and possibly wooden parts for various sections of the aircraft structure. In submitting their suggestions, firms had to take this into account.

Chief-TLR staff had great hopes for the light Ju EF 126 Jabo at the beginning of 1945. The Junkers Elli was one of the few new ideas at Junkers still being worked on with determination in April 1945. Ju EF 126 was a completely revolutionary design for a light, wood-built single-seat Jabo. Initially it had a fully retractable undercarriage, but diminishing resources eventually argued for the skid. By 14 February 1945 the rudder and weight calculations had been made. The machine, due for mass production in 1945, had a take-off weight of 2,800 kg (6,170 lb), 110 kg (243 lb) of this being the armament. It was to take-off using two rocket boosters or by compressed-air catapult launch. All development work was carried out at Junkers Dessau. The performance calculations gave a top speed of780 km/hr, or 680 km/hr (485/420 mph) with an external load. Powerplant was the Argus As 109-044 pulse jet used for the V-l flying bomb. Operational ceiling would be at least 7,000 metres (23,000 ft), range relatively short at 320 km (200 miles).

Junkers wanted to arm the new Jabo with 2-cm weapons (MG 151/20s each with 180 rounds) which would be housed level with the cockpit as with the Volksjager. Two sets of six Panzerblitz rockets would be carried in wooden racks below the wings or a firing installation for WK 14s fitted. Racks for spin – stabilised rockets were designed and manufactured by Kurt Heber GmbH at Osterrode/Harz. Besides the rockets a 500-kg bomb-load in four AB 70 or two larger AB 250 containers was envisaged.

According to a conference note of December 1944 progress on the Hs 132 did not take the course wanted by the Chief-TLR because of planning delays. The general war situation would not allow a completion of the first prototypes until at least mid-1945. After the Main Development Commission (EHK) had expressed doubts about the performance data of the EF 126 in January, the General der Kampfflieger was obliged to ask DVT to review the figures for Elli submitted by Junkers.

Work on the prototype was halted from February. After an air raid on 16 January, and another on Dessau on the night of 8 March, the Jumo factory was moved out to Muldenstein. At that time a mock-up of the Ju EF 126 existed but the prototypes ordered by the Chief-TLR were forgotten as the fronts then crumbled. The Volkssturm were called into Dessau on 10 April to man the outlying tank obstructions. Work in the development bureau was quiet but the arrival of RLM officials at Dessau in mid-April with orders to convert 20 Ju 290s to long-range bombers brought an unexpected brief period of relief from the prevailing indolence. On 21 April American tanks rolled past the development office on the way to Dessau town centre.

After a few chaotic days while the Americans were plundering the factory and removing documents, the situation quietened and in the summer of 1945, when US troops left, the Russian occupying force built the first prototype after taking over the Junkers works. The EF 126 was tested in the Soviet Union, where the fifth prototype made a maiden flight using a Russian engine on 16 March 1947. Testing continued into 1948 when the design was abandoned.

Along with Alexander Lippisch, the brothers Reimar and Walter Horten were the most influential proponents of the flying-wing principle in Germany. The various Nurfliigel gliders, and also the later twin-jet Но IX, predestined the development team to create far larger aircraft. The work was headed by engineer Naul, aeronautical designers Bollmann and Briinne designed the wings and Piitzer the undercarriage.

In the autumn of 1944 an RLM conference with Horten, Junkers and Messerschmitt called for far more powerful aircraft able to reach targets on the US East Coast and return to Europe without refuelling. AJ1 design offices became involved. At a three-day conference at RLM subsequently it was admitted that neither the Ju 287 with enlarged range had that radius of action, nor did the aircraft planned by Horten and Messerschmitt, although the Horten design had a 60 per cent greater range than all its competitors. Although no contract had been awarded by November 1944, Horten decided to develop the

Но VIII for preliminary tests. Exact details could not be provided to the RLM without the mathematical data and wind-tunnel tests. As provisional engine plant for the future Но VIII it was planned to integrate into the wing six Argus As 10 motors with long-shaft propellers. Using the development details of earlier designs, Horten believed the work could be finished within six months. With a relatively light wing loading of only 53 kg/sq. m (1,250 lb/sq. ft), Но VIII was to be the training aircraft for the heavier, but almost equal sized ultra-long range bomber. Work began in mid-December 1944 and took shape surprisingly quickly during the next three months.

