Category SA-2 "GUIDELINE" SAM

As the target was approached the back-seat “Bear” monitored his ER-142 (AN/APR-35) panoramic attack indicator’s three-band displays for signal activity, using his panoramic scope and attack indicator and his AN/APR-26/-36 azimuth indicator and threat lights. His view from the cockpit was extremely limited, so the pilot’s vision ahead was crucial. The Shrike’s nose-mounted seeker also provided the pilot with an effective radar-receiving device. Both men would listen for the high – pitched, rattlesnake-like sound – the “song” of an active “Fan Song” – from 100 miles out. Closer in, if the red azimuth sector SAM launch light came on, the pilot immediately initiated evasive maneuvers.

AGM-78s were launched as soon as there was a valid hostile radar return in order to use the missile’s maximum range, as well as to lighten the aircraft. The pilot climbed in afterburner while the missile warmed up, the round then being “lofted” from a distance of between 25 and 45 miles. A green “missile acquisition” light showed that the weapon had locked onto a radar, and it was launched using the red firing button on the control column. The AGM-78’s motor was ignited via a lanyard coupling, and the missile made a 5g climb before heading for the target. The crew timed its flight against the time a “Fan Song” took to go off the air, thus suggesting a successful hit.

Eleven aircraft had fallen to SA-2s by the end of 1965. A Russian technician reported that, “The most impressive moment was when the aeroplanes were downed.

All of a sudden through this dark shroud an object you couldn’t even see before came down in a blaze of shattered pieces”.

Normally, battery commanders adhered to the Soviet rapid three-missile salvo method that was specifically created to tackle maneuvering targets. However, most of 55

the early kills were against targets flying straight and level at between 18,000ft and 35,000ft. Two of the SA-2 victims in 1965 were Iron HandF-105s flying at relatively low altitudes while searching for SAM batteries. Lt Col George McCleary, CO of the 357th TFS, was killed when his jet (62-4342) was hit by a missile that unexpectedly emerged from the cloud-base near Nam Dinh on November 5. Eleven days later, Capt Donald Green’s Iron Hand flight was on the look out for SAM sites near Haiphong when a quick thinking battery commander detonated an SA-2 close to his Thunderchief (62-4332). Green, from the 469th TFS, managed to nurse his crippled jet out to sea, but he perished when the fighter crashed before he could eject.

These losses prompted new guidance to Korat F-105 crews:

Never fly below 4,500ft AGL, except when evading SA-2s. Turn into the missile and descend. “Fan Songs” take up to 40—45 seconds to re-acquire an aircraft after the lock is broken, giving the F-105 time to escape. Never fly over an undercast (cloud-base) in a known SAM threat area.

Seeing the cloud of orange-brown smoke and dust kicked out by a SAM on launch was often a pilot’s best warning, but a Mach 3 SA-2 emerging from cloud after shedding its booster had a less visible smoke trail, allowing only seconds for evasion.

The extremely hazardous anti-SAM strategy known as Iron Hand, which was officially initiated on August 16, 1965 with F-105s, demanded the employment of new tactics. The initial response, however, was conventional. Following the F-4C shoot-down on July 24, 1965, the US government sanctioned retaliation with the commencement of Operation Spring High three days later. Some 54 F-105s from the 18 th, 23rd and 355th TFWs, supported by a further 58 aircraft, struck SAM Sites 6 and 7, and their barracks areas, using bombs, rockets and napalm, but with disastrous

results. Capt “Chuck” Horner was flying an 18th TFW F-105D when he saw “Bob Purcell’s F-105 (62-4252 Viet Nam ANG) rise up out of a cloud of dust with its entire underside on fire, roll over and go straight in. We were doing 650 knots, carrying cans of napalm that were limited to 375 knots! I looked out to the left and saw anti­aircraft artillery lined up in rows with their barrels depressed, fire belching forth”.

Capt Purcell’s was one of six F-105Ds lost on that mission. Four fell to the 120 anti-aircraft guns in the area and the remaining pair crashed after Capt William Barthelmas’ damaged “Thud” (61-0177) became uncontrollable near his Thai base (Ubon) and collided with an escorting F-105D (62-4298) flown by Maj Jack Farr.

Both men were killed. More bad news followed, as reconnaissance photographs showed that Site 7 — manned by the 236th Missile Regiment — had been evacuated, while the “missiles” at Site 6 were fakes. Both “batteries” had been set up as flak traps in what was to become a familiar North Vietnamese tactic.

As previously mentioned, the USAF’s first official Iron Hand strike was flown on August 16, 1965, although Maj William Hosmer had led a dozen 12th TFS F-105s against SAM Site 8 three days previously. There were no losses on this occasion, but again the site was empty. This attack preceded a short period when Iron HandF-105s were placed on ground alert to respond quickly to SA-2 threats. An attack on September 16, led by Lt Col Robinson Risner, on a site near Thanh Hoa used two Iron Hand flights, with the lead F-105s loaded with napalm and the wingmen carrying 750lb bombs. Risner usually dropped napalm on the “Fan Song” vans while his wingman climbed in afterburner and then dive-bombed the missile batteries. On that raid two 67 th TFS F-105Ds, including Risner’s 61-0217, were shot down.

Iron Hand flights were soon attached to all strike missions in high-threat areas from Rolling Thunder28/29 (August 20) onwards as North Vietnam’s SAM network rapidly expanded. From November 1965 F-105s made low-level approaches to SAM sites with a “pop-up” climb to 4,000ft to launch 2.75in. high-velocity aerial rockets.

The first Wild Weasel III-1 F-105Fs arrived at Korat RTAFB in great secrecy in May 1966. As a 13th TFS flight within the 388th TFW, the Weasels accompanied all the wing’s important strike packages in hunter-killer teams (F-105Fs paired up with F-105Ds) against SA-2 sites around petrol-oil-lubricant and transportation targets.

Of the flight’s 12 assigned F-105Fs, only one (63-8286) was lost when Maj Roosevelt Hestle and Capt Charles Morgan (“Pepper 01”) were hit by 57mm AAA during an Iron Hand attack on a site near Thai Nguyen on July 6. The blazing aircraft flew into a hillside, killing both crewmen — Capt Morgan duly became the first F-105F EWO casualty of the conflict.

