Category The Chinese Air Force

The beginning of World War II saw German airpower applied at the operational level of war with stunning results. On September 1, 1939, Germany unleashed Blitzkrieg on Poland. The Luftwaffe began the operation with massive air attacks on airfields and other military targets across the country. Although the Polish air force fought with skill and bravery, it was quickly overwhelmed by superior numbers. Soon afterwards the Polish army buckled under the coordi­nated onslaught of hundreds of Panzer tanks and Stuka dive-bombers.24

This campaign first showed the world what synergies were possible in coordinated air and ground operations. Interdiction bombing made it impos­sible for the Poles to move troops in the open, and German armored forces quickly advanced, enveloping the Polish formations. At that point, close air support (CAS) was instrumental in crushing Polish efforts to break out of the encirclements. By the end of September, the Polish army and air force had been destroyed and Warsaw bombed into capitulation. But the small, ill-equipped Polish air force was no real challenge to the Luftwaffe—the real test came the following spring in the Battle of France.25

In May 1940 the German Army overran Luxembourg and drove multi­ple spearheads into the Netherlands, Belgium, and Northern France. As in the Polish campaign, the Luftwaffe struck airfields hard and fast, destroying a large percentage of French and Belgian aircraft on the ground. The Germans used the vertical dimension in novel ways, dropping airborne forces to seize key bridges on the Meuse and behind Dutch defenses in the canal country, and car­rying out a bold glider assault, landing on the roof of the Belgian fort of Eben Emael to unhinge defenses there. Meanwhile, Stuka dive-bombers pounded French, British, and Belgian forces ahead of German armor divisions as the Panzers plunged into Belgium and France. The results in this campaign resem­bled those in Poland the previous September. In the face of a rapid, coordi­nated assault, the defenders buckled physically and morally. The campaign was over in 6 weeks. Although Germany employed airpower similarly in subse­quent campaigns, often achieving tactical success, its ability to translate those achievements into strategic effects diminished as the war progressed.26

In the summer of 1940, with the continental Allies in Western Europe defeated, German leaders began planning operation “Sea Lion,” the invasion and conquest of Great Britain. Such an effort would have presented a unique challenge for German campaign planners in terms of their ability to inte­grate Luftwaffe operations with those of two other services, but their ability to meet that challenge was never tested. Before the German army and navy could launch a cross-channel operation with any chance of success, the Luft­waffe would have to neutralize Britain’s RAF and win command of the air. It failed to do so.

The Luftwaffe launched the main air assault on August 13. Although it gave the outnumbered RAF a considerable pounding for several weeks, the British held on tenaciously, rationing Fighter Command’s limited resources in a sector defense scheme made possible by the use of radar to detect incoming attackers and direct fighter interceptions.27 Even so, the Luftwaffe still might have exhausted RAF resistance had not Adolf Hitler, in a fit of pique in early September, redirected the German air effort away from the RAF bases and against London instead, in an effort to break British resolve with terror bomb­ing. That effort failed as well. By September 17, it was clear that the Luftwaffe would be unable to secure the skies over Britain and the English Channel and Hitler “postponed” plans for Sea Lion.28

Blunted in the west, Germany turned east once more in 1941, unleash­ing Blitzkrieg on the Soviet Union. As in previous campaigns on the continent, the Luftwaffe quickly decimated Soviet airpower, destroying 1,200 aircraft the first day alone. Moreover, the Red Army, immense but stripped of compe­tent leadership in Stalin’s recent purge, lost more than 50 divisions in the first three weeks of battle.29 Yet despite the fact that the Germans drove the Red Army from Poland to the outskirts of Moscow over the course of a few short months, the Soviet will to resist never wavered. The Russians held out, rebuilt their army and air force (with considerable U. S. material support), and turned the tide, eventually driving the Wehrmacht to Berlin and destroying it with the Soviet Union’s own doctrine for integrating airpower with ground forces at the operational level of war—deep battle.30

A more balanced mix of strategic and tactical airpower application char­acterized the Anglo-American airpower experience in World War II, though American and British thinking sharply differed over the fundamental nature of strategic air operations. Soon after the United States entered the war in Decem­ber 1941, the U. S. Army Air Forces (the USAAF, established in 1941 from the prewar U. S. Army Air Corps) had its opportunity to put its strategic bombing doctrine in action. With France fallen, Britain driven off the continent, and the Soviet Union refusing to allow Allied personnel on Soviet territory, the U. S. Army had no immediate foothold from which it could launch an operation against German ground forces, and the only way the United States could strike at its principal European enemy was to join the RAF in the strategic bombing of German industry.

As a result, prewar Air Corps doctrine was the guiding principle when four former ACTS faculty members drafted Air War Planning Document 1 (AWPD-1), the blueprint for U. S. participation in the bombing campaign—the USAAF would use high-altitude, daylight precision bombing to attack Germa­ny’s industrial web. Such an approach was inconsistent with that used by the RAF, which had already tried daylight bombing and switched to nighttime area bombing after suffering unbearable losses. However, the two doctrines were not incompatible, and the Anglo-American Allies eventually agreed to a Com­bined Bomber Offensive (CBO) in which the USAAF would bomb by day and the RAF by night, thereby putting the maximum pressure possible on Germa­ny’s industrial infrastructure and the forces defending it.31

Thus began the first sustained test of the strategic bombing theories developed between the wars.32 Over the next 3 years, the Allies dropped over 2.7 million tons of bombs on industrial targets, first in German-occupied West­ern Europe and later in Germany itself. While the British effort was devoted to crippling German industry by area-bombing urban areas and industrial centers, the USAAF, guided by ACTS industrial web theory, sought to bring German war production to a halt by using precision bombing to destroy key nodes in the system. While they were confident in their ability to do this, the question that arose repeatedly throughout the war was, just what were the key nodes on which German industry most depended? Opinions differed over the course of the strug­gle, and though target lists never focused on one category exclusively, the weight of effort shifted from the aircraft industry in early 1943 to ball bearing plants later that year. In early 1944 the bombing came to focus more heavily on trans­portation and other targets in preparation for the Normandy invasion. Mid-1944 saw a shift once again to steel and, most significantly, synthetic oil production. While the destruction of none of these targets succeeded in bringing Germany’s industrial production to a halt early enough to end the war before its armies were defeated on the ground, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) later concluded—both from physical and documentary evidence, and from the interrogations of key German military, civilian, and industrial leaders—that the attacks on fuel production had the most dramatic impact. Indeed, some analysts have since argued that strategic bombing might have had war-winning effect if synthetic fuel production had received a far greater weight of effort earlier.33

Strategic bombing was by no means the only way airpower was employed in the western theater in World War II. Beginning with the 1943 North Africa campaign and continuing with the invasions and reconquest of the European continent, airpower provided essential support to ground operations in all the basic missions pioneered in World War I: reconnaissance, air superiority, close air support, and interdiction. Along the way—and often through costly errors, such as the debacle at Kasserine Pass in North Africa, which resulted in airmen being given greater responsibility and authority in the conduct of air-ground operations, based largely on earlier RAF experience in the Western Desert— the Allies learned important lessons that became central tenets of U. S. Air Force and RAF doctrine in future years.34 Chief among them was that airpower must never be divided into “penny packets” and dispersed to the control and support of individual ground commanders. Rather, its control must be cen­tralized under the command of an airman, the only military professional who could be entrusted to sufficiently understand its unique properties and employ it effectively, to allow for the most flexible employment and the most effec­tive massing of force against key targets. Most importantly, command of the air is essential: air superiority is a prerequisite for effective surface operations. Though controversial at the time, both of these tenets have endured and are accepted as core prerequisites even today, in the era of hyper-jointness charac­teristic of contemporary American and coalition military operations.35