On 12 March 1945 Goring instructed Horten and the commander of Kommando IX to build the first long-range flying-wing bomber, but set no firm completion date. However, this was the order for the Но VIII. When US troops arrived in April 1945, the design work was almost 100 per cent complete, the first

fuselages 50 per cent ready. On 12 March 1945, SS-FHA Amt X is said to have ordered the Но XVIII built. By 23 March the Horten Works had drawn up a project outline for presentation in Berlin, and work on the Но VIII developed from the Но XVIII long-range aircraft continued to the end of March 1945. This three-seater would have had a maximum range of 13,000 kilometres (8,000 miles), inclusive of a 1,000 kilometre reserve. With four SC or SD 1000 bombs, Horten considered that an operational range of 4,000 kilometres was possible, with only one bomb considerable more. Six Jumo 004B turbines were planned to be installed in the wings after calculations showed that the alternative of four BMW 003s would be under-powered. Fuel tanks would hold 16 tonnes. It was also considered giving the Но XVIII two efficient propeller-turbines. A payload of 4 tonnes would have provided an all-up weight of 32 tonnes. For an attack on the United States the bomb-load would have been reduced to one tonne or less to provide an operational reserve of fuel. For short-range work the

bombs would have been carried in a central bay below the fuselage and in two others between the engine blocks and outer wing. On long-range operations part of the bomb bay space would have been given over to disposable fuel tanks. The aircraft could have been refuelled by a Ju 290 in flight as originally planned. Top speed in horizontal flight was thought to be 820 km/hr (510 mph), maximum possible speed of the steel skeleton/wood configuration 900 km/hr (560 mph). Since considerable preliminary work remained to be done as Allied ground forces approached, on 1 April 1945 the Chief-TLR transferred the development to the Harz, but when the time came to place the firm order, the Allies had overrun practically all production centres. In the last few days of the war most of those involved in the Но XVIII projects gave their lives in the defence of the Third Reich. The Но XVIII and the smaller Но VIII remained incomplete. Neither Kammler nor the SS had been able to force through either project as the Reich collapsed.

A second gigantic project, the four-jet Development Aircraft (Entwicklungs – flugzeug) EF 130, the competitor to all designs (including the Но XVIII) submitted to the Chief-TLR, had a powerplant of four HeS Oil jet turbines. The estimated 38-tonne aircraft had a 24-metre (78 ft) wingspan and a large wing surface of 120 square metres (1,300 sq. ft). Because of lack of capacity at Junkers at the beginning of 1945, it was transferred at least partially to DFS. In contrast to the Horten development, the EF 130 would have had a metal fuselage and large wooden wings. The bomb bay had capacity for 4 tonnes and several armoured fuel tanks. The three-seater cockpit was designed as a roomy pressure cabin from where the gunner operated the two remote-controlled defensive barbettes in the fuselage. Initially it was planned to fit four HeS 011 turbines. These were not sufficiently reliable at the beginning of 1945 and four BMW 003 C-l engines were considered instead but were scarce. Top speed would have been 950 km/hr (590 mph) but the maximum flight even with only one 1-tonne bomb was only 7,500 kilometres (4,650 miles), not enough to reach the US coast and return. The EF 130 was abandoned in March 1945 by the Chief-TLR in favour of the Horten design.

Exhortations to step up the pace to build a large jet bomber in March 1945 resulted from the dreams of a leadership blind to the unstoppable approach of defeat. Although no high-value construction materials were available, many lives were sacrificed to force through a senseless project. The excavation of ever more galleries and underground production centres in the spring of 1945 led to an until then unimaginable death rate amongst concentration camp prisoners and forced labourers engaged on the work, but the SS held firm. Not until a day or so before Allied forces reached the bombed-out factories or tunnels in which production had been concentrated did the last SS men give up, throwing down their weapons and leaving to their own devices the slaves who had survived.

Berlin had been declared a ‘fortress’ on 1 February 1945 and martial law was introduced on 9 April. Anything usable as a weapon was made ready. All available

aircraft were to take part in a low-level attack in the Baruth area. These included 14 pilots who had volunteered for suicide missions. Their motives were various: many had lost family or a partner in the air raids, some wanted to save Germany, others were lost for an explanation.

