Category The Chinese Air Force

Like most defense establishments, the PLA characterizes its moderniza­tion efforts as defensive in nature. To this end, aerospace power is viewed as a vital element of territorial air defense with offensive air operations as a means to suppress adversary strike capabilities at their source. As the PRC’s 2008 De­fense White Paper explains:

China pursues a national defense policy which is purely defensive in na­ture. China places the protection of national sovereignty, security, ter­ritorial integrity, safeguarding of the interests of national development, and the interests of the Chinese people above all else.16

The concept of integrated defense and offense is primarily in the context of the joint air defense. Indeed, most aerospace industry studies address an antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) capability in the context of defending against sea-based assets, such as Tomahawk cruise missiles and other strike systems. Integrated at­tack and defense (^KS#)is intimately related to the concept of a joint counter­air strike campaign (К-^йЙЖШё:). In doctrinal writings, counterair strike op­erations theory is divided into passive defense (ШЯ), territorial air defense (K ф), and offensive counterair operations (йф). The PLAAF and Second Artillery envision holding at risk facilities and assets around China’s periphery, including air bases, aircraft carriers and other surface assets, and missile-related facilities.17

A general concept appears to be to develop the ability to conduct offen­sive counterair strikes out to a range covered by persistent surveillance assets as far as Guam, at a distance of 3,000 kilometers (1,860 miles) from the east coast of China. Second Artillery and PLAAF force modernization appears to be fo­cused on systems able to suppress air operations on Guam, throughout the South China Sea, and other locations by the middle of this decade. Systems are under development which may place U. S. military facilities on Guam at risk by 2015.18 To test theories, in the summer of 2009, the PLAAF and Second Artil­lery conducted one of the first large-scale joint live-fire exercises involving ele­ments from four missile brigades and two PLAAF air divisions.19

In the traditional PLA operational lexicon, air and/or conventional mis­sile operations are viewed within the context of an integrated joint firepower campaign that consists of strike aviation, theater missiles, and/or long-range ar­tillery. PLA analysts view an air campaign as an integral component of “joint fire­power warfare” operations (К-^^Лі№) involving the coordinated use of PLA Air Force strike aviation assets and Second Artillery conventional theater missiles.

Kenneth W. Allen

Any examination of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) must examine its organizational structure «ФФШФО, answer­ing three fundamental questions: What is the PLAAF’s current organizational structure and what are the historical, theoretical, bureaucratic, and other rea­sons for it?1 What are the implications of the current organizational structure for the PLAAF’s future development? Finally, how might the PLAAF’s organi­zational structure change in order to operate in a joint conflict?

Introduction

During the 1990s, the PLAAF began purchasing high-tech weapons from abroad, as well as developing and purchasing them domestically, includ­ing combat aircraft (such as the Russian Sukhoi Su-27), surface-to-air missiles (SAMs, such as the SA-10), and radar and electronic countermeasures (ECM) systems that now form the cornerstone of its table of organization and equip­ment (TOE). In order to support these systems, the PLAAF has also begun implementing significant organizational changes that have mirrored similar changes occurring in the rest of the PLA.

Starting in the early 2000s, PLAAF officers began to assume key joint bil­lets, including membership on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) Central Military Commission (CMC), commandant of the Academy of Military Science, commandant and political commissar of the National Defense University, and deputy director billets in the General Staff Department (GSD), General Political Department (GPD), and General Logistics Department (GLD). Although these appointments are impressive, not all of them are permanent PLAAF billets. In addition, the army still dominates the majority of the leadership and working billets in all of these organizations, along with the General Armament Depart­ment (GAD), which has yet to have a PLAAF (or PLA Navy) deputy, and all seven of the Military Region (MR) Headquarters. There are no indications this pattern of army domination will change in the next decade.

Concerning the PLAAF’s branches, one of the most significant orga­nizational changes occurred within the last decade, when the PLAAF redes­ignated its radar branch as a specialty force. Even though the PLAAF’s ECM troops are also considered a specialty force, the PLAAF has consolidated their administrative structure into a PLAAF Electronic Countermeasures and Radar Department under the Headquarters Department and merged the research and development for the two forces into a single research institute under the Air Force Equipment Research Academy. Yet another significant change occurred in 1993, when the 15th Airborne Corps upgraded its three brigades to divisions, was designated the lead element for the PLA’s rapid reaction force, and changed from being subordinate to the Guangzhou Military Region Air Force (MRAF) to being directly subordinate to PLAAF Headquarters.2 Although the airborne corps still lacks sufficient airlift capabilities, since the early 1990s it has shifted from having primarily an internal security mission to a combined internal and external security mission.