The air war in the Pacific theater yielded similar lessons, though it unfolded in an order opposite that in Europe. With Japan having captured a broad defensive perimeter of islands in the first months of the war, its home islands were protected by an expanse of ocean that exceeded the range of U. S. bombers. Consequently, the USAAF was first tasked with providing support to Chinese forces in their struggle against the Japanese army on the Asian main­land and to U. S. Army and Marine ground operations in the systematic recon­quest of islands in the southwest Pacific. By late 1944, however, the Marianna Islands had been recaptured and bases built on Guam, Saipan, and Tinian, put­ting Japan in striking range of B-29 heavy bombers.

Once again, ACTS industrial web theory-based Air Corps doctrine guided the effort, at least initially. For the first several months, the USAAF’s XXI Bomber Command attempted high-altitude daylight precision bombing with high explosives, but the characteristically strong winds found at altitudes above 30,000 feet (the so-called “jetstream” blowing west-to-east over Japan and the Pacific) and Japan’s dispersal of industry rendered that approach inef­fective. Therefore, in March 1945 the XXI Bomber Command changed tactics, resorting to nighttime raids at low altitude using incendiaries on urban cen – ters.36 The results were devastating. Over the next 5 months, B-29s dropped 104,000 tons of bombs, destroying an average of 40 percent of the built-up areas in Japan’s 66 largest cities.37 Yet despite this horrific pounding, Japanese leaders were unwilling to accept Allied demands for unconditional surren­der until after the USAAF dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima on August 6 and Nagasaki on August 9. The surrender finally came on August 14, 1945. In the eyes of U. S. airmen, theories espousing the employment of airpower as an independent war-winning weapon had finally been validated.

The Asia-Pacific region is in the midst of fundamental change, with sig­nificant implications for long-term strategic stability. The gradual expansion of China’s long-range precision-strike capabilities is altering the regional strategic landscape. The PLA Air Force and Second Artillery are making modest prog­ress in developing advanced capabilities with an eye toward expanding their operational range into space and into the Asia-Pacific region. For the PLA Air Force, the ability to carry out strategic strike missions at ranges of 3,000 kilo­meters (1,860 miles) or more is viewed as the key to becoming a truly indepen­dent service, rather than one dependent on the Second Artillery or a support­ing player to the ground forces. Despite the PLAAF’s aspirations to develop a force capable of an independent air campaign around China’s periphery and speculation of subordination of Second Artillery conventional ballistic mis­sile units to the PLAAF, senior PRC political and military authorities will likely continue to rely on the established capabilities of the Second Artillery for coer­cion, strategic strike missions, and suppression of enemy air defenses for some time to come.124

Due their speed, precision, and difficulties in fielding viable defenses, these systems—if deployed in sufficient numbers—have the potential to pro­vide the PRC with a decisive military edge in the event of conflict over terri­torial or sovereignty claims. Reliance on ballistic missiles and extended-range LACMs incentivizes other militaries to develop similar capabilities.

The rapid deployment of ballistic missiles and GLCMs has dampened the requirement for an offensive-oriented air force. Another possible constraint has been the limitations of China’s aviation industry and its corresponding re­liance on foreign procurement of key systems. Nevertheless, over the coming decade, a more capable, technologically advancing domestic aviation industry may be better positioned to support the PLAAF’s vision of becoming a world – class service capable of conducting air campaigns independent of the Second Artillery.

Beyond force modernization programs in India and Taiwan, PRC ex­pansion of its aerospace capabilities is at least a partial driver for a modest shift in U. S. defense policies.125 Intended to counter lower end threats, such as those of North Korea and Iran, U. S. missile defenses are likely unable to coun­ter more sophisticated and larger Chinese ballistic missile raids, much less new generation, hypersonic, extended-range flight vehicles.126 As a result, the Unit­ed States and allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region would need to rely on hardening and counterstrikes for defense.

Beijing’s missile-centric strategy presents a number of challenges for re­gional stability. Barring the fielding of effective countermeasures, Chinese con­ventional aerospace power, specifically short – and medium-range ballistic and extended-range land attack cruise missiles, may over time give the PLA a de­cisive advantage in future conflicts around China’s periphery. Barring a vis­ible and decisive American response, the PRC’s successful deployment of an antiship ballistic missile capability could diminish confidence in U. S. security guarantees not only in Taiwan but throughout the region as a whole.

Beijing’s continued theater missile-centric strategy presents challenges that transcend the operational realm. Beijing’s large infrastructure of short – range ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan fosters mistrust and discourages mean­ingful political dialogue that could lead toward a resolution of differences in a manner acceptable to the people of Taiwan and the international community. Beyond Taiwan, Beijing’s continued reliance on and expansion of convention­al theater missiles as the centerpiece of its aerospace power have the potential to create strategic competitions that increase the risks of conflict in the future. Looking out toward the future, PRC success in linking aspirations for integrat­ed aerospace power with operational capabilities over the next 10 to 15 years is far from certain, yet clearly bears watching.

According to PLAAF 2010, the PLAAF currently has a three-tiered verti­cal command structure for its operational forces: PLAAF Headquarters, MRAF Headquarters, and the unit and subunit tier, from air corps level down to pla­toon and even squad level.

PLAAF Headquarters (Й¥) is the highest leadership organization in the PLAAF. Under the leadership of the CMC and the four General Departments, PLAAF Headquarters’ primary missions during peacetime are to manage and over­see air force reform and modernization and to execute direct operational command authority over some PLAAF units, such as the 15th Airborne Corps and the 34th Air Transport Division in Beijing. It is not clear what PLAAF Headquarters’ exact roles are during wartime. Most likely, however, it will be responsible for having full situa­tional awareness, assigning forces to the different theaters, and providing personnel to man the Air Operations Groups in the national-level and theater headquarters.

The seven MRAF headquarters (¥E^¥) comprise the second tier.71 According to the PLAAF, each MRAF is organized according to its missions and battlefield environment. Thus, no two MRAFs are organized exactly the same way. However, each MRAF has subordinate air divisions, SAM brigades or regi­ments, and AAA regiments, as well as radar brigades and regiments, commu­nications regiments and companies, and support units and subunits. Following the PLA’s 2003-2004 force reduction (up to 200,000 personnel), all combat units in each MRAF, with the exception of the 15th Airborne Corps and 34th Air Divi­sion, are now under the direct leadership of the MRAF Headquarters.