On 1 April 1945 a number of volunteers in the Berlin Brandenburg area were sent to Magdeburg-Slid and given special identity papers as part of 8. Panzerjagd-Sonderstaffel, a Luftwaffe special anti-tank squadron. Several Вії 181 were prepared on a former Deutsche Lufthansa airfield with construction hangars, on or about 15 April 1945. This low-wing aircraft with dual side-by – side seating was actually a trainer and therefore unarmed. A Hirth HM 500 piston engine provided a speed a little over 200 km/hr or up to 350 km/hr (125/220 mph) in a steep glide. These aircraft would now be used in the anti­tank role at very low level. In the assembly hangar each wing was fitted with two wooden racks to hold a total of four Panzerfaust rockets. The weapons were fired by tugging on a steel wire leading over or below the wing to the control stick. The rudder was steel plated since in tests with the Panzerfaust it tended to fracture. A simple circular sight mounted on the engine cowling served as a primitive aiming device. At 80 metres range and 100 metres height it was possible to draw a bead on enemy tanks and fire down on them obliquely with some accuracy.

Apart from courage the operation required skill in low-level flying since the Bii 181 was intended to engage tanks with all four rockets during a shallow dive close to the ground. An alternative was an almost horizontal approach followed by a fast turn away. A third tactic involved an approach at less than 50 metres height, rise to 50 metres just short of the target, depress the nose, fire the Panzerfaust rockets and then use whatever ground cover was available to get clear. The aircraft might be hit by anti-aircraft fire at any time between the approach and the escape. Ground troops would also respond with light arms fire if not sheltering from splinter bombs. German losses were disproportional to the number of Soviet tanks destroyed.

Operation Bienenstock was born of despair in the second half of April 1945. This idea was to attack Allied aircraft by Luftwaffe sabotage operations against airfields using explosives or the Panzerfaust. One such squad headed for Weis in a decrepit lorry to find 16 new Fw 190 D-9s with Jumo 213 E-l engines needing maintenance work. Orders came to fly the machines to Halle/Saale with virtually no ammunition. No enemy aircraft were seen and all arrived safely bar Oberleutnant Merkel, who baled out shortly after take-off when his aircraft caught fire. From Halle the 15 survivors reached Wallersdorf airfield. Here the unit commander was advised that his sabotage squad could not be used as ground troops, but shortly afterwards American fighter-bombers attacked the airfield and destroyed their aircraft.

Six selected pilots were sent along the Autobahn to the nearest aerodrome. After surviving an air raid at Rosenheim in the railway station bunker the men got to Salzburg where they found various single and two-seater aircraft drawn up in large numbers on an airfield. They were informed that these light aircraft were to be made operational against the Allies.

On 5 May the men were assembled and received orders to cross the Alps to attack Allied bombers parked on airfields in northern Italy. The following night it snowed and the operation was cancelled. Another special mission was ordered. The men were arranged in small groups. Feldwebel Hans Unmack, who had flown 129 missions, was given a young pilot to assist in navigation to the target. They flew their Fw 44 at tree-top height towards Franconia. Near Nuremberg they easily avoided American anti-aircraft fire by dodging between the bursts – the guns could not adjust to the slow-flying aircraft. When the fuel ran out they landed in pasture in the Steigerwald. After sinking their explosives in a nearby stream they set off on foot for the American lines, and Unmack at least got there.

On 16 April 1945 some of the pilots who had outlived the 7 April suicide mission were ordered to Pocking to be decorated by Oberst Hajo Hermann with the Iron Cross First Class or the German Cross. Further ramming attacks were no longer possible because of the lack of suitable aircraft. There were no useful machines at Pocking. Fifty men now moved off to Neubiberg and then Fiirstenfeldbruck near Munich where they discovered at least four Panzerfaust – armed Bu 181s and other training machines including three new Si 204 D-l night fighter-bombers. A number of flight instructors flew the converted Bii 181 anti-tank aircraft from Trebbin, all but one being shot down by Russian ground fire. In the evening Panzerjagdkommando General Keller was pitched into the fray south of Trebbin. This unit was made up of Aviation Hitler Youth. Next morning they were wiped out. While Goring set off from Berlin for the Alps along the last highway still open from the capital, it was left to flight instructors and pupils with Panzerfausts to hold off a vasdy superior enemy.

