Category Last Days of the Luftwaffe

The German Research Institute for Gliding (DFS) was investigating a similar project meanwhile. Under the designation Ebery a small fighter was built which could be towed by an Fw 190 or Me 262 to within a few kilometres of the target and released. A primitive rocket-propelled aircraft in wood, the So 344, designed by Heinz Sombold, was armed with rockets enabling it to attack a bomber formation. Similar designs were the Rammer and Fliegende Panzerfaust built by the airship firm Zeppelin in the late summer of 1944. Besides the Me P 1103 Rammjager, the Messerschmitt design bureau evolved the Me P 1104 variant which could be armed with either a fixed MK 108 or an R4M rocket battery. As with the Ar E 381, these designs were unsuccessful even though they could scarcely have been simpler. Even the Me P 1104 project had easily manufactured Fieseler V-l flying bomb wings. The engine plant was an HWK 109-509. Willy Messerschmitt recommended the machine himself since to turn out 1,000 monthly needed only 650 man-hours labour per aircraft from start to finish, distinctly less than for the Me 163 B-l, while the investment in the Me P 1104 was substantially below that of the Bachem Ba 349 A-l.

A disadvantage of all these ‘midget fighters’was the tactical range. A ramp or catapult launch from a fixed position was one thing, using a tug aircraft quite another, for in the approach to an enemy bomber force the yoked pair was at risk for its lack of manoeuvrability and being substantially under-powered. At the end of 1944 OKL therefore urged the creation of a powerful rocket-propelled local-defence fighter able to reach the operational area without assistance.

Another project was the brainchild of the Focke-Wulf design office. This was based on a suggestion of 21 September 1944 for a manned V-l for ramming aerial targets. Instead of a warhead the variant would have an armoured nose to destroy the tailplane of enemy bombers. The pilot, seated in an armoured cockpit amidships, would separate his fuselage section by means of explosive bolts and use an ejector seat to save himself. The standard V-l ramjet would be replaced by a more efficient Walter HWK engine. As the machine could not take off from the ground to reach the enemy bomber fleets, a tug would have been required to get it up to altitude which, in view of Allied air superiority, was out of the question.

In response to an RLM enquiry whether a highly aerodynamic, fast, wooden flying bomb could be made cheaply to replace the Ju 88, in 1944 Junkers prepared various ideas including Mistel combination 5, an He 162 with a BMW 003 E-l turbine as the cheap, manned upper part, a Ju 268 below. This is detailed in files dated 12 May 1945 and compiled for the occupation powers at Dessau. The Mistel 5 was to have been powered by two BMW 003 A-l and one BMW 003 E-l turbine. The Ju 268 was of wooden construction and had a wingspan of 11.5 metres and was 14.5 metres long (37 ft 9 in x 47 ft 7in). Wing area was 22 square metres (237 sq. ft). The undercarriage was not retractable and would have been jettisoned after take-off. The combination weighed 6,030 kg, the Ju 268 4,300 kg. Together with 4,200 kg fuel, a 2-tonne explosive payload plus the He 162 with 1,270 kg fuel atop the fuselage, the take-off weight was 13,500 kg. Supplementary tanks were necessary for the He 162 in the turbo or ramjet variants because the standard He 162 A-2 range did not allow for the return flight. Top speed was estimated at 840 km/hr at 6,000 metres (520 mph at 20,000 ft).The range was 1,000 km at 11,000 metres (620 miles at 36,000 ft).

The lower component would have had nine separate fuel tanks in the fuselage in the basic configuration. An SC 2000 was to be carried in a makeshift bomb –

bay. A variant had room for an SHL 3500. This combination would have needed a lot of fuel and was thus only suitable for shorter range missions. In the third, trainer version the pilot could fly the lower Ju 268 unit from a perspex cockpit in the nose; 400 kg ballast was needed in the nose to fix the centre of gravity if no extra fuel tanks or payload was carried.

According to a document of 18 February 1945, OKL was interested principally in the 3C variant with 2,500 kilometres range, but other suggestions were being investigated by the various aircraft manufacturers. According to the Chief-TLR War Diary, Mistel 5 was at the final drawings stage at the beginning of March 1945, and the new SHL 3500D (a land mine with shrapnel) first tested on 2 March 1945 was included in the later drawings. None of the designs being worked on at Dessau in April 1945 was ever realised and the occupation forces for whom the project had been committed to paper also showed little enthusiasm for it.

