Category Last Days of the Luftwaffe

Berlin had been declared a ‘fortress’ on 1 February 1945 and martial law was introduced on 9 April. Anything usable as a weapon was made ready. All available

aircraft were to take part in a low-level attack in the Baruth area. These included 14 pilots who had volunteered for suicide missions. Their motives were various: many had lost family or a partner in the air raids, some wanted to save Germany, others were lost for an explanation.

On 1 April 1945 a number of volunteers in the Berlin Brandenburg area were sent to Magdeburg-Slid and given special identity papers as part of 8. Panzerjagd-Sonderstaffel, a Luftwaffe special anti-tank squadron. Several Вії 181 were prepared on a former Deutsche Lufthansa airfield with construction hangars, on or about 15 April 1945. This low-wing aircraft with dual side-by – side seating was actually a trainer and therefore unarmed. A Hirth HM 500 piston engine provided a speed a little over 200 km/hr or up to 350 km/hr (125/220 mph) in a steep glide. These aircraft would now be used in the anti­tank role at very low level. In the assembly hangar each wing was fitted with two wooden racks to hold a total of four Panzerfaust rockets. The weapons were fired by tugging on a steel wire leading over or below the wing to the control stick. The rudder was steel plated since in tests with the Panzerfaust it tended to fracture. A simple circular sight mounted on the engine cowling served as a primitive aiming device. At 80 metres range and 100 metres height it was possible to draw a bead on enemy tanks and fire down on them obliquely with some accuracy.

Apart from courage the operation required skill in low-level flying since the Bii 181 was intended to engage tanks with all four rockets during a shallow dive close to the ground. An alternative was an almost horizontal approach followed by a fast turn away. A third tactic involved an approach at less than 50 metres height, rise to 50 metres just short of the target, depress the nose, fire the Panzerfaust rockets and then use whatever ground cover was available to get clear. The aircraft might be hit by anti-aircraft fire at any time between the approach and the escape. Ground troops would also respond with light arms fire if not sheltering from splinter bombs. German losses were disproportional to the number of Soviet tanks destroyed.

Operation Bienenstock was born of despair in the second half of April 1945. This idea was to attack Allied aircraft by Luftwaffe sabotage operations against airfields using explosives or the Panzerfaust. One such squad headed for Weis in a decrepit lorry to find 16 new Fw 190 D-9s with Jumo 213 E-l engines needing maintenance work. Orders came to fly the machines to Halle/Saale with virtually no ammunition. No enemy aircraft were seen and all arrived safely bar Oberleutnant Merkel, who baled out shortly after take-off when his aircraft caught fire. From Halle the 15 survivors reached Wallersdorf airfield. Here the unit commander was advised that his sabotage squad could not be used as ground troops, but shortly afterwards American fighter-bombers attacked the airfield and destroyed their aircraft.

Six selected pilots were sent along the Autobahn to the nearest aerodrome. After surviving an air raid at Rosenheim in the railway station bunker the men got to Salzburg where they found various single and two-seater aircraft drawn up in large numbers on an airfield. They were informed that these light aircraft were to be made operational against the Allies.

On 5 May the men were assembled and received orders to cross the Alps to attack Allied bombers parked on airfields in northern Italy. The following night it snowed and the operation was cancelled. Another special mission was ordered. The men were arranged in small groups. Feldwebel Hans Unmack, who had flown 129 missions, was given a young pilot to assist in navigation to the target. They flew their Fw 44 at tree-top height towards Franconia. Near Nuremberg they easily avoided American anti-aircraft fire by dodging between the bursts – the guns could not adjust to the slow-flying aircraft. When the fuel ran out they landed in pasture in the Steigerwald. After sinking their explosives in a nearby stream they set off on foot for the American lines, and Unmack at least got there.

On 16 April 1945 some of the pilots who had outlived the 7 April suicide mission were ordered to Pocking to be decorated by Oberst Hajo Hermann with the Iron Cross First Class or the German Cross. Further ramming attacks were no longer possible because of the lack of suitable aircraft. There were no useful machines at Pocking. Fifty men now moved off to Neubiberg and then Fiirstenfeldbruck near Munich where they discovered at least four Panzerfaust – armed Bu 181s and other training machines including three new Si 204 D-l night fighter-bombers. A number of flight instructors flew the converted Bii 181 anti-tank aircraft from Trebbin, all but one being shot down by Russian ground fire. In the evening Panzerjagdkommando General Keller was pitched into the fray south of Trebbin. This unit was made up of Aviation Hitler Youth. Next morning they were wiped out. While Goring set off from Berlin for the Alps along the last highway still open from the capital, it was left to flight instructors and pupils with Panzerfausts to hold off a vasdy superior enemy.

