Category The Chinese Air Force

Given these three possible games, it is clear the implications of PLAAF modernization for the United States vary between the games. In both the Game of Influence and within the Battle over a Third Party, the types of adap­tations are essentially incremental, with force additions tailored to fairly spe­cific problems. In the Great Power Game, the types of U. S. responses encom­pass much bolder moves to bolster regional positions and improve symmetric combat capabilities to maintain relative superiority. These differences affect how the balance is perceived and also frame the type of actions that might be taken within the game.

In both the Game of Influence and the Battle over a Third Party, the shifting of existing forces, as well as tailored responses focused on localized problems, appears adequate. In these cases, the focus is on crafting a strat­egy to solve specific problems created by the PLAAF and on ascertaining the steps necessary for solving them. The changes in the PLAAF make some oper­ational concepts more difficult than in the past and undercut current assump­tions as to how the United States could operate at will with airpower in almost any region of the world. However, the moves to counter these elements can be fairly well tailored and manageable in terms of what might be required for new operational concepts, munitions, and, perhaps most importantly, the level of engagement with other countries in the region. Dispersal and remote basing of forces, selective hardening and defense, a greater use of longer-range sys­tems, and changing the threshold for success (defeating certain types of mili­tary attacks and accepting damage from others) can all help address the imme­diate problem of creating the broader perception of an effective U. S. response as well as help address specific issues in regard to problems associated with defense of third parties. Therefore, to the extent PLAAF modernization drives game changes, they will be relatively focused and bounded.

The balance in the Great Power Game is more sensitive than those in the other games in terms of the U. S. need to maintain relative position through such actions as addressing perceived rates of change and rate of acceleration of change for a variety of reasons that are not directly related to the security situation in the particular geographic region. Even if marginal improvements such as a force shift might address the immediate security problem, they would not address the broader aspect of the military competition that is integral to the game itself. It is not only the qualitative improvements of the PLAAF that are significant; after all, they are essentially only matching earlier generations of U. S. force capabilities. Instead, the dynamic of the broader region is driven by the twin problems of U. S. forces operating at a distance (the United States is acting as a global power and is expected by many to be anywhere a threat occurs) and the fear of what China’s rapid rise in capability might presage. The balance in the Great Power Game incorporates elements of predictions and wagers about the future that are not dominant in the other games. This is par­tially due to the fact that in some narratives the immediate influence of the United States in the game is discounted and thereby diminished if the United States is not seen as actively addressing a possible negative future.

Implications for the United States

This paper provides the framework for how the United States should view and assess the impact of PLAAF modernization. This framework also yields important insights for U. S. decisionmaking within the overarching game structure. Most significantly, the United States must make a deliberate choice as to what game or combination of games it wants to play and how it will respond (force structure, political stances, etc.) within the games it chooses. This will allow the United States to best utilize its military and political tools to achieve its national interests and to avoid being forced into a nonoptimal decision.

When the United States is choosing which game to play, it will of course be influenced by Chinese military choices (one being continued PLAAF mod­ernization) and political moves. There will also be other factors influencing the United States, and the choice between games will be predicated on the strategic importance assigned to the situation, relevant political considerations, fiscal constraints, and other factors. But whatever game it chooses to play, the United States must always be aware of the range of possible Chinese countermoves and be careful not to lock itself into a course of action that may prove detrimental if and when the game being played changes. And, of course, it is necessary for the United States to both recognize that China is not obligated to play the same game the United States chooses and to understand that such a situation would lead to potential disconnects that would need to addressed. Furthermore, once a game is chosen and is being played, the United States will continue to face choices about its specific set of actions. These choices will require the United States to prioritize different aspects of its power. Given these uncertainties, it will be prudent for the United States to hedge.

The United States and China have largely confined themselves to Game 2—The Battle over a Third Party—and the impact of PLAAF modernization has been widely evaluated through this lens. PLAAF modernization does have a direct impact on this game—and a negative impact for the United States if it does not take steps to counteract it—but the only way that modernization shifts the overall military balance across the spectrum of possible games is if the United States holds all other factors in its relationship with China constant. There is no reason for the United States to do so. The United States can define which game it is going to play by what it chooses to address as important. And in that context, the United States has a wide range of options that do not neces­sarily require a new force structure or more defense expenditures, but instead may call for an altered military and political emphasis.

The bottom line for the Chinese is that PLAAF modernization is con­tributing to conditions that compel a reaction from the United States. If the United States chooses to continue to play the same game in the same way it has since the end of the Cold War, the results may be to China’s advantage. But if the United States chooses to play another game where its significant military and political assets can be more fully utilized, PLAAF modernization may lead to a Pyrrhic victory for the Chinese.31

The U. S. bottom line is the recognition that there is no compelling rea­son for it to maintain its current game. Instead, it is extremely prudent for the Nation’s policy and military planners to assess the current situation and deter­mine if another course should be pursued. This is because once the current equilibrium with China is interrupted, as it inevitably will be, the situation will shift and it is difficult to predict the course that events will take from that point.

If the United States does not then already have a plan in place or if the issue has not already been extensively discussed, the Nation’s leaders could be pushed by the domestic political climate, fiscal constraints, or a variety of other factors to make a choice they would not have otherwise made. This type of sit­uation would be metastable, and because of that lack of stability, it is a situa­tion that could be significantly impacted by small military changes on the Chi­nese side. The United States must be aware that it will be necessary to make a decision before it reaches any such tipping point. Otherwise, the United States could be forced into making not only a nonoptimal decision as to which game it is going to play and how it is going to play it, but a nonsatisfactory one as well.

Xu and Ma are believed to share similar career advancement paths. They both joined the air force and became jet pilots in the mid-1960s (Ma in 1965 and Xu in 1967) and have a very similar and impeccable track record in mili­tary service. They both enjoy sports, particularly basketball.