In January 1967, the 13th TFS flew Iron Hand alongside 354th TFS Weasels in support of Operation Bolo (an elaborate combat “sting” that saw F-4 fighters of the 8 th TFW concealed within a radiated image that simulated bomb-laden F-105s in an effort to trick VPAF MiGs into combat) and the ongoing heavy strikes on North Vietnam’s industrial facilities.

Eight months later, on August 11, 13th TFS commander Lt Col James McInerney and his EWO Capt Fred Shannon were awarded the Air Force Cross for their actions

during a mission against the Paul Doumer Bridge. Braving extremely heavy AAA and 5 7

three SA-2s, they successfully eliminated three SAM sites without loss. This crew pioneered the Weasel tactic called “trolling” in which the F-105 flight flew about ten minutes ahead of the main force to search for missile sites without interference from airborne jammers. This tactic evolved into a pattern of two elements flying “figure – of-eight” orbits near a known site, with one pair of F-105s always heading towards the missile battery to threaten it with Shrikes.

The 13th TFS was a casualty when the 388 th TFW shrunk to three squadrons in October 1967 due to attrition, its assets being passed to the 44th TFS, which continued the Korat Weasel duty until October 10, 1969.

At Takhli RTAFB, F-105F Weasels had initially arrived for the 354th TFS in early 58 July 1966. Whereas Korat aircraft were assigned only to the 13th TFS, the 355th

TFW planned a Weasel flight of up to six aircraft for each of its squadrons, beginning with the 354thTFS on July 4, 1966. The latter unit’s Takhli Weasel cadre had lost all four of its original F-105F complement within a month of commencing operations. Two of these fell to SA-2s, Majs Gene Pemberton and Ben Newsom being the first 355 th Weasel loss when F-105F 63-8338 was hit at high altitude on July 23.

“Lincoln” Wild Weasel flight maintain close formation for the benefit of the photographer during Capt Merlyn Dethlefsen’s March 10, 1967 Medal of Honor mission. Capt Gilroy’s name appears on the aircraft’s rear canopy rail, but the pilot’s “name-plate” is incorrectly spelt CAPT M H DETHLESSEN! (Paul

Chesley/USAF) 59

Two were shot down on August 7, as were three F-105Ds. Capts Ed Larson and Mike Gilroy fired a Shrike from F-105F 63-8358 that probably knocked out a “Fan Song”, but they were then tracked by a second site, which they also fired at. Seconds after the Shrike left their aircraft they had to evade an SA-2, but a second “Guideline” suddenly emerged from cloud in front of them and detonated. Usually, successful evasion required 6,000—8,000ft of altitude above the height at which an oncoming missile had first been sighted.

The F-105’s 20mm ammunition drum exploded, filling the cockpit with smoke. Unable to see the canopy jettison handle, Capt Gilroy initiated ejection but stopped the sequence after the canopy had been jettisoned. He could then see a large hole in the wing, and also noted the absence of the top of the tail fin and the aircraft’s nose, but the wounded “Thud” continued to head for the coast at 500 knots. A final flak burst severed a hydraulic line, forcing the crew to eject into the sea for recovery by an HU-16 amphibian. Minutes later a second 354th TFS Weasel (63-8361) was hit by 85mm AAA as it took on a SAM site near Kep airfield, forcing Capts Bob Sandvick and Thomas Pyle to eject into captivity in Hanoi. This left only one Weasel F-105F at Takhli until replacement aircraft arrived. The 355th TFW destroyed several SA-2 sites during the rest of the year.

On December 19, 1967 a 333rd TFS Weasel crew added half a MiG-17 to the two already downed by Weasel F-105s. Majs William Dalton and James Graham (flying F-105F 63-8329 The Protestor’s Protector) used 20mm gunfire to finish off the VPAF fighter after an 8th TFW F-4D crew had damaged it. Dalton reported that he “observed impacts on the left wing and fuselage under the cockpit” before the MiG broke away. This Thunderchief, upgraded to F-105G configuration, was lost on January 28, 1970 during an escort for an RF-4C Phantom II photographing a SAM site. At that time, “protective reaction” missions allowed escorting fighters to retaliate to ground fire. When Capts Richard Mallon and Robert Panek dived to strafe an aggressive AAA site their F-105G was shot down, and an HH-53 helicopter that tried
to rescue them was destroyed by a MiG-21. Both F-105G crewmen and six rescuers were killed, the former reportedly being executed after their capture by North Vietnamese militiamen.

The AGM-45 was vital to the F-105F’s SEAD mission from the outset, although crews quickly discovered that the weapon’s small warhead was effective only against the radar antennas it homed onto. Lt Col Robert Belli recalled, “When we fired at ‘Fire Can’ radars or a SAM site we found that within 24 hours the same site was ‘up’ once again in the general area. We figured all they did was change the antenna”.

Iron Hand jets usually flew about seven minutes (later down to just one to two minutes) ahead of the main strike package in the hope of “bringing up” hostile radar emitters and destroying them before they could threaten the strikers. A four-aircraft flight approached the target at 6,000—9,000ft and around 500 knots, dividing into two elements nearer the target — one monitored potential threat radars while the other suppressed known threats. Weasels tried to be unpredictable in order to outwit the SA-2 batteries, although missile crews could adapt their rigid Soviet training to keep pace with the Weasels moves. Having protected the strike, Weasel crews waited to cover the fighters’ exit, thus living up to their “first in – last out” motto.

Among the early F-105F Weasel pilots was Capt Mike Gilroy, who reported that SAM sites were “extremely difficult to acquire visually and looked just like the villages or jungle close by”. Those pilots with luck on their side might catch sight of a dust cloud as an SA-2 was launched, thus giving them a few precious seconds to take appropriate evasive action before attacking the site.

As the CO of the 469th TFS, Maj Bob Krone played an important role in the early operational integration of the Weasels within the 388th TFW:

As the Weasel aircraft had no range estimation capability, the searching was haphazard and

could not be carefully pre-planned. The SA-2 sites were invariably in heavily defended

areas protecting the “hard” targets. In many areas there was more than one site within range of the Iron Hand flight. This forced the Iron Hand crews to expose themselves to the heaviest concentration of enemy anti-aircraft fire in North Vietnam, in addition to the SAM threat. The use of free-fall bombs or unguided rockets by the strike aircraft necessitated visual acquisition of the site before destruction could be expected. The necessary maneuveres to deliver these weapons also required considerable exposure to enemy defenses.