The final tier consists of PLAAF units (nPPA) and subunits (^4PA). The PLA defines units as organizations at the corps, division, brigade, and regiment level. For example, air divisions and regiments, SAM brigades, and communications regiments are considered units. The PLA defines subunits (^4PA) as organizations at the battalion, company, and platoon level, with some including even squads. Sub­units can be either permanent, or ad hoc organizations such as communications, radar, vehicle, maintenance, or launch/firing subunits.72 Prior to the 2003-2004 reduction, the PLAAF had 11 corps leader-grade organizations, including the 15th Airborne Corps plus five air corps and five bases (ШШ), which were subordinate to their respective MRAF headquarters and were responsible for directly com­manding the PLAAF combat units (aviation, air defense, radar, etc.) in their area of responsibility. The PLAAF also had two division-level CPs (ШШ№) serving the same function.73 Today, the only corps leader-grade combat organization is the 15th Airborne Corps, which is directly subordinate to PLAAF Headquarters and has three subordinate airborne divisions in the Guangzhou and Jinan MRAFs. As a result of the force restructuring, the PLAAF reduced the grade of the remaining air corps and corps-level bases to either corps deputy leader – or division leader-grade organizations, re-designating them as Command Posts, as shown in table 4-4:74

The air force establishment system (Й¥^$І) refers to the regulations gov­erning establishing the table of organization and equipment (TOE) (ШФІ^Й) for every PLAAF organization. This includes the organizational structure, number or personnel, billets, and equipment (including order of battle) for each unit through­out the PLAAF. The PLAAF bases its establishment system according to three sets of criteria: the time period (В^ШТ), both peacetime and wartime; functions (Щ|ь) and missions (Ji#), both divided into departments, units, and academic institu­tions; and duty status (й&’ЙШ), including either active duty units or reserve units.75

Although not stated, the Headquarters Department’s Military Affairs Department is responsible for managing the TOE, including assigning aircraft tail numbers and military unit cover designators (MUCDs). It also serves as the personnel center for the enlisted force.

Official Chinese military publications define airpower as the overall term for aviation forces belonging to air forces, navies, air defense forces (such as the Russian Protivo Vozdushnaya Oborona [Anti-Air Defense], or PVO), ground forces, and special operations forces.63 In joint operations, airpower is said to be used for high-speed, deep strikes against key targets and to be used first and throughout campaigns to seize control of the skies in support of broader cam­paign objectives. Airpower also is used defensively to protect the ability of an air force to conduct air operations, especially air bases, air defense positions, and radar sites, as well as to protect ground and naval operations.64

PLA publications assert that the struggle for dominance of the battlefield will increasingly consist of an integrated struggle for air, space, information, electromagnetic, and network superiority. Acquiring air superiority is consid­ered a prerequisite in a variety of operations involving all services. By obtaining air superiority, one can restrict enemy air, air defense, and ground force opera­tional movements while ensuring that one’s own ground and navy forces have effective cover from the air to carry out their operations.65 Like the USAF, how­ever, the PLA does not assert that achieving absolute air superiority in all stages of combat and across all battlefields or theaters is necessary. Instead, it aims to achieve enough air superiority to achieve its campaign or tactical objectives.66

Presumably because of reservations about its ability to defeat a qualita­tively superior opponent such as the United States in the air, the PLA places primary emphasis on achieving air superiority by attacking the enemy on the ground and water: enemy forces, equipment, bases, and launch pads used for air raids. Especially at the beginning of a war, the PLA will endeavor to attack enemy air bases, ballistic missile bases, aircraft carriers, and warships equipped with land-attack cruise missiles before enemy aircraft can take off or missile strikes can be launched.67 Another means of achieving air superiority will be to carry out air and land attacks to destroy and suppress ground-based air defense systems and air defense command systems.68 Finally, defensive operations will be an important component of air superiority throughout a campaign.69

In future warfare, space superiority is expected to be crucial for control­ling the ground, naval, and air battlefields. To gain space superiority, offensive and defensive weapons systems will be deployed on the ground, air, sea, and space. Space control operations are said to include space information warfare, space blockade warfare, space orbit attack warfare, space-defense warfare, and space-to-land attacks.70

In struggles for information superiority, the goal will be to control information on the battlefield, allowing the battlefield to be transparent to one’s own side but opaque to the enemy. Methods for achieving information superiority include achieving electromagnetic superiority through electronic interference; achieving network superiority through network attacks; using firepower to destroy the enemy’s information systems; and achieving “psy­chological control.”71

While acquiring electromagnetic superiority is described as a subset of acquiring information superiority, it is treated as a distinct type of operation in PLA publications.72 Methods for obtaining electromagnetic superiority are said to include electronic attack and electronic defense. In electronic attack, “soft kill” measures include electronic interference and electronic deception. “Hard kill” measures include antiradiation destruction, electronic-weapon attack, firepower destruction, and attacks against the enemy’s electronic instal­lations and systems. Electronic defense is simply defending against enemy elec­tronic and firepower attacks.73 The primary targets of EW are said to include command, control, communications, and intelligence systems.74

PLAAF publications describe three major types of air combat opera­tion: air-to-air combat, air-to-surface combat, and surface-to-air combat.75 Air-to-air and surface-to-air operations are areas of traditional emphasis for the PLAAF, but the PLAAF seems to be moving away from focusing on air – to-air operations and toward emphasizing operations to gain air superiority by attacking enemy airfields and controlling the enemy on the ground before resorting to fighting the enemy in the air.76 Air-to-surface operations are con­sidered more effective, less costly, and less reactive than air-to-air operations.77

By the end of World War II, the concept of airpower as an independent strategic weapon was firmly established. Although the CBO’s ultimate effect on the outcome of the war in Europe was indeterminate and military analysts and scholars have since debated what factors were most instrumental in forc­ing Japan’s capitulation, conventional wisdom immediately presumed that stra­tegic bombing had won the war—the atomic bombs had forced Japanese lead­ers to accept unconditional surrender.38 This appeared to be a harbinger of how future wars would unfold. Atomic weapons could only be delivered from the air, and only heavy bombers were large enough to carry them. Consequently, the emerging concept of atomic warfare seemed indistinguishable from strate­gic bombing, and airpower became widely accepted as the independent war­winning weapon that theorists had long claimed it to be.

It is ironic that at a time when the concept of strategic airpower seemed most transcendent, further development of airpower thought would grind to a halt. But that is what happened, largely as a result of the impact on thinking caused by the dramatic advance in destructiveness made possible by atomic and later nuclear weapons. Military and political leaders first saw atomic bombs simply as more powerful ordnance, weapons to be used in future wars to achieve military and political objectives more efficiently. But as USSBS investigators learned more about the extent of destruction wrought on the cit­ies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it became increasingly apparent that atomic bombs were weapons in a totally different class from anything used before. The following year, RAND analyst Bernard Brodie published his now classic book, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, in which he argued that atomic weapons were so potentially devastating that they would change the very nature of war.39 Thirteen years later, with the United States and Soviet Union both possessing growing stockpiles of nuclear arms, Brodie would write:

Perhaps the most elementary, the most truistic, and yet the most impor­tant point one can make is that the kind of sudden and overwhelming calamity that one is talking about today in any reference to all-out or total war would be an utterly different and immeasurably worse phenomenon from war as we have known it in the past.40

Much had changed by the time Brodie wrote those words. Soon after the end of World War II, America’s erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union, had emerged as its rival in the long-term ideological struggle for geopolitical dominance that came to be known as the Cold War. The United States’ monopoly on atomic weapons was curtailed sooner than expected when the Soviets exploded their own atom bomb in 1949, and U. S. leaders were further distressed when the Soviets tested their first thermonuclear device in August 1953, less than a year after the United States had crossed that threshold. Even so, U. S. nuclear capabilities, both in terms of numbers of bombs and of long-range bombers needed to deliver them, suffi­ciently outstripped those of the Soviet Union that the Eisenhower administration opted for a “New Look” policy in which the United States would save money by reducing expenditures on conventional armaments, relying instead on the threat of massive nuclear retaliation to deter Soviet aggression in Western Europe. That meant that defense budgets would be slashed, and most of the remaining money would go into nuclear weapons, heavy bombers, and defenses against Soviet bombers, versus Army and Navy personnel and equipment.

