Category The Chinese Air Force

The highlights of PLAAF modernization are:

■ Aircraft have improved in terms of overall performance, particu­larly in regard to longer-range fighter-bombers, but the total force has shrunk in size.

■ Munitions for air-to-air and air-to-surface operations are greatly improved as less capable air-to-air weapons and ground attack weap­ons such as dumb bombs and cluster bombs are supplanted by mod­ern guided weapons.

■ Electronic attack capabilities have improved.

■ Training and tactics have improved.

■ Supporting systems such as early warning, C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence), and battle manage­ment systems have been improved.

Specific examples of PLAAF improvement include:

■ fourth-generation fighters (the Su-27, J—10, Su-30, and J—11, called third generation in PLAAF doctrine ) that are equipped with modern avionics for targeting and electronic countermeasures and that enable employing precision air-to air and air-to ground munitions17

■ longer-range upgraded variants of the B-6 medium bomber employ­ing long-range cruise missiles

■ new air-to-surface weapons such as long-range land-attack cruise missiles for medium bombers and fighter-bombers, and shorter-range near-precision and precision weapons

■ Modern early warning, surveillance, and battle management systems to facilitate control of forces.

To fully understand the effects of PLAAF modernization, the role of the Second Artillery must also be assessed.18 The Second Artillery’s ability to threaten base operations has continued to grow substantially, meaning that the U. S. ability to reliably generate fighter sorties from close-in bases will be chal­lenged during the period of time that the Second Artillery’s force persists in substantial numbers. This would occur in cases where the conflict is of suffi­cient importance to China to substantially draw down the Second Artillery’s missile forces by firing the missiles and potentially engaging in attacks in sev­eral countries.19 The mere existence of these capabilities in Chinese hands cre­ates a number of challenges, alters the way that all informed parties view oper­ations in the region, and provides a means of challenging the U. S. style of air operations as conducted in the early phases of a serious conflict since the end of the Cold War.

Given these improvements, the potential impact of PLAAF moderniza­tion on the three games can be considered, along with possible actions these improvements cause the United States to take in response to those problems if it is playing that particular game. The ranges of actions are representative of possible U. S. actions within these games and are not exhaustive or reflective of official U. S. policy. The PLAAF’s impact on the Game of Influence is outlined briefly below. Table 14-1 highlights a few of the major impacts of the current PLAAF modernization and the significance within the game, plausible strate­gies the United States might adopt, and concrete steps the United States could take to implement the strategies. This is intended to be illustrative and to pro­vide an overview of the actions the United States could take and of the impli­cations of those actions.

For the purposes of this discussion, we will focus on the three aspects of the PLAAF modernization that have the most significant consequences for the United States: extended areas of operations and influence, an increase in per­ceived effectiveness of operations, and a statement of military competence by operating the PLAAF as a modern air force.

The PLAAF’s extension of its area of potentially effective operations is significant because of the resulting increase in the PLAAF’s relevance to situa­tions of importance to other nations in the region. PLAAF fighter-bombers can now extend their capabilities to not only Taiwan, but to significant regions in other countries. Fighter-bombers have also begun to extend their reach to sea areas that hold interest for countries including Japan and South Korea, as well as to countries in the South China Sea.20 Observers in Australia, where there are keen concerns over the Northern Territory and approaching sea areas, have noted Chinese air assets’ increased range of influence. Other nations, nota­bly Singapore, also view increased range of Chinese forces with concern. To address other nations’ concerns, the United States may be required to simulta­neously exert influence in more regional areas. When this requirement is com­bined with qualitative changes in the Chinese force, both a larger and more capable U. S. force will be necessary to maintain situational relevance. A force that would operate quite successfully in an array of combat situations is sim­ply not relevant if it is not present when and where the adversary is operating. The presence requirement drives a buy-in force posture for the United States to maintain presence in areas where it retains interests.

The increased effectiveness of the Chinese force also influences how mil­itary technical experts who assess operational implications of Chinese capabili­ties in a narrow military sense perceive the Chinese air force. The effective­ness of the PLAAF in one-versus-one and small “M-v-N” combat engagements forces the United States to allocate more of its own forces and potentially to operate them in a manner acknowledging its opponent’s capabilities.21 This might translate into different numbers of fighters allocated to certain situa­tions, a need to allocate the most capable fighters to the theater (even if bas­ing them forward might expose them to damage or destruction from the Sec­ond Artillery), or, in the longer run, improving key U. S. capabilities to operate under conditions where U. S. assumptions of large-scale conflicts are no longer obtainable.22

Aside from their direct operational impact, these combinations of capa­bilities are also important because they are viewed by outside observers as symbolic of China’s rise to the level of a great military power. Possible U. S. approaches to address these capabilities focus on strategies to maintain the desired equilibrium in theater by stepping up the presence of U. S. forces. This increased presence is intended to be visible to allies and to clearly demon­strate relevant defensive capabilities to both the general populations and to the national decisionmakers. These U. S. capabilities are generally associated with protecting key partners from attack, as the PLAAF represents a force of signifi­cant utility in a variety of coercion campaigns against neighboring states. The U. S. counters to these Chinese capabilities need to be relevant to the observers to have a significant impact. For instance, threats of escalation must not only be viewed by the Chinese as credible and potentially successful, but they also need to be seen as credible and sufficient for protection by the nations seek­ing protection. Defensive postures are probably easier to demonstrate and to have accepted by other nations, provided they are compatible with potential sensitivities about U. S. military presence in the region. In practice, this is a difficult line to walk, and building a useful narrative about when, where, and how U. S. forces would be used requires a careful alignment of strategies, capa­bilities, and operational concepts that can prove difficult and time-consuming to enact. Table 14-2 offers a perspective of impacts and likely fall-outs from the Battle over a Third Party game.23 Because this game is a military problem where the array of forces and strategies is associated with protection of a key party, standard military metrics are relevant.

The key PLAAF improvements focus on three elements: significant air- to-air capability improvements that make air superiority operations signif­icantly more difficult (especially in cases where force ratios might be unfa­vorable because of airfield suppression by the PLAAF); increased overall effectiveness resulting in a decrease in the U. S. ability to operate in contested airspace which makes deep attacks and intelligence, surveillance, and recon­naissance (ISR) operations more difficult and costly; and greater PLAAF offen­sive impact that is largely directed at the third party military which prevents it from effectively waging a defense. Although the area where the PLAAF can operate extends the battlespace, the focus of the Battle over a Third Party oper­ation is still most likely to be within areas where other Chinese forces can play a substantial role. The cases where the PLAAF is the only military arm play­ing are degenerate cases where the Chinese would be forgoing much of their advantage.24

Improving PLAAF capabilities manifest themselves as an erosion of U. S. capabilities to prevent PLAAF operations from inflicting damage both on the third party military and on U. S. forces. The detrimental impact of PLAAF operations on the third party air forces and air defense assets also increases the demands on U. S. forces. The PLAAF’s ability to challenge opponents in the air-to-air arena and the addition of better munitions and improved tactics for air-to-surface operations mean that the force is much more capable in opera­tions where relatively simple tactics and operational concepts can be employed to facilitate actions by other forces. The PLAAF thus becomes an enabler for other operations, rather than strictly a supporting force. The PLAAF defen­sive improvements mean that its opponents’ offensively focused air operations reliant on relatively free access to airspace over some or all of the key battle areas become problematic. The great difficulty of maintaining loitering ISR in a modern air defense environment, as well as the difficulty in engaging mobile forces such as mobile rocket and missile forces that are themselves enablers of air operations, creates a problem for U. S. planners.