It was the consensus of pilots of the 469th TFS that the early concept of operations should have been the protection of the strike force through detection and avoidance of SA-2 sites, rather than search and destroy. With the acquisition of the AGM-45A Shrike, there was no longer the requirement for visual acquisition of the target, and the same harassment could be effected without the high degree of risk to the attacking flight. However, the weapon’s small warhead, the inability of the early Shrike to discriminate and track one radar signal and the lack of an adequate tracking flare and spotting charge were limitations to effective Shrike employment.

The last two shortcomings detailed by Maj Krone meant that pilots could not use an AGM-45A Shrike to mark a target effectively, as its flight could not be followed

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visually by either the launch jet or other aircraft in the immediate area. Both areas were eventually addressed with the AGM-45A-2, which boasted a tail-mounted flare and a white phosphorus target marker within the warhead of the weapon.

When attacking a “Fan Song”, the pilot had to fly directly towards the target emitter, using azimuth and elevation indicators and visual clues to identify the radar’s location. Calculating altitude, speed and estimated distance from the target, he could then work out the optimum “loft angle” for the missile by using a kneepad graph. “Lofting” the missile from a 30- to 45-degree climb significantly increased the Shrike’s range and dive impact, and kept the F-105 further from the SAM site. Even so, as F-100F EWO Capt Jack Donovan observed, the Shrike’s range, speed and guidance limitations compared with the SA-2 made the contest “like fighting a long sword with a pen-knife in an elephant stampede”! Donovan was also credited with originating the Wild Weasels long-standing motto, “YGBSM — you gotta be shitt’n me”.

The 1967 Korat Tactics Manual advised that “unless the flight leader knows exactly where the SAM/Tire Can’ is located and can plan a surprise attack, it is generally good practice to initiate an attack with a Shrike to place a tracking radar site on the defensive and buy time for the flight to penetrate the critical zone between the enemy’s maximum and minimum effective range”.

Weasels also flew hunter-killer missions in allocated “free-fire” zones, where they could find targets of opportunity. Some of these were performed at night, often as elements divided into single-aircraft SAM hunts.

After an uncertain start (there was an outbreak of booing from 355 th TFW pilots when it was first announced that pods would replace some of their bombs), all Thunderchiefs were QRC-160-1 pod-equipped by November 1966. The disastrous

losses (72 F-105s in the period April-September 1966 prior to adoption of the pods) over Route Pack 6 were reduced by two-thirds — North Vietnam was divided up into areas of responsibility, or “Route Packages”, by the USAF and US Navy, and their strike aircraft stuck religiously to their assigned “packs”. Col Bill Chairsell, commanding Korat’s 388th TFW, observed, “The introduction of the QRC-160-1 (AN/ALQ-71) pod to the F-105 represents one of the most effective operational innovations I have ever encountered. Seldom has a technological advance of this nature so degraded an enemy’s defensive posture”.

Although most of the 72 losses were caused by AAA, the pods restricted F-105D/F SAM shootdowns to just three between October 1966 and March 1967 — 18 aircraft of other types were downed by the missiles during the same period. One of the three “Thuds” lost was Iron Hand F-105F 63-8262 “Magnum 03”, which was trying to lure an SA-2 site into firing at it on February 18, 1967. The jet took a hit seconds after launching a Shrike from just above a 10,000ft cloud base, Capts David Duart and Jay Jensen (on their 13th mission) becoming PoWs for the next six years.

As ECM pod technology advanced, the effect on SAMs was dramatic. During August 1967 in excess of 65 per cent of the SA-2s launched lost control soon after being fired, and several crashed into Hanoi, causing substantial casualties. In mid – December 1967 the introduction of the QRC-160-8 pod, tuned to the SA-2’s weak

20 MHz downlink beacon signal from a small spiral antenna at the missile’s rear, caused virtually all the SA-2s launched during a five-day period to lose control. And of the 247 missiles fired between December 14, 1967 and March 31, 1968, only three destroyed USAF jets. One of these was 44 th TFS F-105F 63-8312 Midnight Sun, flown by Maj C. J. Fitton and Capt C. S. Harris, who were both killed. Weasel aircraft could not usually carry QRC-160 pods, as they interfered with the aircraft’s other unique ECM systems. 63-8312 was hit by an SA-2 in its starboard wing, the jet disintegrating ten miles from Hanoi as its Weasel flight ran in towards the city.

Soviet technicians responded to the new jamming threat in two ways. Firstly, they advised the batteries to “track on jam”, homing their missiles at the “cloud” of jamming surrounding the enemy formation. The second tactic was to use lesser-known frequencies available for the “Fan Song”, knowing that Shrikes would thereby probably be tuned to the wrong frequency. US Navy cryptological officer Lt Cdr John Arnold, aboard the guided missile cruiser USS Long Beach (CGN-9) sailing in the Gulf of Tonkin, quickly “cracked” the new command codes and frequencies, however, turning the tables in the Weasels’ favour once again.

As well as suppressing SAM sites via EW jamming, the F-105 Weasel flights could adopt their second, more offensive, role. As the 388 th TFW Tactics Manual described it, this allowed “the Weasel flight to direct its entire efforts to seeking out and destroying SA-2 sites or “Firecan” AAA radars”, rather than just protecting the strike force. This technique was first practiced in southern North Vietnam in 1967, but it was also used in Route Pack 6, particularly during Operation Linebacker II.

Takhli’s first Standard ARM-capable F-105Fs went to the 357th TFS in February 1968, and the squadron made the first combat firing of an AGM-78A (Mod 0) on March 10, destroying a “Fan Song”. Three of the five missiles fired on this occasion failed to guide, however. AGM-78B Mod 1 F-105Gs followed early in 1969, and they continued to support post-Rolling Thunder missions in Laos until the 355th TFW ceased combat operations in October 1970. The Weasels then moved to Korat as Det 1 of the 12th TFS, where they combined with survivors from Takhli’s 44th, 333rd and 354th TFSs. Flying a mixed fleet of F – and G-models, Det 1 subsequently became the 6010th WWS, before being redesignated the 17th WWS on December 1, 1971.