On 27 April three sabotage squads left Fiirstenfeldbruck by air for Metz with explosive charges to destroy parked Allied heavy bombers. One of the three machines crashed shortly after take-off. Nothing more was ever heard of the other two Si 204 D-ls. It is possible that the pilots made the right decision for themselves and their passengers. Four Bii 181s were sent to Schwandorf to attack parked American aircraft. Other crews were selected to blow up the bridges over the Danube at Regensburg. Unfortunately it was not known at Fiirstenfeldbruck that engineers had already done the job. All men sent on the missions disappeared. Two Fi 156s with highly decorated pioneer troops aboard crashed when the undercarriage legs broke during landing on swampland near Dillingen behind the American lines. Two men escaped and avoided captivity, at least for the time being.

On 26 April Bienenstock commandos from Fiirstenfeldbruck and Pocking assembled at Zollfeld airfield near Klagenfurt for an operation to attack parked Allied bombers in northern Italy. Forty small aircraft and 80 crew were on hand. In the first mission, involving 20 pilots, only two crews returned to Klagenfurt, and both had a man dead or injured. The target for the attacks had been changed at the last minute from Italy to Hungary. Further desperate flights followed on 5 May to Papa in Hungary and next day to Warasdin. The few surviving machines took off on their final missions on 8 May 1945. Meanwhile Oberst Hermann had been advised of the capitulation by telex. After parading his men for the last time he disbanded the unit. Nearly all crews succeeded in flying, driving or walking to the Allied lines or directly to Germany. In the north, the Hitler Youth remnants of Panzerjagdkommando General Keller retreated before the Red Army towards Schwerin, and from there to Flensburg. Together with General Keller, his staff, some senior NSFK leaders and 150 Fliegerkorps men, they surrendered to the British on the road to North Frisia.

During the last phase of the war, to the beginning of 1945, the air defence of the Reich fell within the jurisdiction of Luftflotte Reich, under whose umbrella came Jagddivisionen 1 (Doberitz), 2 (Stade), 3 (Wiedenbriick) and 7 (Pfaffenhofen) together with Jagdfiihrer (Jafu) Mittelrhein (Darmstadt) and numerous Luftwaffe signals units. Despite an efficient radio control system, even at night the crews failed to achieve the expected successes. Why?

The Allies had a huge reserve of bomber aircraft. The ability to deploy over a thousand aircraft in a single night raid far exceeded the Luftwaffe defensive capacity. Even raids with far fewer bombers proceeded with impunity and devastating effect. On the night of 29 January 1945, for example, 606 RAF heavy bombers inflicted serious damage on Stuttgart for only eleven losses to night fighters and flak.

At the beginning of 1945 the Wehrmacht was operating with only 28 per cent of the fuel stock it had in January 1944. Ever heavier air raids on the production centres of aviation fuels had cut Luftwaffe supplies to 6 per cent of the previous years figure for January. In late 1944 Luftwaffe operational units were living for a while on their meagre fuel reserves, and night-fighter sorties were only flown if the occasion looked particularly favourable. Night-fighter Gruppen in 1945 might have 30 machines, mainly Bf 110 G-4s and Ju 88 G-6s, at readiness but probably only five, exceptionally ten would be committed. It is therefore not surprising that of 6,600 RAF bombers over the Reich in January 1945, only 1.4 per cent, fewer than 100, came to grief. The Luftwaffe Command Staff could see a greater debacle in the offing for the night fighter arm, and on 3 February 1945 they disbanded the Jafii Groups in East Prussia, Silesia and Hungary once they came under threat as the enemy advanced.

The remorseless RAF Bomber Command operations continued nightly, and British aircrew found it increasingly common to have little or no Luftwaffe opposition. From the beginning of 1945, the Luftwaffe experimented with new groupings and unit interchange apparently in the hope of improving its performance at night. OKL, recognising that supplies of fuel were limited and the level of operations could not be raised by dipping into the fuel reserves, decided on another tack by selecting which crews would fly. On 24 February aircrew were assessed into categories T, ТГ and ‘Others’. The last were employed on transfers or workshop flights, their machines being parked on the edge of airfields under camouflage. From the end of February, Class I veteran crews with numerous victories were those mainly used on operations, and proportional to the machines committed far more kills were achieved than before.