On 27 April three sabotage squads left Fiirstenfeldbruck by air for Metz with explosive charges to destroy parked Allied heavy bombers. One of the three machines crashed shortly after take-off. Nothing more was ever heard of the other two Si 204 D-ls. It is possible that the pilots made the right decision for themselves and their passengers. Four Bii 181s were sent to Schwandorf to attack parked American aircraft. Other crews were selected to blow up the bridges over the Danube at Regensburg. Unfortunately it was not known at Fiirstenfeldbruck that engineers had already done the job. All men sent on the missions disappeared. Two Fi 156s with highly decorated pioneer troops aboard crashed when the undercarriage legs broke during landing on swampland near Dillingen behind the American lines. Two men escaped and avoided captivity, at least for the time being.

On 26 April Bienenstock commandos from Fiirstenfeldbruck and Pocking assembled at Zollfeld airfield near Klagenfurt for an operation to attack parked Allied bombers in northern Italy. Forty small aircraft and 80 crew were on hand. In the first mission, involving 20 pilots, only two crews returned to Klagenfurt, and both had a man dead or injured. The target for the attacks had been changed at the last minute from Italy to Hungary. Further desperate flights followed on 5 May to Papa in Hungary and next day to Warasdin. The few surviving machines took off on their final missions on 8 May 1945. Meanwhile Oberst Hermann had been advised of the capitulation by telex. After parading his men for the last time he disbanded the unit. Nearly all crews succeeded in flying, driving or walking to the Allied lines or directly to Germany. In the north, the Hitler Youth remnants of Panzerjagdkommando General Keller retreated before the Red Army towards Schwerin, and from there to Flensburg. Together with General Keller, his staff, some senior NSFK leaders and 150 Fliegerkorps men, they surrendered to the British on the road to North Frisia.

During the last phase of the war, to the beginning of 1945, the air defence of the Reich fell within the jurisdiction of Luftflotte Reich, under whose umbrella came Jagddivisionen 1 (Doberitz), 2 (Stade), 3 (Wiedenbriick) and 7 (Pfaffenhofen) together with Jagdfiihrer (Jafu) Mittelrhein (Darmstadt) and numerous Luftwaffe signals units. Despite an efficient radio control system, even at night the crews failed to achieve the expected successes. Why?

The Allies had a huge reserve of bomber aircraft. The ability to deploy over a thousand aircraft in a single night raid far exceeded the Luftwaffe defensive capacity. Even raids with far fewer bombers proceeded with impunity and devastating effect. On the night of 29 January 1945, for example, 606 RAF heavy bombers inflicted serious damage on Stuttgart for only eleven losses to night fighters and flak.

At the beginning of 1945 the Wehrmacht was operating with only 28 per cent of the fuel stock it had in January 1944. Ever heavier air raids on the production centres of aviation fuels had cut Luftwaffe supplies to 6 per cent of the previous years figure for January. In late 1944 Luftwaffe operational units were living for a while on their meagre fuel reserves, and night-fighter sorties were only flown if the occasion looked particularly favourable. Night-fighter Gruppen in 1945 might have 30 machines, mainly Bf 110 G-4s and Ju 88 G-6s, at readiness but probably only five, exceptionally ten would be committed. It is therefore not surprising that of 6,600 RAF bombers over the Reich in January 1945, only 1.4 per cent, fewer than 100, came to grief. The Luftwaffe Command Staff could see a greater debacle in the offing for the night fighter arm, and on 3 February 1945 they disbanded the Jafii Groups in East Prussia, Silesia and Hungary once they came under threat as the enemy advanced.

The remorseless RAF Bomber Command operations continued nightly, and British aircrew found it increasingly common to have little or no Luftwaffe opposition. From the beginning of 1945, the Luftwaffe experimented with new groupings and unit interchange apparently in the hope of improving its performance at night. OKL, recognising that supplies of fuel were limited and the level of operations could not be raised by dipping into the fuel reserves, decided on another tack by selecting which crews would fly. On 24 February aircrew were assessed into categories T, ТГ and ‘Others’. The last were employed on transfers or workshop flights, their machines being parked on the edge of airfields under camouflage. From the end of February, Class I veteran crews with numerous victories were those mainly used on operations, and proportional to the machines committed far more kills were achieved than before.

Allied electronic jamming methods were considered first-class. The years spent rejecting centimetric technology had led the once powerful German night- fighter arm into a blind alley. Moreover, from March 1945, more and more airfields were abandoned as the Western Allies reached the Rhine-Main area, the units dispersing to north and south Germany to guarantee further operations.

