Category Last Days of the Luftwaffe

From the beginning of 1944 remote-controlled and spin-stabilised rockets grew in importance in aerial warfare. They were initially simply aimed by eye (Werfergranate WGr 21), but later a whole series of guided and spin-stabilised missiles was developed. Except for the R4M none was ever even partially ready

for a series run by the war’s end because of problems in obtaining materials and Allied domination of the skies over the shrinking Reich.

As further development of midget fighters, special aircraft and manned rockets had not provided the hoped-for results, at the end of 1944 the Chief-TLR turned to more reliable machines. A significandy improved Me 163 had greater range and a retractable undercarriage to make it easier to handle, but, as its potential was seen as limited, the Me 262 Heimatschiitzer also received fresh impetus.

Ju248 – Further Development of the Me 263

The Ju 248 was the Me 263 renamed, the work having been passed to Junkers because the Me 262 had exhausted Messerschmitt’s capacity. In view of the tactical successes of the Me 163, OKL had decided on an improved version with

longer endurance and a retractable undercarriage. The new machine, equipped with a more powerful rocket motor, was based on experience with the Me 163 В and was developed by Junkers as the Ju 248 from the late summer of 1944. The line was set up at Dessau Slid Waggonfabrik at the end of the year. The first wings were to be manufactured by 10 January 1945 at Puklitz/Zeitz, while the firms of Kronprinz and VDM were responsible for the undercarriage. Many of the other parts were duplicates from the Me 163 B. However, the fuselage would not take the Walter engine and had to be extended by 0.5 metres, thus ruining the timetable.

On 13 January OKL pressed hard for the series run even though work on the first experimental machines had come to a halt, and therefore on 29 January OKL considered abandoning the whole project: JG 400 would receive the He 162 in the short term. The decision was reversed at the beginning of February when the first prototype, Ju 248 V-l, was ready and Flugkapitan Pancherz flew it on 8 February under tow by a Bf 110 (pilot Karl Went). After a second test flight, Pancherz flew six more times on 11 and 13 February and by 19 February the aircraft had been in the air on 13 occasions.

On 7 March the Junkers engineers admitted that the Ju 248 was not so well ahead as might appear, for example the Walter motor ordered for Ju 248 V-2 had not arrived. The daily air raids on the Junkers Werke had destroyed many documents including material being prepared for the Japanese. By mid-March 1945 the undercarriage, part of the electrical system and some instruments were still awaited. In view of the fact that rocket fuels could not be produced in sufficient amounts, on 20 March OKL decided that the Me 263 would have to be cancelled, leaving the field theoretically to the He 162. Three days later Junkers Dessau advised the Chief-TLR that the Walter motor had finally been mounted in the first prototype, but important elements were still missing so that the first rocket-powered ascent was now postponed to the end of the month, and ultimately no test was possible because the front line arrived at Dessau. Most of the documents were destroyed at Ragun School to thwart their seizure by US forces. At least one of the two Me 263s had been blown up shortly before. Dessau was occupied on 24 April 1945.

In 1943 there was a crisis in rocket development. Numerous projects were in their early stages, and the design teams encountered the widest variety of problems. At that time the following missiles were under production: Enzian and Rheintochter (subsonic, later supersonic), Schmetterling (subsonic) and Wasserfall (supersonic). The rockets had different engines and needed different fuels. Although the RLM and Speer’s Armament Office could not agree on a uniform rocket fuel, it was agreed that there should be a general increase in the production of special fuels despite the lack of industrial capacity. Getting development going was the important thing.

Feuerlilie F25 and F55

In 1940, the LFA Hermann Goringhtg^n design work on a long-range, remote- controlled rocket, the F 25 Feuerlilie. At first 25 were tested by DFS and the Reichspost Research Office. The first F 25 arrived at the Leba test site on the Baltic in mid-July 1943. By mid-summer 1944 at least four had been fired. On 25 January 1943 the Ardelt company of Breslau (Wroclaw) received an official contract to build five improved experimental type F 55 rockets at RM.20,000

each. Unexpected technical difficulties resulted in the first start of F 55 A-l being delayed until 12 May 1944 when it rose 7.5 kilometres in 69 seconds. From 22 November 1944 the RLM Technical Office continued to reduce the number required as other rockets gained in favour.