Starting in the late 1990s, the PLAAF began to restructure its academic institution and equipment support structures. To help provide better education to its cadets and meet operational support requirements, the PLAAF consoli­dated several colleges into two universities—Air Force Engineering University (1999) and Air Force Aviation University (2004)—and restructured some of its other colleges—Xuzhou (Logistics) Air Force College, Guilin (Antiaircraft Artillery and Airborne) Air Force College, and flight colleges. At the same time, however, the PLAAF has increased the number of new officers who have grad­uated from the Defense Student (SK£) program at 18 civilian academic insti­tutions. This program is also called the Reserve Officer (^S^W) program. The goal for 2010 was to have 60 percent of all new officers come from civilian academic institutions, of which two-thirds would come from the Defense Stu­dent Program and one-third from directly recruited civilian college graduates with science and engineering degrees; however, a November 2009 Jiefangjun Bao article stated that the PLAs officer corps receives about 100,000 graduates per year, of which 70 percent come from military academic institutions and 30 percent from the Defense Student program.3 The number of pilot cadets who have been recruited from civilian college graduates and students rather than from high school graduates and enlisted personnel is also rising. These changes will continue to challenge the size and structure of the PLAAF’s academic insti­tutions and may necessitate further consolidation over the next decade.

Over the past decade, the PLAAF’s logistics support structure has mir­rored changes that have occurred in the GLD, which is roughly equivalent to the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff’s J-4 (Logistics) Directorate. One of the biggest changes occurred in 1998 when the PLAAF’s Logistics Department, which had been responsible for providing maintenance support for all nonaviation equip­ment and weapons systems (e. g., SAMs, AAA, radars), turned over support for all of this equipment, except vehicles, to the PLAAF’s restructured Equipment Department. In addition, during the 2000s, the GLD and PLAAF consolidated

their Quartermaster Department, Materials Department, and Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL) Department into a single Quartermaster, Materials, and POL Department. Even though these organizations have been merged at the top, they remain separated as individual branches at the regiment level.

Concerning the equipment support structure, two major changes have occurred since the late 1990s. The first occurred in 1998, when the PLA estab­lished the GAD and the PLAAF adjusted its existing equipment support struc­ture, so that the restructured Equipment Department took responsibility for developing and supporting all combat equipment and weapons systems, except vehicles, from birth to death. In 2004, the PLAAF also created a new Air Force Equipment Research Academy that became responsible for managing the research and development for all PLAAF combat equipment and weapons sys­tems. There are no indications the equipment support structure, which is fully integrated with the logistics support structure at the regiment and below levels, will change appreciably over the next decade.

Chinese air – and spacepower analysts demonstrate great faith in the util­ity of modern air and space offensive missions, and they maintain that PLAAF offensive missions can accomplish or support a wide array of strategic, cam­paign, operational, and also political objectives. To underscore the concept of the PLAAF as a “strategic” service, a number of analysts stress the ability of modern, informatized air and space forces to achieve the strategic objectives of the state either singlehandedly, or as the lead service in joint operations. Their contention is that in several recent limited wars and operations around the world, the speed, range, and destructiveness of offensive air and space have not only been militarily critical, but also politically decisive—constituting “the final word” that destroyed the adversary’s economic and logistical capability to sustain military operations, and that undermined the political will of an adver­sary’s population, armed forces, and government to fight onward.

Writing in 2006, analysts Cai Fengzhen and Deng Fan described the decisive importance of the air and space offensive mission this way:

The practise of modern warfare has already verified that “victory or defeat is determined in the air and space.” Air-space superiority not only can achieve maximum military advantage. It can also be used to obtain comprehensive benefits in political, spiritual and other areas. By means of operations in air-space battlefields. . . fighting speedy battles and win­ning quick decisions has already become the principal measure used by the United States and other major air – and space-countries for seizing comprehensive political and military benefits.26

The Science of Campaigns has identified three clusters of “basic tasks” that define the key strategic – and campaign-level objectives of PLAAF offen­sive campaigns. These focus on destroying or disabling enemy forces to achieve air dominance, supporting ground and maritime campaigns, and achieving other unspecified strategic goals of the state. More specifically, they include the following: “Destroy or cripple enemy aviation forces and ground air defense forces, and thereby seize air dominance”; “Destroy or weaken large enemy troop concentrations, and destroy enemy transportation systems, to create conditions for ground or maritime campaigns”; and “Strike enemy polit­ical, military, and economic targets, weaken the enemy’s combat potential to achieve specific strategic goals, and accomplish other specially assigned stra­tegic aims.”27

NDU analyst Yuan Jingwei’s description of the objectives of offensive missions, however, places more explicit emphasis on disabling the enemy’s combat systems than the list of tasks in The Science of Campaigns. He describes the objectives of these missions as follows:

to achieve air and space superiority [kongtianyoushi, Й^’ЙЙ’], paralyze the enemy’s combat systems [nanhuan di zuozhan tixi, ЯЙ±Й! ТШФ^], and weaken the enemy’s combat potential [xiaoruo di zhanzheng qianli, ШШШШ&%ІТ], in order to create the conditions for achieving strategic and campaign goals [wei dacheng zhanlue zhanyi mudi chuangzao tiao- jian, or to achieve these goals directly.28