The last great night-fighter operation ensued on 21 March when 89 crews opposed an RAF raid on the hydro-electric plant at Bohlen-Altenburg. Aircraft of Jagddivisionen 1 and 3 and the Mittelrhein Jafii were involved in the pursuit which resulted in at least 14 bombers being shot down. At the end of the month night-fighter operations were cut drastically as fuel stocks vanished with no fresh supplies expected now that communications to storage dumps had been severed. Despite the fuel situation OKL manoeuvred individual squadron units in an attempt to continue the struggle. An OKL order to disband part of each Staffel reduced all surviving night-fighter Gruppen to a maximum of 16 aircraft, while the now superfluous Geschwader – and Gruppenstabe were disbanded. These were to be replaced by autonomous Einsatzgruppen (Operational Groups), each with a Gruppenstab, four Staffeln and a Stabsstaffel. Because of the deteriorating situation on the ground this instruction was dubious from the start.

At unit level, flight organisation had long been dictated by the realities. On 11 April, 20 twin-engined night fighters took off to engage RAF heavy bombers for the last time, and after that operations ebbed. The majority of the command centres had been dissolved, and the Allies had cut the Reich into two at the midriff. In northern Germany and Denmark, Luftwaffenkommando Nord controlled night-fighter operations, which amounted to more or less well-led individual missions. Day and night-fighter operations over Bavaria, Austria and the Reich Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia were headed by Luftwaffen­kommando West. As the supra-regional command structure and operational control crumbled away in the last weeks of the war, the Geschwader were placed in an extremely difficult positions when enemy bomber streams arrived and then often split to attack several targets.

After numerous diverse project studies in 1943, the Focke-Wulf design bureau at Bad Eilsen concentrated on variants of their jet-fighter projects. Special importance was placed on a powerful twin-boom machine in the summer of 1944. The planned single-seater Flitzer was to be powered initially by a BMW 003 (as an intermediate solution), later by the HeS Oil, the standard engine with greater thrust. A turbo-prop (PTL 021) was also investigated. The aircraft would be capable of 900 km/hr (560 mph) and – depending on the powerplant – operate at up to 15,000 metres (49,000 ft). Endurance hoped for was at least one hour. Three different but easily produced weapons variants were to be offered: either an MK 103 and two MG 151/15s, or two MK 108s and two MG 151/20s, or four MK 213s in the fuselage and wings. The EZ 46

reflex gyro-stabilised gunsight was planned. Electronics were the FuG 15 ZY and an FuG 25a as an IFF unit for German flak. By the beginning of 1945 the design work was almost completed, as was the future equipment for the first series-produced aircraft, but the promised HeS Oil turbine never came, and substitutes had to be considered instead. The Allies captured the Focke-Wulf planning offices in April 1945, and came into possession of numerous plans, reports and drawings of the Flitzer, which would surely have been a very useful fighter aircraft.

The deployment of the much faster twin-jet Ar 234 В-2 which became operational in reasonable numbers from the end of 1944 was seen as an important step forward. The first unit to be equipped with the Arado bomber,

III./KG 76, received its first Ar 234 B-2 on 28 August 1944. Led by Knights Cross holder Hauptmann Diether Lukesch, conversion training took place at Burg near Magdeburg, and the first operation was flown on 23 December by the operational flight Kommando Lukesch. Once 9. Staffel at Miinster-Handorf began working as the operational test unit, operational preparations began for 7. and 8. Staffeln. III./KG 76 had 21 bombers in December 1944. Its first attack was made on Verviers town centre when six aircraft came in at low level and dropped SC 500 bombs to commence Ar 234 operations in the West. On 24 January III./KG 76 was placed at the disposal of IL/Jagdkorps, while other elements of the Geschwader were transferred to Achmer. Over the airfield the German jet bombers were attacked by aircraft of 401 Squadron RAF, two Ar 234s being shot down. As other machines landed they were attacked by low – flying aircraft, a third bomber exploding and a fourth being seriously damaged by machine-gun fire. Not until 8 February did III./KG 76 begin operations from Achmer on a large scale. The original plan was to attack the Brussels marshalling yard with SC 500 bombs but the unfavourable weather forced the bombers to go for the alternative railway installations at Charleroi and two other stations. Because of Allied low-level attacks and bad weather, flying was much restricted until 14 February, when the targets were near Eindhoven and Kleve.

On 21 February Knight’s Cross holder Oberstleutnant Robert Kowaleski, KG 76 Kommodore, was tasked with setting up a Gefechtsverband joining together Stabsstaffel/KG 76 (Ar 234), 6., 8. and 9. Staffeln (Ar 234) plus I. and

II./KG 51 (Me 262) into a powerful high-performance jet-bomber unit for the first time. That day Major Hansgeorg Batcher led a raid dropping SD 500 bombs on Allied positions in north-western Germany: 21 Ar 234 В-2s launched heavy attacks against troop formations between Eindhoven and Kleve. Around 24 hours later, nine Ar 234s bombed American ground forces south and north-east of Aachen. Attacks on Allied positions and airfields continued throughout February.