In comparison to Fw 190 D production, the Та 152 had a shadowy existence. After 3 aircraft in October, 12 in November and 19 in December 1944,23 came off the lines in January and 10 in February. At year’s end 1944 problems were encountered with the Та 152 H-0 starter motors at Cottbus Works. Three

normal Та 152 prototypes were airworthy in January with the DB 603 E engine, the more powerful DB 603 motors not being available, while the total loss of production at Posen, where Та 152 fuselages and wings were made, could not be rectified. The Erfurt firm Mimetall delivered its first two Та 152s in February. Other firms from whom the first deliveries were expected in March were Siebel of Halle and ATG Merseburg. The last machines were assembled from spare parts. Most of the 21 Та 152 H-Os were received at KdE; Luftflottenkommando Reich took seven more and another went directly to III./JG 301. Luftflotte Reich also took possession of the first Та 152 H-2 in the spring of 1945. Losses at JG 301 ensured that the number of operational machines never exceeded twelve and at the beginning of March 1945 only five Та 152 H-Os and H-2s remained.

III./JG 301 flew the operational trials instead of EK 152. As the front line edged ever closer to Berlin, EK 152’s airfield, Alteno (Luckau), was soon home to various fighter and Jabo Gruppen which was naturally unhelpful for Та 152 testing. When the major Soviet offensive began, III. Gruppe was ordered
unwittingly to an airfield behind Russian lines. Only a few of the Та 152s managed to get clear, the remainder being destroyed by explosion to prevent their falling into enemy hands. By 21 January 1945 fourteen new machines had been lost to enemy action or failures in flight. At the end of the month Oberfeldwebel Josef Keil scored the first success when his Та 152 shot down a B-17 bomber over Berlin. On 2 February, Leutnant Hagendorn of 9./JG 301, who took off with two wingmen to attack RAF Mosquitos, flew at over 12,500 metres (41,000 ft) altitude.

Once the Posen works fell into Soviet hands at the end of February 1945, the supply of new aircraft dried up. Allied attacks on hangars and parking areas together with combat losses against the Eighth Air Force accounted for other Та 152s. On 25 March 1945 only Stab/JG 301 had machines operational. That day part of III. Gruppe arrived unexpectedly at Hannover-Langenhagen which had just been attacked by Allied bombers. The runways and taxying areas were therefore full of bomb craters and a number of crash landings occurred. At the end of March 1945 a number of Fw 190 D-9s attacked enemy camps and vehicle columns with AB 250s and AB 500s. On 1 April 1945 pilots dropped numerous SD-1 anti-personnel bombs from an altitude of only 10 metres (30 ft) in a successhil attack against US supply lorries: next day several Fw 190 D-9s led by Hauptmann Posselmann made a successful attack on ground targets near Kassel. After these operations the aircraft returned to the east, landing at Hagenow, a small airfield on the road to Ludwigslust. On 10 April 1945 Oberfeldwebel Keil took off from Sachau airfield near Gardelegen. North-east of Brunswick he engaged an formation of at least 15 P-47 fighters and shot down at least one.

The same day Stab/JG 301 reported two Та 152 and 36 Fw 190s at I. and

II. Gruppen, 49 aircraft being operational in all. The staff flight had seven Та 152s, of which only three were operational and parked in the blast pens. On 24 April Feldwebel Walter Loos flying a Та 152 H-0 (Works No. 150003) shot down two Soviet Yak 9s over Berlin, and claimed another next day. On 30 April he shot down an La 9 and thus became the most successful Та 152 pilot in the Luftwaffe.

That day Stab/JG 301 at Welzow had only two aircraft, these being modern all-weather Та 152 C-1/R31 fighters. Both machines were operational and equipped with K-23 auto-pilots. To the extent that fuel supplies allowed, the Geschwader could call on more than 50 Fw 190 D-9s and Bf 109 G-14s at Alteno, Finsterwalde and Welzow. III./JG 301 at Luckau was already disbanded at this time. In the first days of May the remnants of JG 301 pulled back from Hagenow to Neustadt-Gleve from where the last missions were flown, although