Xu has enjoyed good fortune while in the air force. After graduation from the 8th Aviation Academy in 1969 he became a fighter pilot in the Inde­pendent Detachment of Air Force (AF) Division 4. This detachment was a bat­talion unit, but had regiment rank. As a result, Xu skipped the conventional regiment step on his way up. He was made commander of the 26th Division at 33 years of age and deputy corps commander of the 4th Corps (later reorganized as the PLAAF’s Shanghai Commanding Headquarters) at just age 34 in 1984, becoming the youngest army-level commander of the PLA at the time. He became commander of the new 8th Corps (deployed in Fujian for Taiwan mis­sions) at the age of 40 in 1990, still holding the record of youngest corps com­mander to this day. In 1994, he became chief of staff of the air force, achieving the crucial deputy MR rank. In 1999 the PLA leadership transferred him to the Shenyang MR as deputy commander. In 2004, he was made the PLAs deputy chief of general staff, a full MR rank post. Three years later, he became air force commander, the fourth youngest PLAAF commander following Liu Yalou, Wu Faxian, and Ma Ning (Ц’т), and thus a member of the CMC as well.11

Ma was born in 1949 and quickly proved a model officer. In 1972, because of his birth date, he was selected to appear in a documentary film As the Same Age of the Republic, representing the PLA. Thereafter he entered the fast track of promotion. He became commander of the 72d Regiment in 1973, at the age of 23(!), and then, a decade later, was promoted to deputy com­mander of the 24th Air Force Division, part of the 6th Corps, at 34. In 1995, he became commander of the 10th Corps, and then, just 2 years later, the PLA leadership promoted him to deputy chief of staff for the PLAAF. Only a year later, he was transferred to be chief of staff of Guangzhou Air Force Region.12

The Guangzhou transfer was unusual, in that he moved at the same rank. Seldom is a transfer from the center to the region at this level made with­out a promotion. But even this reflected his favored status, for the underlying reason was to broaden Ma’s command experience and familiarity with opera­tional combat units in different war zones. Two years later, in 1999, he was pro­moted to the position of deputy commander of Lanzhou MR, and commander of Lanzhou Air Force Region, making the crucial climb into the deputy MR rank. Within 2 years he was transferred to be deputy commander of Nan­jing MR and commander of PLAAF Nanjing Region. In 2003 he became dep­uty PLAAF commander. In 2006 he assumed the presidency of the National Defense University, thus entering the full MR rank. The following year he was given his current position as the PLAs executive deputy chief of general staff.

It is very interesting to compare Xu and Ma’s career paths, something that can shed a lot of light on PLA elite selection, advancement, and career termination. From the information mentioned above, it is clear that both Xu and Ma were identified early by the air force and the CMC as candidates for top leadership. They had excellent performance qualifications, were top-grade fighter pilots тЮ, and were well respected by their peers and subor­

dinates. Both Xu and Ma piloted J-10s, Su-27s, and Su-30s to gain first-hand experience with these aircraft.

Yet, in this invisible race, Ma was left behind, virtually from the starting point. There are some clues why. First, Xu served in one of the PLAAF’s elite fighter divisions, while Ma’s was a relatively less prestigious one. This gave Xu an advantage in attracting the attention of the PLA/PLAAF leadership. Later his 8th Corps was deployed in a key strategic location—Fujian, near the Taiwan Strait—where it was on constant combat readiness, while Ma’s corps was based in more distant Hebei with more routine service. Second, Xu’s skip of the regi­mental step in the upward ladder allowed him to enter the cadre reserve list of the military region earlier than Ma. Therefore, once there was an opportunity for promotion, Xu was the first to be considered. Third, Xu served in the 4th Corps (later the Air Force Shanghai Commanding Headquarters (±ЖЙЩн№ W) as its chief of staff. This corps historically produced many more key PLAAF leaders (for example, Gao Houliang [ЛЩЙ], Qao Qingchen [^>ій], and Han

Decai [ШШШ]) than Ma’s 6th and 10th Corps. These leaders naturally favored subordinates following the same career track. Fourth, Xu was younger than Ma by 1 year, a seemingly small difference, but one that could be a key cut-off fac­tor in Chinese Communist Party (CCP)/PLA succession politics.13

Thus, Xu accelerated ahead of Ma as early as the late 1980s, even though Ma’s own upward progression was a veritable “helicopter” compared with his peers. Xu acquired deputy corps rank about a decade earlier than Ma (1983 versus 1993). When Xu became the PLAAF chief of staff in 1994, Ma was only chief of staff of the 10th Corps. This was a crucial difference, as Xu entered the CMC cadre management list while Ma stayed in the air force list. The gap was finally closed on the eve of the 16th National Party Congress as both were at the same military rank: Ma was then Nanjing MR deputy commander and its air force chief, and Xu held the same ranks in Shenyang. At the congress, they were both elected to be CC members, and thus equal to the parallel third – most-important personages in the air force (the first two CC members being the commander and political commissar of the PLAAF).

But when the selection of the PLAAF commander came down to Xu and Ma, Xu’s early seniority over Ma played a crucial role in his promotion. This dif­ference is a huge one, because Xu as a CMC member is ranked as the leader of the PLA (¥S^#), while Ma can only be dubbed the leader of a headquarters (йнШЮ. It is interesting to watch if Ma can again match up with Xu in the forthcoming PLA leadership reshuffle. Certainly in no aspect is Ma inferior in ability and performance to Xu. Their relative career progression is evidence, yet again, that sometimes the factor of luck is more important than anything else.

Phillip C. Saunders and Joshua K. Wiseman

Although China continues to lag approximately two decades behind the world’s most sophisticated air forces in terms of its ability to develop and pro­duce fighter aircraft and other complex aerospace systems, it has moved over time from absolute reliance on other countries for military aviation technol­ogy procurement to a position where a more diverse array of strategies can be pursued. Steps taken in the late 1990s to reform China’s military aviation sector demonstrated an understanding of the problems inherent in high-tech­nology acquisition, and an effort to move forward.1 However, a decade later it remains unclear how effective these reforms have been. Where are the Peo­ple’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and China’s military aviation indus­try headed? What obstacles must be overcome for China to join the exclusive ranks of those nations possessing sophisticated air forces and aviation indus­tries capable of producing world-class aircraft? Answering these and related questions is at the heart of this study. Because advanced fighter aircraft exem­plify the most sophisticated level of aerospace technology, are important for air force combat capabilities, and present unique design and fabrication chal­lenges for a military aviation industry, the authors’ analysis focuses primarily on China’s efforts to acquire, produce, and develop fighter aircraft and related technology. It also includes some discussion of bombers, transports, and air­borne early warning aircraft where relevant to Chinese technology develop­ment and acquisition efforts.