As a result, between 1954 and 1961 almost half of the entire defense bud­get was allocated to the Air Force, with the remaining half divided among the other three services.41 Roughly half of the Air Force budget was, in turn, allo­cated to the Strategic Air Command (SAC), the early Cold War proprietor of the nuclear bombardment mission. Army and Navy leaders protested vehe­mently, of course, but to no avail. Despite the Korean War experience—one in which U. S.-led United Nations (UN) forces helped defend the Republic of Korea in a major conventional war against North Korean and Chinese efforts to unite the peninsula under communist rule—U. S. and British defense plan­ners argued that all future wars would likely swiftly “go nuclear,” and planned their force-structure and defense investment accordingly.

These decisions had dramatic effects on force structure and strategic thinking. The service made heavy investments in long-range strategic bomb­ers and tankers, and crew training and exercises for the units receiving them focused almost exclusively on skills needed to scramble the strategic force, get the bombers across the Arctic, penetrate Soviet airspace, and deliver nuclear ordnance. Conversely, as Air Force planners believed the threat of nuclear retaliation would deter Soviet aggression in Europe, the greatest threat to U. S. national security was a nuclear attack on the homeland by Soviet bombers. Con­sequently, the U. S. Air Force procured a series of fighter interceptors designed to maximize speed for bomber interception in lieu of designs that would have balanced speed, maneuverability, and armament—capabilities needed to make them effective weapons for winning air superiority against other fighters.42 Not even Tactical Air Command (TAC), the organization responsible for provid­ing air support to ground operations, was immune to the prevailing nuclear dogma. Starved of funding and support by an Air Force dominated by SAC bomber generals, TAC procured the F-105 Thunderchief, an extremely fast (Mach 2 capable) fighter-bomber designed to deliver a single tactical nuclear weapon on the battlefield.43

More serious, though, was the effect that this thinking had on Air Force doctrine and strategy. Secure in the conviction that strategic bombing had won World War II and the belief that the next great war, if it occurred, would be won by nuclear bombardment, Air Force strategic thought and doctrine stagnated to the point of virtual paralysis. Air Force education focused on the history of strategic bombardment and largely neglected the other vital lessons learned regarding the use of airpower for CAS and interdiction. At the same time, due to the potential for catastrophic destruction entailed in nuclear war, political leaders concluded that strategy had now become too important an issue to be left in the hands of military professionals. Consequently, the next generation of relevant theories, those addressing such topics as nuclear warfighting, deter­rence, escalation management, and crisis stability, came not from the intellec­tual center at Maxwell Field or anywhere else within the Air Force, but from a group of civilian “strategy intellectuals” at the RAND Corporation and in aca­demia.44 Meanwhile, as political scientist Karl Mueller has noted, SAC planners occupied themselves compiling notional target lists and “continued in general to approach strategic airpower much as their wartime predecessors had during the Combined Bomber Offensive” largely oblivious to the theories and strate­gies debated by prominent intellectuals and political leaders.45

The impacts of these decisions manifested themselves when the United States found itself at war with both conventional and unconventional adver­saries in Vietnam, forcing hard-learned lessons on the national military estab­lishment in general and the Air Force in particular. Although not designed for conventional warfare, the F-105 Thunderchief became the workhorse of the Air Force conventional deep-strike and interdiction missions during the first several years of the war, completing over 20,000 sorties. From a combination of restrictive rules of engagement, poor operational concepts, and inadequate protection of its vulnerable flight control system, almost half of the 833 F-105s produced were lost in the skies over North Vietnam, mostly due to surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and conventional antiaircraft fire. Air-to-air combat also brought some rude surprises. The North Viet­namese air force sought-out U. S. bombers and strike aircraft, but generally avoided combat whenever confronted by Air Force and Navy fighters. When they did confront their American counterparts, however, they often proved more of a challenge than anticipated, particularly early in the war. With U. S. aircrews inadequately trained for air combat, constrained by unrealistic rules of engagement and doctrine, and flying aircraft designed principally for intercepting bombers or conducting nuclear strike missions, they often found themselves at a disadvantage against more maneuverable Soviet-built fighters.

Over time the Air Force reacquired the skills needed for air superior­ity and developed tactics for drawing the North Vietnamese out to fight, ulti­mately achieving a kill ratio of 2-to-1 over their adversaries. That was certainly better than the negative ratio suffered in the first months of the war, but unim­pressive when compared to the 10-to-1 kill ratio achieved in the Korean War. Complicating matters, U. S. air commanders were unable to achieve unity of command, having divided the airspace over Vietnam into six separate “route packages” and parceled out control over them to the Army, Navy, and Air Force, respectively.46

The most serious problems, however, stemmed from the overall con­cept in which airpower was employed to obtain U. S. political objectives in the war. Seeing the conflict as a war of aggression by communist North Viet­nam against a democratic South Vietnam and the southern insurgency purely as a product of northern subversion, U. S. political leaders believed the solu­tion to the challenge lay in compelling Hanoi to cease its aggression against South Vietnam. Air Force leaders, in turn, steeped in a heritage of strategic bombing against industrialized countries, concluded that the most reasonable course of action would be to execute an intense bombing campaign to destroy 94 industrial and transportation targets that they believed would break Hanoi’s will and capability to continue the war. They argued for such a campaign throughout the summer and fall of 1964 and again in February 1965 follow­ing a Viet Cong attack on the U. S. air base at Pleiku. But President Johnson was concerned about the political risks of too forceful an approach and opted, instead, for a more measured strategy.47

In March 1965, under President Johnson’s orders and direct supervision, Air Force and Navy aircraft began Operation Rolling Thunder, a bombing cam­paign designed to gradually escalate in intensity and move progressively north­ward in an effort to interdict supplies headed southward and compel Hanoi to agree to peace. It was an abject failure. By the spring of 1968, U. S. aircraft had flown over 300,000 sorties and dropped over 860,000 tons of bombs, but had failed to interdict enough supplies to prevent communist forces from launch­ing a major offensive during the Tet holiday.48 More importantly, after 3 years of bombing, communist leaders in Hanoi remained as intractable as ever, vow­ing to continue the war until the United States left and Vietnam was reunified. Before the end of the year, Johnson announced that Rolling Thunder would soon end and he would not seek reelection as president.

Despite the discouragements encountered in Vietnam, the Air Force learned a great deal there that would make it much more effective in future conflicts. Old lessons were relearned, such as the need for skills and tactics for winning air superiority and the vital importance of unity of command. And while the Air Force continued to believe that the key to victory in war against an industrialized state would be the independent application of airpower, Air Force doctrine came to acknowledge that close air support and interdiction would also be important missions in future wars.