III. Gruppe made for Leek in Schleswig-Holstein. An armistice was observed there as from 5 May 1945.

Once the first prototype had been completed, on 27 December 1944 KdE and Chief-TLR proposed setting up their own test command for He 162 tactical trials at Larz near Rechlin. The unit would be of Staffel size (maybe 12 aircraft) and begin flight training from February. On 1 January the General der Jagd – flieger asked the QM-General to increase the test command to Gruppe size. In Galland s opinion, it would then be well placed to become a supply Gruppe for new He 162 pilots after the conclusion of trials, but this idea was rejected. Next day OKL ordered that the test command should operate as near as possible to the manufacturer. On 9 January the new Gruppe, I./JG 200, was formed on paper. The unit came within the jurisdiction of Luftflotte Reich, but for training purposes was controlled by Galland. During talks it was then revealed that the purely technical trials to be carried out by Stab/JG 200 at Larz would be done elsewhere, and on 10 January the Luftwaffe QM-General set up EK 162 for the usual period of six months. On the 14th the first 27 men of the technical personnel set off for Heinkel Marienehe. Less than a fortnight later, on 25 January, after JG 200 was wound up, OKL gave instructions for the formation

of a new unit, JG 80, with Stabsschwarm, Stabskompanie and a Gruppe composed of three Staffeln, each of 12 aircraft. The Gruppenstab would have an additional four He 162s. On 5 February, personnel for I./JG 80 were ordered to Vienna-Aspern where a front-line pool was set up for the He 162. Gruppenstab together with 2. and 3. Staffeln of the planned JG 80 would be set up at Parchim, the Stabsstaffel ofJG 80 at Rechlin. On 7 February the order to form JG 80 was rescinded, and the former I./JG 1 with Stabsstaffel and three flying Staffeln was to be equipped as the first Volksjager unit of the Luftwaffe.

This rocket was based on the 21-cm mortar bomb and development began in May 1944. The projectile was stabilised in flight by a so-called Messer-Spreitz tail unit in which the previous numerous apertures for stabilizing the spin were replaced by a large central jet. Burn time for the solid-fuel, 95-kg (209-lb) rocket was only 1.3 seconds. This gave the projectile a speed of 590 m/sec (1,935 ft/sec). The first explosive heads for the weapon were tested in the autumn of 1944 and the process concluded officially on 29 January 1945.

The first thousand of a series run with a 130 BS shrapnel head were completed at the end of February 1945. A larger explosive charge was developed but this needed to be finished by hand and never reached the testing range. Two firing tubes slung below the forward fuselage of an Me 262 each holding a 21-cm calibre mortar bomb were purely a makeshift measure to disperse a bomber formation and so allow the fighters a better opportunity to attack. They were probably WGr 21 mortars similar to those carried by the Bf 109 and Bf 110. A number of Me 262 A-las at Gruppenstab III./JG 7 were

equipped with them in the spring of 1945.The tactical results did not produce the expected success, and use of the rocket was quickly discontinued.

The Me 262 C-la was to combine all the advantages of the Me 163 В local – defence fighter with those of the jet fighter. After work on the ‘interceptor’began

in 1943 there had been a break before Messerschmitt returned to the idea in September 1944. On 12 September the machine was lighdy damaged in an air raid. Flight testing was suspended frequently between 9 and 29 November because of problems with the rocket engine, and further delays resulted in the first take-off, with turbines and rocket motor running in tandem, being put back to 27 February. The works pilot, Lindner, expressed great satisfaction despite light damage to the undercarriage cover. In February 1945, Me 262 V-6 – designated C-la – the future ‘Protector of the Homeland Г made a single 14- minute flight. Damage to the HWK 109-509A-2(S) motor and unfavourable weather wrecked the schedule. On 19 March take-off was aborted when Lindner failed to raise enough fuel pressure because of an air-bubble in one of the fuel tubes. The only Me 262 C-la was therefore housed in an anti-splinter shelter at Lechfeld where it was damaged by Allied night fighters on 22 March. Total test flying time in March was 22 minutes. By the end of the month works pilots had flown the prototype on only seven occasions although the commander of III./JG 2 at Lechfeld, Oberstleutnant Bar, allegedly flew the machine, reaching an altitude of 9,000 metres in three minutes and shooting down a P-47. When US ground forces arrived at Lager Lechfeld the damaged Heimatschutxer I was

discovered under tarpaulins near the aerodrome. The engine system had been scarcely serviceable, and the series conversion of available Me 262 A-las was out of the question.

The Messerschmitt Enzian gave rise to great hopes. It was a subsonic, remote- controlled flak rocket for use against aerial targets at high altitude. Powerplant was an efficient liquid-fuel engine with four solid-fuel rocket boosters to aid take-off. The squat body was tailless, there being four large swept-back wings mid-fuselage having combined aileron/rudders.

After numerous early studies a full-size mock-up was begun in January 1944, the first experimental E 1 being completed at Augsburg in February 1944. After the factory was bombed that same month, production transferred to Holzbau Kissing at Sonthofen, this area being considered safer. After the first missile was delivered to Peenemiinde, it was test fired at Greifswalder Oie in mid-April 1944, the second on 29 April. On completion of the 38th test, Messerschmitt

considered the basic test series complete. After watching a demonstration at Peenemiinde West on 30 October 1944, Goring spoke out expressly in favour of Enzian since the equally prioritised Schmetterling was not yet ready.