The PRC’s first surface-to-air missile, like that of other Communist Bloc countries, was the Soviet-developed S-75 Dvina, known to the West as the SA-2 Guideline, five batteries of which were delivered from the USSR in 1959. Then, the growing Sino-Soviet political crisis flared into open disagreement, bringing further deliveries to an end. On October 7, 1959, one of these Chi­nese SA-2 batteries shot down a Taiwan twin-engine two-crew Martin RB – 57D reconnaissance aircraft while it was flying at 60,000 feet near Beijing. This loss came almost 7 months before the Soviets shot down Francis Gary Powers’ Lockheed U-2 with an SA-2 on May 1, I960.10

After the Sino-Soviet split, the PRC reverse-engineered the SA-2 and its SNR-75 Fan Song radar, and placed it into service as the HQ-2A, subsequently developing the more sophisticated HQ-2B. China’s air defenses remained heavily dependent upon this system until the end of the Sino-Soviet split fur­nished China the opportunity to upgrade its surface-to-air missile defenses. In particular, it acquired advanced “double digit” SAM systems from Russia, notably the S-300 (SA-10/20) which has, like the SA-2 before it, undergone

reverse engineering to further China’s own indigenous SAM development pro­grams. The PLA also acquired and manufactured derivatives of such Western SAM systems as the Crotale, Aspide, and Stinger.11

Though the HQ-2B remains an important element of PLA air defense, the nature of PLA missile defenses is increasingly built around the S-300 and equivalent high-technology systems. As one source suggests:12

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF)’s Surface-to-Air Missile Corps has been operating the S-300 (NATO reporting name: SA-10 Grumble) family of surface-to-air missile system since the mid-1990s. The S-300 mis­sile system was regarded as one of the world’s most effective all-altitude regional air defense systems, comparable in performance to the U. S. MIM-104 Patriot system. The PRC remains the largest export customer of the S-300, mainly due to its incapability to produce a similar system domestically or acquire it from another country. A Chinese indigenous system analogous with the Russian S-300 series, the HQ-9, has had a long gestation but is now being deployed in some numbers.

A typical S-300 regiment has four to six batteries. One regiment in the PLAAF would thus have 16 to 24 transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) that could fire a total of 64 to 96 missiles (before reloading) to protect one area. The high performance (and high lethality) of the S-300 makes this a formida­ble system for any nation to “crack,” even the United States, particularly if fly­ing “legacy” third – and fourth-generation aircraft such as the F-CK-1, F-16, and Mirage.13

Taiwan currently deploys a plethora of SAM systems. As reported by the U. S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Taiwan uses layered SAM coverage to pro­tect its major population centers, key national leadership installations, mili­tary facilities, and national infrastructure. The air defense network consists of 22 SAM sites utilizing a mix of long – and medium-range systems, augmented by short-range tactical SAMs to provide overlapping coverage.”14 Table 13-4 offers a survey of the types, numbers of batteries, and numbers (where known) of the various missiles.

Kenneth W. Allen is a Senior China Analyst at the Defense Group, Inc. (DGI), where he focuses on Chinese military issues. Prior to this, he worked in vari­ous nonprofit research organizations dealing with China and Taiwan relations. From 1971 to 1992, he served in the U. S. Air Force, including assignments in Taiwan, Berlin, Japan, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, and Washington, DC. He also served as the Assistant Air Force Attache in China from 1987 to 1989. He has written several books and articles on China’s military. He received a B. A from the University of California at Davis, a B. A from the University of Maryland in Asian Studies, and an M. A. from Boston University in Interna­tional Relations.

Hsi-hua Cheng retired from the Taiwan Air Force as a colonel in November 2011. His military assignments include a tour as acting deputy commandant of the Air Command and Staff College at Taiwan’s National Defense University. Cheng was a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States from July 2006 to June 2007 and graduated from the U. S. Air Force Air Command and Staff College in 1994.

Roger Cliff is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. His areas of research include China’s military doc­trine, defense industries, and future military capabilities and their implications for U. S. strategy and policy. He has authored, coauthored, or edited more than a dozen research monographs and more than a dozen journal articles, book chapters, and op-eds on these topics. He is currently writing a book on China’s future military capabilities. Dr. Cliff has previously worked for the Project 2049 Institute, the RAND Corporation, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and VERAC, Inc. He received his Ph. D. in International Relations from Princeton University, and holds an M. A. in Chinese Studies from the University of Cali­fornia, San Diego, and a B. S. in Physics from Harvey Mudd College. He is flu­ent in written and spoken Chinese.

David R. Frelinger is a Senior Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation with experience in leading technical and policy analytic studies for senior govern­ment consumers. His research interests include intelligence operations, infor­mation technologies, and the interaction of commercial and governmental activities, as well as an ongoing interest in assessing advanced weapons systems concepts. Mr. Frelinger holds an M. A. in Political Science from the University of California, Los Angeles, and a B. A in Political Science from the University of California, San Diego.

Richard P. Hallion is an aerospace analyst and historian who has written widely on defense, aerospace, military affairs, and technology. He received his B. A and Ph. D. from the University of Maryland, and is a graduate of the Fed­eral Executive Institute and the National Security Studies Program for Senior Executives at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He has served as a founding curator, Lindbergh Professor, and Verville Fellow at the National Air and Space Museum; as a National Aeronautics and Space Administration and Air Force historian; as the Johnson Chair at the U. S. Army Military History Institute; as a senior issues and policy analyst and senior advi­sor for air and space issues to the Secretary of the Air Force; and as a special advisor on aerospace technology to the Air Force Chief Scientist. Currently, he is a senior advisor to Commonwealth Research Institute/Concurrent Technol­ogies Corporation; Vice President of the Earthshine Institute; and a research associate in aeronautics for the National Air and Space Museum. He has taught and lectured widely, is active in professional associations, and is a Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, a Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society, and a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society.

Jessica Hart is an Analyst at a defense contractor. From 2008 to 2011, she worked as a research assistant for the RAND Corporation where she focused on defense policy and nuclear deterrence issues. Ms. Hart holds an M. PI. A. in Intelligence and Defense Studies from Texas A&M University, and a B. A. in Political Science from Clemson.