Allied electronic jamming methods were considered first-class. The years spent rejecting centimetric technology had led the once powerful German night- fighter arm into a blind alley. Moreover, from March 1945, more and more airfields were abandoned as the Western Allies reached the Rhine-Main area, the units dispersing to north and south Germany to guarantee further operations.

The last great night-fighter operation ensued on 21 March when 89 crews opposed an RAF raid on the hydro-electric plant at Bohlen-Altenburg. Aircraft of Jagddivisionen 1 and 3 and the Mittelrhein Jafii were involved in the pursuit which resulted in at least 14 bombers being shot down. At the end of the month night-fighter operations were cut drastically as fuel stocks vanished with no fresh supplies expected now that communications to storage dumps had been severed. Despite the fuel situation OKL manoeuvred individual squadron units in an attempt to continue the struggle. An OKL order to disband part of each Staffel reduced all surviving night-fighter Gruppen to a maximum of 16 aircraft, while the now superfluous Geschwader – and Gruppenstabe were disbanded. These were to be replaced by autonomous Einsatzgruppen (Operational Groups), each with a Gruppenstab, four Staffeln and a Stabsstaffel. Because of the deteriorating situation on the ground this instruction was dubious from the start.

At unit level, flight organisation had long been dictated by the realities. On 11 April, 20 twin-engined night fighters took off to engage RAF heavy bombers for the last time, and after that operations ebbed. The majority of the command centres had been dissolved, and the Allies had cut the Reich into two at the midriff. In northern Germany and Denmark, Luftwaffenkommando Nord controlled night-fighter operations, which amounted to more or less well-led individual missions. Day and night-fighter operations over Bavaria, Austria and the Reich Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia were headed by Luftwaffen­kommando West. As the supra-regional command structure and operational control crumbled away in the last weeks of the war, the Geschwader were placed in an extremely difficult positions when enemy bomber streams arrived and then often split to attack several targets.

After numerous diverse project studies in 1943, the Focke-Wulf design bureau at Bad Eilsen concentrated on variants of their jet-fighter projects. Special importance was placed on a powerful twin-boom machine in the summer of 1944. The planned single-seater Flitzer was to be powered initially by a BMW 003 (as an intermediate solution), later by the HeS Oil, the standard engine with greater thrust. A turbo-prop (PTL 021) was also investigated. The aircraft would be capable of 900 km/hr (560 mph) and – depending on the powerplant – operate at up to 15,000 metres (49,000 ft). Endurance hoped for was at least one hour. Three different but easily produced weapons variants were to be offered: either an MK 103 and two MG 151/15s, or two MK 108s and two MG 151/20s, or four MK 213s in the fuselage and wings. The EZ 46

reflex gyro-stabilised gunsight was planned. Electronics were the FuG 15 ZY and an FuG 25a as an IFF unit for German flak. By the beginning of 1945 the design work was almost completed, as was the future equipment for the first series-produced aircraft, but the promised HeS Oil turbine never came, and substitutes had to be considered instead. The Allies captured the Focke-Wulf planning offices in April 1945, and came into possession of numerous plans, reports and drawings of the Flitzer, which would surely have been a very useful fighter aircraft.

The deployment of the much faster twin-jet Ar 234 В-2 which became operational in reasonable numbers from the end of 1944 was seen as an important step forward. The first unit to be equipped with the Arado bomber,

III./KG 76, received its first Ar 234 B-2 on 28 August 1944. Led by Knights Cross holder Hauptmann Diether Lukesch, conversion training took place at Burg near Magdeburg, and the first operation was flown on 23 December by the operational flight Kommando Lukesch. Once 9. Staffel at Miinster-Handorf began working as the operational test unit, operational preparations began for 7. and 8. Staffeln. III./KG 76 had 21 bombers in December 1944. Its first attack was made on Verviers town centre when six aircraft came in at low level and dropped SC 500 bombs to commence Ar 234 operations in the West. On 24 January III./KG 76 was placed at the disposal of IL/Jagdkorps, while other elements of the Geschwader were transferred to Achmer. Over the airfield the German jet bombers were attacked by aircraft of 401 Squadron RAF, two Ar 234s being shot down. As other machines landed they were attacked by low – flying aircraft, a third bomber exploding and a fourth being seriously damaged by machine-gun fire. Not until 8 February did III./KG 76 begin operations from Achmer on a large scale. The original plan was to attack the Brussels marshalling yard with SC 500 bombs but the unfavourable weather forced the bombers to go for the alternative railway installations at Charleroi and two other stations. Because of Allied low-level attacks and bad weather, flying was much restricted until 14 February, when the targets were near Eindhoven and Kleve.