A mysterious chapter unclarified to the present day concerns Hitlers uranium project worked on by several groups of researchers during the Second World War aimed at the production of material from uranium for weapons purposes. These seem to have been small SS or Reichspost groups, as for example Baron Marfred von Ardenne, who specialised in particle research in his Reichspost-fiinded laboratory at Berlin-Lichterfelde. The Reichspost had an interest in nuclear physics. On 27 March 1945 at a meeting in Thuringia, Speer, Himmler, Kammler and other important personalities discussed the question of using a ‘miracle weapon to change the course of the war at the last hour. Eyewitness reports of small scale, but very destructive explosive tests at Ohrdruf and elsewhere in central Germany in March 1945 remain to be confirmed. No documentary evidence regarding such a miracle weapon project has so far come to light.

he coming collapse of the Luftwaffe could be seen relatively early, although at the highest level, in particular for Reichsmarschall Goring, this was not accepted. After the disaster at Stalingrad, the overall war situation deteriorated and with it the general situation for the Luftwaffe. Offensive capacity declined as a result of the heavy losses over the Eastern Front and the aircrew losses sustained during the attempts to supply encircled troop conglomerations. During the fighting in the East and Italy, the Allies found it increasingly easy to win territory and so force the Wehrmacht completely to the defensive.

From the summer of 1943, the US Eighth Air Force demonstrated that the Allies could successfully attack important ground targets everywhere in Europe with high precision even by day and in unprecedented numbers. RAF four- engined bombers attacked one major German city after another, mosdy by night, their purpose being to demoralise the German people, particularly the labour force, and bring about the greatest possible war weariness in the medium term.

The increased use of long-range escort fighters and ever better protected four – engined bombers such as the B-17 and B-24 was decisive for the course of the air war. In this way the Allies forced the squadrons of the once ‘invincible’ Luftwaffe step by step onto the defensive, even over Reich home territory. The fire storm at Hamburg showed the Luftwaffe leadership the strength of the enemy against which it was pitted, and more and more towns disintegrated into ash and rubble. The beginning of the end had been reached.

As 1944 dawned, large enemy bomber formations were attacking the production centres of the German aviation industry even by day. Heavy bomb- loads were dropped on shipyards, power stations and above all fuel refineries so important for a war effort in which all had been wagered on mechanisation. Nevertheless the number of completed fighters still rose noticeably. The monthly increase in production from 1,000 to 3,000 single-engined machines was intended eventually to force the Western Allies to abandon their bombing policy.

Aircraft Production Programmes 223 and 224 had this aim but increased production of fighters was not possible at once. One difficult problem was the

shortage of aluminium and other necessary raw materials for aircraft manufacture. Fuel production and the adequate training of aircrews also declined from 1944. The decrease in training flights was proportional to the lack of operational successes experienced later. An infrastructure disintegrating under constant bombing and a gradual flattening out of fuel production provided little prospect of cheer from mid-1944. Lines of communication, particularly the railways, were the constant target of air raids and low-level attacks, while attacks on inland shipping and other traffic, especially in the West, ensured delays to raw materials and other supplies.

Operation Steinbock, the resumption of the bombing offensive in the West, proved little more than a flash in the pan over England. In comparison, the ever­growing enemy air forces were so superior that they could strike with great precision wherever and whenever they chose. On account of the shortened training schedules, losses during tactical training rose. This was partly due to the lack of flying instructors and training aircraft with dual controls. In the summer of 1944 the training period of Luftwaffe fighter pilots was only 35 per cent of

its former length, and the training units also faced severe shortages of fuel. Pilots newly operational were often referred to as ‘three-day wonders’ by veterans because so many failed to survive their first sorties.

The massive delays which occurred before the large-scale introduction of jets, and the numerous related technical hitches, spawned serious doubts in the possibility of final victory. The advent of a miracle weapon was a factor even amongst a section of the Reich government which provided hope for a favourable change in the situation, and became important in evaluating the military situation to the very end.

A final attempt to realise an all-weather jet aircraft besides the Me 262 was made at the beginning of January 1945. Apart from the 1 TL aircraft already mentioned, of which many designs exist, for the first times guidelines were established for an equally powerful 2 TL fighter.

On 27 January Chief-TLR issued his first instruction for the planning of such an aircraft. By early February the decisive specification for the later development, worked out with members of the EH К Flugzeuge, were notified to individual manufacturers. The result was to be a heavy fighter and destroyer armed with at least four, or if possible six MK 108s, and 160 rounds per gun. The fixed, forward­facing weapons were to be housed in a sealed turret. In place of the MK 108, the installation of up to six MG 213s was considered, of which four would have been located in the turret, but this was reduced to two to save weight. Two 30 mm MK 108s were planned as upward-firing weapons. This powerful armament was to be supplemented by a trainable gun firing to the rear. All machine guns had extremely efficient automatic aiming devices. This was extremely important because OKL proposed to deploy the heavy fighter, and the fighter-bomber version, in all weathers and at night. The installation of two HeS Oil A-ls or TLR engines would make the machine into a long-distance fighter with a fast rate of climb.