You Ji is Reader/Professor in the School of Social Science, University of New South Wales. He has published widely on China’s political, military, and foreign affairs. He is the author of three books, including China’s Enterprise Reform: Changing State/Society Relations after Mao (1998) and The Armed Forces of China (1999). He has authored numerous articles and book chapters, includ­ing: “China’s Response to the Deadly Triangle: Arms Race, Territorial Dispute and Energy Security,” CLAWS Journal, Summer 2010; “Managing the Cross – Taiwan Strait Military Conflicts in a New Era of Political Reconciliation,” in 30 Years of Sino-US Relations, Sujian Guo, ed. (Lexicon Books, 2010); “Chang­ing Civil-Military Relations in China,” in The PLA at Home and Abroad, David Lai, Roy Kamphamsen, and Andrew Scobell, eds. (National Bureau of Asian Research and Strategic Studies Institute of the U. S. Army War College, 2010).

Kevin Lanzit is a Senior Analyst at Alion Science & Technology, Inc. with over thirty years in national security affairs. During his Air Force career he served in a variety of operational and national security planning positions, including mul­tiple fighter assignments in the United States, Western Europe, and the Southwest Pacific. As a foreign area officer specializing on China and East Asia, he completed two assignments with the United States Embassy in Beijing, China (1989-1991 and 2000-2003), where his language skills and operational acumen facilitated the successful execution of both diplomatic and operational missions. Following mil­itary service, Mr. Lanzit has worked in both private and government positions. From 2005 to 2006, he served as a senior analyst with the U. S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission where he shaped the research, analysis, and written reports related to China’s growing military power and its effect on U. S. national security interests in the region. Since leaving the Commission he has continued to lend his regional knowledge and operational experience to national security analysis. Mr. Lanzit received a B. S. in Economics from the USAF Acad­emy in 1975, an M. S. in Systems Management from the University of Southern California, and studied National Security Affairs at the U. S. Air War College and Mandarin Chinese at the Defense Language Institute.

Forrest E. Morgan is a defense policy researcher working in the RAND Cor­poration’s Pittsburgh Office. Prior to joining RAND in January 2003, Dr. Mor­gan served a 27-year career in the U. S. Air Force. His military assignments included duty as a signals intelligence analyst and as a space operations officer in various operations and staff positions. Later he served on the strategy and policy staff at Headquarters, U. S. Air Force, Pentagon, and did a tour of duty as a professor of comparative military studies at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. Since coming to RAND, Dr. Morgan has done strategy and doctrine research examining such issues as preemptive and preventive attack, escalation management, deterrence, information operations, and assessing performance of the Air Force and Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Kevin Pollpeter has been the China Program Manager at Defense Group, Inc. since 2005. He manages a group of 11 analysts focused on primary source research on Chinese security issues. Mr. Pollpeter writes on a range of issues, but is a specialist on the Chinese space program. He previous worked at the RAND Corporation from 2000 to 2005 as a Research Assistant and a Project Associate. His other work experience includes time at the Monterey Institute’s East Asia Nonproliferation Project, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Marine Corps Reserves. Mr. Pollpeter has an M. A. in International Policy Stud­ies and a Certificate in Nonproliferation Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies and a B. A. in Chinese Studies from Grinnell College.

Phillip C. Saunders is Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs and a Distinguished Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic Research, part of National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies. Dr. Saunders previously worked at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where he was Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program from 1999 to 2003, and served as an officer in the U. S. Air Force from 1989 to 1994. Dr. Saun­ders is coauthor with David Gompert of The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in an Era of Vulnerability (NDU Press, 2011) and co-editor of Cross-Strait Relations: New Opportunities and Challenges for Taiwan’s Security (RAND, 2011) and The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (NDU Press, 2011). He has published numerous articles and book chapters on China and Asian security issues in journals such as International Security, Inter­national Studies Quarterly, China Quarterly, The China Journal, Survival, Asian Survey, Pacific Review, Orbis, Asia Policy, and Joint Force Quarterly. Dr. Saunders attended Harvard College and received his M. P.A. and Ph. D. in International Relations from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University.

Shen Pin-Luen is an assistant research fellow at the Cross-Strait Interflow Prospect Foundation in Taiwan. His research focuses on People’s Republic of China national policy and the development of People’s Liberation Army modernization. He has an M. A. in mainland China studies from Taiwan’s National Chengchi University, Taiwan.

David Shlapak is a Senior International Policy Analyst working in the RAND Corporation’s Pittsburgh Office. His areas of research include U. S. defense strat­egy and policy, Asian security, Chinese military modernization, and airpower operations. During his time at RAND, Mr. Shlapak has completed projects on reshaping the U. S. joint force for future challenges, countering nuclear-armed adversaries, and U. S-China security relations. He holds a B. A. in Political Sci­ence from Northwestern University.

Mark A. Stokes is Executive Director of the Project 2049 Institute. During 20 years of service in the U. S. Air Force, Lt Col (Ret.) Stokes was assigned to a variety of electronic warfare, intelligence, planning, and policy positions. From 1984 to 1986, he was assigned to the 6922nd Electronic Security Squadron, Clark Air Base, Philippines. From 1986 to 1989, he served as a signals intel­ligence and electronic warfare officer in the 6912th Electronic Security Wing, Berlin, West Germany. In July 1989, Mr. Stokes entered the Air Force’s for­eign area officer training program as a China specialist. From 1992 to 1995, he served as the assistant air attache at the United States Defense Attache Office in Beijing, People’s Republic of China (PRC). He subsequently was assigned to Headquarters, Air Force’s Plans and Operations Directorate, where he was responsible for operational and strategic planning for the Asia-Pacific region. Between 1997 and 2004, Mark served as Team Chief and Senior Country Director for the PRC, Taiwan, and Mongolia in the Office of the Assistant Sec­retary of Defense for International Security Affairs (OASD/ISA). For 7 years, he was responsible for developing, coordinating, and managing U. S. defense policy with respect to China. He holds a B. A in History from Texas A&M Uni­versity, and M. A.s in International Relations and East Asian Studies from Bos­ton University and the Naval Postgraduate School.