All of these insights had implications for force structure. Painfully aware of its technical inadequacies at the beginning of the war, the Air Force learned lessons in combat that informed designs for new, much more capable fighters, such as the F-15 Eagle, F-16 Fighting Falcon, and a plane specifically devel­oped for supporting ground operations, the A-10 Thunderbolt II (nicknamed the “Warthog”). By the end of the Vietnam War, the Air Force was fielding its first laser-guided munitions, making interdiction strikes against bridges and railroads much more effective and far less costly in planes lost and aircrew killed or captured. And as North Vietnam, with the Soviet Union’s material and technical support, developed what was then the world’s most sophisticated air defense system integrating fighter defenses with radar-cued, antiaircraft artil­lery and SAMs, the U. S. Air Force developed suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) systems and tactics to defeat the new threat.

Many of these emerging concepts and capabilities came to bear when the North Vietnamese army launched a major conventional invasion of South Vietnam in the spring of 1972. By then the bulk of U. S. ground forces had been withdrawn from the conflict under President Richard Nixon’s “Vietnamiza – tion” program, but U. S. airpower was still available, and the President ordered it to support the badly battered Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Operation Linebacker, an interdiction campaign put together to carry out that order, imposed a terrible toll on the communist invasion force.

Over the next several months, with U. S. and South Vietnamese air sup­port, the ARVN withstood the initial onslaught, fought the communists to a standstill, and began pushing the invaders back until Hanoi finally called for a halt and agreed to negotiate an end to the war. When those negotiations broke down, President Nixon ordered the Air Force to conduct Operation Linebacker II, the heavy bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong using B-52 Stratofortresses. The Air Force did so from December 18 to December 29, with a 36-hour break for Christmas, flying 741 B-52 sorties, along with 769 sorties flown by other Air Force and Navy aircraft, dropping a total of more than 20,000 tons of bombs.49 The cost was high, with 15 B-52s and 12 other planes lost, but the opera­tion was successful. When the integrated air defense system (IADS) protect­ing Hanoi lost the ability to coordinate its operations and then exhausted its supply of SAMS, North Vietnamese leaders agreed to return to the bargain­ing table and a final agreement was struck a few weeks later. Analysts debate whether that agreement resulted more from the coercive leverage of airpower or the concessions that U. S. leaders made during negotiations, but either way, the United States was out of the Vietnam War.50

Xiaoming Zhang

The rise of China as a global economic and political power in recent years raises concerns for many policymakers, strategists, and scholars about Chinese military modernization—concerns that might provide a new perspec­tive on global security for years to come.1 At the center of this concern is the fact that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force (PLAAF) has gained offensive capability by equipping itself with an increasing number of third – and fourth-generation fighters, airborne early warning aircraft, aerial refueling tankers, intelligence collection and jamming aircraft, and long-range antiair­craft missile systems. But what matters most is not so much the growth of Chi­nese airpower capability per se; rather, it is how China might use its new mili­tary strength, especially its air and naval power. One area of particular interest to defense analysts is the evolving influence of the PLAAF within the PLA and in China’s own national policymaking.

Airpower and its influence have primarily dominated in Western politi­cal thought. Given China’s growing economic and military power as well as changes in its bureaucratic politics, security interests, and technology, it is logi­cal to examine the following concerns as they relate to the PLAAF:

■ concepts for airpower as an instrument of statecraft

■ influence within the PLA and in national policymaking

■ vision of future roles and missions

■ organization, leadership, personnel, and doctrine

■ capabilities

■ political and military implications of all of the above for Taiwan and the United States.

In 2007, a U. S. Army War College and National Bureau of Asian Research project, Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China’s Military, produced two separate studies of the latest development of the PLAAF and its growing capability.2 Using different methodologies, these two studies—one a scenario-based approach to articulate impending developments of the Chinese air force, and the other focused on institutional and doctrinal developments since the 1990s—addressed concerns such as the PLAAF’s current status and influence within the PLA and what role the PLAAF currently plays in national policymak­ing. The studies contend that perceptions of the international threat environment, technological limitations, lack of advanced aircraft, and budget concerns would act as constraints on the PLAAF’s modernization efforts, and any significant prog­ress in force modernization would take at least 10-15 years to reach.3

This chapter is inclined to argue that while the PLAAF is transforming, the PLA’s political culture and organizational system pose a serious challenge to China’s current effort to embrace an air force that is capable of both offensive and defensive operations, and especially to the PLAAF’s own ambition to “bear the brunt of the operations, and play a sustained, independent role” in modern warfare. These challenges include the PLAs and PLAAF’s tradition, percep­tion of itself and each other, older way of doing things, outdated organizational structure, and limited funding under the current system. The PLAAF’s current development is about more than changing doctrine and buying advanced sys­tems. An appropriate organizational change is necessary. It will take far longer to nourish an institutional culture that enables the PLAAF to embrace both offensive and defensive capability as an independent strategic force.

Analyzing the current and future state of PLAAF modernization neces­sitates examining the historical development of the Chinese air force and its experiences (during the Korean War, the 1950s Taiwan Strait crises, and the air defense engagements against Nationalist and American intrusions); it also requires an examination of the historical evolution of the political culture of the PLAAF over the years, including utilization of the senior leadership’s mili­tary thought as guidance to keep the development of the air force politically correct and thus reliable. It is against this historical background that the author has made his assessment of the current development of the PLAAF. The con­clusion following from this is that the army-dominated organizational system and the emergence of different services’ cultures continue to limit the PLAAF’s influence within the PLA, its relationship with other services, and the role it currently plays in national policymaking. This situation exists despite China’s experiencing profound changes in bureaucratic politics, in its security inter­ests, and in its technology and military capabilities.

The PLAAF’s education and training system (ЙМЛІШФФ1) consists of three main components: leadership and management system (^й^вїИФФІ); academic institution professional military education (PME) system (ідіЛКФФІ); and flight training system (^ТЛНШФФІ).76

The leadership and management system has five tiers: PLAAF Headquar­ters, MRAF Headquarters, corps, division (academic institutions, aviation troop training bases, brigades), and regiments. The Military Training Department (¥-ЩЛШМ / ¥ЛНнР) in the PLAAF Headquarters’ Headquarters Department is the highest organization for leading PLAAF education and training. Each of the other four tiers has an equivalent department for leading training at their level.77 Significantly, however, the Political Department’s Cadre Department (ШпнРТнРнР), not the Military Training Department, is responsible for manag­ing the Defense Student program.78 Based on a review of PLAAF-related books, journals, newspapers, and Internet articles, it appears that the Headquarters Department in each MRAF Headquarters and the 15th Airborne Corps Head­quarters has a Training Division (iJII^F,^); some divisions and brigades have a Training Office (ІЛІШ4), while others have a combined Operations and Train­ing Office (1ТШ4); and all regiments have a combined Operations and Training Branch (1TJJ№). There are no training organizations below the regiment level.