In early March the Allied advance in the West picked up. On the early morning of 7 March the first Sherman tank of US 9th Armored Division reached the Rhine and, since the defenders had failed to demolish the Ludendorff bridge at Remagen, it soon fell into American hands. KG 76 received orders to destroy the structure immediately at whatever cost, but bad weather kept aircraft grounded until 8 March, allowing the Americans to establish their bridgehead and reinforce it with heavy AA batteries.

Ar 234 B-2 jets attacked the Ludendorff bridge for the first time on 9 March. Oberfeldwebel Friedrich Bruchlos (Wks No. 140589 F14AS) drew the entire concentration of light AA fire on himself in a low-level pass at 400 metres. A

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turbine caught fire and began trailing smoke, and his aircraft was soon overtaken by Allied fighters and shot down 15 kilometres from the bridge at Fockenbachtal north of Neuwied. The other two pilots were also unsuccessfiil.

The next attacks followed on 11 March when two Ar 234 B-2s were unsuccessful, and on 12 March at midday two machines of the Geschwaderstab and two from 6. Staffel headed for the now very heavily defended bridge. Hauptmann Hirschberger and Fahnenjunker-Feldwebel Riemensperger, leading the first operation by 6./KG 76, approached the target with auto-pilot engaged at 8,000 metres in level flight. Short of Remagen Riemensperger took over manual control and dropped his bomb. Then he noticed the Staffelkapitan sitting motionless in his cabin, his bomb still slung beneath the fuselage. The ensign bore away for base at Achmer. When the fuel in Hirschberger’s Ar 234 ran out, he crashed near Lyons. Another attack on the bridge by 14 Ar 234s followed a little later. Using the accurate Egon equipment, SC 1000 bombs were dropped from 5,000 metres altitude but without success. On 13 March seven Ar 234 B-2s of 6./KG 76 each carried a one-tonne bomb to the target. One flight released its SC 1000 bombs in a gliding approach, the others using Egon from 5,000 metres. III./KG 76 also attacked Remagen with 12 bombers, and six 6./KG 76 pilots tried a little later, but the bridge held.

The Allies now took counter-measures. Fighters attacked the jet bombers at Achmer on take-off and pursued them to Remagen where the AA took its toll.

A number of German aircraft were hit by fire from the principal bridge and pontoon crossings over the Rhine and crashed. After the bridge was unexpectedly demolished on 17 March, Gefechtsverband Kowaleski operational staff removed all its machines to well-developed aerodromes in southern Germany on 19 March from where they could attack Alsace and Rhine-Hesse, the starting points for the American advance on Mainz. Part of KG 76 operated from Miinster – Osnabriick. The KG 76 airfields in this region now received the attentions of USAF bombers, 12 B-24s being sent to destroy Achmer airfield and 13 others to Hesepe.

On 28 March large Allied armoured formations began their attempt to force a route to the Westphalian plain. The following evening Ar 234 bombers of III./KG 76 attacked targets in the west. Four pilots dropped their bombs on American armoured positions along the River Nahe between Sobernheim and Bad Kreuznach. As the threat to the KG 76 airfields near Osnabriick from low flying Allied fighters and bombers became more severe, a move northward by the squadron remnants became unavoidable. On 1 April 6./KG 76 from Hesepe landed at Reinsehlen on Liineburg Heath after a refuelling stop.

Meanwhile the number of available jet bombers had fallen to ten. Despite the situation, on 2 April six pilots of III. Gruppe made gliding attacks on rewarding columns of lorries 10 kilometres south-east of Rheine, their earlier airfield, without loss to themselves. The rapidity of the Allied advance forced the Stab and three Staffeln to transfer to Kaltenkirchen north of Hamburg on 5 April, from where further sorties were flown against the Munster area. On 9 April, despite the grave fuel situation, the number of machines at KG 76 had risen to 17. Some Ar 234 B-2s arrived unexpectedly by road. Next day a number of bombers from Kaltenkirchen attacked convoys of Allied lorries on the Autobahn between Bad Oeynhausen and Hannover. Attacks were flown from a long stretch of Autobahn at Blankensee near Liibeck against the bridgehead at Essel, north of Nienburg, and to demolish bridges at Celle, particularly the Autobahn over the River Aller.

On the morning of 15 April, pilots of KG 76 attacked an Allied armoured column on the Autobahn between Brunswick and Hannover with visible success. Allied air superiority was now evidendy greater than it had been just a few weeks previously. More and more fighters operated over the ever-shrinking area which remained under German control. Losses therefore rose. The daily numbers of available jet bombers declined rapidly. An operational Gruppe for these was set up at Blankensee. Once the Red Army had begun its encirclement of Berlin, this unit concentrated on bombing raids around the capital. The Kommodore alone flew eight missions against Soviet tanks; previously he had flown seven sorties with other pilots against forces besieging the Ruhr.