By 1 November 1944,15 Enzian had been test fired. In a surprise move the entire project was then transferred to the Bavarian Alps under Dr Wurster, and the planning office set up on a farm at Schloss Lindhof. Two other Enzian (E 2) variants made in early summer 1944 to the earlier FR-6 design were fired from Greifswalder Oie in mid-November, but a really reliable flak rocket system still seemed far off. The Walter Werke motor rocket division at Beerburg was informed at the end of 1944 that their motor fell 35 per cent below the specified values: for this reason Enzian would receive the Rheintochter engine. A more efficient engine (on paper) designed by Professor Conrad of the Technical University of Berlin was also being considered: a first test run was expected in January 1945, but the date could not be met.

A 550-kg warhead was planned for Enzian. Dynamit Nobel of Hamburg supplied the first of these. Various detonators had been examined including the
modern Dogge. The project now fell well behind the RLM timetable, for the acute shortage of high-value metals prevented series production. On 19 December 1944 the Commission for Rocketry argued with the Chief-TLR against introducing Enzian because of the woeful technical problems, but despite this objection Askania was given a contract to provide new control mechanisms. It was hoped to test these from February 1945. With effect from 17 January 1945 OKL ordered the termination of the project since other developments were more promising and 450 man-hours per unit was excessive. On 6 Februarv Himmler withdrew his permission for further work on Enzian.

As the Red Army advanced, Greifswalder Oie was abandoned, the installations being prepared for destruction. Work on documenting the test reports was cut short at Schloss Lindhof in mid-March. A total of 60 Enzian rockets were completed and at least 24 test fired at Greifswalder Oie. The failure rate of these was relatively high at 70 per cent. Another 10 served for ground testing, 15 were blown up on 25 April at Sonthofen to prevent their capture. Almost all the remainder existed only in component parts. Most of the technical data were found by the Allies in underground galleries at Oberammergau and carted away.

On 13 October 1943 all personnel of IV./JG 3 paraded on the apron at Neubiberg to hear Reichsmarschall Goring hold forth on the operational record of his fighter pilots. The Gruppe’s Bf 109 G-6 fighters were now to operate with Sturmstaffel 1 as its escort. These assault Gruppen had the task of attacking enemy bomber formations, protected by escort fighters, at close quarters. For this purpose the aircraft had been provided with armour protection against heavy machine-gun fire. The protection covered at least the cockpit, the pilot’s seat and ammunition magazine. Few machines returned without damage after engaging B-17 formations with their immense fire power.

After suffering a period of heavy losses, the unit participated in the Ardennes campaign before arriving at Stargard on 25 January 1945, and from 31 January flew mainly low-level Jabo missions in support of German ground troops. In February the Gruppe received a few Fw 190 D-9s for the first time, but low-level work continued into March when orders came to assume the escort role. The task involved engaging the ever-larger Soviet fighter and light bomber swarms. On 11 March Oak Leaves holder Major Schroer, JG 3 Kommodore, shot down his 104th to 106th victims, and on 15 March he increased his tally to 109. From April 1945 operational readiness at IV.(Sturm)/JG 3 fell drastically. Little enthusiasm could be drummed up for suicide missions, and following sorties in defence of Berlin the survivors fell back to Westerland/Sylt on 2 May.

Learning from the experience of Sturmstaffel 1, OKL applied the basic operational principles to larger groupings, but the assault unit formed from parts

of JG 4 was always fighting a losing battle because of Allied air supremacy. In September 1944 the pilots of II.(Sturm)/JG 4 flew numerous assault missions against the Allied bomber fleets, escorted by III./JG 4’s Fw 190 A-8s. In these often very costly operations the individual assault groups were usually escorted by two Gruppen of Bf 109s. After the Ardennes campaign JG 4 was subordinated to Luftflotte Reich and defended the ever-contracting airspace over the western Reich. On 5 February 1945 Stab and II./JG 4 were at Neuhausen near Cottbus; I./JG 4 at Guben; III. and IV./JG 4 shared Drewitz aerodrome. In March JG 4 had a total of 158 Bf 109s and Fw 190s, often up to 95 per cent operational but short of fuel. For protection III./JG 4 at Berlin Schonefeld and IV.(Sturm)/JG 4 had around 100 blast pens. This latter Gruppe in particular achieved excellent results in its operations against heavy bombers. Of 376 victories claimed, 194 were heavy bombers. The other Gruppen of JG 4 shot down another 205 aircraft of which about 150 were heavy bombers. At the conclusion of the fighting on the Oder, JG 4 pulled back to northern Germany where all Gruppen were disbanded on 1 May.