On 21 February Knight’s Cross holder Oberstleutnant Robert Kowaleski, KG 76 Kommodore, was tasked with setting up a Gefechtsverband joining together Stabsstaffel/KG 76 (Ar 234), 6., 8. and 9. Staffeln (Ar 234) plus I. and

II./KG 51 (Me 262) into a powerful high-performance jet-bomber unit for the first time. That day Major Hansgeorg Batcher led a raid dropping SD 500 bombs on Allied positions in north-western Germany: 21 Ar 234 В-2s launched heavy attacks against troop formations between Eindhoven and Kleve. Around 24 hours later, nine Ar 234s bombed American ground forces south and north-east of Aachen. Attacks on Allied positions and airfields continued throughout February.

In early March the Allied advance in the West picked up. On the early morning of 7 March the first Sherman tank of US 9th Armored Division reached the Rhine and, since the defenders had failed to demolish the Ludendorff bridge at Remagen, it soon fell into American hands. KG 76 received orders to destroy the structure immediately at whatever cost, but bad weather kept aircraft grounded until 8 March, allowing the Americans to establish their bridgehead and reinforce it with heavy AA batteries.

Ar 234 B-2 jets attacked the Ludendorff bridge for the first time on 9 March. Oberfeldwebel Friedrich Bruchlos (Wks No. 140589 F14AS) drew the entire concentration of light AA fire on himself in a low-level pass at 400 metres. A

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turbine caught fire and began trailing smoke, and his aircraft was soon overtaken by Allied fighters and shot down 15 kilometres from the bridge at Fockenbachtal north of Neuwied. The other two pilots were also unsuccessfiil.

The next attacks followed on 11 March when two Ar 234 B-2s were unsuccessful, and on 12 March at midday two machines of the Geschwaderstab and two from 6. Staffel headed for the now very heavily defended bridge. Hauptmann Hirschberger and Fahnenjunker-Feldwebel Riemensperger, leading the first operation by 6./KG 76, approached the target with auto-pilot engaged at 8,000 metres in level flight. Short of Remagen Riemensperger took over manual control and dropped his bomb. Then he noticed the Staffelkapitan sitting motionless in his cabin, his bomb still slung beneath the fuselage. The ensign bore away for base at Achmer. When the fuel in Hirschberger’s Ar 234 ran out, he crashed near Lyons. Another attack on the bridge by 14 Ar 234s followed a little later. Using the accurate Egon equipment, SC 1000 bombs were dropped from 5,000 metres altitude but without success. On 13 March seven Ar 234 B-2s of 6./KG 76 each carried a one-tonne bomb to the target. One flight released its SC 1000 bombs in a gliding approach, the others using Egon from 5,000 metres. III./KG 76 also attacked Remagen with 12 bombers, and six 6./KG 76 pilots tried a little later, but the bridge held.

The Allies now took counter-measures. Fighters attacked the jet bombers at Achmer on take-off and pursued them to Remagen where the AA took its toll.

A number of German aircraft were hit by fire from the principal bridge and pontoon crossings over the Rhine and crashed. After the bridge was unexpectedly demolished on 17 March, Gefechtsverband Kowaleski operational staff removed all its machines to well-developed aerodromes in southern Germany on 19 March from where they could attack Alsace and Rhine-Hesse, the starting points for the American advance on Mainz. Part of KG 76 operated from Miinster – Osnabriick. The KG 76 airfields in this region now received the attentions of USAF bombers, 12 B-24s being sent to destroy Achmer airfield and 13 others to Hesepe.

On 28 March large Allied armoured formations began their attempt to force a route to the Westphalian plain. The following evening Ar 234 bombers of III./KG 76 attacked targets in the west. Four pilots dropped their bombs on American armoured positions along the River Nahe between Sobernheim and Bad Kreuznach. As the threat to the KG 76 airfields near Osnabriick from low flying Allied fighters and bombers became more severe, a move northward by the squadron remnants became unavoidable. On 1 April 6./KG 76 from Hesepe landed at Reinsehlen on Liineburg Heath after a refuelling stop.