Table 8-1 lists the composition of the Chinese air force at 5-year inter­vals from 1990 to 2010. It shows that as late as 1995, almost 80 percent of the PLAAF’s combat aircraft were variants of 1950s vintage Soviet MiG-17 and MiG-19 fighters. To put this in perspective: the original MiG-19 was intro­duced in the Soviet air force in the mid-1950s and entered Chinese service around 1962. In 1962, the most common combat aircraft in the U. S. Air Force was the F-100 Super Sabre. While the F-100 was an excellent airplane in its own right, it is hard to imagine the U. S. Air Force (USAF) in 1995 being built around it, as the PLAAF was built around the MiG-19/J-6.2

As notable—though perhaps less remarked upon—is the dramatic reduction in the number of combat aircraft in the PLAAF inventory. Between 1990 and 2010, almost 3,500 obsolete aircraft—70 percent of the force—were retired, mostly since 1995. Again by way of comparison, the USAF’s fleet of fighter-bombers shrank from a Cold War level of 3,620 in 1990 to 2,650 in 2010—a little over 25 percent.3 That the PLAAF was willing to shed so many of its aircraft indicates the scope of the PLAAF’s modernization efforts equally as much as its acquisition of modern aircraft.

One way of understanding the impact of the past 20 years on the PLAAF’s fighter force is to compare the number of its modern fighters with the numbers

owned by the air forces of other advanced countries; table 8-2 shows that com­parison. It reveals that the third-largest fleet of advanced fighters in the world may be found within the PLAAF, smaller only than those of the United States and Russia, and larger than the combined inventories of, for example, the Brit­ish and French air forces.

Finally, figure 8-1 presents a third way of visualizing the reshaping of the PLAAF’s fighter fleet by depicting its order of battle according to fighter “gener­ation.” Today, almost a third of the PLAAF’s fighter-bombers are fourth-genera­tion jets; yet as recently as 2000, they made up only 2 percent of the force. (Chinese writings refer to fourth-generation fighters as “third-generation” aircraft; this book employs the Western terminology throughout.)4

As early as 2004, a guiding PLA objective for developing its armed forces has been “informatization.” This principle stresses the centrality of information technology in weapons systems and their application.20 The PLA still considers itself in the early stages of integrated information-firepower (й^^Л_Ф) with a goal of achieving its fullest capabilities by 2050.21 The application of Chinese aerospace power against operational targets is likely to be linked with (and thus limited by) the scope and sophistication of its persistent surveillance network and related command, control, and communications system. PLA joint firepow­er operations theory thus envisions the seamless connection between sensors and shooters of the PLA Air Force, Second Artillery, and other firepower custo­dians echoing Western F2T2EA (“Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess”) the­ory and evolving practice undertaken over the past two decades.

The mission of firepower warfare is three-fold. First and most important, air strikes and theater missile operations, supported by information operations, are intended to create the conditions necessary for a decisive attainment of stra­tegic and theater objectives. These conditions include the achievement of the “Three Superiorities” (HfX): information dominance, air superiority, and sea superiority. Achievement of the three superiorities could, in and of itself, cre­ate the necessary conditions for termination of conflict on the PRC’s terms. The second mission of firepower warfare is to support large-scale ground force op­erations through annihilation of or paralyzing the enemy’s effective strength. The final function involves independent firepower operations in direct support of strategic and theater objectives. Independent missions involve demonstra­tions of force or resolve, “strategic deterrence” missions, punishment through long-range air strikes, or a series of Second Artillery strikes that are intended to achieve limited strategic or operational objectives. Firepower warfare would dominate the preliminary phase of a campaign and, under certain conditions, could independently achieve strategic objectives of the PRC.22

Limited firepower assets would be intended for use against targets whose destruction or suppression can achieve the greatest effects. Primary targets for the application of firepower include the command and control system and as­sociated communications; strategic infrastructure; the most advanced capabil­ities of the opponent, including the air defense system; defense industries; and airbases and ports. From the PLA’s perspective, air and conventional theater missile strikes are the most important means of firepower against deep targets.

The PRC views information operations as integral to a successful joint aerospace or firepower campaign. Coercive military operations ultimately are intended to affect the decision calculus and morale of opposing civilian and military leaders. Perceptions and decisions of an opposing leadership are shaped by the quality and amount of information which they possess. Effective military operations rely upon the ability to defend one’s sources of information while exploiting and assaulting an opponent’s information structure. The fo­cus of information operations is the enemy’s command system. The command system serves as the strategic and operational “vital point” (^A), and consists of policymakers at the strategic level, the operational military command, and supporting command, control, and communications systems.

In addition to increasingly accurate and lethal theater ballistic and land attack cruise missiles and increasingly sophisticated multirole fighter aircraft, the PLA is prioritizing development of stand-off and escort jammers as well as other electronic warfare assets. At the same time, Beijing is investing in ad­vanced command, control, communications, and intelligence systems while placing greater emphasis on training, particularly through the use of simulators.

Intelligence warfare, electronic warfare, and psychological operations are force multipliers that can enhance the effectiveness of air and missile oper­ations in the successful attainment of limited political objectives. These capa­bilities are intended to confuse an adversary and increase the chances of stra­tegic or operational surprise. From a psychological perspective, information operations can magnify the effects of air strikes with detrimental effects on an enemy leadership’s morale and national will. Electronic attack and electronic defense are integral aspects of a PLA joint air campaign.