The last assault Gruppe to be mentioned here was II.(Sturm)/JG 300 whose target was bombers. During the defence of the Reich in 1944, the Gruppe flew many missions with 3. Jagd-Division, and was transferred to 1. Jagd-Division in February. The Stabsstaffel was then at Jiiterbog-Waldlager, II.(Sturm)/JG 300 at Lobnitz, from where it covered central Germany. At the end of 1944 OKL decided that blind-flying training at JG 300 should be discontinued since the unit was to receive the Me 262. On 20 March 1945 OKL decided to disband I. Gruppe immediately and equip the former II.(Sturm)/JG 300 instead with Bf 109 K-4s since there was now a shortage of jets.

On 19 April II. Gruppe moved to Holzkirchen with its 33 Fw 190 D-9s and. D-lls of which only 20 were airworthy. The surviving Fw 190s remained at JG 300 until 3 May 1945, their last flights being over the foothills of the Alps. The assault group concept had great success against Allied bomber formations but the toll in lives was too high. The nature of the operation required pilots to attempt to combat the enemy at very close quarters before turning away sharply

to flee the incoming fighters at the last moment. In employing this tactic many Luftwaffe pilots acted above and beyond the call of duty with disregard for their own fives.

By the OKL decision, JG 1, recendy tested in the fighting on the Eastern Front, became the standard bearer for the new aircraft. Stabsstaffel/JG 1 would take over the tactical trials and training and would therefore be direcdy accountable to KdE. On 11 February the Stabsstaffel was placed under the jurisdiction of KdE by order of the Luftwaffe organisation staff. According to the plans, I./JG 1 was to be brought up to strength by personnel from II. and III./JG 1. At the same time Luftkommando 6 telexed I./JG 1 that the unit was now deemed to be resting and all its Fw 190s were to be handed over to II./JG l. The latter was also to send its own advance party to Vienna Aspern for the later transfer there of the He 162. Nothing came of this because the end was so near. The entire Geschwader, however, was to prepare itself immediately for the Volksjager on orders of OKL.

On 25 January the situation of JG 1 did not look favourable. I./fG 1 had 13 Fw 190 A-8 and A-9 aircraft return from the Eastern Front under Oberleutnant Demuth. A little later the remaining aircraft of II./JG 1 followed. III./JG 1 existed only on paper. During the retreat before the Soviet advance in East Prussia, the unit had been almost completely wiped out. Until the beginning of February the remaining Fw 190s were used as Jabos before II./JG 1 transferred to Rostock-Marienehe. The Red Army was then engaged from the Heinkel Works airfield. While this was in progress, on 9 February I./fG 1 support section arrived at Parchim. The remnants of both Gruppen would now form two Auffangsstaffeln (‘intercept squadrons’) on the He 162, these being l./JG 1 at Marienehe and Bernburg, and 2./JG 1 at Heidfeld/Vienna.

On 24 February, 2. Staffel led by Leutnant Hachtel transferred to Heidfeld, and two days later OKL ordered III./JG 1 to Parchim immediately. As there were no He 162s available there, most of the Staffel went to Vienna instead, where for some time He 162 M-19 had been the only machine ready for use by JG 1, provisionally as a trainer. As no other He 162s were expected immediately, parts of II. and III./JG 1 returned to Parchim. Instruction using one machine at Vienna was a lengthy business, and by 7 March only eight pilots of I./JG 1 had been conversion-trained for the Volksjager. A number of flight restrictions were in force: in particular it was forbidden to exceed 500 km/hr (310 mph) for longer

than 15 minutes on account of the susceptibility of the BMW turbines to breakdown. The situation was no better at Heidfeld because there were insufficient ground staff trained for the He 162.

In central Germany the ubiquitous shortages ensured that He 162 production advanced only slowly. There were too few skilled personnel and technical staff to service the Volksjager, since most trained servicemen were at the front. It was not possible to call upon Heinkel staff or their flight trials organisation because it had long been overburdened with work. The shortage of В-4 (benzine) cut back flying time. The conversion of BMW 003 turbines to J-2 (kerosene) had proved far more difficult than expected and could not be implemented for the time being. The combination of all these problems was destroying any hope that the Volksjager would be able to change the course of the air war over the Reich in the foreseeable future. Only Hitler and a few of the Luftwaffe commanders in their bunkers thought it possible to introduce positive changes fast. The ever more hasty forward planning reaching the Geschwader from March onwards took no account of the everyday major technical problems and ever worsening difficulty of fuel supply.