Murray Scot Tanner has published widely on Chinese and East Asian poli­tics and security issues, and is recognized as one of the country’s top specialists on internal security, social unrest, policing, and intelligence in China. Among his many books and articles are Chinese Economic Coercion against Taiwan: A Tricky Weapon to Use (RAND, 2007), The Politics of Lawmaking in China (Oxford, 1998), and “China Rethinks Unrest,” Washington Quarterly, 2004. Dr. Tanner has previously served as Professor of Political Science at Western Mich­igan University, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, as a senior staff member for the U. S. Congress, and as a China analyst for the U. S. Govern­ment. Raised in Syracuse, New York, Dr. Tanner received his B. A. and Ph. D. from the University of Michigan.

Joshua K. Wiseman is a Research Analyst at National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies. Prior to joining the Institute as a Con­tract Researcher in 2010, he worked as a Chinese language translator for the Department of Commerce. His research focuses on Chinese security issues, specifically the Chinese defense industrial sector, Sino-Russian strategic rela­tions, and China’s expanding aerospace power. Mr. Wiseman attended The George Washington University, where he completed an M. A. in Security Pol­icy Studies with a China regional focus. He has extensive experience working, traveling, and studying in China.

Xiaoming Zhang is Associate Professor in the Department of Leadership and Strategy at the Air War College. Dr. Zhang holds a Ph. D. in history from the University of Iowa and has authored a number of articles on Chinese military involvement in the Korean and Vietnam Wars and Sino-Soviet relations during these conflicts, as well as Red Wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union and the Air War in Korea (Texas A&M University Press, 2002).

The second echelon of PLAAF leadership consists of the PLAAF’s dep­uty commanders, chief of staff, deputy chiefs of staff, and assistant chiefs of staff. Readers are advised that these elites at the headquarters belong to two clusters in CMC nomenclature. The deputy commanders and chief of staff are at the deputy MR rank and fall into the CMC “Category B” management list, requiring that (though nominated by the CMC’s professional soldiers) their appointments be approved by the CMC chair personally. The deputy chief of staff and assistant chief of staff are Corps-level leaders whose appointments are basically decided by the PLAAF, approved by the CMC in regular meetings, and signed by the CMC chair. Their appointments are professional, not politi­cal. In fact the PLA is no longer subjected to impositions of blatantly politi­cal appointments, though this was a widespread phenomenon in the now-past eras of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.14 Currently, the PLAAF has five dep­uty commanders, five deputy chiefs of staff, and five assistant chiefs of staff.

Deputy Commanders

All five PLAAF deputy commanders were born in 1949, meaning that they have little or no prospect of upward progression, since the deputy MR rank requires compulsory retirement age at 63. Among them are three fighter pilots of the top grade and two army officers transferred to the PLAAF, with distinctive military family backgrounds.

Lieutenant General He Weirong ) is executive deputy commander,

responsible for operations and training. He commanded Fighter Division 6 and was deputy commander of the Jinan MR and the Jinan AF Region (2003). He was PLAAF chief of staff (2003) before assuming his current position (2005).

Lieutenant General Jing Wenchun (ЯЙ#) is in charge of the depart­ments of supporting arms in the Headquarters (electronic warfare, radar and communications, education institutions, and key weapons projects).15 He was commander of the 10th Corps (1998) and deputy commander of the Beijing MR and the Beijing AF Region (2002-2006) before assuming his current position.

Lieutenant General Zhao Zhongxin (М&ЭД is in charge of headquar­ters affairs and air force MR affairs. He was commander of the 19th Fighter Division and the Dalian base (2000) and chief of staff for the Nanjing (2002) and Chengdu (2004) AF Regions and deputy chief of staff (2004) and chief of staff of the PLAAF (2005) before assuming this position.

Lieutenant General Yang Dongming (ШЖЩ) is in charge of the PLAAF Research Institutions (basic weapons design, research and development), the Engineering Department, and logistics. Although recruited into the PLA as an air force technical officer—he graduated from the Beijing Aero-Space and Avi­ation University in 1977 as a rocket engineer—his career advancement came mostly in the army, with postings to the Defense Technology Commission, the Hebei Military District, and the Beijing Garrison. He was transferred back to the PLAAF as deputy commander from the GLD (where he was director for the Material and Oil Department). Without the connections of his father (General Yang Chengwu [Ш$.Ж], former PLA chief of general staff), he would not have come this far in the air force, for he was not an airman and possessed no prior experience in PLAAF combat units or headquarters.

Lieutenant General Chen Xiaogong (^/JI) is in charge of intelligence, training safety, and foreign affairs. He is probably the only senior commander in the PLAAF with battlefield combat experience, having fought in the Sino-Vietnam border war as a battalion commander. He was PLA defense attache in Washington (2001) and then the PLAs intelligence chief (director of the 2d Department of the GSD). He represented the PLA as deputy director of the Politburo’s Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) office and was appointed assistant chief of general staff in 2007, temporarily filling the vacancy left by General Xiong Guangkai.

Chen’s career progression is intriguing. It is not clear how he was trans­ferred to the PLAAF, which had already filled its four deputy-commander quota. Chen belongs to the PLA category of “cadre to be rescued” (ЙЙ^нР), a com­mander with a distinctive service record who, due to lack of a compulsory experi­ence or lack of a vacancy, is transferred elsewhere as a way of promotion. General Pei Huailiang (Ш’Тй) was a good example of this category when he was pro­moted as president of the NDU. General Zhang Qingsheng was promoted to be deputy chief of general staff without experience as a group army (GA) and MR Commander. For Chen Xiaogong, assistant chief of general staff is still between the army and DMR ranks that he achieved long time ago ()#^KS).16

But without experience as a commanding officer at or above divisional level (¥#iW), it went against the norm to create an exception for him to become deputy chief of general staff. Overall, Chen’s career progression was frustrated despite his extensive connections with top leaders while working in the Politbu­ro’s FALSG and his father’s connection as China’s first ambassador to Japan. He thus went to the PLAAF because the PLAAF was a place that could adopt him.