The turbine-rocket combination would climb steeply to the ceiling of 10,000 metres (33,000 ft) with good endurance at that altitude. Propulsion and an offensive radar system with automatic solution finding were to be situated forward and a target-finder in the rear was to be used to detect attacking enemy aircraft. The most important elements were to be well armoured and resistant to 20-mm hits; 4,500 litres (1,200 Imp gal) of fuel was to be carried. Wing loading worked out at 300 kg/sq. metre (7,100 lb/sq. ft). Speed was to be at least 1,000 km/hr (620 mph), adequate for engaging all known enemy aircraft.

Focke-Wulf, especially from 1944 onward, developed numerous studies for a two-seat heavy fighter with up to three turbines. Starting from the ‘two- propulsion system TL fighter with the HeS Oil’of 23 November 1944, various studies were completed by the end of the year. Their aim was an all-weather night fighter with two HeS 011 turbines. At the conclusion Focke-Wulf could put forward five different designs, the last being completed on 19 March 1945. The almost 20-tonne aircraft with three HeS 011 turbines could operate at 14,000 metres at a top speed of 900 km/hr (46,000 ft; 560 mph).

Dornier had also given thought to a multi-engined heavy all-weather fighter with mixed plant such as As 413 with Jumo 222 C and D, or two DB 603N and two BMW 003. This kind of thinking was too cosdy to build having regard to the war situation, and for this reason Dornier went over to a three-seater operational aircraft with two HeS Oils. Even then, none of the designs was possible at that time. Nevertheless EH К was still duty-bound – with the greatest optimism – to announce that it would soon be possible to turn out 100 2 TL fighters monthly. On 9 March 1945 OKL completed its previous specifications for the 2 TL project, now known by its final designation ‘2 TL All-Weather and Night Fighter’. Besides improved oblique armament the

machine would have a tactical brake (a special flap designed to reduce flight speed rapidly) from the start. On 2 April the equipment for the later operational aircraft was debated at Bad Eilsen. Although nobody knew where the next tank of fuel would be coming from, EH К was now considering even more complicated additions such as blind-firing processes and other advanced electronics for the concept. Discussions included a four-turbine long-range bomber to replace the Ju 287.

On 12 April 1945 all work on the new fighter was given up. There had been no possibility of the project being realised; the only result was to offer the victorious powers plenty of opportunity to catch up to the level of development achieved by the German aircraft industry.

The heavy Luftwaffe losses led to ever younger pilots filling the gaps in the ranks. Both the NSFK and the Hitler Youth could not remain inactive. New operational pilots, especially for the He 162, were to be trained at the Reich Glider School at Trebbin, and also at Laucha and Brno from the end of January 1945. At all three aerodromes, training was arranged for the Me 163 and other types kept secret from the novices, perhaps the Natter.

The ‘total mission had been rejected by Hitler in principle, but from the beginning of the year had numerous advocates, amongst them the famous female aviator Hanna Reitsch. What the young candidates were actually being trained for seems to have been a mystery to all involved. Ever greater importance, as was obvious, was being attached to the He 162. A whole Geschwader was to be equipped with it. The idea of giving the second formation the name HitlerJugend was received with enthusiasm in the ranks of the boyish heroes and their promoters. It was necessary to press ahead as soon as possible but as neither the required infrastructure nor airworthy He 162s were available for the planned training, instruction tended to be mainly theoretical.

From the end of November 1944 therefore, life was breathed into Recruitment Group Oesau by accepting volunteers born in 1928 for training in theory at Luftkriegsschule 1, Dresden-Klotzsche, from where they would be drafted to Oschatz in central Germany for continuation training as fighter pilots. A training company and supply unit were set up from the various recruitment groups. In February 1945 Kompanie Oesau was spread between Celle and a holding camp at Goslau instead of Dresden. This was a unit whose personnel were to be used as ‘fighter pilots recruited for special purposes’ and then – depending how things turned out – as infantry. Once aviator training was dissolved, many of the pilots went to recendy formed anti-tank commandos.

Most of the barely 17- or 18-year-old pilots still believed, on the basis of assurances given by their superiors, that there would be a chance to fly the Natter, over which the SS had great influence, or the Volksjager if things changed. Behind the scenes the power struggle between the Party (that is the SS, NSFK and Hider Youth) and the Luftwaffe raged on. The Reich Youth leader attempted to shrug off NSFK influence by making a deal with the SS. Meanwhile Himmler had accepted the Natter, successfully test flown by Oberstleutnant Siegfried Knemeyer, despite Luftwaffe objections that it was included in their projects classified as ‘manned flak rockets’. The machine was a ‘disposable’ unit from which the pilot would bale out after firing his Fohn rockets. The idea of a ‘Luftwaffe Suicide Division’, openly proposed by Generalmajor Walter Storp during his stint as General der Flieger to 31 January 1945, also found a reception at the RLM. Most at OKL, and Hider himself, were opposed to suicide missions of all kinds, but could not always prevent them, although they remained few.