The potential paths that the United States might take to counter these improvements are quite distinct, and the underlying logic is predicated on very different strategies. For instance, the United States might shift attention from a comprehensive protection strategy to operations that seek to defeat a cer­tain class of attack such as a land or sea invasion, deeming acceptable a some­what higher degree of damage from early air attacks. The United States might likewise emphasize operations against fixed targets supporting a set of com­bat operations. It might also consider strategies that punish the adversary for attack by engaging in either vertical or horizontal escalation, employing force in a manner to its relative advantage.25

Each of these notional approaches requires a different emphasis on force types. Some approaches may focus on destroying certain classes of targets (such as land forces), while others may focus on fixed targets supporting com­bat operations.26 Improving this capability with strictly shorter-range forces requires an extremely robust (i. e., hard and redundant) basing posture with forces close to the defended areas to minimize logistical vulnerabilities. Absent that type of posture, forces capable of longer-range combat operations (air-to – air and air-to-surface) are required since they might minimize the threat from Second Artillery units and still retain some combat capability in both domains during the period of greatest Second Artillery threat.27

The Great Power Game is particularly interesting because of the compe­tition’s comprehensive nature and the scope of the competition that locks the participants into a fundamentally antagonistic relationship across all aspects of the competition. When viewed from this game perspective, PLAAF changes in the quality/quantity mix of forces, area of influence, and rate of develop­ment become the central issues of its modernization. The Great Power Game is also the least desirable of the games because, as table 14-3 reveals, it tends to lock parties into adversarial relationships and is more prone to drive arms race dynamics because of the pervasive nature of the competition and the strong and broad military character of many interactions.28

The quantity/quality improvement of the PLAAF (along with improve­ments in munitions) means that it has evolved into a modern force that is capable of challenging in many dimensions the ability of the United States to conduct the sort of dominating combat operations it desires. The challenge to the balance may not be per se about engaging in combat in a specific area, but about the perceptions of dominance and perceived changes in capabili­ties across the broad spectrum. For instance, the assessment of the changes in the few vs. few and one-on-one combat outcomes become significant because these outcomes, whether favorable or unfavorable, are widely viewed as sur­rogates for engagements between the powers at a variety of levels. But sim­ple superiority may not be adequate given either the plausible employment scenarios or the narrative used to describe the situation. In order to address this, the United States might alter the deployment of its forces, alter the qual – ity/quantity mix of its forces, or even redefine the game as to render moot the specific discussion of force performance. This could be accomplished by con­centrating on Chinese homeland targets or forces outside of China without emphasizing the U. S. forces that are being matched. Such an approach might mean that the United States would accept a decrease in tactical air dominance by utilizing different strike options, focusing on secure strike against targets at all depths, building more robust basing, and allocating more forces. This approach also might build new combat systems to reestablish superiority in the air-to-air arena and build the basing infrastructure for those cases. The United States also might go in a completely new direction by trying to redefine the game it is playing.

Another challenge to the United States is the number of potential states that feel they may be forced to deal with the PLA threat as the effective range of PLAAF operations increases. To allay these concerns, the United States might need to aid in the defense of a wider geographic area. The purpose for the United States is not only to defend that area in wartime; it is to provide reassurance in peacetime to prevent erosion of confidence in U. S. abilities. Defense of the rel­evant areas needs to be plausible to the interested parties and must cope with the problem of third parties wanting to be supported by the United States while simultaneously not wanting to be antagonistic to China. Increasing U. S. pres­ence in several ways would be a reasonable top-level description of U. S. actions here. This increased presence might be manifested in a host of operations that demonstrate the U. S. ability and willingness to commit forces to the area. To more demanding allies, the ability of the United States to commit forces in the face of the substantial Chinese challenge as well as the U. S. ability to defend the assets that the supported country deems important might be required. The specifics would need to be tailored based on the nature of the perceived chal­lenge, but could include long-range operations, maritime operations, and dem­onstrated robustness of the regional force posture in the face of attack.

The rate of change and acceleration of the change in relative capabilities define another aspect of the Great Power Game. These measures are an assess­ment of the projected capabilities of the two forces some number of years down the road. In a Great Power Game, this assessment defines the research and development (R&D), force development, and force planning futures of each side. In turn, potential allies look at the projected paths of the major powers in order to make their own investments and strategic decisions well in advance of the possible outcomes. These projections are arguably the most interesting and contentious aspect of the game, since it is about what might be and is not bound to current reality.

High rates of change and significant accelerations of that rate of change that are adverse to the United States are potentially alarming for allies, who will seek to make their way through a future based on extrapolations from near­term actions. Australia, which frames its own strategic arguments about future plans in terms of how situations might change in response to U. S. actions, is an example of a nation that is forward looking in its defense policy.29 An absence of a U. S. response to alter the changes in apparent airpower capabilities might necessitate changes in Australia’s own defense policies years before the imme­diate balance has been affected. The United States cares about these actions by allies because the overall assessment of the balance in this game is heav­ily influenced by allies whose association with the United States has not been effectively locked in by factors such as shared existential threats, and/or stand­ing alliance arrangements like the relationships typified by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) arrangements for mutual defense.30

For the United States, the implications of this sensitivity to projections are quite striking because it has significant incentives to take actions across several levels to address the revealed changes. One possible U. S. action is an essentially symmetric response of improving U. S. capabilities such that the apparent improvements in basic combat effectiveness of the opposing forces are largely reversed. However, this might initiate an ongoing arms competi­tion that can degenerate into a type of arms race if left unconstrained by other forces. Another action might be to pursue and then exercise military opera­tions with allies to demonstrate commitments in the wake of PLAAF improve­ments. Exercising forces that might be effective in combat operations tends to undercut perceived gains of the opposite side and also improves the prospect of basing and cooperation of allies in situations where the United States might need support for defense of other nations. Finally, the United States might seek to negate any Chinese gain by pursuing stronger formal arrangements to bind allies together. This binding would buffer to a certain extent the need to respond to deficiencies created by increased PLAAF capabilities by giving the United States more basing options, adding the contributions of partner mili­tary and logistical capabilities to those of the United States, and making it less likely allies will question U. S. commitments to a region.

There is no doubt that the career path of Generals Xu and Ma presents a very useful case for the study of PLAAF leadership. Their past experience exposes broadly how the PLA top command selects top brass, trains them with various difficult tasks, and finally realizes their potential to be the highest-level leaders. More significantly, the study of Xu and Ma is integral to that of the 18th CMC. Therefore, in studying them, research of the emerging PLAAF leader­ship is linked to that of the future PLA leadership as a whole.

In the make-up of the current CMC, the age structure of its members may lead to retirement of all but Xu and Chang Wanquan (^Л^), director of the General Armament Department (GAD), in the Party’s 18th National Con­gress in 2012.2 Being the youngest CMC member and with the highest senior­ity (Xu became divisional, corps, and service commander much earlier than Chang), it is likely Xu would be promoted further. Yet there are only two posi­tions for him at this level of power: either deputy CMC chair, or minister of defense.3 In this case he would vacate his current position of PLAAF com­mander. Ma would likely be the first in line to succeed Xu, following Xu’s own path from the PLAAF Headquarters to the General Staff Department (GSD), and thence to the CMC as the PLAAF representative.