Lieutenant General Yang Guohai (ЙВЛ) is the PLAAF chief of staff. From his resume, we can see that he has been Xu’s old associate in Shanghai and is the same age as Xu. The relations between a commander and his chief of staff are always special, and this makes the post of chief of staff a key position in the PLA. According to PLA regulations, the chief of staff is in a way more important than deputy commanders. For instance, if the commander is killed in combat, the next person in line to fill the commanding job is not one of the deputy commanders, but the chief of staff because the former are in charge of specific areas while the latter is more familiar with the overall responsibilities and workings of the unit.17 Although deputy commander and chief of staff are at the same military rank, in recent years more chiefs of staff have been pro­moted to lead MRs and Corps-level units than deputy commanders.

Yang was born in 1950, and became commander of the 4th Fighter Divi­sion in his late 30s and commander of the Shanghai base in 1998. He stayed in the post of chief of staff of the Lanzhou AF Region for 6 years from 2000, a bit too long for a designated candidate for a future PLAAF leader and, as a result, his future is relatively limited. But after he was appointed to deputy chief of staff of the Air Force in 2006, he held that post for hardly a year before being promoted to chief of staff. Obviously his deputy period was transitional, wait­ing for the incumbent chief of staff (Zhao Zhongxin) to vacate the position.

Few things differentiate the lethality of an air force more than the level of technology in its most advanced aircraft. Historically, advantages in avia­tion technology have often translated into significant advantages in combat environments, especially for fighter aircraft. In the current environment, the world’s most advanced air forces have access to fifth-generation fighter air­craft technology.2 Fifth-generation fighters are characterized by the incorpo­ration of advanced technologies such as stealth, integrated avionics systems, thrust vectoring, and helmet-mounted sights.3 The technological demands of designing and producing advanced fighters present considerable challenges for developing countries. They may want an air force that is on par qualitatively with the world’s most advanced, but usually lack an aviation industry capable of producing cutting-edge fighter aircraft technology. A developing country may be able to produce some highly sophisticated components, but lack the knowledge or industrial capacity to design and build all necessary components or to integrate them into a finished product. Industrial capacity refers to the ability to fabricate each component part that goes into the final product and assemble it using indigenous labor. Knowledge encompasses the know-how to design and manufacture component parts, together with requisite competence in areas such as systems engineering, which is critical to integrating various complex systems into a working unit.4

Developing countries incapable of producing cutting-edge fighters on their own must seek to acquire complete aircraft or technologies from coun­tries willing to sell them advanced aircraft or to export or codevelop the rele­vant technologies. However a number of factors might dissuade countries with an advanced aviation technology base from exporting aircraft or advanced avi­ation technologies to a particular developing country. The exporter country might view such transfers as potentially harmful to its security interests if it is unsure about the developing country’s long-term intentions. It might seek to avoid entering into a technology transfer relationship out of deference to its relationship with allies or other customers. Allies might use leverage to dis­suade potential exporters from making arms sales or technology transfers to developing countries about which they have security concerns. Nevertheless, access to foreign advanced fighters and aviation technology is critical for devel­oping countries seeking to build a modern air force.

In 2009, the Taiwan Ministry of National Defense reported that:15

The PLA has currently deployed more than 1,300 short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles in areas opposite Taiwan. . . various kinds of improved missiles continue to be mass-produced and gradually assigned to the PLA. In the future, the PLA will continue to research and manufacture high precision and interception-resistant ballistic missiles, and deploy super­sonic cruise missiles, which will enable rapid multi-wave missile assaults against Taiwan, and it can conduct precision strikes against Taiwan’s critical political and military infrastructures, airports, sea ports, and military bases.

In May 2010, the Pentagon noted that the “PRC’s Second Artillery maintains at least five operational SRBM brigades; an additional two bri­gades are subordinate to PLA ground forces—one garrisoned in the Nanjing

MR [Military Region] and the other in the Guangzhou MR. All SRBM units are deployed to locations near Taiwan"16 Table 13-5 lists the PLAs ballistic missiles.

Land attack cruise missile (LACM) systems are proliferating in the global defense community, and the PLA had been quick to pick up on their signifi­cance. As with its earlier aircraft and missile programs, it has moved to acquire foreign cruise missile technology from abroad, going to Russia and the Ukraine, but seeking to exploit relevant technologies from other countries as well. Report­edly, between 1999 and 2001, Ukraine delivered Kh-55 (NATO AS-15) cruise missiles to the PRC, which also reportedly received detailed design information of another variant of the Kh-55 from Russia.17 According to one analyst:18

Current development projects reportedly include Chang Feng (CF), Hong Niao (HN), and Dong Hai (DH), with possible range between 400~1,800km.

It is likely that even if the U. S. tried to deny GPS [global positioning system] signals to China, the PLAs cruise missiles could still function via the Rus­sian GLONASS, or in the future the European GALILEO navigation signals.

China is also developing its own “Compass Satellite Navigation System"

which would eventually comprise 5 geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) satellites and 30 medium Earth orbit satellites to provide a global cover.

The Second Artillery, which established a conventional missile force in the 1990s, complementing its strategic nuclear force established earlier, is cred­ited with possessing up to 300 DH-10 LACMs.19 The PLAN possesses numer­ous YJ-62 (C-602) and YJ-82/YJ-83 (C-802/803) antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs), giving it a robust capability to interdict and offset Taiwan’s naval forces, and perhaps those of other parties, such as the United States, that might intervene on its behalf.20

Regarding the Second Artillery’s long-range cruise missile (LRCM) capabilities, Martin Andrew has noted that:

The Chang Jian (Long Sword) CJ-10 (DH-10) long-range cruise missile system reportedly started trials with the Second Artillery Force in 2004 and between 50 and 250 missiles had been deployed along with between 20 and 30 launch vehicles as of September 2009. The Chinese media ini­tially revealed their existence during the 60th Anniversary Parade. The CJ-10 is identified by three long launch canisters, square in circumfer­ence, mounted on the rear of the Chinese WS 2400 8 x 8 tractor-eleva­tor-launcher (TEL), and the missile has a reported range of over 1,500km and up to 2,000 km.21

The PLAAF deputy chief of staff and assistant chief of staff positions are at Corps rank (young assistant chiefs of staff are usually at the deputy Corps level) and normally serve as an important stepping-stone to more senior posts.