As development of the Natter and other aircraft needed time, the NSFK attempted to conjure up at least a couple of He 162s. In mid-February 1945 work had barely begun on the first two planned training machines with an engine. The He 162 training glider built by the NSFK at Dresden was flight- tested for the first time at Trebbin on 1 March 1945. In the provisional judgement of veteran airmen the aircraft was unsuitable for Hitler Youth pilots, being so unstable that the planned run of prototypes had to be halted while attempts were made to improve the design. Time was lacking in which to turn out a useful glider tug after production centres in the Erzgebirge came under threat from the Red Army sooner than expected.

Besides the single-seater with normal surfaces (as a glider), work on a two-seat trainer with greater wing surfaces began. The fourth variant in preparation at the beginning of 1945 was a two-seater with BMW 003 E-l turbine at DLH Oranienburg. Due to under-capacity the prototype engine for the two planned experimental machines was never completed at Heinkel-Siid Heidfeld/Vienna, as was the case with all other mixed-construction He 162 trainers. In the end, none left the works. So long as it remained possible, training and instruction was given in the hangars, but youthful dreams of the aviator’s life now faced an imminent end.

On 19 March training for fighter pilot recruitment in Bohemia was abandoned upon the approach of the Red Army, and as a result the NSFK agreed with OKL to concentrate practical flying training mainly in central Germany. After even the meagre requirements for two geographically separate training institutions could no longer be met, the best candidates from each of the three

schools were assembled at Trebbin. The Reich Glider School belonged to 4. Group NSFK Berlin/Mark Brandenburg. In comparison to the unit at Brno, the school was relatively well equipped at the beginning of 1945.The last course began at the end of March, some of the trainees having been transferred in from Laucha and Brno.

According to the diary entry of instructor Georg Cordt, in the second half of March there was at least one He 162 training aircraft in its component parts in one of the hangars at Trebbin. On 26 March construction of the machines began and two days later several flying instructors attached to the course for ‘Fighter Pilot Recruitment for Special Purposes’ made at least seven flights in the unpowered school glider, an especially powerful winch being used for the take­offs. On 29 March an aircraft was used as a tug. On 8 April the famous aviator Hanna Reitsch arrived unannounced in her Bii 131 and flew for the first and probably only time over Trebbin airfield in the He 162 S. Meanwhile motorised training flights at the Reich Glider School had been ordered severely restricted. Constant air alarms made any useful work on the ground or in the air extremely difficult and although some flying was done it could not be called very useful.

From 15 April flying routine gave way to Panzerfaust training. This involved firing the weapon at a wooden mock-up of a T-34 and at targets set up in the terrain. That their future role in the war, whether trainee or instructor, would be as ground troops became ever clearer. A few days previously Oesau units at Celle and Goslar with a total strength of 1,500 men were ordered to prepare for the

front. On 1 April 1. Kompanie Oesau at Celle was raised to Bataillon Oesau of three companies. On 6 April 2. Kompanie Oesau, also of battalion size, went direcdy from Goslar to the front. Only two weeks later, on 21 April at the hamlet of Michelstein, the battalion had been reduced to 65, all others being dead, wounded or missing in action. The survivors served as ‘paratroops’ on the so – called ‘Innermost Line’.

Numerous weapons for pin-point bombing, such as this ‘Special Machine with Bomb – Torpedo 1400’were projected from 1944 onwards. They would have demanded kamikaze tactics from the pilot.

On 20 April the Special Course at Trebbin was dissolved and all personnel at the Reich Glider School were attached to the newly formed Division Friedrich Ludwig Jahn of Twelfth Army, for the defence of Berlin. During the heavy fighting around Potsdam, the unit was encircled for a while but reached German lines after sustaining heavy losses. Casualties rose. One of two Hitler Youth companies was reduced to 14 boys, the other, including its company commander, fell in the field. Shordy afterwards the surviving unit broke up and its members sought refuge in flight.

The midget fighters such as He P 1077 Julia developed from the summer of 1944. The Bachem Natter was another midget fighter intended to assist jet

fighters such as the Me 262 to regain mastery in the air. These and all similar projects arose from the stated desire of the RLM on 15 July 1944 for a light fighter for local defence. By mid-November 1944 it was evident that it had poor tactical potential, contrary to the assessment of the light fighter with BMW 003 engines given in September 1944. For this reason, on 15 November a ‘single – seater special aircraft in wood’ suitable for anti-bomber work in the local protection role was demanded. Simpler than ‘midget fighters’, the new fighter generation would fire rockets of great destructive power into the enemy bomber formation.