If this occurs, it would constitute a groundbreaking development within the elite politics of the PLA and its service relationships. First, since the ouster of Wu Faxian (^;i^) in 1971, the PLAAF has not had another person in the second rank of CMC. Secondly, for the first time since the founding of the air force, it would now have two officers, Xu and Ma, at the apex of power. This is conducive to the PLAs efforts to erode the “army-first” mentality (Лй¥±Ю affecting its overall strategic orientation.4 Given Mas background—previously he was the deputy commander of Lanzhou and Guangzhou Military Regions; pres­ident of the National Defense University; currently, most senior deputy chief of staff; and most importantly, a member of the Party’s Central Committee (CC) since 2002—his further promotion is a perfect fit to PLA personnel advancement patterns.5 Failure to promote Xu and Ma would be regarded as unfair and dis­criminatory according to PLA norms and standards (¥ФШ1). If this is indeed the case, both of them would take a veritable great leap forward in their politi­cal and military careers. As CMC deputy chair, Xu would acquire the Party rank of Standing Committee member in the Politburo; if he is made defense minister he would hold the rank of State Council counselor. Ma would hold the rank of a Politburo member as a CMC member. And as such they would both enjoy the prestige of Party and state leaders.

Certainly there are high odds against such a dual PLAAF membership in the CMC. Today, service representation in the CMC is basically functional. This is especially true of specialized, highly technical services, such as the air force, the navy, and the strategic missile force (z®). The initial concept in 2004 of absorbing service commanders into the CMC was to turn it into the top body for commanding joint warfare, increasingly seen as the primary type of warfare for the PLA in the decades to come.6 It drew upon the example of the U. S. joint chiefs of staff system in integrating service functions as part the PLA’s preparation for war, the central theme of China’s defense policy since 1999.7

As the PLAAF contemplates its future, it faces a number of intriguing questions. Would the potential dual air force representation upset the func­tional balance among the different services? Would this dual representation be viewed as fair by other services? The perception of fairness in the PLA is an important concept in maintaining factional and service equilibrium, some­thing that may impact force stability. The navy, for instance, would be jeal­ous; its current CMC representative, Admiral Wu Shengli (^Й^) will be over 65 years of age in 2012 and will likely retire.8 Admiral Sun Jianguo is 3 years younger than Ma Xiaotoan and would be the primary choice to replace Wu, but the naval headquarters does not have a figure comparable to Ma.9 The situ­ation with the leadership of the strategic missile force (Second Artillery Corps) is similar.

Ma’s future is tangled up with Xu’s in that if Xu is not promoted, there is no vacancy for Ma in the CMC, unless Ma would be made chief of the general staff or a director of either GAD or the General Logistics Department (GLD), both rela­tively unlikely. If Ma does not advance, it is a loss not only for the air force, but the PLA as a whole. In the GSD he has been praised as the most competent deputy chief of staff, evidenced by his being given a wider range of duties than his GSD colleagues, including war preparation and training; strategic planning; foreign affairs (a euphemism for intelligence); the air force; and the PLA professional mili­tary education (PME) institutions. In particular, Ma has impressed his colleagues and others (including the present author) with his ability to grasp and analyze even casually presented information in briefings and during various conferences.10

It is possible that the CMC would regard the issue of two PLAAF CMC members not strictly from the viewpoint of service representation. This is to say that one of the two would be functional, representing the air force, but the other would be regarded simply as a competent top leader who can make great con­tribution to PLA transformation, regardless of whether he is a seaman, airman, or foot soldier. Both are well qualified for either position. Mas experience at the National Defense University (NDU) and as the executive deputy chief of GSD in the lead-up to General Ge Zhenfeng’s (ВД1#) retirement testified that the CMC had great expectations of him. The NDU experience was meant to broaden his strategic vision and theoretical depth in the “ivory tower” of ideas. It also famil­iarized Ma with key candidates (then at corps rank) for future top PLA leader­ship positions. His position as executive deputy chief of the GSD furnished a rare opportunity to grasp the overall military situation, from the nuclear button, foreign military exchanges and joint exercises, weapons research and develop­ment, operations and training, and the PLAs domestic missions to budgetary allocations among services and interservice coordination.

Airpower strategy and the aviation industry have advanced together. Observations on the evolution of the PLAAF’s strategic objectives and the reform of the aviation industry since the 1980s suggest that China has man­aged to keep them up to speed. After Den Xiaoping put forward the guideline of “building an armed forces with quantity and quality” in 1985, the PLAAF started to study its strategic role. After the Gulf War in 1991, the PLA real­ized that a modernized air force is the key to victory in battle, and thus estab­lished CAIC. In 1999, China restructured AVIC I and AVIC II. In November of the same year, the PLAAF’s commander outlined on the 50th anniversary of the PLA the idea of shifting the air force from “territorial air defense” to “both offense and defense.”17 In 2004 and 2007, the PLAAF Party Congress passed resolutions on building a “strategic air force” and “an air force that matches the status of a great power.”18 In 2008, China once again restructured AVIC. It is believed that these developments are not coincidental. Instead, they are calcu­lated measures adopted after comprehensive considerations on the two major objectives of strengthening airpower and developing the aviation industry.

The aviation industry has been selected as a key development project. The Outline of the National Program for the Medium – and Long-Term Development of Defense-Related Science, Technology and Industry (2006-2020), released by COSTIND in 2006, stipulates clearly that by 2020, defense-related science and technology must be able to meet basically the needs of the independent R&D, as well as the manufacture and information-based development of mod­ern weapons and equipment.19 According to the Outline, China will step up research on basic aviation science, and develop advanced aviation technology. Moreover, the development of the aviation industry should be unaffected by the government’s macroeconomic control measures. On the whole, the PLA’s effort to develop new-type fighter-bombers, AEW&C aircraft, air-launched missiles, aircraft engines, and large passenger aircraft, to which the govern­ment has committed significant resources, are all concrete manifestations of the Outline.

However, the biggest problem of China’s aviation industry is that its ability of independent innovation and invention needs to be enhanced, since Chinese-made fighter aircraft, guided missiles, engines, and other systems are more or less the results of suspected piracy and some are even exact reproduc­tions of foreign inventions. If China is unable to acquire advanced products from foreign countries, the development of its aviation industry will be limited. Furthermore, internal R&D expenditure by China’s aircraft manufacturing industry in 2007 amounted to merely RMB 3,722.68 million,20 far behind that of its European and American counterparts. Inadequate investment in R&D is another factor constraining the development of China’s aviation industry.

Foreign assistance is needed if China is to develop advanced technology. Though it has built up some measure of strength, China’s aviation industry still lags behind advanced countries to a great extent. According to the Stock­holm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the U. S. Department of State, China belongs to the “third-tier” states in terms of military-industrial strength. The strength of the military industry in Russia, which ranks no. 1 in the second-tier states, is about one-sixth of the military-industrial strength of the United States.21 For a long time, China has used procurement to boost its own technological capabilities. Nonetheless, in the face of U. S. high-tech export controls, the European Union arms embargo, and Russia’s growing wariness of Chinese piracy, China’s attempt to acquire high-end technologies from foreign countries has run into a severe challenge.