The squadron participated in Operation Kingpin on November 20—21, 1970, when the USAF supported US Army Special Forces in an unsuccessful attempt to rescue PoWs (including 47 EWOs) from Son Tay prison. Five Weasels destroyed four SAM sites in the area, with a fifth one being left in a damaged state. During a later
“protective reaction” strike, F-105Gs used AGM-78s to destroy the Moc Chau radar station that was directing MiG activity over Laos.

When the bombing of North Vietnam re-commenced in April 1972, the 17th WWS was reinforced by Det 1 of the 561stTFS/23rd TFW, which flew in from McConnell AFB, Wichita. The North Vietnamese had massively increased their defenses since Rolling Thunder had ended in November 1968, with the Weasels now facing more than 300 SA-2 sites. An April 16 B-52 mission attracted 250 SAMs, and F-105G 63-8342 was lost as it attacked a missile supply depot. Seven F-105Gs were shot down in 1971—72, six of them by SA-2s as Operation Linebacker took USAF strike packages back to the Hanoi-Haiphong area. In several cases the Weasel crews were just about to fire at “Fan Songs” that were tracking them when SA-2s got them first, two losses arising from missiles suddenly emerging from cloud.

However, the destruction was mutual. During Operation Proud Deep Alpha (December 26—30, 1971) Weasels fired 50 Shrikes and ten AGM-78s, knocking out five “Fan Songs” and at least three early warning radar installations.

Not all ARM launches went according to plan, as Maj Murray B. Denton recalled:

Myself and my “Bear”, Russ Ober, were on a night multi-drop B-52 mission. We had gone to the tanker and were orbiting Nakhon Phanom, waiting for our next time-on – target (TOT). Russ was monitoring the AGM-78. As our TOT approached, I started to accelerate to attack speed, and selected my AGM-45 to monitor it inbound to the target. However, when the Shrike was selected the AGM-78 jettisoned from its rack! We finished the mission and returned to Korat, reporting the lost missile. Base personnel at Nakhon Phanom searched their area for two days and finally found the AGM-78 about eight to ten yards from the wing commander’s accommodation trailer. On inspection, a shorted

A camouflaged SA-2 trails its distinctively-shaped tail of fire at dangerously close quarters to this gun-camera “automatic photographer”. During Operation Linebacker II six B-52s were claimed by two sites managed by the 57th and 77th Battalions. Some sites salvoed unguided missiles in the hope of achieving a hit. (USAF)

Strike packages in 1972 used chaff flights to defeat enemy radars and F-4 MiGCAP flights to beat the MiG fighter threat ahead of the main Phantom II strike force. Hunter-killer flights, each with two missile­armed F-105Gs and a pair of F-4Es with bombs and CBUs, flanked the strikers, moving out to take on any SAM sites that posed a threat.

F-4 Chaff flight ^ ^ ^ ^

F-4 MiG CAP

F-4 MiG CAP

F-4 Chaff flight escort

F-105G Hunter-killer flight

F-4 Escort flight

F-4 Escort flight

EB-66 ECM jamming (2-3 aircraft)

EC-121T ‘disco’ MiG watch———– ►

RF-4C Post-strike BDA recce

F-4 Escort for RF-4 recce

<——– KC-135 tankers

68

F-105G 63-8266 White Lightning of the 17th WWS/ 388th TFW is prepared for its next mission at Korat RTAFB in August 1972. This unit replaced the 6010th WWS from December 1, 1971, and continued flying combat operations until October 1974, when the survivors returned to the USA under Operation Coronet Exxon. 63-8266 completed another six years with the 35th TFW (visiting Germany in 1976) prior to retiring to the Mid-America Air Museum in Liberal, Kansas, in 1992. (Larsen/Remington)

and corroded connection was found on the AGM-78 pylon. Needless to say, the entire fleet was checked.

As the North Vietnamese moved south, preparing to invade South Vietnam, their SA-2 batteries followed. They shot down a 17 th WWS F-105G (63-8333) from a position just north of the DMZ on February 17, 1972 and an 8 th TFW AC-130A gunship from a SAM site in southern Laos on March 28. Their main objective was to bring down a B-52, and much Weasel time was devoted to four-hour missions protecting the bombers. “Ambush” sites were cleared in difficult terrain under Soviet direction, and batteries would fire a few SA-2s before hiding in the jungle and moving

on to escape detection. After many attempts the SA-2 finally got lucky on November 22, 1972 when B-52D 55-0110 was hit near Vinh. Dan Barry was leading the Weasel flight of four F-105Gs that night:

The B-52 cell was supposed to ingress from the south-southwest, and we put the 17th WWS element on the right side of its ingress track and the 651st element on the left. Since we were usually down at 15,000ft (about 20,000—25,000ft below the “BUFFs”), we never had a visual on the bombers. We operated individually in an orbit to give optimum positioning for coverage based on the B-52s’ TOT. Unfortunately, they were never on our frequency, so we never received any change in TOT or ingress track, nor could they receive any advisory we’d transmit on SAM signals received.

Although at least one 17th WWS crew fired a pre-emptive Shrike, I don’t believe any of us received a “Fan Song” signal. I recall only one SAM being fired, and it seems to go nearly vertical before exploding at altitude. A short time later we began to hear calls on Guard frequency, with “BUFF” crews trying to make contact with one of the jets in their cell. I remember finally turning towards our egress heading and seeing an explosion at altitude and the flaming wreckage falling nearly 100 miles away.

The B-52D had managed to struggle across the border into Thailand before breaking up. All six crewmen were recovered.

As this incident graphically proved, SA-2 crews had learned how to “burn through” the B-52’s considerable jamming power (particularly the less-protected B-52G) by firing in “track-on-jam” mode when the intensity of the jammers was reduced while bombers were directly above the target, or banking away just after releasing their ordnance. This technique helped them to shoot down no fewer than 16 B-52s and damage nine others during the 11-day Linebacker IIoffensive at year-end.