The two Arado plans presented to the RLM in August 1944 were discussed on 4 and 5 September at Landeshut/Silesia with RLM representatives. An average speed of700 km/hr (435 mph) was proposed, as with the Ar 234 B-2.The Mistel would have an additional powerplant of two ‘cast off’ turbines which had to provide between 300 and 500 kg standing thrust. They would be limited in size to 0.5 metres diameter and 2.5 metres in length and easy to maintain. Arado’s idea for a plastic fuselage was rejected by the RLM because the material had not

been perfected: the lower aircraft would be all-wood. The wings were to be shoulder-mounted and tapered and would serve as auxiliary fuel tanks for the parent aircraft as suggested by Dr Hiitter. The 20-tonne Mistel would take off using a Rheinmetall-Borsig chassis which could remain attached to the lower aircraft during flight to enable landings without fuel and payload. The power – plant was an Ar 234 C-3 using four 1,000 kg-thrust rockets on the take-off chassis. The Ar E 377 itself could be piloted if necessary by means of fighter pilot controls once the upper machine had detached. A 2-tonne explosive charge in the nose was sufficient to sink a 15,000-ton ship. For ground targets a thin – cased container with up to 500 kg flammable liquid was planned.

On 30 November 1944 the design division completed detailed drawings of the two versions in which the previous SC 1800 was replaced by a more destructive 2-tonne bomb. On 7 December 1944 the Arado team provided the completed specifications for the new Mistel as follows:

(i) Ar 234 C-3 with Ar E 377 or Ar E 377a on 20-tonne take-off chassis;

(ii) He 162 with Ar E 377a on 20-tonne take-off chassis.

The lower unit with explosive payload would be steered in flight on a straight course to the target by means of a gunsight in the Ar 234 C-3. An He 162 could

have been used in place of the jet bomber. Probably the only difference in construction from the Ar 234 would have been in the use of explosive bolts to hold the Volksjager and Arado body together, since the Ar 234 spring bolt was not practical for the lighter He 162 to guarantee the release. If used with the He 162, the lower unit would have had two BMW 003 A-l turbines installed below the wings to supplement the engine power of the fighter, and a reserve of 4.5 tonnes of fuel.

This idea was abandoned by OKL on the grounds that there were insufficient He 162 A-2s to equip the envisaged JG 1, and the Riistungsstab would have had to free the necessary capacity to build the Ar E 377. In the few weeks before the final collapse, this Mistel would not have been possible no matter which system was chosen.

Despite the appalling experiences with chemical weapons to which troops of all belligerents had been exposed in the First World War, similar weapons were developed and improved after 1918 by the victors. Germany’s chemists had worked on tear gases such as xylyl bromide, then increasingly on anti-respiratory agents such as chlorine. Next came mustard gas and the dangerous lewisite, then the poisonous arsine or chlorzyan. Most gases were released to drift with favourable winds or were fired in artillery shells. Germany had been forbidden to have battlefield gases by the 1919 Versailles Treaty (and battlefield gases were declared illegal universally in 1925), but work progressed in secret and noxious substances which were easy to store, simple to fabricate and lethal were developed in laboratories. Deadly nerve gases such as sarin, soman and tabun were also produced in quantity.

In the late summer of 1939, the Luftwaffe had phosgene, tabun, several kinds of mustard gas and so called ‘mask-breakers’ (irritant gases which forced the wearer to remove his gas-mask and so expose himself to a far more dangerous
back-up gas). All these gases could be dropped operationally in cylindrical containers (КС). Apart from the КС 50 bomb, the standard weapons for this were the КС 250 and КС 500. One of the most dangerous was КС 250 IIGr filled with 100 kg of tabun. Germany produced almost 60,000 tonnes of battlefield gases. In the autumn of 1944 the Luftwaffe audit showed an arsenal of 1,160,340 bombs filled with chemicals, 1,600 of these being tabun-filled, 900 heavy КС 1800 with White Cross (tear-gas) and Green Cross (suffocating gas) and 3,600 КС 1000 Green Cross, enough to have laid low whole regions worldwide. Hitler imposed a strict rule that no such weapons were to be used at the front or against civilian targets in enemy territory. Most German chemical bombs were discovered by Allied forces in ammunition depots or underground facilities, such as Stassfurt. At the beginning of 1945 British forces captured a few Ju 88 G-ls and G-6s rigged to carry battlefield-gas payloads. The special containers were examined by British experts to determine their general purpose.