On 19 April after a bombing mission to the south of Berlin, Major Polletin was killed. The following day Baruth, Zossen and Jiiterbog were bombed, and on the 25th 9./KG 76 attacked a bridge close to the centre of Berlin. After releasing his SD 500, one pilot headed for Oranienburg east of Berlin to reconnoitre where he saw large Red Army formations. On 26 April two Ar 234 В-2 bombers of the Geschwaderstab took off from Kaltenkirchen and attacked Soviet tanks at the Halleschen Tor, the very centre of the ruined Reich capital. Oberfeldwebel Breme looked down on a Berlin where many great fires raged, the city already partially occupied by the enemy. There was so much smoke from these fires, particularly around the Halleschen Tor, that it was impossible to make out Soviet tanks or other useful targets.

On 27 April the last serviceable Ar 234 B-2s were flown to Leek, from where, despite the dwindling tactical opportunities, orders from Hitler stipulated that Berlin was the target. On the 29th, the Geschwaderstab hit an armoured column

in the Berlin battle zone. At midday on the 30th KG 76 pilots flew direcdy over the burning city centre with orders to lend support to the defenders in the government district and on the streets near the Reich Chancellery. Since this was not a promising project, attention was focused next on strongpoints closer to the home airfield. On 2 May a 9./KG 76 pilot dropped an SC 500 amidst a British armoured column approaching Liibeck on the Autobahn. On his return he was intercepted by several RAF Tempests and then came under heavy AA fire, but his superior speed enabled him to make good his escape.

Besides III. Gruppe, only II./KG 76 was close to being operational but had to complete the remainder of training. On 10 April USAF bombers attacked the unit’s airfields at Brandenburg-Briest, Burg and Zerbst with 372 B-17s; 147 of this formation wiped out Burg aerodrome. This put an end to II. Gruppe conversion training. The runway was out of commission for some considerable time. At the beginning of April, Alt-Lonnewitz came under threat from the Red Army. II. Gruppe and the Geschwaderstab transferred on 2 May from Liibeck to Schleswig, where there was sufficient fuel and provisions despite the danger of low-level attack, and from there to Rendsburg, where they eventually gave in.

The training of IV. Gruppe, intended to become III./EKG 1, a jet bomber operational training unit, was also broken off short. Between 1 and 20 February a number of III./EKG 1 crews under training carried out bombing missions against Schwedt on the Oder and at Stettin in the attempt to weaken the Soviet
advance. They flew fifteen He 111 H-20s loaned by other units. Whatever they achieved was a mere pinprick in the side of the Red Army.

ocally based fighters stationed to protect sensitive areas and able to reach operational heights swiftly by rocket power were seen at the beginning of 1944 as one way forward against day-bomber formations. The first such machine introduced by the Luftwaffe was the Me 163 Komet. The first fighter unit to be so equipped was JGr 400 at Wittmundhafen. The initial contact with enemy four-engined bombers occurred on 14 May 1944 over northern Germany when Me 163 В V-41 approached a bomber at 960 km/hr (595 mph) but turned away with a technical problem. When l./JGr 400 had 16 Me 163 Bs, though only a few were operational, 2./JGr 400 was formed.

The first successful clash with the Eighth Air Force occurred in July 1944 when Leutnant Hartmut Ryll damaged a B-17. On 5 August 1944 he claimed a bomber shot down. Numerous attacks by Me 163s ensued over central Germany in subsequent weeks when massed bomber formations arrived intent upon destroying the fuel industry at Leuna. Successes and losses were proportional. On 7 October 1944 JGr 400 had a total of 30 machines. This number showed a marked increase at the end of the year when mass production of the Me 163 В began at Junkers and licensees. Only a major shortage of reliable rocket engines kept the output down.

By November 1944, despite all obstacles, over 70 Me 163s were concentrated at JG 400,63 at I./JG 400 and 8 at II./JG 400. In January 1945 several airfields were opened specially for Me 163s near the most important hydro-electric plants. The Luftwaffe was also planning numerous aerodromes in western Germany for the Me 163 and to establish a large reserve of rocket fuel. These ideas came to nought in March 1945. On the 20th of the month JG 400 received the order to re-equip with the Volksjager, but since these were only available in small numbers, Me 163 operations continued, fuel permitting. On 19 April 1945 OKL ordered the Geschwaderstab, I. Gruppe at Brandis and II. Gruppe at Husum to disband, and at the beginning of May 1945 the remnants of II./JG 400 with 13 Me 163 Bs surrendered to British forces. The operations of the rocket fighter ended because of over-diversification into other machines. Despite the huge budget to

develop the Me 163 B, the Me 163 C and D projects and the more powerful Ju 248, to which we will come later, the operation was not the success it could have been.