During this intense period of operations the Weasels used their missiles mainly for suppression as they orbited below the bombers. On the first night of Linebacker II, 47 Shrikes and 12 Standard ARMs were launched at some of the 32 operational SAM sites in the Hanoi/Haiphong area, thus keeping B-52 losses to three jets. Nevertheless, 567 SA-2s were fired during the first three nights as the B-52s flew their predictable routes across Hanoi, exposed to SAMs for a full 20 minutes. The first casualty was hit by two SA-2s fired from Nguyen Thang’s 59th SAM battalion. By the fifth night missile stocks had run very low, and the 36-hour “Christmas truce” was the SA-2 assembly centers’ only chance to replenish sites with more than 100 missiles.

Although only three ARMs definitely “killed” radars during the 11-day onslaught, there were 160 occasions on which radars closed down, probably due to Weasel suppression by F-105Gs (with F-4E Phantom II “hunter-killer” support for some missions) flying race-track patterns on either side of the bomber stream. Five sites were seriously damaged by bombs from designated B-52 or F-111A attacks, with another 15 being knocked out by F-105G/F-4E hunter-killer teams. By the last night of the campaign (December 29/30) hardly any SAM radar emissions were detected. Six more sites were hit by F-111s and two by B-52s, including SA-2 assembly facilities 70 near Phuc Yen and Trai Cam.

Any discussion of the relative success of the SA-2 in North Vietnamese service compared with US attempts to defeat it is inevitably clouded by the “fog of war”. In most cases, hits by SA-2s were observed by other crews in an American attack formation, but occasionally the speed of the interception, separation of the victim aircraft from other flight members or the wide range of other threats at the time convinced pilots that they had been hit by AAA or MiGs. “Over-claiming” was also a factor in all aspects of the air war, with several SAM sites sometimes laying claim to the same “kill”, or claiming a damaged aircraft as destroyed.

However, the constant depredations of the WildWeasels throughout the war steadily reduced the effectiveness of the SAMs. In 1965 SA-2s were able to destroy one aircraft for every 15 missiles launched. By the end of 1968 this ratio had dropped to one in 48 missiles fired, and the best result during Operation Linebacker IIwas one in 50, despite a huge increase in the number of SAM sites, and in the mobility of SA-2 batteries.

For the Weasel force the price of success was considerable. Between December 1965 and the last F-105G combat sortie in August 1973, two F-100Fs and 46 F-105F/Gs had been lost in the process of destroying or disrupting hundreds of SAM sites. Of these, seven F-105Fs and seven F-105Gs were attributed to SA-2s. In the same period the SA-2 force downed 19 F-105Ds, 15 of them in 1967 alone. Nine were destroyed in the intense attacks between October 27 and November 19, 1967 during strike or Iron Hand sorties at 10,000—20,000ft in daylight. Between November 17 and 19 ten of the 17 US aerial losses were caused by SA-2s. Total losses to SAMs in 1967 were 62 — by far the highest toll of the war years apart from 1972, when no fewer than 72

aircraft were downed in the final onslaught, including 17 B-52s. The latter was the highest loss figure to SAMs for any USAF type that year, exceeding the 14 losses of the far more numerous F-4 Phantom IIs.

Thirty-four F-105F/G aircrew members were killed in action and 22 became PoWs. The cost to SA-2 troops is unknown, but the frequent hits by cluster bombs and other ordnance must have taken many lives.

Overall, fixed-wing US losses to SAMs amounted to 205 (against North Vietnamese claims of 1,293 kills), including nine forward air control aircraft and one AC-130A to hand-held SA-7 “Grail” short-range missiles. Although this is a comparatively small proportion of the 3,322 losses (with 3,265 fatalities) to all causes, the effect of the SAM threat has to be measured in terms of its deterrence and disruption too.

The addition of SEAD flights to every strike in a high-threat area added to the cost and complexity of the missions, and diverted aircraft that could have been used to bomb primary targets. Aircraft ordnance pylons that could have carried extra bombs had to take ECM pods instead, or AIM-9 missiles to tackle MiGs. More importantly, the presence of SA-2s caused many strikes to be partially or wholly aborted as the attackers evaded interception. Indeed, many B-52 Arc Light missions were recalled prior to Linebacker II, when SA-2 sites were moved into Laos and southern North Vietnam. SAC was understandably anxious to preserve the myth of invincibility
surrounding its primary nuclear bomber, and it did not want the communist world to see that its ECM protection was not completely SA-2 proof.

For the F-105 and F-4 strike packages of Rolling Thunder, the only defense against imminent MiG or SA-2 interception was the jettisoning of ordnance to provide the speed and maneuverability to give the pilot a chance of escape, thereby negating the purpose of the mission.

In the two peak years of activity, SA-2 sites engaged US aircraft on 1,104 occasions in 1967 and 1,135 times in 1972. However, they too paid heavily. Of the 95 batteries of SA-2s (7,658 missiles) provided by the Soviet Union, only 39 remained in January 1973, with a little over 800 missiles available — some of which were unserviceable.

Another 200 were destroyed on the ground. Although US pilots reported almost 9,000 SA-2 launches, some could have been multiple reports of the same missiles for the North Vietnamese recorded only 5,800 launches.

The growth of North Vietnam’s air defense network was rapid, beginning with a few P-8 and P-10 early warning radars in 1961 and expanding to 22 sets by early 1964, with a large number of AAA guns with “Fire Can” (SON-9) and “Whiff” fire control radars to guide them. The first SA-2 site was detected by a US Navy RF-8A Crusader on April 5, 1965, and 63 others had been identified by the end of that year. This figure had risen to 150 by the end of 1966, and they were used by 30 SA-2 batteries travelling between the sites.

Despite the urgency generated by Brig Gen Kenneth Dempster’s anti-SAM program in the late summer of 1965, no F-105F Wild Weasels were available for deployment to Thailand until May 1966. The systematic training of Wild Weasel tactics also began at this time too with the introduction of four-week courses at Nellis AFB’s 4537th Fighter Weapons Sschool. Unlike the SA-2 crews in-theater, the early Weasels were using largely untested equipment and evolving tactics in situ, with a small number of aircraft and crews facing highly experienced Soviet missile operators with plentiful supplies of a battle-tested missile system.

Only 63 F-105Fs were converted to WildWeaselconfiguration, including the two prototypes. Of these, 11 were combat losses and four were destroyed in operational accidents from a total casualty figure of 46 F-105F/Gs involved in anti-SAM activity and five during other attack sorties.