Electronic warfare is another key aspect of integrated information-fire­power warfare. PLA strategists believe electronic warfare can powerfully affect the results of a military campaign and theater offensives, and perhaps help deter­mine the outcome of a war. The PLA also has been developing a computer net­work attack capability. The most likely target would be automation systems, of­ten referred to as process control systems (PCS) or supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, which are critical to the safe, reliable, and efficient operations of critical infrastructure. PCS is used extensively in managing electric power, water, petroleum, natural gas, as well as communications systems. If a PCS system could be affected, there may be no need for physical destruction.

Counterstealth is another aspect of integrated information-firepower warfare. The PLA is seeking to reduce the advantages that low observable air assets enjoy. Most important is the ability to detect, track, and engage aircraft and land attack cruise missiles with low radar cross sections. Also focused on reducing the signature of its own assets, greater knowledge of stealth systems will increase their capabilities against U. S. low observable systems.23

PLA programs to counter potential adversary space capabilities also are an aspect of integrating information with firepower, and essential for denying or degrading adversary C4ISR (command, control, communications, comput­ers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities. For electronic defense, the PRC is investing heavily in command automation, tactical data links, electronic attack, and space-based reconnaissance and communications systems. The PLA appears to be applying principles of network-centric war­fare to correlate data from increasingly sophisticated sensor architectures. Net­work-centric warfare equips soldiers, airmen, and soldiers with a common op­erational picture that significantly increases situational awareness. As a result, individuals and units equipped to participate in the network are able to syn­chronize action, without necessarily having to wait for orders, which in turn reduces their reaction time. In addition, the network allows for dispersed and flexible operations at lower cost. Therefore, the introduction of a networked common tactical picture based on an advanced tactical data link program is a paradigm shift that could gradually break down the PLAs traditionally stove – piped, service-oriented approach to defense.24

The PLAs Joint Theater Command structure would direct integrated infor­mation-firepower warfare. The Firepower Coordination Center would coordinate an air and theater missile campaign against key targets in order to achieve strategic and theater objectives. Cells would contain PLA Air Force, Second Artillery, spe­cial operations, and ground force elements that would carry out necessary liaison with their respective corps-level service headquarters. Other supporting facilities would include centers for communications, firepower coordination, intelligence information, electronic countermeasures command, and weather.

The PLAAF’s organizational structure is a complicated one.4 The 2002 and 2008 editions of China’s National Defense state: 5

Concerning the PLA Air Force organizational structure, the Air Force practices a leadership system that combines operational command with Air Force building and management. The organizational system consists of Air Force Headquarters, seven Military Region Air Force Headquarters, [deputy] corps – and division-level command posts (CPs), divisions, bri­gades, and regiments. The Air Force [has] four branches—aviation, sur­face-to-air missile (SAM), antiaircraft artillery (AAA), and airborne—plus five types of specialty forces—communications, radar, electronic counter­measures, chemical defense, and technical reconnaissance. The Air Force also has education, research, testing, and training institutions.

According to PLAAF writings, the air force’s organizational structure or military system (Й¥¥$І) consists of 11 components, each of which has various subcomponents, some of which overlap.6 These are the organizational system (ШІР4Ф$І);7 leadership and command system (^Й^ІнШФФІ);8 estab­lishment (e. g., table of organization and equipment / TOE) system (^$J);9 edu­cation and training system (ЙМЛІШФ®);10 scientific research system (f4^W ір4Ф®І);п political work (ШпІІ^);12 logistics support (йШЖШФ®);13 equipment management (^^вИФ®);14 equipment technical support (S^S ARB);15 personnel management (A#®!);16 and mobilization (ййІФФІ) and reserve forces (й^ЛИй).17 Each is subsequently examined.18

Yuan’s definition of the offensive mission reflects a growing consensus among PLA air – and spacepower theorists (including the authors of The Sci­ence of Campaigns in 2007) that a primary objective of offensive missions is to destroy or undermine the capability of the enemy’s command and control, sur­veillance, and other information systems to function together effectively. This mission is to be accomplished by sudden, carefully targeted attacks on “key – point” (zhongdian, Фй) or “critical” (yaohai, ШШ) targets. A critical aim is to disable enemy air defenses and induce paralysis, blindness, or isolation in these key combat systems at least long enough for PLAAF forces to establish and exploit corridors to carry out their main attacks.