The PLAAF’s PME system is different from the USAF system. Basically, the United States Air Force Education and Training Command (AFETC), one of the USAF’s major commands, is responsible for enlisted and officer basic educa­tion, specialty training, and PME, throughout the member’s career. The excep­tion is the U. S. Air Force Academy (USAFA), which is a Direct Reporting Unit (DRU) under Headquarters Air Force. Upon graduation from USAFA, the new officers receive their specialty training under AFETC. The differences between the PLAAF and USAF education and training systems for enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and officers are both numerous and signifi­cant. For example, whereas the USAF conducts basic training for all of its enlisted members at Lackland Air Force Base, the PLAAF does not train its new recruits and conscripts (who serve for 2 years) at a single location.79 Instead, they receive basic training at their operational unit or at a technical training unit. All PLAAF basic training occurs between early December and late January and the instruc­tors are assigned by that unit on a temporary basis. Upon completion of basic training, the new enlisted members either receive on-the-job training (OJT) at their operational base or at the technical training unit.

To achieve promotion, USAF NCOs must satisfactorily complete cor­respondence courses throughout their career, and selected senior NCOs take in-residence PME at a training organization, such as the Air Force Senior NCO Academy, for a few weeks. In contrast, the PLAAF emphasizes lengthier in-res­idence training. It has only one NCO school (specializing in communications), which students attend for 2 years. Several other PLAAF officer academic institutions offer separate 2- or 3-year associates degree programs for NCOs, including the Air Force Engineering University, Aviation University, Radar College, 1st Aviation (Aircraft Maintenance) College, Guilin (AAA and Airborne) College, Xuzhou (Logistics) College, and the 2d Flight College.80 Like the USAF, the PLAAF also provides correspondence courses for its NCOs, where they can receive a high school equivalency degree or an associate’s degree. If necessary, NCOs can attend a short course for squad leaders and for technical training if, for some reason, they did not receive it during their first 2 years as a new recruit/conscript.

The USAF’s officers come from graduates of USAFA, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs, and college graduates who successfully complete a postgraduate Officer Training School (OTS) course. Upon gradua­tion, these officers then receive their specialty training. All officers must have a bachelor’s degree. In contrast, the PLAAF’s officer cadre comes from grad­uates of one of three PLAAF universities and 15 colleges, from Defense Stu­dent programs at 18 civilian universities, or from directly-recruited civilian college graduates with a science or engineering degree. The PLAAF ceased directly recruiting enlisted personnel as officers in the early 1980s. All cadets who attend a PLAAF academic institution also receive their technical training and are assigned directly to their operational unit upon graduation. Students who graduate from the Defense Student program or who are directly recruited after graduation are assigned to their operational unit, where they receive OJT.

USAF officers must complete PME correspondence courses at each level to be competitive for promotion. Some, though not all, officers also have the opportunity to attend in-residence courses sponsored by the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base. These programs include the 6-week Air and Space Basic Course for second lieutenants, 5-week Squadron Officer School course for captains, 40-week Air Command and Staff College course for majors and major selectees, and the 44-week Air War College course for lieutenant colo­nels and colonels. Some officers also have the opportunity to attend joint insti­tutions such as the National War College, or specialized training such as the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. Students in these courses come from all specialties, as well as from other service branches and selected civil­ians in government service. In addition, the Air Force Institute of Technol­ogy (AFIT) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base provides a variety of graduate programs in science and technology-related subjects. Some USAF officers are sponsored to attend nongovernmental academic institutions such as the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University or other civilian insti­tutions, with majors ranging from military history to aerospace engineering.

Currently, the PLAAF’s officer PME academic education system is divided into two levels of education: basic and specialized education and advanced education (S^SW).81 Whereas all cadets who attend a PLAAF college, including pilots, receive both their basic education and specialty train­ing before they graduate, Defense Students do not receive any technical training until after they graduate. Pilot cadets who are selected from high school grad­uates receive 30 months of basic education at the Air Force Aviation Univer­sity (Й¥^Й^^). Upon completion, they are assigned to the university’s flight training base or to one of seven flight colleges, where they complete 6 months of flight training in a basic trainer and 12 months in an advanced trainer. Depend­ing on the type of aircraft they will eventually fly at an operational unit, they are then assigned directly to an operational base or for 1 year to one of seven tran­sition training bases. Pilot candidates who were recruited from PLA or civilian college graduates receive 2 years of training that includes basic flight theory and flying time in a basic trainer and advanced trainer. After graduation, they are then assigned to one of the seven transition training bases for 1 year.

Nonaviation PLAAF cadets receive basic education either at the Air Force Engineering University (AFEU) or at a PLAAF specialty college. Those finishing AFEU are then assigned to one of the PLAAF’s colleges to complete their specialty training and a bachelor’s degree. Cadets who do not attend AFEU remain at the same college to complete their specialty training and receive either a senior technical (associate’s) or bachelor’s degree. Upon grad­uation, all new officers are assigned to their permanent unit, where the first year is considered a probationary (Я^) period, during which they spend the first 6 months as a squad (enlisted troop) leader.82 Prior to graduation, some Defense Students spend a short period of time at an operational unit observing the daily activities. Upon graduation, Defense Students have several options, including attending graduate school. If they do not attend graduate school, they are assigned either directly to an operational unit or to a training organization where they receive specialty training. With the exception of new graduates who serve in remote areas, the first year is a probationary (Я^) period.83 Almost all Defense Student graduates serve in technical, rather than command, billets.84

Advanced education for intermediate – and senior-level PLAAF officers (lieutenant colonels, colonels, senior colonels, and major generals) is conducted in only a few military academic institutions. Only selected officers have the oppor­tunity to receive advanced PME or a graduate degree. For example, command track officers receive 1 year of intermediate – and senior-level PME at the Air Force Command College (Й¥1н№^й), which does not award a graduate degree, while some technical officers attend specialized programs for 2 to 3 years in various PLAAF colleges, such as AFEU, the Air Force Radar College (Й^га&^й), or Xuzhou Air Force (Logistics) College (ШИЙ^^й), to obtain graduate degrees. Certain command track officers, such as radar and SAM commanders, can attend specific graduate programs in a PLAAF college or a civilian university where they receive an advanced degree. Some officers (senior colonels and major generals) receive their senior-level PME at the National Defense University (ИШЛ^).

The PLAAF’s various academic institutions are organized into two basic categories: flight colleges and all others.85 Each category has three main compo­nents: a command element ($й^ЛЙ), administrative departments (ШП), some of which also provide certain types of training, and academic departments (^).86

Flight training for all new high school graduates or enlisted personnel selected for pilot training begins at the Air Force Aviation University (Й^^ЙЛ ^), which was created in 2004 by combining the Changchun Flight College (R# ЛТ^й), 7th Flight College (Щ^ЛТ^й), and the 2d Aviation (Aircraft Mainte­nance) College (Щ“^Й^й). All new flight cadets spend their first 30 months at the university, where they receive their basic education. They then transfer to one of the seven numbered flight colleges for 18 months to receive their flight training.87

The Aviation University, which is located in Changchun, Jilin Province, has a commandant (RR), PC, and at least two deputy commandants and one deputy PC. The university has a Training Department (Х)\ШМ) that serves as well as the Headquarters Department. It also has a Political Department (&)n Ш), College/School Affairs (й#Ш / Й^Ш), and Scientific Research Depart­ment (HWH).88 The Scientific Research Department is responsible for over­seeing all of the institution’s technical training curricula and systems research work.89 The Training Department and Scientific Research Department also have subordinate classrooms and laboratories, where personnel from the departments provide training to the cadets. The College/School Affairs Depart­ment is responsible for managing facilities and logistics issues.