Bacteriological weapons, especially those bearing easily transmissible diseases such as anthrax, went into the arsenals. All belligerents were aware of the dangers of these weapons. Exacdy how much Germany produced, if any, is not known but the research existed. Fortunately there seems to have been some kind of tacit

understanding between the various belligerents that even in defeat they would not resort to chemical or bacteriological weapons.

Rumours

Rumours regarding certain kinds of research were used by the Third Reich leadership. Whether circulated deliberately or in error, these bred new rumours. It was easy to believe that work must be proceeding on larger and more terrible rockets, for example. The new America-Rocket or the solid-fuel counterpart V-101, both armed with a powerful warhead or lethal substance, were bound to strengthen belief in final victory. In the end it was all wishful thinking. There were to be no miracles, nor miracle weapons in a German Reich crumbling to ruin. Belief in a miracle weapon, however, inspired many senior military men to fight on. Even in the Fiihrer-bunker, in the embattled city centre of Berlin, Hitler spoke to his last Luftwaffe Commander-in-Chief, Generalfeldmarschall Ritter von Greim, about the many modern jet aircraft at readiness. Greims task was to

make the Luftwaffe leadership believe that the war was still not lost. It was a similar story with new rockets, death rays and other new weapons which existed only in fantasy. The Propaganda Ministry had no difficulty in convincing many people that weapons which would soon be on hand would bring victory, and whoever did not believe it hoped nevertheless that somehow it might be true.

Many Wehrmacht units kept fighting even when the war was lost and the capitulation was actually in effect. On 8 May 1945 there was aerial fighting in the East over the Erzgebirge mountains between Me 262 A-las of JG 7 and Soviet fighters. That same evening German aircraft attacked Soviet tanks for the last time near Eger (Saaz). In Bohemia, Generalfeldmarschall Schorner’s Army Group tangled on 9 and 10 May in skirmishes with the Red Army and partisans before throwing in the towel and admitting defeat.

There was only one way to counter the comprehensive aerial strength of the enemy because of the limited possibilities of production in Germany. Tactical superiority was to be regained by high performance aircraft – ‘quality instead of quantity’. Faced with shortages of materials and no chance of a major increase in production, the fighter squadrons were to receive more efficient machines to clear the skies over the Reich of Allied P-47s and P-51s and their four-engined bombers. Time was the problem. It was impossible within a few weeks and

months to design, turn out and make operational a stream of new aircraft. The later experience with the He 162 Volksjager would prove the point.

Even initial production of flak rockets was not completed, as long planned, by mid-1944, nor air-to-air rockets and weapons such as the futuristic revolver – cannon MG 213. In August 1944 OKL (Luftwaffe High Command) announced the future equipment of Luftwaffe squadrons for the period to December 1945. The nine and one-third bomber Geschwader in late summer 1944, most equipped with the Ju 88 and Ju 188, would be cut to eight, and in all probability two more would be disbanded during 1945 so that by the end of 1945 only six Geschwader would survive, equipped with the Ju 388 K-l. All Do 217-equipped units were to be disbanded by October 1944 at the latest. Ju 388 K-ls would replace the Ju 88 A-17s at KG 26. Between December 1944 and May 1945 three Gruppen of that unit were meant to get improved Ju 188s and Ju 388s for torpedo-bomber operations over the North Sea and Arctic waters. The fourth Gruppe would probably not come to operational strength because of the production situation at September 1944. The Gruppen to be disbanded were those flying the He 177 A-5 with remote control installations and the Do 217 K-3 with the Hs 293 A Kehl missile guidance system. As it could not be determined to what extent these aircraft would be required for missions in future,

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all 135 bombers would go provisionally into the OKL Reserve. A number of these were decommissioned on airfields in Denmark and Norway after the heavy losses suffered over Normandy and western France, some being cannibalised for their DB-605 engines for re-use in new machines. There would also be no further Fw 200 C units operating.

The further reduction of He 111 front-line groups would depend on demand: since the production of the He 111 H had been discontinued, the only fresh aircraft being delivered to units would arrive from the repair shops. III./KG 3 would receive ten aircraft monthly in connection with the V-l flying bomb programme. If and how the He 111 H-20s with other bomber groups would be operational on the Eastern Front was left open.