The importance of these roles is to bring promising commanders of tactical units (divisional and forward bases) to the headquarters to familiarize them with higher command and strategic management. If the top PLAAF leadership is composed of generals of different age clusters separated by about 5 years, deputy chiefs of staff are reserved for candidates for deputy MR positions either in air force headquarters in Fuxingmen (Я^ПЙ¥Лй) or in the seven air force regions. Since the mid-1990s, almost all PLAAF deputy chiefs of staff have advanced further, to the deputy MR rank or higher.

The following is the list of past deputy PLAAF chiefs of staff since that time:

■ Xu Qiliang (1£Йй, 1993-1994, AF commander)

■ Wang Liangwang (ЇЙЕ, 1994-1996, deputy AF commander)

■ He Weirong (ЙЙ®, 1996-2002, deputy AF commander)

■ Jia Yongsheng (™ж£, 1996-2003, regional commander)

■ Ma Xiaotian (ЦШ^, 1997-1998, deputy PLA chief of general staff)

■ Liu Zuoxin (МТІЛ, 1998 regional commander)

■ Jiang Jianzeng 2000-2004, regional commander)

■ Zhou Liaqian (M№®, 2000-2004, regional commander)

■ Zhao Zhongxin (M^f^, 2004-2005, deputy AF commander)

■ Yang Guohai (ЫШ’М, 2005-2006, PLAAF chief of staff).

The present deputy chiefs of staff have an average age of 53 and are des­tined to take over more senior commanding positions, as the entire pool of incumbent deputy PLAAF commanders and regional commanders (whose average age is about 62) will be replaced in accordance with the “63 and out” regulation.

Currently, there are four deputy chiefs of staff in the PLAAF headquarters:

Major General Zhang Jianping (ЖШ¥) was born in 1956 and enlisted in the PLAAF in 1974. He now assists the chief of staff, overseeing operations and training. For instance, he was the PLAAF representative in the Sino-Russo joint military exercise Peace Mission 2009 in the Zhaonan Joint Tactical Train­ing Base in the Jinan MR in July 2009. After the exercise, he made a widely cir­culated speech on how the PLAAF should learn the best air force theory and practices of the foreign counterparts, noting “Joint exercises and exchange of personnel with other militaries would be a very useful means for absorbing the good experiences of foreign air forces and this will have profound impact on PLAAF transformation.”18

Zhang had already served in various key commanding posts before com­ing to the PLAAF headquarters. He was regimental commander at the age of 27 and commander of the 3d Fighter Division a few years later (the elite of all elite divisions in the PLAAF). Being the first “fist unit” equipped with the Su-27 in the mid-1990s, he led the first team from the division to Russia to receive the Su-27 and become the first of the Su-27 pilot cadre in the PLAAF. He was promoted to be commander of the 9th Corps and deputy commander of the Beijing MRAF. There is no doubt he was marked early as a candidate for the service’s senior leader. As first deputy chief of staff, he is poised to replace Yang Guohai.19

Major General Yi Xiaoguang (Z, K^) was born in 1958 into a military family and was one of 296 PLA deputies to the 17th Party National Congress.20 In charge of training and headquarters affairs, he is the most promising and the youngest officer at the full corps rank in Fuxingmen, and the second young­est in the entire PLAAF. His rise was swift and impressive: joining the PLAAF in 1974 at the age of 16, he studied at the Baoding Aviation School (ЇІЙ) for a year, and became a commander at the battalion level 3 years later at the age of 20. He studied in the PLAAF Command Academy in 1984, laying the foun­dation for his own subsequent “helicopter rise.” He reached the post of deputy division commander in 1989 at the age of 31 and division command in 1992, director of the Department of Training in the PLAAF Headquarters in 1996 (the youngest grade-two Department head at the time), and deputy chief of staff of Guangzhou AF region in 2002.

Before being appointed to his current post, Yi was president of the famous Air Force Command Academy (AFCA) in Haidian, Beijing. In PLA tradition, it is relatively easy to find a capable corps commander, but very dif­ficult to locate a capable president for a top military university.21 When he was divisional commander in 1992, Yi composed The Chinese/English Manual for Jet Pilots, something quite unique for a combat pilot with no formal higher education and an achievement helpful for his appointment to the presidency of the AFCA.22 Clearly, Yi was brought back to the PLAAF headquarters to man­age the routine work at the apex of power before taking on more senior posi­tions elsewhere in the future.

Major General Wang Yisheng (iN.±) was an interesting appoint­ment in 2009, for he was clearly a “rescued cadre.” He was commander of the AF Weapons Experimental Base in Jiuquan (Shuanchengzi Base,

Site), Gansu Province, having spent fully 38 years in the base since joining the PLAAF in 1968.23 He transformed it into the PLA’s most sophisticated and largest electronic warfare center. Wang was transferred to Beijing following Hu Jintaos instruction that the CMC should take good care of the cadres who have served in remote and poor provinces for a lengthy period of time, such as

Tibet, Xinjiang, Gansu, and Qinghai, where living conditions are harsh. Wang is now assisting the chief of staff in managing technological affairs and weap­ons research and development programs.

Major General Dan Zhiping (jl®^), born in 1957, assists the chief of staff in matters of training and foreign affairs in the headquarters. He was assis­tant chief of staff between 1994 and 1999 in his late 30s (a remarkably young age for the post). He assumed the current position after transfer from deputy chief of staff of the Chengdu AF region in 2008. Before that, he also served as deputy chief of staff of the Lanzhou AF region. In 2007 he was sent to study at “the Generals’ course” (ЩЩЩ) in the PLA NDU where he was cited as an excellent student. His graduation thesis on training in a combat situation using simulation facilities furnishing “Red” versus “Blue” force scenarios and prac­tice won high praise. He was subsequently chosen to supervise further study resulting in an influential colloquium in which the main ideas expressed by participants were subsequently published in the PLA Daily.24 Clearly he is a ris­ing star in the PLAAF.

Countries whose overall level of economic development and relatively backward aviation industry limit their aircraft production capability have the three basic options of purchase (buy), indigenous development (build), or espionage (steal) in their efforts to develop a modern air force. For countries in this situation, all three options have significant limitations.