The search for the ultimate aircraft to destroy pin-point targets such as large road and rail bridges, power plants of all kinds and war factories resulted in numerous projects between 1943 and 1945. OKL wanted such aircraft initially to resist the Normandy landings, but later to destroy bridges of major importance and so protect the Reich borders. For all the long and intensive planning, however, they failed. A few hits were achieved but there was no possibility of turning the tide of events.

The idea of the Mistel originated with Flugkapitan Siegfried Holzbaur, who had an important role in flight testing for Junkers at Dessau. The idea of using

the Ju 88 A-4 as an unmanned large bomb was first considered seriously in the early summer of 1943.The arrangement involved a control aircraft, a Bf 109 F-4, riding on the upper central section of the bomber’s fuselage. Close to the target the Ju 88, armed with a 3.5-tonne bomb in the nose, would be detached and glide to the target under guidance. DFS flight-tested the first S-2 versions from the beginning of 1944. The first reliable data from July 1944 onwards showed that the wire-guided ‘Beethoven machine’ had enormous destructive power with a direct hit, but the relatively expensive construction and frequent problems in flight made the Mistel less ideal than at first thought.

Three versions were built and used by the war’s end:

Several other pairings were under consideration from 1944. Та 154a/Fw 190 A-8 was relatively well advanced and there were plans for He 177 А-5/Fw 190 A-9 or F-8, but only the Ju 88 combinations ever came to fruition. The high expenditure in costly material militated against the use of the 3.5-tonne special hollow charge – Luftwaffe arsenals had already begun extracting explosives from older bomb stocks to fill modern casings.

In January 1945 Mistel M 3B was in an advanced stage of research. The expendable bomber would have 1.5 tonnes of explosives in the nose. By 1 February 100 conversions, and by 10 February another 50, were in

hand. The production of the M 3B was held up for lack of Ju 88 G-ls, and only three complete pairs, and ten pathfinders equipped with remote control, left the Junkers works. Orders were in place for 150 special hollow-charge SHL 3500B bombs by 25 January at Riesa and another 100 by 10 February. The M 3B was in production during early February and the first pairs were due for delivery to KG 200 at the beginning of March. On 3 February Speer deferred the M 3C, which had a longer range than the M 3B, on the grounds of the shortage of Ju 88 G-lOs. On 14 February the Riistungsstab ordered the production of 50 Mistel able to fly 2,500 kilometres, and the resumption of the M 3C as soon as possible.

By 17 February 60 of 130 SHL 3500D bombs were ready and ten followed each day. The hollow charge had a mine and shrapnel effect. The first practical tests on 2 March were successful. As Allied jamming of remote guidance systems was expected, DFS had devised the Beethoven wire guidance system. On a test flight in which the Mistel pair did not separate, the command system worked flawlessly. A test with separation was scheduled for March, special importance being attached to the accuracy of the Beethoven system guiding the Ju 88 bomb.

Serious doubts about the Mistel manifested themselves from 15 March after attacks on bridges along the Eastern Front were not as successful as OKL had hoped. Numerous technical defects, the appearance of substantial numbers of Soviet fighters and heavy fire from the well-disciplined anti-aircraft batteries caused the premature abandonment of the majority of operations. Mistel development continued, however. From the beginning of March increasing numbers of Ju 88 G-lOs (Work Numbers Block 460) were test flown at Junkers particularly by Flugkapitane Harder and Dautzenberg. This aircraft was a lengthened Ju 88 G-6. The flight characteristics of the long version, as the Ju 88 H-l had shown, were not satisfactory, and the risks in flying a Ju 88 G-10/fighter combination were obviously greater than the Ju 88 G-l/ Fw 190 F-8. The last known movements recorded in surviving flight logs are for 30 March 1945. There were some Mistel pairs on the airfield at Barth at that time.

By mid-April doubts about the Mistel had increased, but the military situation was so desperate that all straws were being clutched at. Thus by the end of the
month all viable Mistel were on the Eastern Front, even if not too much was being expected of them.

To the very end, OKL believed that the introduction of faster fighters would give the night-fighter arm its old sparkle. From 1944, the possibilities open to the German aviation industry were increasingly limited. The Luftwaffe had held back and relied too long on the old machines, particularly the Ju 88 G-6 or He 219 A. From the outbreak of war, too little emphasis, or rejection on ideological grounds, had impeded the development of superchargers for altitude

work and other futuristic ideas. What remained ultimately was tinkering with existing aircraft in the hope of improving them. The development of night – fighter versions such as the Ju 388 J-l to J-3 did not receive the necessary support from the Jagerstab and later the Rustungsstab.