When the first F-105G shoot-down occurred on January 28, 1970, 28 F-105Fs, including two Combat Martin and three “Ryan’s Raiders” aircraft, had already been

lost, denying them to the WildWeasel conversion program. In addition, around 15 jets were retained in the USA for training and test work. With a total production of 143 F-105Fs and no prospect of extra F-105G batches, the pressure on the small Weasel force was considerable, particularly as its intended replacement, the F-4C WildWeasel IV, proved to be less capable than the F-105G.

Their sortie rates were impressive. Between March 1, 1967, and March 31, 1968 (one of the most difficult phases of Operation Rolling Thunder), 931 Iron Hand sorties were flown, 1,146 AGM-45 Shrikes were fired and 370 “Fan Songs” were claimed as destroyed or damaged. In return only two F-105Fs were lost in specific Wild Weasel missions at that time, but 12 other F-105Fs were destroyed in “hunter-killer” SAM attacks on 40 sites, and no fewer than 85 F-105Ds were downed, some also during Iron Hands. Additional to the destruction of “Fan Songs” was the even more important suppression element in the Iron Hand/Wild Weasel effort. USAF evaluators estimated that SA-2 launches decreased by up to 90 per cent when F-105Fs were on station.

During Linebacker II, in support of 741 B-52 sorties, USAF and US Navy SEAD aircraft fired no fewer than 421 Shrikes, half of them pre-emptively (to force “Fan Songs” to close down), and 49 AGM-78s against an estimated 200 SAM launchers. Only two AGM-78s and one Shrike were confirmed hits on “Fan Songs”, but SAM radars were closed down on 160 occasions, reducing the destructive effect of many of the 850 SA-2s launched.

An increased use of pre-emptive launches also accounted for 320 of the 678 Shrikes fired in the period April-October 1972, when only one definite hit (and 59 “possibles”) was recorded. The 230 AGM-78s fired during that period scored two definite kills and 37 possible hits, but reduced the 388 th TFW’s stock of the missiles to 15 by the fourth night of the campaign, increasing the need for CBU-carrying F-4Es despite heavy cloud cover on several nights. Although 380 of these launches in all were calculated as “misses”, their effect in shutting down enemy radars was considered valid, reflected in the steady decline in the rate of aircraft losses to SAMs throughout the war.

The SA-2 regiments were also running very short of missiles by the fifth night of the campaign. Once sites had fired their complement, new SA-2s had to be fetched by transloader vehicles from depots that were hidden in urban areas around Hanoi and Haiphong, and there were very small stocks of ready-assembled missiles left by the end of December 1972.

While pre-emptive launching had been the basis of the US Navy’s SEAD policy throughout the conflict in Vietnam, the USAF continued to rely on specialized Wild Weasels as a surer means of identifying, suppressing or destroying sites. In the words of the 388th TFW Tactics Manual:

The actual destruction of SA-2 sites is normally of secondary importance in the suppression role, and would not normally be carried out unless a particular site could be destroyed without sacrificing the protective suppression the strike force requires from other threatening sites. However, for particular targets, SA-2 site destruction may be the

best and most permanent form of suppression. 75

When Congress finally withdrew funding for military activity in Southeast Asia on August 15, 1973, the 12 F-105Gs of the 561st TFS Det 1 returned to George AFB, California, under Operation Coronet Bolo IV, joining the 35th TFW. The aircraft remained in service with the group until 1978, when conversion to the F-105G’s successor, the F-4G Phantom II began. After 17 Thunderchief years, the 561st TFS’s F-105Gs were passed to the Georgia Air National Guard’s 128th TFS in 1979-80. Following two years of refurbishment, the veteran aircraft flew on until May 25, 1983 when the last 128th TFS Wild Weasel (63-8299) was retired, thus ending 20 years of

ANG F-105 service.

A second unit, the 562nd TFS, was formed at George AFB with F-105Gs of the 17th WWS upon their return from Korat RTAFB in October 1974. This squadron ended the aircraft’s TAC active – duty career on July 12, 1980.

The F-105G’s intended replacement, the F-4C Wild Weasel IV, which was scheduled to deploy to war in June 1966, was delayed two years by severe problems associated with the installation of the F-105’s anti-SAM equipment within the Phantom Il’s denser internal structure. Despite their lack of AGM-78 Standard ARM capability, some of the 36 modified F-4Cs operated with the 67th

TFS at Kadena AB, Okinawa, from October 1969. During Operation Linebacker II, six jets were deployed to Korat RTAFB, claiming three SAM sites and three “probables”.

Several F-4D Phantom IIs received the Bendix AN/APS-107 RHAW system and ER-142 receiver, providing crucial AGM-78 capability, but the USAF abandoned plans for 90 F-4D Wild Weasels in favor of the F-4E Advanced Wild Weasel V. With a new AN/APR-38 (later AN/APR-47) radar warning and attack system, the aircraft was able to deliver AGM-45, AGM-78, AGM-88A HARM and AGM-65 Maverick missiles. F-4Gs were among the most effective weapons during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, flying with the 561st TFS until 1996. The role then passed to the less capable, pod-equipped F-16CJ.

The SA-2 “Guideline” continued in service after the North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam in 1975. Although the USSR began to replace some of its 400 S-75 batteries in the late 1970s, it continued to update the missile in many modified and refurbished variants. Whereas the F-105 was only ever used by the USAF, the SA-2 became the most extensively exported system of its kind, with more than 20,000 missiles supplied to 30 users.

The SNR-75M3 “Fan Song E” was the final production variant, accompanying the SA-2E Mod 4 missile. It added two parabolic scanners above the box-like horizontal Lewis scanner housing, providing Lobe-On-Receive-Only (LORO) capability, which greatly improved the unit’s ECCM flexibility. Post-war, Vietnam continues to obtain most of its defense equipment and training from the USSR, including, in 1993, the advanced SA-10C (S300 PMU1) “Grumble” SAM.

The SA-2 was an important weapon during the Middle East wars of the 1970s and the Iran-Iraq conflict in the 1980s (when it was still in production), as well as Desert Storm in 1991 — SA-2 batteries were among the 600 Iraqi missile units facing Coalition strike aircraft. Finally, it played a role in the various conflicts in the Balkans through to 1999.