Recent measures adopted by China’s aviation industry are worthy of attention. In December 2009, AVIC XAC acquired a 90 percent stake in Aus­tria’s Future Advanced Composite Component (FACC).22 FACC is a company specializing in the development and production of aviation composite mate – rials.23 The acquisition was the first of its kind that China had made in a for­eign aviation industry. AVIC will use FACC as an R&D and test center for avi­ation composite materials. Relevant technologies will be transferred to China for production, assisting considerably the R&D and manufacture of advanced composite materials in China. AVIC and ACAE have devoted about 4,000 peo­ple to research and develop the C919 and its engine. To drive forward follow-up works in each stage, both companies have launched a global talent recruitment program. The management personnel AVIC hired initially in August 2009 have been appointed senior managers at five subsidiaries. AVIC’s goal is to recruit 3,000 people of various talents in 5 to 8 years. This indicates that lack of tal­ent has constrained China’s ability to make breakthroughs in key technologies. Therefore, China wishes to acquire foreign technology through the recruit­ment of international specialists.24

Blazing a path of development with military and civilian integration. PRC research suggests that the United States has created a matchless military by harnessing the infinite power of the civilian sector and that the separated civil – military research systems in China are one of the factors causing China to trail behind. Hu Jintao stressed at the 17th Party Congress that China would “estab­lish sound systems of weapons and equipment research and manufacture that integrate military with civilian purposes and combine military efforts with civilian support, and blaze a path of development with Chinese characteristics featuring military and civilian integration.”25 Take the development of China’s aviation industry, for instance. The strategy adopted to develop large civil pas­senger aircraft and large military transport aircraft is based on the principle of “1 project, 2 models, civil-military coordination, and series development.” Technologies acquired from international cooperation—such as structural designs for airframes, composite materials, aircraft engines, and automatic control systems—can be used in the R&D and manufacture of military aircraft in China, making it difficult for foreign countries to implement effective con­trols. In Western countries, most AEW&C, electronic warfare, and command and control aircraft use civil passenger aircraft as the basic platform to build upon. The C919 also has the same potential. China will be able to produce a synergistic effect for the development of its military power if it can promote the “civil-military integration” strategy effectively.

Export and domestic demand: the prospects for China’s aviation industry. There is no doubt that the primary mission of China’s aviation industry is to support the development of the PLA. With regard to the export market, China has found a niche in the arms markets of some Asian and African coun­tries through the sales of the J-7, Q-5 and K-8. If the production agreement between China and Pakistan on 150 JF-17s is taken into account, China will become the world’s third-largest exporter of military aircraft, behind only the United States and Russia.26 Two Pakistan JF—17 aircraft were displayed for the first time at the 2010 Farnborough International Air Show in London. During the air show, China and Pakistan discussed matters relating to possibly export­ing JF—17 fighters to eight countries: Congo, Egypt, Nigeria, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, and Venezuela. In addition, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, and others have expressed high levels of interest in the Chinese-made

J—10. If China can avoid Russian control over engine production, the global export of Chinese-made military aircraft would seem to have a bright future.

Airbus predicted in 2006 that China would need to add more than 2,800 passenger aircraft and freighters in the next 20 years. Moreover, an AVIC market forecast for the period up to 2028, released at the Beijing Air Show in 2009, pre­dicts that China will need 2,922 large and 874 short-to-medium-range aircraft.27 From these data, it seems that China’s domestic market will be able to shore up the sales of the C919 and its follow-up models. However, to form a complete civil aviation industry, China will have to face up to the competition from Boeing and Airbus, and the key is whether China can obtain Federal Aviation Administra­tion and European Aviation Safety Agency airworthiness certifications. If China fails to get the certifications, then large civil aircraft made by China could only fly in the sky in China and in a few other countries.

Conclusion

Since its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic of China has weathered many troubles at home and from abroad. Driven by the goal of a modern mili­tary, China has listed the development of its aviation industry as a key project from the beginning. After 60 years of development and reform, the aviation industry in China, though growing slowly with limited transformation, has achieved some results. For a long time, China has sought to enhance the stan­dards of its aviation industry by copying finished products that are acquired from abroad or through OEM production. Initial results generated from this approach include the key technologies that China lacked but has now learned, and the improvement of foreign products with some innovations. In general, China already has a considerable capacity for indigenous production. Once reaching a certain level, China’s indigenous production capacity will begin to transform quantitatively and qualitatively, ultimately allowing China to achieve its aspiration toward independent innovation and invention. China’s aviation industry still faces many unsolved problems and lags far behind advanced countries. Despite that, in time, the standards of China’s aviation industry may progress to an extent unimaginable to the outside world.

“Airpower,” Sir Winston Churchill once stated, “is the most difficult of all forms of military force to measure or even to express in precise terms”; defi­nitions abound, one of the most succinct being: “The ability to project power from the air and space to influence the behavior of people or the course of events.”6 In this regard, the key factors affecting airpower in the Taiwan Strait would include weapons technology such as aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, bal­listic missiles, cruise missiles, airfields and runway availability, and unmanned aerial systems; crisis circumstances such as military intimidation, blockade, and employment of limited force or coercive options; and full-scale military action such as air and missile strikes, the dispatch of an amphibious invasion force, and landing assault. All of the latter can be expected to be accompanied by a fierce battle to control the airspace over the Taiwan Strait. Each of these is subsequently discussed in detail.

Aircraft

According to a January 2010 U. S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report,7

Although Taiwan has nearly 400 combat aircraft in service, far fewer of these are operationally capable. Taiwan’s F-5 fighters have reached the end of their operational service life, and while the indigenously pro­duced F-CK-1 A/B Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) is a large compo­nent of Taiwan’s active fighter force, it lacks the capability for sustained sorties. Taiwan’s Mirage 2000-5 aircraft are technologically advanced, but they require frequent, expensive maintenance that adversely affects their operational readiness rate.

This U. S. DIA report may exaggerate the facts, but undoubtedly it reveals some of challenges that Taiwan’s airmen face. A U. S.-Taiwan Business Council study concluded that same year as follows:8

In qualitative terms, Taiwan’s F-16A/Bs and Mirage 2000-5s are roughly comparable to Chinese Su-30s, Su-27/J-11s, and J-10s in performance and combat capability. The F-CK-IA/Bs are generally considered supe­rior to J-8s, but lack the aerodynamic performance of some of the newer PLA aircraft types, while the F-5E/Fs should be a match for the J-7s.

That same year, the U. S. Department of Defense concluded the following:9

The PLAAF and the PLA Navy have approximately 2,300 operational combat aircraft. These consist of air defense and multi-role fighters, ground attack aircraft, fighter-bombers, and bombers. An additional 1,450 older fighters, bombers and trainers are employed for training and R&D. The two air arms also possess approximately 450 transports and over 100 surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft with intelligence, surface search, and airborne early warning capabilities. The majority of PLAAF and PLA Navy aircraft are based in the eastern half of the coun­try. Currently, 490 aircraft could conduct combat operations against Taiwan without refueling. However, this number could be significantly increased through any combination of aircraft forward deployment, decreased ordnance loads, or altered mission profiles.

Given these three possible games, it is clear the implications of PLAAF modernization for the United States vary between the games. In both the Game of Influence and within the Battle over a Third Party, the types of adap­tations are essentially incremental, with force additions tailored to fairly spe­cific problems. In the Great Power Game, the types of U. S. responses encom­pass much bolder moves to bolster regional positions and improve symmetric combat capabilities to maintain relative superiority. These differences affect how the balance is perceived and also frame the type of actions that might be taken within the game.

In both the Game of Influence and the Battle over a Third Party, the shifting of existing forces, as well as tailored responses focused on localized problems, appears adequate. In these cases, the focus is on crafting a strat­egy to solve specific problems created by the PLAAF and on ascertaining the steps necessary for solving them. The changes in the PLAAF make some oper­ational concepts more difficult than in the past and undercut current assump­tions as to how the United States could operate at will with airpower in almost any region of the world. However, the moves to counter these elements can be fairly well tailored and manageable in terms of what might be required for new operational concepts, munitions, and, perhaps most importantly, the level of engagement with other countries in the region. Dispersal and remote basing of forces, selective hardening and defense, a greater use of longer-range sys­tems, and changing the threshold for success (defeating certain types of mili­tary attacks and accepting damage from others) can all help address the imme­diate problem of creating the broader perception of an effective U. S. response as well as help address specific issues in regard to problems associated with defense of third parties. Therefore, to the extent PLAAF modernization drives game changes, they will be relatively focused and bounded.