Buy

Buying imported aircraft allows a developing country to obtain more advanced fighters than its indigenous aviation industry can produce. Buying complete aircraft offers a developing country a relatively fast way to build its air force’s combat capability (although in practice it may take 4 to 5 years from the time a deal is signed until a unit equipped with a new fighter reaches ini­tial operational capability). Often a deal to purchase advanced fighters includes flight training, assistance with maintenance, and the acquisition of spare parts necessary to maintain operational readiness. This can not only speed the intro­duction of the aircraft into service, but also improve the acquiring air force’s human capital and overall capabilities. Because purchasers usually have the opportunity to “fly before they buy,” there is a clearer sense of what the capa­bilities of the aircraft will be and less risk of technological failure or inadequate performance.

The disadvantages of building a modern air force using imported air­craft include the relatively high cost, limited transfer of technology to the avia­tion sector, and continuing dependence on foreign suppliers. Buyers are also limited to the aircraft that supplying companies are willing to sell; advanced countries often restrict the type of aircraft or the sophistication of avionics and weapons systems that can be exported due to strategic concerns or to maintain a technological advantage for their own air force. A common approach is to export last generation systems or watered-down versions of the most advanced fighters. This enables the United States, Russia, and European powers to main­tain a long-term competitive advantage in military aviation technology and a measure of airpower dominance over their customers.

Purchases of complete aircraft do not produce jobs or technological spin-offs for the acquiring countries (though this may be partly overcome by the use of offsets in the contract that require the seller to accept payment in the form of goods produced by the buyer). Finally, the acquiring country will usu­ally have a limited capacity to produce spare parts for an imported aircraft or to modernize its systems, resulting in long-term dependence on the seller in order to keep the aircraft flying or to update an older aircraft’s systems. This can be problematic if the seller’s economy goes through a major transition (note, for example, India’s difficulty in acquiring spare parts for its Soviet air­craft following the breakup of the Soviet Union) or if changes in political rela­tions make the supplier unwilling to continue to provide spare parts and main­tenance (compare Iran’s U. S.-built McDonnell-Douglas F-4, Northrop F-5, and Grumman F-14 aircraft following the Iranian revolution in 1979). Varia­tions on the “buy” option such as coproduction are discussed later in this study.

Build

The pure “build” option requires planning, designing, and producing the desired fighter system utilizing only indigenous knowledge and production facilities. A developing country may invest significant resources in research and development (R&D) to build its domestic aviation technology production base. However, this requires a significant investment of both capital and human knowl­edge and presents large opportunity costs on both fronts. If a developing country seeks to push its aviation sector well beyond the technological development of its broader economy, this entails costly efforts with limited broader payoffs as scarce engineering talent and resources are focused on narrow military applications. If a developing country tries to push the overall technological capacity of the broader economy, this entails a much longer time period before improvements spill over and raise the technological level of the aviation industry.

The chief advantages of indigenous development are that a developing country can master the technologies required to design and build a fighter, limit its reliance on imported parts and technologies (and thus its potential vulnerability to a cutoff that might limit combat readiness), and diffuse some benefits of aircraft R&D and production into the broader economy (in the form of jobs and technology spin-offs). Over time, indigenous production can lay the foundation for a domestic aviation industry capable of designing, pro­ducing, and potentially exporting complete fighter aircraft.

The disadvantages are that a developing country’s aviation industry may only be able to produce low-quality aircraft with limited combat capability, that large technological hurdles and a high learning curve must be overcome to establish an advanced aviation industry, and that the long period required to learn to develop and produce a modern fighter may yield aircraft that are obsolete before they are fielded. There is also no guarantee that investments in aviation R&D and production capacity will pay off. Few defense projects his­torically have been more costly, slower, or more prone to unforeseen difficul­ties than those undertaken to produce new fighter aircraft.5 It is possible for a developing country pursuing the economic and technological spinoffs from indigenous design and production to spend much more than it would have cost to buy an advanced fighter from a foreign supplier, only to wind up with an inferior aircraft. Japan’s F-2 fighter provides a good illustration.

Steal

A developing country can use surreptitious means to steal design and technology information on aircraft and aircraft components that it lacks the knowledge to design and produce domestically. This can be accomplished using covert procurement (often through third countries), traditional espio­nage methods, or computer network intrusion methods to exfiltrate the desired information. Individuals with access to information on classified weapons sys­tems are prime targets of foreign intelligence organizations. Cyber espionage attacks against U. S. targets including military/government organizations and defense contractors have reportedly been successful in obtaining sensitive, though not classified, data.6 The “steal” option can be used to gain blueprints or examples of weapons to use in reverse engineering a subsystem or to develop countermeasures that make a threat aircraft less effective in combat.

The principal advantage of the “steal” option is the potential to acquire advanced systems or technologies that other countries are unwilling to sell. In some cases, espionage can allow a country to acquire advanced technol­ogy without spending funds on its own research and development. The dis­advantages include a developing country’s limited ability to absorb or repli­cate stolen systems and technologies without technological support from the manufacturer, the haphazard and potentially incomplete access to systems and technologies through clandestine or surreptitious means, and the potential for espionage to send a country’s aviation industry down a blind alley. In discussing the degree to which China has employed the “steal” option, we should differ­entiate its comprehensive efforts to collect and assimilate open source defense information (for example, through the China Defense Science and Technology Information Center) from its efforts to obtain restricted technologies covertly, by way of either traditional or cyber espionage. Exploiting the volumes of tech­nical open source information produced in developed countries is an effective, legitimate, and predictable way to acquire knowledge.7

Of these three main avenues to technology procurement, the “build” option is the only one with the potential to stimulate innovation and create a broad-based domestic aviation industry from a low initial starting point. The United States and Russia produce the world’s most complex fighter aircraft and, although they gained the ability in the midst of different economic and politi­cal circumstances, both were only able to reach this status through the ability to develop new technologies. Simply buying fighter aircraft from another coun­try, with no plans to reverse engineer or coproduce, does not help a develop­ing country move toward self-reliance. The steal option can have benefits if a developing country is able to obtain the information it needs without having to expend the necessary resources on R&D. However, simply possessing a blue­print does not guarantee success in reproducing the design, especially for a developing country with a limited aerospace production capacity.