Meanwhile the number of available jet bombers had fallen to ten. Despite the situation, on 2 April six pilots of III. Gruppe made gliding attacks on rewarding columns of lorries 10 kilometres south-east of Rheine, their earlier airfield, without loss to themselves. The rapidity of the Allied advance forced the Stab and three Staffeln to transfer to Kaltenkirchen north of Hamburg on 5 April, from where further sorties were flown against the Munster area. On 9 April, despite the grave fuel situation, the number of machines at KG 76 had risen to 17. Some Ar 234 B-2s arrived unexpectedly by road. Next day a number of bombers from Kaltenkirchen attacked convoys of Allied lorries on the Autobahn between Bad Oeynhausen and Hannover. Attacks were flown from a long stretch of Autobahn at Blankensee near Liibeck against the bridgehead at Essel, north of Nienburg, and to demolish bridges at Celle, particularly the Autobahn over the River Aller.

On the morning of 15 April, pilots of KG 76 attacked an Allied armoured column on the Autobahn between Brunswick and Hannover with visible success. Allied air superiority was now evidendy greater than it had been just a few weeks previously. More and more fighters operated over the ever-shrinking area which remained under German control. Losses therefore rose. The daily numbers of available jet bombers declined rapidly. An operational Gruppe for these was set up at Blankensee. Once the Red Army had begun its encirclement of Berlin, this unit concentrated on bombing raids around the capital. The Kommodore alone flew eight missions against Soviet tanks; previously he had flown seven sorties with other pilots against forces besieging the Ruhr.

On 19 April after a bombing mission to the south of Berlin, Major Polletin was killed. The following day Baruth, Zossen and Jiiterbog were bombed, and on the 25th 9./KG 76 attacked a bridge close to the centre of Berlin. After releasing his SD 500, one pilot headed for Oranienburg east of Berlin to reconnoitre where he saw large Red Army formations. On 26 April two Ar 234 В-2 bombers of the Geschwaderstab took off from Kaltenkirchen and attacked Soviet tanks at the Halleschen Tor, the very centre of the ruined Reich capital. Oberfeldwebel Breme looked down on a Berlin where many great fires raged, the city already partially occupied by the enemy. There was so much smoke from these fires, particularly around the Halleschen Tor, that it was impossible to make out Soviet tanks or other useful targets.

On 27 April the last serviceable Ar 234 B-2s were flown to Leek, from where, despite the dwindling tactical opportunities, orders from Hitler stipulated that Berlin was the target. On the 29th, the Geschwaderstab hit an armoured column

in the Berlin battle zone. At midday on the 30th KG 76 pilots flew direcdy over the burning city centre with orders to lend support to the defenders in the government district and on the streets near the Reich Chancellery. Since this was not a promising project, attention was focused next on strongpoints closer to the home airfield. On 2 May a 9./KG 76 pilot dropped an SC 500 amidst a British armoured column approaching Liibeck on the Autobahn. On his return he was intercepted by several RAF Tempests and then came under heavy AA fire, but his superior speed enabled him to make good his escape.

Besides III. Gruppe, only II./KG 76 was close to being operational but had to complete the remainder of training. On 10 April USAF bombers attacked the unit’s airfields at Brandenburg-Briest, Burg and Zerbst with 372 B-17s; 147 of this formation wiped out Burg aerodrome. This put an end to II. Gruppe conversion training. The runway was out of commission for some considerable time. At the beginning of April, Alt-Lonnewitz came under threat from the Red Army. II. Gruppe and the Geschwaderstab transferred on 2 May from Liibeck to Schleswig, where there was sufficient fuel and provisions despite the danger of low-level attack, and from there to Rendsburg, where they eventually gave in.

The training of IV. Gruppe, intended to become III./EKG 1, a jet bomber operational training unit, was also broken off short. Between 1 and 20 February a number of III./EKG 1 crews under training carried out bombing missions against Schwedt on the Oder and at Stettin in the attempt to weaken the Soviet
advance. They flew fifteen He 111 H-20s loaned by other units. Whatever they achieved was a mere pinprick in the side of the Red Army.