The balance in the Great Power Game is more sensitive than those in the other games in terms of the U. S. need to maintain relative position through such actions as addressing perceived rates of change and rate of acceleration of change for a variety of reasons that are not directly related to the security situation in the particular geographic region. Even if marginal improvements such as a force shift might address the immediate security problem, they would not address the broader aspect of the military competition that is integral to the game itself. It is not only the qualitative improvements of the PLAAF that are significant; after all, they are essentially only matching earlier generations of U. S. force capabilities. Instead, the dynamic of the broader region is driven by the twin problems of U. S. forces operating at a distance (the United States is acting as a global power and is expected by many to be anywhere a threat occurs) and the fear of what China’s rapid rise in capability might presage. The balance in the Great Power Game incorporates elements of predictions and wagers about the future that are not dominant in the other games. This is par­tially due to the fact that in some narratives the immediate influence of the United States in the game is discounted and thereby diminished if the United States is not seen as actively addressing a possible negative future.

Implications for the United States

This paper provides the framework for how the United States should view and assess the impact of PLAAF modernization. This framework also yields important insights for U. S. decisionmaking within the overarching game structure. Most significantly, the United States must make a deliberate choice as to what game or combination of games it wants to play and how it will respond (force structure, political stances, etc.) within the games it chooses. This will allow the United States to best utilize its military and political tools to achieve its national interests and to avoid being forced into a nonoptimal decision.

When the United States is choosing which game to play, it will of course be influenced by Chinese military choices (one being continued PLAAF mod­ernization) and political moves. There will also be other factors influencing the United States, and the choice between games will be predicated on the strategic importance assigned to the situation, relevant political considerations, fiscal constraints, and other factors. But whatever game it chooses to play, the United States must always be aware of the range of possible Chinese countermoves and be careful not to lock itself into a course of action that may prove detrimental if and when the game being played changes. And, of course, it is necessary for the United States to both recognize that China is not obligated to play the same game the United States chooses and to understand that such a situation would lead to potential disconnects that would need to addressed. Furthermore, once a game is chosen and is being played, the United States will continue to face choices about its specific set of actions. These choices will require the United States to prioritize different aspects of its power. Given these uncertainties, it will be prudent for the United States to hedge.

The United States and China have largely confined themselves to Game 2—The Battle over a Third Party—and the impact of PLAAF modernization has been widely evaluated through this lens. PLAAF modernization does have a direct impact on this game—and a negative impact for the United States if it does not take steps to counteract it—but the only way that modernization shifts the overall military balance across the spectrum of possible games is if the United States holds all other factors in its relationship with China constant. There is no reason for the United States to do so. The United States can define which game it is going to play by what it chooses to address as important. And in that context, the United States has a wide range of options that do not neces­sarily require a new force structure or more defense expenditures, but instead may call for an altered military and political emphasis.

The bottom line for the Chinese is that PLAAF modernization is con­tributing to conditions that compel a reaction from the United States. If the United States chooses to continue to play the same game in the same way it has since the end of the Cold War, the results may be to China’s advantage. But if the United States chooses to play another game where its significant military and political assets can be more fully utilized, PLAAF modernization may lead to a Pyrrhic victory for the Chinese.31

The U. S. bottom line is the recognition that there is no compelling rea­son for it to maintain its current game. Instead, it is extremely prudent for the Nation’s policy and military planners to assess the current situation and deter­mine if another course should be pursued. This is because once the current equilibrium with China is interrupted, as it inevitably will be, the situation will shift and it is difficult to predict the course that events will take from that point.

If the United States does not then already have a plan in place or if the issue has not already been extensively discussed, the Nation’s leaders could be pushed by the domestic political climate, fiscal constraints, or a variety of other factors to make a choice they would not have otherwise made. This type of sit­uation would be metastable, and because of that lack of stability, it is a situa­tion that could be significantly impacted by small military changes on the Chi­nese side. The United States must be aware that it will be necessary to make a decision before it reaches any such tipping point. Otherwise, the United States could be forced into making not only a nonoptimal decision as to which game it is going to play and how it is going to play it, but a nonsatisfactory one as well.

Xu and Ma are believed to share similar career advancement paths. They both joined the air force and became jet pilots in the mid-1960s (Ma in 1965 and Xu in 1967) and have a very similar and impeccable track record in mili­tary service. They both enjoy sports, particularly basketball.

Xu has enjoyed good fortune while in the air force. After graduation from the 8th Aviation Academy in 1969 he became a fighter pilot in the Inde­pendent Detachment of Air Force (AF) Division 4. This detachment was a bat­talion unit, but had regiment rank. As a result, Xu skipped the conventional regiment step on his way up. He was made commander of the 26th Division at 33 years of age and deputy corps commander of the 4th Corps (later reorganized as the PLAAF’s Shanghai Commanding Headquarters) at just age 34 in 1984, becoming the youngest army-level commander of the PLA at the time. He became commander of the new 8th Corps (deployed in Fujian for Taiwan mis­sions) at the age of 40 in 1990, still holding the record of youngest corps com­mander to this day. In 1994, he became chief of staff of the air force, achieving the crucial deputy MR rank. In 1999 the PLA leadership transferred him to the Shenyang MR as deputy commander. In 2004, he was made the PLAs deputy chief of general staff, a full MR rank post. Three years later, he became air force commander, the fourth youngest PLAAF commander following Liu Yalou, Wu Faxian, and Ma Ning (Ц’т), and thus a member of the CMC as well.11

Ma was born in 1949 and quickly proved a model officer. In 1972, because of his birth date, he was selected to appear in a documentary film As the Same Age of the Republic, representing the PLA. Thereafter he entered the fast track of promotion. He became commander of the 72d Regiment in 1973, at the age of 23(!), and then, a decade later, was promoted to deputy com­mander of the 24th Air Force Division, part of the 6th Corps, at 34. In 1995, he became commander of the 10th Corps, and then, just 2 years later, the PLA leadership promoted him to deputy chief of staff for the PLAAF. Only a year later, he was transferred to be chief of staff of Guangzhou Air Force Region.12

The Guangzhou transfer was unusual, in that he moved at the same rank. Seldom is a transfer from the center to the region at this level made with­out a promotion. But even this reflected his favored status, for the underlying reason was to broaden Ma’s command experience and familiarity with opera­tional combat units in different war zones. Two years later, in 1999, he was pro­moted to the position of deputy commander of Lanzhou MR, and commander of Lanzhou Air Force Region, making the crucial climb into the deputy MR rank. Within 2 years he was transferred to be deputy commander of Nan­jing MR and commander of PLAAF Nanjing Region. In 2003 he became dep­uty PLAAF commander. In 2006 he assumed the presidency of the National Defense University, thus entering the full MR rank. The following year he was given his current position as the PLAs executive deputy chief of general staff.

It is very interesting to compare Xu and Ma’s career paths, something that can shed a lot of light on PLA elite selection, advancement, and career termination. From the information mentioned above, it is clear that both Xu and Ma were identified early by the air force and the CMC as candidates for top leadership. They had excellent performance qualifications, were top-grade fighter pilots тЮ, and were well respected by their peers and subor­

dinates. Both Xu and Ma piloted J-10s, Su-27s, and Su-30s to gain first-hand experience with these aircraft.