A number of PLA air – and spacepower analysts portray these enemy information systems as fragile, interdependent “systems of systems” that are potentially subject to something like cascade failure, rather than as intercon­nected systems with a robust level of redundancy built in. Analysts Cai Feng – zhen and Tian Anping contend that, properly carried out, “an attack on one point can paralyze the entire situation” (ji qiyidian tanhuan quanju, фй—,йШ Йй^).29 This perspective that the enemy is a vulnerable “system of systems” is spelled out in a number of other analyses as well.30

Toward this end, PLA analysts increasingly emphasize the critical role that achieving information superiority (xinxi youshi, and under­

taking successful information operations plays in the offensive mission to incapacitate enemy systems while protecting China’s own systems.31 They distinguish three aspects of information operations that play a critical role in the overall offensive mission—reconnaissance, attacks, and defense:32

■ Information reconnaissance involves expanding the campaign com­manders’ capability for gathering intelligence materials on enemy information operations.33

■ Information attacks involve seeking information superiority by dis­rupting the enemy’s flows of key information. A major purpose of these operations is “to completely blind the enemy’s air defense sys­tem” and “to open a gap in the enemy’s air defense system to make it difficult for the enemy to organize effective interception actions.” PLA analysts note two forms of “soft” information attacks—electronic jamming and deception and computer network attacks—and “hard” attacks involving firepower destruction of enemy information assets.34 Key targets include enemy reconnaissance and early warning satellites, airborne early warning and control aircraft, ground-based long-range warning and fire-control radars, surface-to-air missile radars, and command guidance systems.35 The Science of Campaigns specifically recommends that attack planners assign a portion of China’s most capable fighters to attack enemy airborne warning and control system (AWACS) planes in order to “chop down one of the enemy’s important information pillars” (qieduan di de zhongyao xinxi zhizhang, ЩІШШ МШШШ^^Й).36 Some analysts contend that China’s electronic jam­ming and deception resources are limited at present, and hence these information attacks are likely to rely more heavily on air attacks.37 This strongly suggests that Chinese forces may be forced to place much greater emphasis on destroying enemy warning and command and control and guidance systems through use of firepower destruction.

■ Information defense involves organizing defensive operations to pre­vent enemy jamming, firepower destruction, and computer network attacks.

Q-5. The last second-generation aircraft in combat service with the PLAAF is the Q-5 Fantan. The Q-5 evolved from the J-6, which itself was a Chinese-pro­duced MiG-19; it first flew in 1965 and entered service in 1970. In keeping with what we will see is PLAAF practice, the Q-5—nearly obsolescent already by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or Warsaw Pact standards at the start of its operational career in China—has been modified and updated several times over the years. The newest variant, the Q-5L, has been fitted with a conformal belly fuel
tank and a laser designator under the nose, and Chinese Internet photos show it equipped with a targeting pod on a ventral pylon and laser-guided bombs hung on the wings. Despite its age, the Q-5L could be an effective light attack aircraft if employed in a very forgiving air defense environment.

1st Generation

2d Generation 3d Generation 4th Generation

J-7. A reverse engineered MiG-21, the J-7 Fishbed was put into produc­tion in the early 1960s, entered PLAAF service in 1965, and has since been pro­duced in a bewildering variety of subtypes.6 It is still the most numerous type of fighter in the PLAAF’s inventory; the latest (and probably last) model, the J-7G, first flew as recently as 2002. In production for nearly 4 decades—a time span that likely will never be approached, let alone surpassed, by another com­bat aircraft—the J-7 has been improved over time, including several upgrades to its radar, addition of a head-up display (HUD) and other updated avion­ics, a larger, double-delta wing, and integration of more modern air-to-to air missiles (AAMs), including the infrared (IR)-guided PL-8. Production of the J-7G reportedly continued at least into 2009.

J-8. Originally an enlarged, twin-engine development of the J-7, the J-8 Finback is yet another PLAAF aircraft that has been progressively upgraded since its introduction in 1981.7 A major redesign was undertaken in the late 1980s, which saw the forward fuselage with its MiG-21-style nose intake give
way to one featuring a solid nose—accommodating a more powerful radar— and two lateral air intakes, one on each side of the aircraft. It is this version, the J—8II or J-8B, which continues to serve and has also been the platform for several generations of progressively more capable models. The latest con­firmed variant is the J-8F, which has been equipped with new cockpit avionics, more powerful engines, and a probe for in-flight refueling.8 The most signifi­cant upgrade is the installation of a newer radar that enables employment of the PL-12 active homing radar-guided “fire and forget” medium-range AAM (MRAAM). Although not as capable as the most modern aircraft in its arsenal, these late-generation J-8s provide the PLAAF another, presumably cheaper, platform capable of using its most up-to-date air-to-air weapons.

JH-7. The JH-7 Flounder is an indigenously designed twin-engine attack fighter that entered PLAAF service by 2004.9 The current production model is the JH-7A, equipped with improved radar, digital flight controls, and modernized cockpit instrumentation. The aircraft’s empty weight has been reduced via utilization of composite materials and the number of stores hard – points increased from 7 to 11. The JH-7A can be equipped with navigation, targeting, and data link pods mounted under the forward fuselage and is capa­ble of carrying a wide array of land attack and maritime strike weapons of both Chinese and Russian origin. It, too, has been photographed carrying the PL-12 MRAAM. There are reports that a second update, the JH-7B—with improved engines and some radar signature reduction—is under development, although no solid evidence of this has yet appeared.