BOOKS

Anderton, David, Republic F-105 Thunderchief (Osprey Air Combat, 1983)

Bamford, James, Body of Secrets — Anatomy ofthe Ultra-secret National Security Agency (Doubleday, 2001) Broughton, Col Jack, Thud Ridge (J. B. Lippincott Company, 1969)

Broughton, Col Jack, Going Downtown — The War Against Hanoi and Washington (Orion Books, 1988) Campbell, J. and Hill, M., Roll Call — Thud(Schiffer, 1996)

Colvin, John, Twice Around the World (Leo Cooper, 1991)

Davies, Peter E., Osprey Combat Aircraft 84 — F-105 Thunderchief Units ofthe Vietnam War (Osprey, 2010) Davis, Larry and Menard, David, Republic F-105 Thunderchief (Specialty Press, 1998)

Davis, Larry, Wild Weasel — The Sam Suppression Story (Squadron/Signal Publications, 1986)

Eschmann, Karl J., Linebacker — The Untold Story ofthe Air Raids over North Vietnam (Ivy Books, 1989) Fitzgerald, Frances, Fire in the Lake — The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam (Little, Brown and Company, 1972)

Geer, James, The Republic F-105 Thunderchief, Wing and Squadron Histories (Schiffer, 2002)

Hewitt, Maj William A., Planting the Seeds of SEAD (Air University, USAF, 2002)

Hobson, Chris, Vietnam Air Losses (Midland Publishing, 2001)

Jenkins, Dennis R., F-105 Thunderchief, Workhorse ofthe Vietnam War (McGraw-Hill, 2000)

Lashmar, Paul, Spy Flights ofthe Cold War (Sutton, 1996)

McCarthy, Brig-Gen James R., Linebacker II—A View from the Rock (Air War College, 1979)

McNamara, Robert S., In Retrospect — The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (Times Books, 1995)

Michel, Marshall L., The 11 Days of Christmas (Encounter Books, 2002)

Momyer, Gen William W., Airpower in Three Wars (University Press of the Pacific, 1982)

Plunkett, W. Howard, F-105 Thunderchief — A 29-Year Operational History (McFarland and Co., 2001)

78 Pocock, Chris, 50 Years ofthe U-2 (Schiffer, 2005)

Price, Dr. Alfred, War in the Fourth Dimension (Greenhill Books, 2001)

Rasimus, Edward J., When Thunder Rolled — An F-105 Pilot Over North Vietnam (Smithsonian Books, 2003) Rock, Col Edward T. (Ed.), First In, Last Out (The Society of Wild Weasels/Authorhouse, 2005)

Rottman, Gordon L., Osprey Warrior 135 — North Vietnamese Army Soldier 1958—75 (Osprey Warrior, 2009) Thompson, Wayne, To Hanoi and Back — The USAF and North Vietnam 1966—73 (University Press of the Pacific, 2000)

Thorsness, Leo, Surviving Hell — A PoW’s Journey (Encounter Books, 2008)

Tilford, Earl H., Jr., Setup — What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why (University Press of the Pacific, 1991) Truong Nhu Tang, A Viet Cong Memoir (Vintage, 1986)

Van Staaveren, Jacob, Gradual Failure — the Air War over North Vietnam 1965—66(Air Force History and Museums Program, 2002)

Wilson, Tom, Lucky’s Bridge (a novel based on the 355th TFW) (Bantam 1993)

Zaloga, Steven J., Osprey New Vanguard 134 — Red SAM: The SA-2 “Guideline” Anti-Aircraft Missile (Osprey New Vanguard, 2007)

Pyotr Grushin, who headed the OKB-2 design bureau that conceived the V-750/ SA-2 in 1953, would have been surprised that “his” missile was used in Vietnam primarily against tactical fighters. Its original purpose was to intercept high-flying American bombers equipped with nuclear weapons, as Premier Joseph Stalin had considered them to be the biggest threat to the USSR. Only at the conclusion of the Vietnam War was it pitted against the B-52 Stratofortress, the opponent that had motivated Grushin’s team 20 years earlier.

Similarly, Alexander Kartveli, a Russian emigrant from Stalin’s hometown, Tbilisi, and primary designer of the F-105 Thunderchief nuclear strike fighter in 1952, could hardly have guessed that his creation would evolve into the USAF’s first dedicated aircraft for the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), particularly the SA-2, over North Vietnam.

Suppressing anti-aircraft fire was an established mission for tactical aircraft, and its dangers were well known. In support of the massive airborne assault codenamed Operation Market Garden in September 1944, four USAAF fighter groups attacked German flak batteries and the 56th FG lost a third of its P-47 Thunderbolts on one mission alone. This role continued through the Korean War and into Vietnam, where anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) was the largest component in the communist North’s air defense network. Dueling with flak gunners was risky, officially discouraged, but sometimes inevitable.

The introduction of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in the early 1950s demanded new approaches. Radar-directed missiles were seen as the replacement for air-to-air guns, being the nemesis of both manned fighters and bombers. Tests indicated that their probability-of-kill rate was close to 100 per cent even with unreliable thermionic valve technology that existed at the time. The loss of a Lockheed U-2 spyplane over

the USSR in May 1960 and another over Cuba in October 1962 showed the accuracy of the SA-2 and the difficulties in defeating it. Ten years later, America’s foremost military aircraft were still being destroyed by the same missile over North Vietnam.

In Korea, the USAF was unprepared for the radar-directed AAA which threatened its B-29 bombers, forcing it to resort to World War Il-vintage radar jammers and B-26 Invaders fitted with radar homing. In 1953 the American military responded to the advent of the SA-2 with the funding of urgent electronic warfare research, although fitting SAM warning systems to aircraft like the U-2 still had a low priority.

The Cuban missile threat hastened the development of the Texas Instruments ASM-N-10 (later designated AGM-45 Shrike) as a US Navy anti-radiation missile (ARM) in 1962—64, although it did not appear on USAF aircraft until March 1966. The Bendix Corporation responded quickly to the arrival of SA-2s around Hanoi with a Radar Homing and Warning (RHAW) system proposal for the F-100 Super Sabre that used existing, tested equipment.