Yet, in this invisible race, Ma was left behind, virtually from the starting point. There are some clues why. First, Xu served in one of the PLAAF’s elite fighter divisions, while Ma’s was a relatively less prestigious one. This gave Xu an advantage in attracting the attention of the PLA/PLAAF leadership. Later his 8th Corps was deployed in a key strategic location—Fujian, near the Taiwan Strait—where it was on constant combat readiness, while Ma’s corps was based in more distant Hebei with more routine service. Second, Xu’s skip of the regi­mental step in the upward ladder allowed him to enter the cadre reserve list of the military region earlier than Ma. Therefore, once there was an opportunity for promotion, Xu was the first to be considered. Third, Xu served in the 4th Corps (later the Air Force Shanghai Commanding Headquarters (±ЖЙЩн№ W) as its chief of staff. This corps historically produced many more key PLAAF leaders (for example, Gao Houliang [ЛЩЙ], Qao Qingchen [^>ій], and Han

Decai [ШШШ]) than Ma’s 6th and 10th Corps. These leaders naturally favored subordinates following the same career track. Fourth, Xu was younger than Ma by 1 year, a seemingly small difference, but one that could be a key cut-off fac­tor in Chinese Communist Party (CCP)/PLA succession politics.13

Thus, Xu accelerated ahead of Ma as early as the late 1980s, even though Ma’s own upward progression was a veritable “helicopter” compared with his peers. Xu acquired deputy corps rank about a decade earlier than Ma (1983 versus 1993). When Xu became the PLAAF chief of staff in 1994, Ma was only chief of staff of the 10th Corps. This was a crucial difference, as Xu entered the CMC cadre management list while Ma stayed in the air force list. The gap was finally closed on the eve of the 16th National Party Congress as both were at the same military rank: Ma was then Nanjing MR deputy commander and its air force chief, and Xu held the same ranks in Shenyang. At the congress, they were both elected to be CC members, and thus equal to the parallel third – most-important personages in the air force (the first two CC members being the commander and political commissar of the PLAAF).

But when the selection of the PLAAF commander came down to Xu and Ma, Xu’s early seniority over Ma played a crucial role in his promotion. This dif­ference is a huge one, because Xu as a CMC member is ranked as the leader of the PLA (¥S^#), while Ma can only be dubbed the leader of a headquarters (йнШЮ. It is interesting to watch if Ma can again match up with Xu in the forthcoming PLA leadership reshuffle. Certainly in no aspect is Ma inferior in ability and performance to Xu. Their relative career progression is evidence, yet again, that sometimes the factor of luck is more important than anything else.

Phillip C. Saunders and Joshua K. Wiseman

Although China continues to lag approximately two decades behind the world’s most sophisticated air forces in terms of its ability to develop and pro­duce fighter aircraft and other complex aerospace systems, it has moved over time from absolute reliance on other countries for military aviation technol­ogy procurement to a position where a more diverse array of strategies can be pursued. Steps taken in the late 1990s to reform China’s military aviation sector demonstrated an understanding of the problems inherent in high-tech­nology acquisition, and an effort to move forward.1 However, a decade later it remains unclear how effective these reforms have been. Where are the Peo­ple’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and China’s military aviation indus­try headed? What obstacles must be overcome for China to join the exclusive ranks of those nations possessing sophisticated air forces and aviation indus­tries capable of producing world-class aircraft? Answering these and related questions is at the heart of this study. Because advanced fighter aircraft exem­plify the most sophisticated level of aerospace technology, are important for air force combat capabilities, and present unique design and fabrication chal­lenges for a military aviation industry, the authors’ analysis focuses primarily on China’s efforts to acquire, produce, and develop fighter aircraft and related technology. It also includes some discussion of bombers, transports, and air­borne early warning aircraft where relevant to Chinese technology develop­ment and acquisition efforts.

The PRC’s first surface-to-air missile, like that of other Communist Bloc countries, was the Soviet-developed S-75 Dvina, known to the West as the SA-2 Guideline, five batteries of which were delivered from the USSR in 1959. Then, the growing Sino-Soviet political crisis flared into open disagreement, bringing further deliveries to an end. On October 7, 1959, one of these Chi­nese SA-2 batteries shot down a Taiwan twin-engine two-crew Martin RB – 57D reconnaissance aircraft while it was flying at 60,000 feet near Beijing. This loss came almost 7 months before the Soviets shot down Francis Gary Powers’ Lockheed U-2 with an SA-2 on May 1, I960.10

After the Sino-Soviet split, the PRC reverse-engineered the SA-2 and its SNR-75 Fan Song radar, and placed it into service as the HQ-2A, subsequently developing the more sophisticated HQ-2B. China’s air defenses remained heavily dependent upon this system until the end of the Sino-Soviet split fur­nished China the opportunity to upgrade its surface-to-air missile defenses. In particular, it acquired advanced “double digit” SAM systems from Russia, notably the S-300 (SA-10/20) which has, like the SA-2 before it, undergone

reverse engineering to further China’s own indigenous SAM development pro­grams. The PLA also acquired and manufactured derivatives of such Western SAM systems as the Crotale, Aspide, and Stinger.11

Though the HQ-2B remains an important element of PLA air defense, the nature of PLA missile defenses is increasingly built around the S-300 and equivalent high-technology systems. As one source suggests:12

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF)’s Surface-to-Air Missile Corps has been operating the S-300 (NATO reporting name: SA-10 Grumble) family of surface-to-air missile system since the mid-1990s. The S-300 mis­sile system was regarded as one of the world’s most effective all-altitude regional air defense systems, comparable in performance to the U. S. MIM-104 Patriot system. The PRC remains the largest export customer of the S-300, mainly due to its incapability to produce a similar system domestically or acquire it from another country. A Chinese indigenous system analogous with the Russian S-300 series, the HQ-9, has had a long gestation but is now being deployed in some numbers.

A typical S-300 regiment has four to six batteries. One regiment in the PLAAF would thus have 16 to 24 transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) that could fire a total of 64 to 96 missiles (before reloading) to protect one area. The high performance (and high lethality) of the S-300 makes this a formida­ble system for any nation to “crack,” even the United States, particularly if fly­ing “legacy” third – and fourth-generation aircraft such as the F-CK-1, F-16, and Mirage.13

Taiwan currently deploys a plethora of SAM systems. As reported by the U. S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Taiwan uses layered SAM coverage to pro­tect its major population centers, key national leadership installations, mili­tary facilities, and national infrastructure. The air defense network consists of 22 SAM sites utilizing a mix of long – and medium-range systems, augmented by short-range tactical SAMs to provide overlapping coverage.”14 Table 13-4 offers a survey of the types, numbers of batteries, and numbers (where known) of the various missiles.

Kenneth W. Allen is a Senior China Analyst at the Defense Group, Inc. (DGI), where he focuses on Chinese military issues. Prior to this, he worked in vari­ous nonprofit research organizations dealing with China and Taiwan relations. From 1971 to 1992, he served in the U. S. Air Force, including assignments in Taiwan, Berlin, Japan, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, and Washington, DC. He also served as the Assistant Air Force Attache in China from 1987 to 1989. He has written several books and articles on China’s military. He received a B. A from the University of California at Davis, a B. A from the University of Maryland in Asian Studies, and an M. A. from Boston University in Interna­tional Relations.

Hsi-hua Cheng retired from the Taiwan Air Force as a colonel in November 2011. His military assignments include a tour as acting deputy commandant of the Air Command and Staff College at Taiwan’s National Defense University. Cheng was a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States from July 2006 to June 2007 and graduated from the U. S. Air Force Air Command and Staff College in 1994.

Roger Cliff is a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. His areas of research include China’s military doc­trine, defense industries, and future military capabilities and their implications for U. S. strategy and policy. He has authored, coauthored, or edited more than a dozen research monographs and more than a dozen journal articles, book chapters, and op-eds on these topics. He is currently writing a book on China’s future military capabilities. Dr. Cliff has previously worked for the Project 2049 Institute, the RAND Corporation, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and VERAC, Inc. He received his Ph. D. in International Relations from Princeton University, and holds an M. A. in Chinese Studies from the University of Cali­fornia, San Diego, and a B. S. in Physics from Harvey Mudd College. He is flu­ent in written and spoken Chinese.