J—10. The J—10 is a single-engine multirole aircraft developed by Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation (CAC). First flown in March 1998, the J-10 reportedly entered PLAAF service in 2003. A tailless design with canard foreplanes, the J-10 strongly resembles the cancelled Israeli Lavi fighter though it is unclear how much design assistance, if any, CAC received from either Israel or Russia (although the latter has to date provided the J-10’s engine). It has 11 weapons stations and has been photographed with what appear to be navigation and targeting pods mounted ventrally just aft of the underslung air intake, and with a removable fixed air refueling probe on the starboard side of the fuselage. Around the time that the first J-10s were being deployed by operational units, development began on an upgraded version of the aircraft. Dubbed the J-10B, the new model features a simplified engine inlet ramp that reduces weight and improves the aircraft’s radar signature. The J-10B also adds an electro-optical targeting system (EOTS), visible as a bulge forward and to the starboard side of the canopy. Featuring an infrared search and track (IRST) sensor and a laser rangefinder, the EOTS allows a pilot to passively detect and target enemy air­craft without requiring telltale signals from the J-10’s radar.

Su-27SK/UBK, J-11A. The first variants of the Sukhoi Flanker to join the PLAAF were the single seat Su-27SK and the two-seat operational trainer, the Su-27UBK.10 These were also the first fourth-generation combat aircraft to enter PLAAF service when they appeared in the mid-1990s. Initially, the PLAAF purchased its Flankers from the Russian production line, but these have been supplemented over time by more than 100 aircraft built from Rus­sian-supplied kits by Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC), aircraft that are designated J-11A. Chinese assembly of these J-11A kits was ended about half­way through the planned 200 aircraft run because PLAAF requirements had reportedly evolved such that the single-role air superiority Su-27/SK/J-11A no longer suited the service’s needs. As originally built, China’s Su-27SK/J-11 fighters can carry neither the Chinese PL-12 nor the Russian R-77 (AA-12) active-homing MRAAMs. There are, however, reports that at least some of these aircraft have been fitted with the radar modifications needed to fire the R-77/AA-12. Like the J-10B, all Flankers feature an EOTS mounted in front of the canopy. In an intriguing development, the PLAAF apparently sent sev­eral Su-27/J-11 aircraft to Turkey in October 2010 to participate in an exercise called “Anatolian Eagle.” This is the first time a NATO country has hosted an exercise that included the PLAAF.11

J-11B. The J-11B is SAC’s response to the PLAAF’s requirement for a true multirole Flanker variant. Based on the Su-27SK airframe, the J-11B fea­tures Chinese-manufactured engines and avionics, including indigenous radar, and can be armed with a wide variety of air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons, including the PL-12 MRAAM. Among other improvements, SAC claims that the radar cross-section of the J-11B has been reduced by 75-80 percent from the Su – 27SK by reconfiguring the engine intakes and employing radar-absorbing paint. This degree of signature reduction may strain credulity absent more substantial changes to the airframe, but the assertion alone indicates that the PLAAF under­stands the advantages afforded by stealth. The J-11B appears to have entered PLAAF service in 2007. A two-seat version, the J-11BS, is under development.

Su-30MKK. The Su-30MKK is yet another derivative of the Flanker family, a two-seat multirole aircraft developed from the Su-27 for the PLAAF. China has reportedly purchased 76 of these Russian-manufactured fighters, which incorporate improved avionics, including a more advanced radar with improved air-to-ground capabilities. The Su-30 can be fitted with a wide array of “smart” and “dumb” weapons and munitions, and it also features a retract­able refueling probe. Licensed production of the Su-30 in China was once expected but now appears unlikely, with the two-seat J-11BS potentially occu­pying what might otherwise have been the Su-30’s “strike fighter” niche in the PLAAF force structure.12

China’s Fifth-Generation Fighter (J-20).13 The first public flight in Janu­ary 2011 of a stealthy new Chinese fighter, the J-20, came as a surprise to many observers who had agreed with then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates that China would “have no fifth-generation aircraft by 2020” and only “a handful” by 2025.14 The flight took place while Gates was in China, an irony that may or may not have been intended by the Chinese.

The J-20 appears to be a large airplane, estimated to be about the size of an F-111 by at least two analysts. Its appearance shows that substantial care was taken in the design to shape the jet for low observable (LO) char­acteristics.15 At this point, all performance specifications are wholly specu­lative, but the J-20 is thought to have two internal weapons bays and to be capable of “supercruising” flight. In both regards, the aircraft resembles the USAF F-22.

Some accounts report that J-20 prototypes had been flying at a PLAAF test center for several months before the fighter’s official debut in January, and that a total of four airframes are being used in the test program.16

Late in 2009, the PLAAF’s deputy commander, General He Weirong, said that a new fighter would soon “undertake its first flight” and be in ser­vice “8 to 10 years” after that.17 This schedule would appear to bring the jet into service around 2016, earlier than previous intelligence assessments had projected.