The principal obstacle was the shortage of high-performance engines, particularly the Jumo 222 E-l or F-l. For a time the Jumo 213 E-l was tried in the hope of turning the He 219 A-2 or Ju 88 G-6 into a superior night fighter, the equal of the RAF Mosquito. The problem was that changes to the fuselage had a limit. The first nine four-seater Ju 88 G-7s were basically a Ju 88 G-6 with two Jumo 213 E-l engines for altitude performance. The aircraft had a G-6 fuselage, a Ju 188 E-l tailplane and unmodified Ju 88 A-4 wings and under­carriage. Only a few of these machines were produced between November 1944 and March 1945. The first two (Ju 88 V-112 and V-113) remained unserviceable until 7 March 1945 because of engine problems. A single Ju 88 G-7 joined the OKL experimental unit on 29 March 1945.

Another white hope for the Luftwaffe night fighter arm was Ju 388 J-l, a hybrid of PE+IA and Ju 388 V-2 (РЕФІВ) which could have been an out­standing night fighter with an FuG 240 radar and powerful engines. The entire

Ju 388 development and the production of new aircraft were cancelled at the beginning of 1945, however. A number ofju 388 J-l aircraft were left at Mockau near Leipzig. It seems that this machine, though expensive to turn out, would have been without doubt a high-performance night fighter.

The He 219, especially the A-7 series, seemed another good prospect as a high-performance aircraft towards the end of 1944, and the Main Development Commission considered it to be the Luftwaffe’s best, but the six experimental machines equipped with Jumo 213 В engines were too few to confront RAF Mosquitos on a substantial basis. The 21 He 219 A-7s delivered between February and the beginning of April 1945 went into the OKL reserve for lack of fuel. The series was still being built at Heinkel Vienna (Heidfeld) until the end of the war, and a few definitely got through to NJG 1 for testing under operational conditions.

The Focke-WulfTa 154 could have been produced in wood. The night-fighter version appeared only in ones and twos, under-powered with Jumo 213 A-l engines. In November 1944, Gruppenstab III./NJG 3 at Stade carried out some half-hearted operational tests. Up to 16 March 1945 there were a few sorties against RAF Mosquitos but nothing came of them. Most aircraft were left at the airfield boundary for later enemy aerial target practice. High-performance engines such as the turbo-charged Jumo 213 E-l could have been made available for the Та 154 A-2 but Oberst Radusch was not interested in the machine, and tests were abandoned for lack of fuel.

The auxiliary night-fighter versions of the Do 335 were the A-5 single seater and A-6 two-seater of which great things were expected. The first high – performance night fighter Do 335 В-6 was due to roll off the production lines at Heinkel Oranienburg and Lothar-Jordan, Braunschweig, at the beginning of 1945, but mass production was halted for lack of materials, and by the war’s end only a few were being built at Dornier Oberpfaffenhofen. On 26 January 1945, Saur advised industry that the Do 335 night fighter could only be built as an experimental aircraft for study purposes. The first, Do 335 М-10 (СРФ1Ж) was airworthy at the beginning of 1945 and tested at Diepensee and Oranienburg. It was captured by the Russians in a damaged condition at the end of April 1945.

Other, mostly Focke-Wulf designed, high-performance night fighters with piston engines and auxiliary turbines remained in the project stage and were not built even for experimental purposes.

Compared to the Flitzer, the Та 183 appeared much more suitable for mass production. The design for aTL-Fighter with HeS Oil powerplant (Design 1, Ra-1) presented to the Riistungsstab on 10 January 1945 seemed to increase the chances of Focke-Wulf obtaining the contract for a top-rank fighter. A swept-wing jet with a squat fuselage, designed by engineer Multhopp, it would be armed with either two MK 108s or the more powerful MK 213. The DVT (German Experimental Institute for Aviation) had calculated in January 1945
that the machine would have a top speed of 875 km/hr (544 mph) near the ground and 940 km/hr at 7,000 metres (584 mph at 23,000 ft).

Design 2, Ra-4 from 1945 was to be of steel and wood construction for reasons of economy and to avoid using duraluminum and other high value materials in short supply. In the last version at the beginning of 1945, two large additional fuel tanks were envisaged to increase the range. March 1945 plans have at least two MK 108s with 100 rounds each, but though planning was well advanced nothing had come of this design by the capitulation.

The main effort was concentrated on the Ra-2, a flying mock-up of the future Та 183 with a Jumo 004 turbine. Basic performance calculations and the construction of the fuselage of Та 183 V-l (Ra-2) were completed in March, the second mock-up Та 183 V-2 (Ra-3) would be tested operationally with an HeS 011 powerplant. Work on improved control surfaces, turbine installation and wing fuel tanks was still in hand on 29 March. An increase in armament to four MK 108s, first thought of in Designs 2 and 3 was taken up and the possibility of adding two MK 103s studied. From a typed page dated 18 February

1945 it seems that the development team considered release gear for a 500-kg (1,100-lb) bomb-load. This resulted from the continuing interest of the OKL in machines which could do a stint as fighter-bombers.