OKL wanted the Me 262 A-la/bo or A-2 available in two bomber Geschwader. From December 1944 a third Geschwader would be formed, and this strength would be maintained. The Me 262 Blitzbomber would be reduced to two Gruppen at the latest by March 1945 since KG 76 was being expanded into the first jet bomber Geschwader. III./KG 76 was planned as the first operational Gruppe with the Ar 234 C-3 or C-5. The first Do 335 bomber Gruppe was expected to be ready in July 1945: the Luftwaffe planners believed

that this would be the first, and probably only bomber unit to have this aircraft before the year was out. The Ju 287 was to be the first heavy jet bomber with the Luftwaffe. The first Gruppe was expected to be ready from July 1945, the second to follow at the year’s end by the latest. Although up to 20 per cent shortages due to delivery problems had been allowed for, it would have needed a great effort to meet these estimates by the scheduled dates, not least because some Ju 88 S-3s, Ju 388 K-ls, Me 262 A-ls and Do 335 A-ls were needed as training machines.

The dismantling and partial re-equipping of the bomber squadrons would continue to the end of 1945. Two Gruppen of LG 1 would receive the Ju 388 K-l instead of Ju 88 A-4. KG 2 would be disbanded if the Do 335 A-l was not available short-term: 14./KG 3 would be disbanded by October 1944, the V-l- equipped III./KG 3 by September 1945 at the latest. The same went for KG 4, whose I. to III. Gruppen, mostly flying the He 111 H-20 and H-16, would cease to operate between April and June 1945. KG 6 would lose its Ju 88 S-3s and Ju 188s in favour of the Ju 388 K-l in stages from February 1945, remaining operational until at least December 1945, while KG 26 would receive the Ju 388 M-l for anti-torpedo operations replacing its Ju 88 A-17s and Ju 188 A-3s.

OKL wanted the remainder of KG 27 disbanded by January 1945 and KG 30 by the end of that year. KG 40 was to remain in reserve, where the former bomber groups would be converted to the Me 262 fighter. The operational period of KG 51 with the Blitzbomber would be short: by the end of 1945 the recently converted units would be disbanded and replaced by KG 76.

KG 53 equipped with He 111 H-ll, H-16 and H-22 would be dissolved in March 1945. It was intended to replace the Ju 88s of at least two Gruppen of KG 54 with the Me 262. KG 55 was to be disbanded by November 1945. I./KG 66 was the only Luftwaffe pathfinder unit and would remain in service, receiving the Ju 388 K-l from August 1945. II. and III./KG 76 would test the Ar 234 B-2 for its suitability as a fast bomber. KG 100 with its He 177 A-5s would remain intact although no immediate operations were on hand for its PC 1400 X or Hs 293 missiles. As the last test unit, mostly equipped with the He 111 H-20, TGr 30 was to remain operational into the summer of 1945 although nobody could decide what should happen subsequently.

On account of lack of fuel and new replacement machines, the transport units were required to keep gong with clapped-out original-issue machines or converted He 111 bombers. The surviving Gruppen ofTG 1 to TG 4, except IV./TG 1, which flew the He 111 H-l to H-5, were to keep the slower but more robust Ju 52/3m. IV./TG 4 would continue to fly heavy machines such as the four-engined Pi 188, Fw 200 and Ju 290 and the three-engined Ju 252 and Ju 352. For transport missions over the battle zones, such as supply drops to encircled troops, TGr 20 would be used with He 111 H-6s, H-16s and principally H-20s and H-22s.

Further changes were foreseen for 1946. From the end of 1945, the air offensive would be pursued using the Do 335 in four Gruppen at KG 2, while two Gruppen at KG 76 and 12 other Gruppen elsewhere would fly the Ar 234. It was hoped to fit out two Gruppen at LG 1 with the Ju 388 high-altitude bomber, and KG 6 would remain in commission with the Ju 388 beyond January 1946, as would pathfinder Gruppe I./KG 66. Three Gruppen of torpedo bombers were planned for KG 76.

From the summer of 1944, Jabos were only operational as sections of ZG 26 and ZG 76. Both could field a single Gruppe, I./ZG 26 and II./ZG 76. Since the production of the Me 410 had been cancelled in the interim, the only fresh arrivals were from the repairers. This state of affairs was not expected to continue beyond February 1945. To replace these Gruppen, at least eight Gruppen were to be equipped with the Do 335 by the end of 1945, provided this aircraft proved superior to the RAF Mosquito. It was believed that two Jabo Gruppen could be formed between August and the end of December 1945 using Ju 388 J-ls orJ-3s.

In the later summer of 1944, 21 long-range reconnaissance Staffeln were operational flying the Ju 88 D or Ju 188 F. Another three flights had the Me 410.

For night reconnaissance Aufklarungsgruppe Nacht had three StafFeln. 1. and 2. Staffel of Fernaufklarungsgruppe 5 flew maritime reconnaissance sorties, Aufklar­ungsgruppe 123 had two StafFeln equipped with Bf 109s. The majority of these units, 29 in all, were to be retained and would fly operations by day, 3 using the Ar 234 B-l, 14 the Do 335 A-4 and 10 the Ju 388 L-l. Ju 388 L-ls or L-3s would replace the Do 217s and Ju 188s of night reconnaissance units. A total of eight StafFeln of Ju 88 G-ls and G-6s would fly weather reporting, amongst them Wekusta OKL 1. He 177s of Wekusta OKL 2 flew long range reconnaissance. Later consideration was given to using the Ju 635 or perhaps the Hii 211.