H-6. The H-6 Badger is the PLAAF’s only true bomber, a twin-engine medium-range aircraft copied from the Soviet Tupolev Tu-16 of the mid – 1950s, with which it shares the same Western reporting name, Badger. The H-6 has been built in a number of versions for both air force and naval use since its first delivery in 1969.18 The newest versions in PLAAF use are the H-6G, which is the carrier platform for China’s first air-launched land attack cruise missile (LACM), the KD-63, and the H-6K, which can carry up to six smaller Tomahawk-like LACMs. The H-6K in particular appears to be a fairly radical reworking of the Badger, with modern turbofan engines appar­ently replacing the less powerful and less efficient turbojets that powered all previous models, composite materials being used to reduce weight, a modern “glass” cockpit installation, improved avionics, and a thermal-imaging sensor under the nose.

Special Purpose Platforms. The PLAAF has long sought to acquire an airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) platform along the lines of the U. S. E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). A program to buy four A-50I aircraft—a Russian Il-76 Candid airframe equipped with Israeli radar and mission equipment—collapsed in 2000 when Israel suc­cumbed to substantial U. S. pressure and dropped out of the deal. After this disappointment, China moved forward with its own aircraft, also based on the Il-76 platform, but with an indigenously developed mission suite. At least four of these KJ-2000 AWACS aircraft are in active service with the PLAAF, provid­ing it with its first sophisticated airborne battle management assets.19

Another area of interest to the PLAAF is aerial refueling, which is a necessary competence if China intends to extend the reach of its airpower beyond its immediate environs. Today, the PLAAF possesses a fairly rudi­mentary capability, owning about a dozen H-6U tankers equipped with a “probe and drogue” refueling pod under each wing. Relatively few of China’s combat aircraft can be refueled in the air: some late-model J-8s have probes fitted, and a fixed probe can be installed on the J—10. The PLAAF’s Su-30s have retractable refueling probes, but their system is allegedly not compatible with the H-6U.20

In 2005, China ordered 34 additional Il-76 Candid transports and four Il—78 Midas tankers from Russia, but none have been delivered to date due to a dispute between the Russian export company and the factory responsible for building the aircraft.21 The PLAAF needs not only additional tankers but also more strategic airlifters—if not from Russia, then from its own aviation indus­try—to achieve any aspirations it might have for possessing a credible power projection capability. In fact, a new large transport aircraft, sometimes called the “Y-20” is reportedly under development; a first flight “around 2012” has been suggested.22

The PLAAF has also developed about a dozen specialized platforms based on the Y-8 four-engine turboprop transport.23 The “Gaoxin” series includes another AEW&C aircraft, a maritime surveillance variant, an air­borne command post, and a number of platforms for various electronic war­fare functions, such as jamming and signals intelligence (SIGINT).

Unmanned Aerial Systems. Table 8-3 lists unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) deployed or under development in China. They range from a copy of the Vietnam-era U. S. Firebee reconnaissance drone to the Xianglong high-alti­tude long endurance (HALE) UAS that bears a passing resemblance to the U. S. RQ-4 Global Hawk.

In the past decade, China has displayed a dizzying array of various UAS models at air and trade shows; many if not most seem never to have gone into production. A look at the table suggests that China is experimenting with many classes of UAS, mostly for surveillance and reconnaissance. Of particular interest is the Harpy, an Israeli-made antiradiation drone. It flies to a target area and loiters until an appropriate target begins to emit, at which point it dives into the target and detonates. Harpy is an interesting hybrid of UAS and cruise missile, somewhat akin to the cancelled American AGM-139A Tacit Rainbow program of the late 1980s.

Air-to-air missiles: Table 8-4 lists air-to-air missiles (AAMs) in service with the PLAAF. As can be seen, for many years the PLAAF was equipped with obsolete AAMs. Through to the mid-1980s, the most common missile in its inventory was the PL-2, a Chinese copy of the Soviet AA-2 Atoll AAM, itself a copy of the first-generation U. S. AIM-9B Sidewinder. But, in the early 1990s, this began to change. Along with Russian Su-27s came modern Rus­sian missiles: the R-27/AA-10 Alamo radar-guided medium-range air-to – air missile (MRAAM) and the R-73/AA-11, short-range AAM (SRAAM), which at the time was probably the best visual range “dogfight” missile in the world. As well, China developed two indigenous infrared homing SRAAMs, the PL-8 and PL-9. The PLAAF fielded its first indigenous MRAAM, the PL-11 semiactive radar homing missile, developed from the Italian Aspide (which Beijing had purchased in small numbers) around the turn of the cen­tury. Along with its Su-30s, China procured a number of R-77/AA-12 “fire and forget” MRAAMs from Russia. Shortly thereafter the PLAAF also began fielding the PL-12, an indigenous active-homing MRAAM compatible with most of its modern fighters.24

Both the AA-11 and the PL-9 are reportedly compatible with helmet – mounted sights, which allow the missile to be locked onto an air target when the pilot looks at it. When combined with the missile’s “off boresight” capabil­ity—it can be fired at targets to one side or another of the launching aircraft up to some specified limit—the sighting system streamlines the engagement dynamics of close-in aerial combat.