David R. Frelinger is a Senior Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation with experience in leading technical and policy analytic studies for senior govern­ment consumers. His research interests include intelligence operations, infor­mation technologies, and the interaction of commercial and governmental activities, as well as an ongoing interest in assessing advanced weapons systems concepts. Mr. Frelinger holds an M. A. in Political Science from the University of California, Los Angeles, and a B. A in Political Science from the University of California, San Diego.

Richard P. Hallion is an aerospace analyst and historian who has written widely on defense, aerospace, military affairs, and technology. He received his B. A and Ph. D. from the University of Maryland, and is a graduate of the Fed­eral Executive Institute and the National Security Studies Program for Senior Executives at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He has served as a founding curator, Lindbergh Professor, and Verville Fellow at the National Air and Space Museum; as a National Aeronautics and Space Administration and Air Force historian; as the Johnson Chair at the U. S. Army Military History Institute; as a senior issues and policy analyst and senior advi­sor for air and space issues to the Secretary of the Air Force; and as a special advisor on aerospace technology to the Air Force Chief Scientist. Currently, he is a senior advisor to Commonwealth Research Institute/Concurrent Technol­ogies Corporation; Vice President of the Earthshine Institute; and a research associate in aeronautics for the National Air and Space Museum. He has taught and lectured widely, is active in professional associations, and is a Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, a Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society, and a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society.

Jessica Hart is an Analyst at a defense contractor. From 2008 to 2011, she worked as a research assistant for the RAND Corporation where she focused on defense policy and nuclear deterrence issues. Ms. Hart holds an M. PI. A. in Intelligence and Defense Studies from Texas A&M University, and a B. A. in Political Science from Clemson.

You Ji is Reader/Professor in the School of Social Science, University of New South Wales. He has published widely on China’s political, military, and foreign affairs. He is the author of three books, including China’s Enterprise Reform: Changing State/Society Relations after Mao (1998) and The Armed Forces of China (1999). He has authored numerous articles and book chapters, includ­ing: “China’s Response to the Deadly Triangle: Arms Race, Territorial Dispute and Energy Security,” CLAWS Journal, Summer 2010; “Managing the Cross – Taiwan Strait Military Conflicts in a New Era of Political Reconciliation,” in 30 Years of Sino-US Relations, Sujian Guo, ed. (Lexicon Books, 2010); “Chang­ing Civil-Military Relations in China,” in The PLA at Home and Abroad, David Lai, Roy Kamphamsen, and Andrew Scobell, eds. (National Bureau of Asian Research and Strategic Studies Institute of the U. S. Army War College, 2010).

Kevin Lanzit is a Senior Analyst at Alion Science & Technology, Inc. with over thirty years in national security affairs. During his Air Force career he served in a variety of operational and national security planning positions, including mul­tiple fighter assignments in the United States, Western Europe, and the Southwest Pacific. As a foreign area officer specializing on China and East Asia, he completed two assignments with the United States Embassy in Beijing, China (1989-1991 and 2000-2003), where his language skills and operational acumen facilitated the successful execution of both diplomatic and operational missions. Following mil­itary service, Mr. Lanzit has worked in both private and government positions. From 2005 to 2006, he served as a senior analyst with the U. S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission where he shaped the research, analysis, and written reports related to China’s growing military power and its effect on U. S. national security interests in the region. Since leaving the Commission he has continued to lend his regional knowledge and operational experience to national security analysis. Mr. Lanzit received a B. S. in Economics from the USAF Acad­emy in 1975, an M. S. in Systems Management from the University of Southern California, and studied National Security Affairs at the U. S. Air War College and Mandarin Chinese at the Defense Language Institute.

Forrest E. Morgan is a defense policy researcher working in the RAND Cor­poration’s Pittsburgh Office. Prior to joining RAND in January 2003, Dr. Mor­gan served a 27-year career in the U. S. Air Force. His military assignments included duty as a signals intelligence analyst and as a space operations officer in various operations and staff positions. Later he served on the strategy and policy staff at Headquarters, U. S. Air Force, Pentagon, and did a tour of duty as a professor of comparative military studies at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. Since coming to RAND, Dr. Morgan has done strategy and doctrine research examining such issues as preemptive and preventive attack, escalation management, deterrence, information operations, and assessing performance of the Air Force and Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Kevin Pollpeter has been the China Program Manager at Defense Group, Inc. since 2005. He manages a group of 11 analysts focused on primary source research on Chinese security issues. Mr. Pollpeter writes on a range of issues, but is a specialist on the Chinese space program. He previous worked at the RAND Corporation from 2000 to 2005 as a Research Assistant and a Project Associate. His other work experience includes time at the Monterey Institute’s East Asia Nonproliferation Project, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Marine Corps Reserves. Mr. Pollpeter has an M. A. in International Policy Stud­ies and a Certificate in Nonproliferation Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies and a B. A. in Chinese Studies from Grinnell College.

Phillip C. Saunders is Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs and a Distinguished Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic Research, part of National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies. Dr. Saunders previously worked at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, where he was Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program from 1999 to 2003, and served as an officer in the U. S. Air Force from 1989 to 1994. Dr. Saun­ders is coauthor with David Gompert of The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in an Era of Vulnerability (NDU Press, 2011) and co-editor of Cross-Strait Relations: New Opportunities and Challenges for Taiwan’s Security (RAND, 2011) and The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (NDU Press, 2011). He has published numerous articles and book chapters on China and Asian security issues in journals such as International Security, Inter­national Studies Quarterly, China Quarterly, The China Journal, Survival, Asian Survey, Pacific Review, Orbis, Asia Policy, and Joint Force Quarterly. Dr. Saunders attended Harvard College and received his M. P.A. and Ph. D. in International Relations from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University.

Shen Pin-Luen is an assistant research fellow at the Cross-Strait Interflow Prospect Foundation in Taiwan. His research focuses on People’s Republic of China national policy and the development of People’s Liberation Army modernization. He has an M. A. in mainland China studies from Taiwan’s National Chengchi University, Taiwan.

David Shlapak is a Senior International Policy Analyst working in the RAND Corporation’s Pittsburgh Office. His areas of research include U. S. defense strat­egy and policy, Asian security, Chinese military modernization, and airpower operations. During his time at RAND, Mr. Shlapak has completed projects on reshaping the U. S. joint force for future challenges, countering nuclear-armed adversaries, and U. S-China security relations. He holds a B. A. in Political Sci­ence from Northwestern University.

Mark A. Stokes is Executive Director of the Project 2049 Institute. During 20 years of service in the U. S. Air Force, Lt Col (Ret.) Stokes was assigned to a variety of electronic warfare, intelligence, planning, and policy positions. From 1984 to 1986, he was assigned to the 6922nd Electronic Security Squadron, Clark Air Base, Philippines. From 1986 to 1989, he served as a signals intel­ligence and electronic warfare officer in the 6912th Electronic Security Wing, Berlin, West Germany. In July 1989, Mr. Stokes entered the Air Force’s for­eign area officer training program as a China specialist. From 1992 to 1995, he served as the assistant air attache at the United States Defense Attache Office in Beijing, People’s Republic of China (PRC). He subsequently was assigned to Headquarters, Air Force’s Plans and Operations Directorate, where he was responsible for operational and strategic planning for the Asia-Pacific region. Between 1997 and 2004, Mark served as Team Chief and Senior Country Director for the PRC, Taiwan, and Mongolia in the Office of the Assistant Sec­retary of Defense for International Security Affairs (OASD/ISA). For 7 years, he was responsible for developing, coordinating, and managing U. S. defense policy with respect to China. He holds a B. A in History from Texas A&M Uni­versity, and M. A.s in International Relations and East Asian Studies from Bos­ton University and the Naval Postgraduate School.