The reorganisation of JG 1, at least on paper, was on hand at QM-General level. Besides the 16 He 162s with the Stabstaffel, three Gruppen of 52 Volksjager each were projected for May 1945, a plan beyond the scope of reality. The QM – General could distribute his aircraft as he saw fit, but before they arrived they would often fall foul of Allied fighters or bombing raids. Equally, some very mundane reason might prevent completion of aircraft: a piece of equipment might not be delivered because of production hold-ups, although most often it would be shortage of fuel or a turbine problem, perhaps because a spanner had literally been dropped in the works by a forced labour saboteur. When the turbine was test-run it would be ruined, and it would be necessary to wait for a replacement. A repair would often not be possible for insufficient spare parts.

QM-General would not be deterred and ordered series aircraft 1-5 to Heidfeld, 6-13 were to be held back for tactical trials at Lechfeld, 14-20 were planned for tactical trials at Roggenthin/Rechlin. In fact no machines had ever been available for flying trials. Auffangsstaffel 2./JG 1 for example had still received no He 162s by 21 March.

On 26 March all the scheduling was revised. The first 18 series machines were to go to Heidfeld. Only afterwards would the tactical and operational trials begin. Nevertheless by 30 March no He 162s had yet landed at either Lechfeld or Rechlin. The first two machines, ЕЗФ51 and ЕЗФ52 finally arrived at Rechlin in mid-April. The emergency trials programme ended a few days later, not on account of the Allied advance but for organisational reasons.

Meanwhile the development and production of all kinds of aircraft had undergone an ominous change on 26 March when Hitler gave SS-General

Kammler wide-ranging plenipotentiary powers. All powers relating to jet aircraft invested hitherto in Reich Minister Speer passed to the SS, while Hitler also subordinated Goring’s General Plenipotentiary for Jet Aircraft to Kammler for the speedy execution of the portfolio. While Kammler familiarised himself with his new area of jurisdiction, the provisional instructions for the production and flying of the He 162 remained in force.

The Soviet advance to the gates of Vienna had led Heinkel-Siid to recognise that the airfields and production facilities in the Vienna region would only remain available for a short period. In secret they began removing files and equipment to the west. As far as possible completed machines were brought to safety at Langenlebarn west of Vienna. From there the majority of pilots took their Volksjager to Horsching/Linz. Here a number of non-airworthy Volksjager remained behind because there were no maintenance facilities for jets. The others were flown to Munich-Riem and Lechfeld. During this operation on 31 March Heinkel works pilot Huldreich Kemnitz crashed during the transfer flight and lost his life. At Lechfeld an attempt to begin operational training was abortive. Only a few test flights were undertaken there before it became necessary to head east for Munich as US ground forces came up.

At the beginning of April the opposing ground forces, German and Russian, clashed before Vienna. By 5 April it was obvious that the front would not hold. Russian tanks rolled into the heart of Vienna and crushed the last resistance of the SS and Hitler Jugend. Flight trials had long been forgotten. Gradually all airfields around Vienna fell into Russian hands. The last death in testing the He 162 occurred on 6 April 1945 when works pilot Wolfgang Liiddemann crashed. Schwechat (Heidfeld) airfield was being abandoned and Liiddemann attempted to fly out with the last airworthy Volksjager and failed.

Meanwhile Kammler had involved himself in the development and production of the Ar 234 and He 162 jets and ordered that all manufacturing of piston-engined aircraft was to cease while the production of the He 162 was to be greatly accelerated. The instruction was expressed in similar terms in an OKL telex of 4 April 1945:

Continuing with the He 162 means persevering with an aircraft which deserves acceptance having regard to its stage of testing – in short a good modern fighter aircraft, if with little flying time, whose final cost is substantially less than for Me 262 and which makes lesser demands on the ground organisation. Moreover, it is expected that this aircraft will bring successes in the battle against the oppressive fighter-bomber plague.

General Karl Roller, Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, asked Kammler on 4 April to reconsider his decision regarding the He 162. Whether the SS – General, who had struck out nearly all Hitler’s newest air armaments with a stroke of the pen, answered or not is not recorded. Whatever was said at the top, conversion training at JG 1 went on to the extent that it was possible.