All seven of the PLAAF’s numbered flight colleges are division leader-grade organizations and are structured similarly to an operational air division, with a command staff plus four administrative and functional departments—Headquar – ters Department, Political Department, Logistics Department, and Equipment Department. Rather than academic departments, each college has a subordinate basic trainer regiment and one or more advanced trainer regiments. Table 4-5 shows the flight colleges, their location, and the types of personnel they train.90

Upon graduation, the pilots from the 1st and 2d flight colleges are assigned directly to their operational units. Pilots graduating from the other five colleges are assigned to one of the PLAAF’s seven transition training bases for about 1 year. Upon completing transition training, they are then assigned to their permanent operational unit, where they transition into that unit’s air­craft. Some of the graduates from the five colleges that train fighter pilots tran­sition into multirole or ground attack aircraft.

The PLAAF’s nonaviation colleges are organized differently from its avi­ation colleges. They each have a command staff, 2-5 administrative and func­tional departments, academic departments, and cadet teams.91 As shown in table 4-6, all nonaviation academic institutions have at least a Training Depart­ment and Political Department (ШпнР). Depending on the institution’s mis­sion, location, and curriculum, other administrative departments include a College/School Affairs, Basic Department (вїїнР), and/or Scientific Research Department. The Basic Department is responsible for providing instruction in certain required basic education courses that all undergraduates must take regardless of their specialty.92 The protocol order for the five departments is Headquarters, Political, College/School Affairs, Basic, and Scientific Research.

Each institution has several academic departments and associated spe­cialties, which prepare graduates to assume their operational duties. For exam­ple, the PLAAF’s Surface-to-Air Missile College (№Й^#^[й) has six academic departments—Command Engineering, Computer Engineering, Electro­Mechanical Engineering, Radar Engineering, Guided Missile Engineering, and Systems Engineering—and 12 academic specialties.93

Depending upon the academic institution, undergraduate students/cadets (^M) and graduate students are grouped into various organizations,

which are typically subordinate to the academic department to which they are affiliated. These include the student group (^M^PA), which is a battalion-level organization; student companies (^йй); student teams (^MKPA / ^MPA); and student squads (^Mffi). Of note, within the PLA, a cadet’s graduating class year is based on the year training begins, not the year of graduation. For example, the cadets who began training in summer 2010 are identified as the class of 2010. The reason for this is that not all cadets receive a 4-year degree. In addition, their total time-in-service includes their cadet time, not just their active duty time, once they become an officer.

Scientific Research System

The PLAAF’s scientific research system is incor­

porated into the broader Chinese research, development, and acquisition (RDA) structure.94 According to PLAAF 2010, RDA of a specific weapon or system usually involves multiple phases of development and related activ­ities by different organizations within and outside of the PLAAF. China’s RDA process allows it to plan properly and to lay a solid foundation for PLAAF modernization programs. Under the overall guidance of the GAD, the PLAAF Headquarters’ Equipment Department is responsible for over­seeing all of the PLAAF’s equipment and weapons systems development.95 The process involves the following sequential phases: Demonstration/ Development and Evaluation (iUffi); Proposal (Й"Щ); Engineering Develop­ment (ifMWfiJ); Design Finalization (ШТ^М) and Production Finalization (±^^M).96 Before the RDA process actually begins, preparatory research takes place for the chosen area of development under the official rubric “National Defense Science and Technology Preparatory Research.” Research­ers examine ongoing technology efforts that could meet operational require­ments and evaluate candidate technologies that could possibly mature into useful weapons.97

In February 2004, PLAAF Headquarters formally established the Air Force Equipment Research Academy (S^S^W^K), consolidating admin­istration of more than 20 PLAAF scientific research organizations.98 The acad­emy is a corps deputy leader-grade organization.99 Its administrative depart­ments include the Science and Technology (S&T) Department (ДЙН), Political Department (ikinH), and Academy Affairs Department (K^H).100 The S&T Department serves as the Headquarters Department, and the Acad­emy Affairs Department most likely manages the facilities. The academy has about 1,500 S&T officers and 490 senior technical billets.

A review of the academy’s activities since 2004 indicates at least two rea­sons the PLAAF, along with the PLA Navy and Second Artillery, created their own equipment research academy. The first was consolidating management of all RDA under a single organization. The second reason was to deal with the GAD and government RDA organizations on a more equal basis.

The academy has a dozen primary functions and responsibilities for equipment and weapons systems research and development (R&D/W$[I), which involve tracking foreign development of new military technology, equipment, and weapons systems; serving as the PLAAF’s top level organiza­tion for equipment and weapons system design, system development, regula­tions, and planning for new systems, modifying older systems and special-use equipment; and conducting research for the operational use, maintenance, and technical support for new and modified equipment.101 Some of the subordinate institutes are shown below.102 The research institutes are either division – or reg­iment-level organizations.103

■ Air Force Equipment General Demonstration (Development and Eval­uation) Research Institute a regiment-grade

organization, has an Organization and Plans Division (ШАра+£№), Political Division (Й/п&), and Management Division (®Щ&), and nine research labs (ШЙЙ)104

■ Air Force Aviation Equipment Research Institute (Й¥^Й^^ЭДЙ№), a division-grade organization, has an S&T Division (ДЙ&), Political Department (ШпнР), and Management Division, and several subor­dinate research institutes and labs105

■ Air Force Ground Air Defense Equipment Research Institute (Й¥±№

a regiment-grade organization, has an S&T Division, Political Division, and Management Division, six research labs, and one testing workshop (й$[№Й)106

■ Air Force Radar and Electronic Countermeasures Research Institute

a division-grade organization, has an S&T Division, Political Department, and Management Division, and sev­eral research labs107

■ Air Force Communications, Navigation, and Command Automation Research Institute (Й¥®1ШЩ^^1н№Шй1ЬЭДЙ№), has a General Office (ІЇ&Ш), several research labs, and a services subunit (Mi^^PA)108

■ Air Force Reconnaissance and Intelligence Equipment Research Institute (Й

with three research labs and a testing workshop109

■ Air Force Weather and Chemical Defense Research Institute (^ЩНМ PMhW^fff), which has an S&T Division, Political Department, and Management Division, as well as four research labs110

■ SAM Technical/Technology Services Research Institute (Щ#Й^Ш^ЭД

W111

■ Air Force Equipment Software Testing and Evaluation Center

(^ШШШПФй).112

Political Work System

The PLAAF’s political work (ШпІ"№) system mirrors the PLAs overall polit­ical work system.113 The PLAs political work system is the means through which

the Chinese Communist Party guarantees absolute control over the military. The PLAAF political work system consists of six main elements integrated into every organization within the PLAAF Party Congress system: Party Committee system; Party Congress system; political officer system; political functional and administra­tive department system; discipline inspection system; and judicial system.114

Chinese military publications identify four types of air force campaigns: air offensive campaigns, air defense campaigns, air blockade campaigns, and airborne campaigns. These can be either air force-only campaigns or, more frequently, air force-led joint campaigns that incorporate other services. These air force campaigns can also be part of broader joint campaigns, such as an island-landing campaign or joint blockade campaign. In all air operations, a great deal of emphasis is placed on surprise, camouflage, use of deception, meticulous planning, and strikes against critical key points.