In a concluding conference at the EHK (Main Development Commission) on 27 and 28 February 1945 there was unexpected agreement on Focke-Wulf project No. 279 as ‘an immediate solution. RLM number 183 was rejected by the Office for Aircraft Development on technical flight and tactical grounds, the Messer- schmitt ‘optimum solution for tailless construction being favoured. The overall result for the Та 183 was that two prototypes only would be produced in a short series at Detmold. Focke-Wulf wanted ten prototypes and two fuselages (Та 183 M-l to M-12) within four months. The Riistungsstab did not make clear for security reasons whether mass production was likely at the end of it all. Before anything further could be undertaken the Allies overran the factories and all the planning went to waste. On 8 April units of the US 84th Infantry Division occupied Bad Eilsen and district.

Although the situation was in reality hopeless, at the end of April the new four – turbine Ar 234 versions began to arrive at unit. The first pair of Ar 234 C-3s (Works Numbers 250002 and 250004) arrived at Alt-Lonnewitz in the second half of March, and were test-flown on the 27th by Unteroffizier Eheim. During these flights, Knight s Cross holder Lukesch – according to some reports – reached an altitude of about 15,000 metres (49,000 ft). Another three Ar 234 C-3s arrived at the beginning of April at III./EKG 1. These were listed for pilot training.

By 16 April, Russian armies had assembled between the Neisse Estuary and the Oder for the final offensive on Berlin. III./EKG 1, the operational training Gruppe at Alt-Lonnewitz, could soon hear artillery fire, and on 19 April the unit transferred to Pilsen, bringing all serviceable operational and training machines to safety. One Ar 234 C-3 crashed on landing for unknown reasons.

Lukesch flew the penultimate machine, an Me 262 B-la, with his leading ground technician as passenger. After Hauptmann Reymann followed him in an Me 262, the installations were blown up. After the second Ar 234 C-3 was destroyed in an air raid at Pilsen, at the end of April the stock of jet bombers was reduced to one Ar 234 C-3 and a few Ar 234 B-2s.

On 27 April III./EKG 1 transferred to Pocking am Inn on the orders of the Airfield Servicing Company (FBK) in order to avoid being cut off. Pocking is 20 kilometres south­west of Passau. Shortly before the transfer the Germans were surprised by an air raid in which all but two of the jet bombers were either damaged or wrecked. Eventually only one C-3 and one B-2 arrived at Pocking. The last serviceable C-3 was blown up shortly before the arrival of US forces. The last III./EKG 1

machine, an Ar 234 B-2, was flown by Oberfeldwebel Oepen to Horsching (Linz) and handed over to l.(F)100. On 29 April, III./EKG 1 was disbanded by Luftflotte 6.

Besides the Ar 234 C-3 which arrived on 28 April, III./KG 76 received a further four up to 3 May. One of these was the former prototype Ar 234 V-25 (RK+EO) coming from Brandenburg-Briest. It had touched down first at Warnemiinde on 15 April, from where it flew to Kaltenkirchen on 1 May. As the B-4 fuel needed for the BMW 003 turbines was almost impossible to obtain, attempts by KG 76 to test-fly the aircraft as ordered were unsuccessful at the outset. Two or three missions were flown after arrival. In one of these, British positions south of Bremervorde were attacked on 3 May. The following day terms for unconditional surrender to the Western Allies in northern Germany were accepted, and the remaining operational machines at KG 76, insofar as they were serviceable, were flown north using the last drops of fuel to be surrendered to British forces.

On the basis of experience gained with the local-defence fighter the idea was pursued from July 1944. Although the production of special fuel for the Me 163 lagged because of heavy air raids day and night on the chemical industries, thought was given to even smaller rocket-powered local fighters. The Luftwaffe, and Waffen-SS in particular, set great store by the deployment of such aircraft in huge numbers in order to break down Allied air superiority, since industry could produce ten of these small fighters for every Bf 109 K-4 or Fw 190 D-9.

The lightweight machine would be truly mass – produced. In various modifications it became increasingly simplified, so that in the end the Chief-TLR and the Development Commission were looking at a miniature rocket-propelled fighter which was a cross between a manned flak rocket, a midget rocket aircraft and the Heimatschutzer (or ‘Protector of the Homeland’ as the Me 262 was sometimes known). One of the most promising designs was Heinkel s Julia, the rival to Bachem’s Natter. As another alternative solution, the further development of the Me 262 C design was pursued until near the war’s end.