Looking ahead, it has been reported that China is working on at least three new AAM designs: an extended-range ramjet powered version of the PL-12, a short-range active radar homing missile, and the PL-ASR, an IR mis­sile employing thrust vector controls which would provide greater agility to the weapon.25

Air-to-surface missiles: Table 8-5 lists air-to-surface missiles (ASM) reportedly fielded by the PLAAF. They range from the Hellfire-class AR-1 to the HN-1, a Tomahawk-like long-range cruise missile (LRCM). In addition to these missiles, China is also beginning to deploy laser- and satellite-guided bombs, although it is not clear whether they are yet available in operationally significant quantities.26

Surface-to-air missiles. The PLAAF operates China’s long-range strate­gic surface-to-air missiles (SAMs); as table 8-6 shows, these are a mix of indig­enous and Russian designs. While the HQ-2 is obsolete, the HQ-9, HQ-12, and SA-300 variants are all very capable systems. Of particular interest is the HQ-12, which appears to have been designed expressly to attack AWACS – type aircraft and jamming platforms; it is unique in being a surface-to-air anti­radiation missile (ARM). The table includes the new S-400 SAM system that has entered service in Russia. No exports of this very long-range SAM—the intended successor to the S-300 series—are as yet reported, but China, which is said to have paid for a substantial portion of the system’s development, is likely to be an early customer for it.

Measuring Up: The PLAAF’s Equipment versus the United States

Consider the circumstances had U. S. and Chinese fighter pilots encountered one another in the skies near Taiwan in 1995. The American would have been flying a fourth-generation F-15, F-16, or F/A-18, armed with AIM-120 advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAMs) and AIM-9L/M short-range air-to-air missiles (SRAAMs). The U. S. pilot would almost certainly have been supported by a controller in an E-3 AWACS, and would have found a KC-135 tanker orbiting nearby in the event that fuel became an issue.

For his part, the PLAAF pilot would most likely have flown a MiG-21 variant without any medium-range missiles, being armed instead with only obsolescent PL-2 or PL-5 short-range IR weapons. While a ground control­ler back on the mainland would have helped manage and inform the PLAAF pilot’s sortie, that controller’s picture of the relevant airspace would have been substantially inferior to the one being monitored inside the AWACS as it cruised high above. And there would have been no tankers available to pro­vide additional fuel should that have been necessary or desirable. In short, the Chinese airman would have been flying an obsolete aircraft carrying anti­quated missiles, have modest situational awareness, and, as is discussed else­where, would himself have been the product of inferior training and prepara­tion compared to the U. S. pilot. Thus, he would have been overmatched and outgunned.27

Now fast-forward 15 years. While the U. S. pilot would most likely be in essentially the same plane with essentially the same weapons and essentially the same support, the picture on the PLAAF side would be very different. Consider the following changes:

The PLAAF Now Has Platforms Comparable to U. S. Platforms

The PLAAF’s Su-27/J-11s are often compared to the U. S. F-15, the J—10 to the F-16, and the Su-30 to the F-15E. As table 8-7 shows, these compar­isons are not far-fetched; though hardly identical, the two sides’ jets clearly seem to fill parallel slots in their respective force structures.

The similarities between each side’s “fourth-gen” fighters go beyond static comparisons of size and payload. Plotted in figure 8-2 are two factors for each of eight aircraft: weight-to-thrust and wing loading. The first shows the relation­ship between an aircraft’s weight and the power of its engines, and the second the relationship between its weight and the surface area of its wings.28 These fac­tors help determine a fighter’s maneuverability in both the horizontal (banks and turns) and vertical (climb and dive) dimensions. Lower is better for each factor, so the farther down and to the left an aircraft lies, the better.

Unsurprisingly, the USAF F-22—seen in the figure’s lower left corner— is superior on both counts; in the upper right are the F-16C and the F/A— 18E/F, which trail the pack in these two regards. Clustered in the middle are five aircraft, the F-15C, F-15E, F-35, J—10, and J—11, which are in more or less the same neighborhood on these two important characteristics. While weight – to-thrust ratio and wing loading vary over the course of a mission as fuel is burned and ordnance expended, these platforms themselves start out broadly similar in these important factors.

The J-10B and Flanker variants are equipped with passive IRSTs. These sensors can permit a pilot—without emitting a radar signal— to detect another aircraft by “seeing” the heat from its engines, the friction produced as it moves through the air, or the heat signature from the launch of a powered missile. Sukhoi claims that the OLS-35—developed for its Su-35 advanced Flanker— has a front hemisphere detection range of 50 kilometers (30+ miles), and as much as 90 kilometers (55+ miles) in the rear hemisphere, where it is “look­ing” at the hot exhaust of a target aircraft.29 While the OLS-27 and OLS-30 that equip China’s Su-27/J-11s and Su-30s, respectively, are less capable, it is worth noting that no current generation U. S. fighter has an IRST at all, not even the F-22.30 The forthcoming F-35 (now in advanced flight testing) will mount an IRST, and programs are underway to retrofit both the F-15C and F/A-18E/F.31