An air offensive campaign can have one or more of several objectives: obtaining air superiority; destroying key enemy political, military, and eco­nomic targets; destroying the enemy’s transportation and logistic supply sys­tem; and destroying the enemy’s forces to isolate the battlefield and facilitate PLA ground and maritime operations. Obtaining air superiority is needed in order to conduct air strikes against targets, but the principal objective of an air offensive campaign is to strike political, economic, and military targets, rather than simply to achieve air superiority.78

Several types of combat groups are involved in air offensive campaigns: a strike group, an air defense suppression group, a cover group, a support group, an air defense group, and an operational reserve.79 An offensive air campaign is said to consist of four tasks: conducting information operations, breaking through enemy defenses, launching air strikes, and protecting against coun­terstrikes. The first three are generally conducted sequentially, beginning with information operations. The last is conducted throughout the campaign.80

A textbook on military operations lists three primary objectives for air defense campaigns: protecting the capital against air attack, protecting other important targets within the theater, and seizing and holding air superiority.81 Defensive air campaigns, according to Chinese military publications, can be national in scope or can be confined to a particular theater.82 Depending on the circumstances, the entire air effort in a given war could be defensive; a single phase could be defensive; or, in the case of a geographically wide-ranging con­flict, some theaters could be defensive, while others are offensive. In a war over Taiwan, for example, the PLA might conduct an offensive air campaign in the area opposite Taiwan while preparing for defensive air campaigns to the north and south in anticipation of possible retaliation or counterattack by U. S. forces.

Air defense campaigns are described as entailing three types of oper­ations: resistance, counterattack, and close protection. Resistance operations are actions to intercept, disrupt, and destroy attacking aircraft. Counterattack operations are attacks on enemy air bases (including aircraft carriers). Close protection operations are passive defense measures, such as fortification, con­cealment, camouflage, and mobility.83 China’s overall approach to air defense is to combine the early interception of enemy attacks with full-depth, layered resistance to protect targets and forces while gradually increasing the tempo of counterattacks on enemy bases.84

Air blockade campaigns are operations intended to prevent an adver­sary from conducting air operations and to cut off its economic and military links with the outside world.85 Some Chinese sources describe them as simply a special variety of air offensive campaign,86 but most authoritative sources regard them as a distinct type of campaign.87 They will usually be conducted as part of a broader joint blockade campaign but can be implemented as an independent air force campaign. Air blockade campaigns are regarded as hav­ing a strong political nature, being long in duration, and requiring a high level of command and control.88 Typically, an air blockade campaign will entail the establishment of one or more no-fly zones surrounded by aerial surveillance zones.89 Actions conducted as part of an air blockade campaign will include information operations, flight suppression operations, interdiction of mari­time and ground traffic, strikes against the enemy’s counterblockade system, and air defense operations.90

Unlike the U. S. armed forces, the PLAs airborne assault (paratroop) forces belong to its air force. Therefore, an airborne campaign in the PLA is an air force campaign, not a joint campaign. Airborne campaigns are regarded as inherently resource-intensive and difficult to organize and prosecute.91 For an airborne campaign to be carried out, information and air superiority must be seized (at least locally) and firepower preparation around the landing zone must be conducted. Then, air corridors to the landing zone must be opened up and kept clear, and enemy land-based air defenses near the landing zone must be suppressed while airborne forces are flown to the landing zone. Once they have landed, the airborne forces must clear and secure a base for receiv­ing additional forces and supplies, including, if they landed on or near an air­field, seizing the airfield and bringing it to operational readiness. Meanwhile, friendly air and missile forces will suppress and interdict nearby enemy ground forces. Finally, the air-landed forces can initiate ground operations.92

Although any of these four types of air force campaigns can be con­ducted as an independent single-service campaign, they are more likely to be conducted as part of a broader joint campaign, such as an island-landing cam­paign or a joint blockade campaign. Even if an air force campaign is conducted as an independent, single-service campaign, other services, particularly the PLAN and the Second Artillery, are likely to be involved in supporting roles. For example, conventional missiles of the Second Artillery will play a key role in air offensive campaigns, counterattack operations of air defense campaigns, and providing firepower support for airborne campaigns.

Similarly, the PLAN has responsibility for defending certain sectors of China’s airspace and would be the service with primary responsibility for conducting counterattacks against air attacks launched from aircraft carriers and, thus, would likely play an important role in an air defense campaign. The PLAN is also responsible for providing air defense for surface naval forces, including, presumably, a Taiwan-bound invasion force. Little information appears to be available in published Chinese sources, however, on how PLAAF and PLAN aviation and SAM forces would interoperate when conducting air operations—a potentially significant challenge, particularly given the huge engagement envelopes (150 kilometers or more) of the land-based and ship – based SAMs the PLAAF and PLAN have begun acquiring. Conversely, naval strike appears not to be an important mission for the PLAAF, meaning that naval strike operations are primarily the responsibility of the relatively small and less-capable PLAN aviation forces (along with, possibly in the future, the Second Artillery, if it acquires an antiship ballistic-missile capability).

Conclusion

Chinese military publications on air force operations are system­atic and comprehensive. Few militaries in the world have such extensive published documentation on the employment of air forces. The concepts described, moreover, appear to be realistic and practical, drawing on the expe­rience of other air forces in recent conflicts, particularly those of the United States (the PLAAF having had no significant combat experience since the 1950s), but remaining appropriate to the current and near-future capabilities of the PLAAF. Chinese military analysts are clearly engaged in a serious process of developing specific, practical concepts for the employment of China’s air forces.

In addition, although the PLAAF has traditionally emphasized defensive operations, that is no longer the case, and the United States and Taiwan would likely find the PLAAF to be an aggressive opponent in the event of a conflict. The PLA clearly prefers to achieve air superiority by attacking its enemy on the ground or water. Especially at the beginning of a war, the PLA will endeavor to attack enemy air bases, ballistic-missile bases, aircraft carriers, and warships equipped with land-attack cruise missiles before enemy aircraft can take off or missile attacks can be launched. These attacks, moreover, will be carried out not by China’s air force operating in isolation but in coordination with the Sec­ond Artillery’s conventional ballistic and cruise missiles.

By 2015 or so, the weapons systems and platforms that China is acquir­ing will potentially enable it to effectively implement the four types of air force campaigns described in the previous section. The significant numbers of mod­ern fighter aircraft and SAMs, as well as the long-range early warning radars and secure data and voice communication links China is likely to have by 2015, for example, coupled with the hardening and camouflage measures China has already taken, would make a Chinese air defense campaign, if conducted according to the principles described in Chinese military publications, highly challenging for U. S. air forces.93 Similarly, these same modern fighters, along with ground-launched conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, cruise mis­sile-carrying medium bombers, and aerial refueling aircraft, will enable China to conduct offensive operations far into the western Pacific.94

Whether China will actually be able to fully exploit its air force doctrine and capabilities, however, is less clear. Much will depend on the quality of the training and leadership of China’s air force, and it should be pointed out that the PLAAF last engaged in major combat operations in the Jinmen campaign of 1958, more than 50 years ago.