Murray Scot Tanner has published widely on Chinese and East Asian poli­tics and security issues, and is recognized as one of the country’s top specialists on internal security, social unrest, policing, and intelligence in China. Among his many books and articles are Chinese Economic Coercion against Taiwan: A Tricky Weapon to Use (RAND, 2007), The Politics of Lawmaking in China (Oxford, 1998), and “China Rethinks Unrest,” Washington Quarterly, 2004. Dr. Tanner has previously served as Professor of Political Science at Western Mich­igan University, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, as a senior staff member for the U. S. Congress, and as a China analyst for the U. S. Govern­ment. Raised in Syracuse, New York, Dr. Tanner received his B. A. and Ph. D. from the University of Michigan.

Joshua K. Wiseman is a Research Analyst at National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies. Prior to joining the Institute as a Con­tract Researcher in 2010, he worked as a Chinese language translator for the Department of Commerce. His research focuses on Chinese security issues, specifically the Chinese defense industrial sector, Sino-Russian strategic rela­tions, and China’s expanding aerospace power. Mr. Wiseman attended The George Washington University, where he completed an M. A. in Security Pol­icy Studies with a China regional focus. He has extensive experience working, traveling, and studying in China.

Xiaoming Zhang is Associate Professor in the Department of Leadership and Strategy at the Air War College. Dr. Zhang holds a Ph. D. in history from the University of Iowa and has authored a number of articles on Chinese military involvement in the Korean and Vietnam Wars and Sino-Soviet relations during these conflicts, as well as Red Wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union and the Air War in Korea (Texas A&M University Press, 2002).

The second echelon of PLAAF leadership consists of the PLAAF’s dep­uty commanders, chief of staff, deputy chiefs of staff, and assistant chiefs of staff. Readers are advised that these elites at the headquarters belong to two clusters in CMC nomenclature. The deputy commanders and chief of staff are at the deputy MR rank and fall into the CMC “Category B” management list, requiring that (though nominated by the CMC’s professional soldiers) their appointments be approved by the CMC chair personally. The deputy chief of staff and assistant chief of staff are Corps-level leaders whose appointments are basically decided by the PLAAF, approved by the CMC in regular meetings, and signed by the CMC chair. Their appointments are professional, not politi­cal. In fact the PLA is no longer subjected to impositions of blatantly politi­cal appointments, though this was a widespread phenomenon in the now-past eras of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.14 Currently, the PLAAF has five dep­uty commanders, five deputy chiefs of staff, and five assistant chiefs of staff.

Deputy Commanders

All five PLAAF deputy commanders were born in 1949, meaning that they have little or no prospect of upward progression, since the deputy MR rank requires compulsory retirement age at 63. Among them are three fighter pilots of the top grade and two army officers transferred to the PLAAF, with distinctive military family backgrounds.

Lieutenant General He Weirong ) is executive deputy commander,

responsible for operations and training. He commanded Fighter Division 6 and was deputy commander of the Jinan MR and the Jinan AF Region (2003). He was PLAAF chief of staff (2003) before assuming his current position (2005).

Lieutenant General Jing Wenchun (ЯЙ#) is in charge of the depart­ments of supporting arms in the Headquarters (electronic warfare, radar and communications, education institutions, and key weapons projects).15 He was commander of the 10th Corps (1998) and deputy commander of the Beijing MR and the Beijing AF Region (2002-2006) before assuming his current position.

Lieutenant General Zhao Zhongxin (М&ЭД is in charge of headquar­ters affairs and air force MR affairs. He was commander of the 19th Fighter Division and the Dalian base (2000) and chief of staff for the Nanjing (2002) and Chengdu (2004) AF Regions and deputy chief of staff (2004) and chief of staff of the PLAAF (2005) before assuming this position.

Lieutenant General Yang Dongming (ШЖЩ) is in charge of the PLAAF Research Institutions (basic weapons design, research and development), the Engineering Department, and logistics. Although recruited into the PLA as an air force technical officer—he graduated from the Beijing Aero-Space and Avi­ation University in 1977 as a rocket engineer—his career advancement came mostly in the army, with postings to the Defense Technology Commission, the Hebei Military District, and the Beijing Garrison. He was transferred back to the PLAAF as deputy commander from the GLD (where he was director for the Material and Oil Department). Without the connections of his father (General Yang Chengwu [Ш$.Ж], former PLA chief of general staff), he would not have come this far in the air force, for he was not an airman and possessed no prior experience in PLAAF combat units or headquarters.

Lieutenant General Chen Xiaogong (^/JI) is in charge of intelligence, training safety, and foreign affairs. He is probably the only senior commander in the PLAAF with battlefield combat experience, having fought in the Sino-Vietnam border war as a battalion commander. He was PLA defense attache in Washington (2001) and then the PLAs intelligence chief (director of the 2d Department of the GSD). He represented the PLA as deputy director of the Politburo’s Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) office and was appointed assistant chief of general staff in 2007, temporarily filling the vacancy left by General Xiong Guangkai.

Chen’s career progression is intriguing. It is not clear how he was trans­ferred to the PLAAF, which had already filled its four deputy-commander quota. Chen belongs to the PLA category of “cadre to be rescued” (ЙЙ^нР), a com­mander with a distinctive service record who, due to lack of a compulsory experi­ence or lack of a vacancy, is transferred elsewhere as a way of promotion. General Pei Huailiang (Ш’Тй) was a good example of this category when he was pro­moted as president of the NDU. General Zhang Qingsheng was promoted to be deputy chief of general staff without experience as a group army (GA) and MR Commander. For Chen Xiaogong, assistant chief of general staff is still between the army and DMR ranks that he achieved long time ago ()#^KS).16

But without experience as a commanding officer at or above divisional level (¥#iW), it went against the norm to create an exception for him to become deputy chief of general staff. Overall, Chen’s career progression was frustrated despite his extensive connections with top leaders while working in the Politbu­ro’s FALSG and his father’s connection as China’s first ambassador to Japan. He thus went to the PLAAF because the PLAAF was a place that could adopt him.

Lieutenant General Yang Guohai (ЙВЛ) is the PLAAF chief of staff. From his resume, we can see that he has been Xu’s old associate in Shanghai and is the same age as Xu. The relations between a commander and his chief of staff are always special, and this makes the post of chief of staff a key position in the PLA. According to PLA regulations, the chief of staff is in a way more important than deputy commanders. For instance, if the commander is killed in combat, the next person in line to fill the commanding job is not one of the deputy commanders, but the chief of staff because the former are in charge of specific areas while the latter is more familiar with the overall responsibilities and workings of the unit.17 Although deputy commander and chief of staff are at the same military rank, in recent years more chiefs of staff have been pro­moted to lead MRs and Corps-level units than deputy commanders.

Yang was born in 1950, and became commander of the 4th Fighter Divi­sion in his late 30s and commander of the Shanghai base in 1998. He stayed in the post of chief of staff of the Lanzhou AF Region for 6 years from 2000, a bit too long for a designated candidate for a future PLAAF leader and, as a result, his future is relatively limited. But after he was appointed to deputy chief of staff of the Air Force in 2006, he held that post for hardly a year before being promoted to chief of staff. Obviously his deputy period was transitional, wait­ing for the incumbent chief of staff (Zhao Zhongxin) to vacate the position.