The extent to which these extremely optimistic plans were called into question by the end of 1944 is demonstrated by the idea of operating KG 51 (Me 262 A-la/A-2) and the Ar 234 B-2 at KG 76. Even after all Ju 388 production had been abandoned in favour of the jets, and the Do 335 and Ju 287 were put on hold, neither of the ambitious schemes for KG 51 and KG 76 ever came to fruition, not even partially.

Once the rearrangement of the bomber formations was given up as impossible, the fighter and Jabo units were given absolute priority. Since small piston-engined aircraft and jets were easier to manufacture, the schedule was drawn up for large numbers by the end of 1944. It was clear to the squadrons that the Fw 190 D-9 or the Bf 109 K-4 together with the Me 262 jet fighter, coming off the lines in ever greater numbers, were the likely new deliveries. JG 1 wanted to exchange its Fw 190 A-8s and Bf 109 G-lOs for the Fw 190 A-9. JG 2 also required a complete changeover to the Fw 190 D-9. At JG 3 to JG 6, JG 11, JG 26, JG 27, JG 51 to JG 54 and JG 77, the existing Bf 109 G-6s, G-lOs and G-14s were to be exchanged for G-lOs and G-14s and principally K-4s. These machines would be delivered to squadrons from the beginning of 1945 to replace the Bf 109 G-6. All units flying the Fw 190 A-8 would make a gradual change to the A-9 and then D-9. Only a few units, in particular the three Gruppen of JG 26, were chosen to receive the Fw 190 D-12 instead of the A-9 or D-9 from the beginning of 1945.

All-weather units JG 300 and JG 301 had a special role. It was considered that the Fw 190 AS-6 to A-8 and Bf 109 G-6 to G-10/R6 of JG 300 should be

traded in for the Fw 190 A-6 to A-8 with A-9/R11 and then the Fw 190 D-9/R11. Later III./JG 301 would receive the Та 152.

The only rocket-fighter Geschwader, JG 400, would continue to use the Me 163, and perhaps later the Me 263 (Ju 248). The only jet-fighter Geschwader, JG 7, would retain the Me 262 A-la. All bomber Geschwader operating in the fighter role would receive the Bf 109 G-10 to K-4 or, to a lesser extent, the Fw 190 A-9/R11, while all units awaited delivery of the Me 262.

Jabo formations were to be equipped with the Fw 190 F-8 and F-9 to await mass production of the Та 152 when it was intended that many of these machines would be fitted to carry the Panzerblitz I to III or the Panzerschreck, both efficient anti-tank rockets. The Та 152 would have been an outstanding ground-attack aircraft with its more powerful engine. However, mass production had not begun by the end of 1944. For the moment a few units with Hs 129 B-3s and Ju 87 D-5s still flew missions mosdy over the Eastern Front.

The night Jabo Gruppen NSGr I to X flew mainly the Ju 87 D-3 and D-5 until the end of 1944 except 4./NSGr II, NSGr V, and NSGr VII equipped with the Fiat CR 42. Most of these units also operated Ar 66 Cs and Ds, Go 145s, Fw 58s and Si 204 training aircraft converted to auxiliary night Jabos. All of these units flew initially with what was available. There is no indication of advance planning.

The seaworthy Do 24T-1 flying boat dominated amongst the few remaining air-sea rescue units. For aerial protection and search missions some Ju 88 C-4s and C-7s, Fw 190 A-8s and Jabos such as the Me 410 were on hand. No forward plans are known of, and are hardly to be expected in the light of the situation in 1945. In mid-December 1944 the general outlook was such that the intentions might still be forced through, though with delays. Once the Western Allies were advancing to the Rhine, and the Russians had begun their major offensive from Poland, the final collapse, perhaps within months, would become apparent.

From February 1945 – at steadily decreasing intervals – one emergency plan after another replaced the former policy. At the beginning of the year, the At 234, Do 335, He 162 and Me 262 were in the frame. Then the Do 335 was dropped. On 27 March 1945 Hitler put SS-Obergruppenfiihrer Kammler in charge of the development, testing and completion of all jet aircraft. As ‘General Plenipotentiary for Jet Aircraft’ in April 1945 he ordered that the Me 262 alone was to be produced in the greatest numbers possible. In that decision he saw the one last chance, and a small one, of providing a local air defence. It was a vain hope, for the war had long been lost.