By August 1965, after USAF jets began to fall to SA-2s, Brig Gen Kenneth Dempster was tasked with energising the anti-SAM program and finding rapid, operationally practical solutions. His committee recommended a force of hunter-killer aircraft to extend Korean War tactics by using SAM radar detection equipment to identify SA-2 sites rather than merely jamming them.

For Project Wild Weasell, four F-100F Super Sabres carried two systems produced by Applied Technologies — the Vector IV (APR-25) RHAW set with a cathode ray tube strobe showing the direction of a SAM threat, and the IR-133 panoramic receiver which analysed and identified radar emissions. Finally, a WR-300 unit warned of an imminent SAM launch.

As Wild Weasel pioneers, Maj Garry Willard and his four-aircraft F-100F Detachment interrupted their training at Nellis AFB due to the urgent need (as seen by the Pentagon) for “an immediate RHAW capability to counter the missile threat” and headed to Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB). Commencing operations on November 24, 1965, the “det” quickly established many of the tactics used by later F-105F/G crews, including the standard SAM evasion tactic — a “split-S” diving turn into the missile’s trajectory, with a last-second break that the missile could not follow. Capts Allen Lamb and Jack Donovan made the first of nine SAM-site kills on December 22, 1965, attacking and marking the target with guns and LAU-3 rocket pods for F-105D bombers. Lamb recalled, “As I pulled off there was a bright flash. I must have hit the oxidizer supply for the SA-2 rocket motor”.

This engagement introduced a new era of electronic warfare between the crews of the F-100F’s successor, the F-105 Thunderchief, and teams of North Vietnamese conscripts and their Soviet advisors. Operating in hot, dark, claustrophobic radar vans, the missile technicians sat close together on simple metal chairs, grappling with the crude but tricky manual control wheels of “Fan Song” guidance radars and learning to penetrate US jamming and countermeasures. They faced the constant risk of an anti-radiation missile strike on their compartment, or a lacerating cluster-bomb attack. Other troops drove the SA-2’s cumbersome trans-loader vehicles from the SAM sites into crowded urban areas to collect new missiles once the SAM battery’s complement of 12 weapons was exhausted.

In the cockpits of the small numbers of F-105 Wild Weasels, pilots struggled to steer their heavy aircraft through unprecedented levels of AAA, not to mention multiple SA-2 launches, trying in poor visibility to identify camouflaged SAM sites and set up missile attacks on them. Their electronic warfare officers (EWOs, or “bears”) faced an increasing overload of work as they managed the EW systems and weapons panels. They also had to watch for MiGs, despite the very limited view from their cockpits, and monitor crowded communications and navigation channels, while enduring constant high-g maneuvering. Their mission was neatly summarized in the 388th TFW’s Tactics Manual:

The mission of Wild Weasel aircrews generally falls into two roles — Iron Hand to suppress and Wild Weasel to destroy. Tactics employed on the Iron Hand missions are primarily designed to suppress the SA-2 and gun-laying radar defenses of North Vietnam during the ingress, attack and egress of the main strike force. Shrike missiles are used to kill, or at least harass, the SA-2 and/or “Fire Can” (AAA) radar transmitters. Coincidentally the threat represented by the Iron Hand flight also diverts the attention of enemy radar operators from the main strike force and this, in itself, is a form of suppression.

On both sides, courage and ingenuity were at least as important as technology.

F-105F/G THUNDERCHIEF

For the first seven years of the F-105’s development and service, its pilots learned to fly the fighter in single-seat versions – the YF-105A, F-105B and F-105D. By 1963 the increasing complexity, weight and cost of these strike variants meant that it had become too hazardous to allow pilots to train wholly on single-seaters. USAF Air Training Command had requested a two-seat F-105B (designated the F-105C) in 1956, but this was cancelled in favor of the F-105E — a two-seat F-105D variant — the following year. The E-model was also cancelled in 1959 as a cost-cutting measure, but in June 1962 an order for 36 F-105Fs was approved, with another 107 planned for Fiscal Year 1963. The latter were financed by cancelling the last 143 F-105D-31-REs.

F-105Fs were intended to fly the same tactical nuclear strike missions as the F-105Ds. This role dated back to 1952 when Republic’s Chief Engineer, Alexander Kartveli, adapted his RF-84F Thunderstreak design to carry a small tactical nuclear weapon internally. Evolving slowly via YF-105A prototypes into the F-105B, the type eventually entered Tactical Air Command (TAC) service in 1959. Its massive J75 engine could drive it at 750 knots at ground-hugging altitude with a Mk 28 “nuke” aboard, or almost 1,200 knots at 36,000ft. The 45-degree swept wing spanned only 34.9ft (two feet less than a Spitfire from World War II) against a fuselage length of 63.1ft (similar to that of a C-47 Skytrain). With only 385 sq. ft of wing area to support 10 a 47,000lb take-off weight, the F-105B had limited maneuverability, but offered great

stability in its primary strike role. Evading enemy radar via terrain masking, it could outdistance any other fighter at low altitude.

The F-105D proposal in 1957 sought to give all-weather capability, particularly in the European Cold War scenario. A 15-inch fuselage extension allowed a 2,000lb increase in combat weight through the addition of an AN/ASG-19 fire control system,

FC-5 flight control system (FCS) and R-14A radar that was optimized for ground mapping. The jet’s limited all-weather capability came from the FCS, which permitted both visual and “blind” delivery of conventional and nuclear ordnance. The FCS’s terrain guidance mode also enabled the pilot to perform low-altitude navigation in poor visibility. In the cockpit, new vertical tape displays provided basic flight information at a glance. Externally, an arresting hook was added.

In an effort to offset the weight gain associated with these improvements, the aircraft was fitted with a Pratt & Whitney J75-P-19 engine whose water-injection gave it a short-term 2,000lb thrust increase for take-off at increased weight. The M61A1 20mm rotary cannon installed in the F-105B’s nose was moved back to accommodate the larger radar, the weapon drawing ammunition from a drum rather than via belts from a box as with the F-105B.

The first F-105D flew on June 9, 1959, and the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), which was selected to introduce the aircraft into frontline service, was in business by late 1962. D-models eventually equipped 12 tactical fighter wings before going on to serve with Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units until 1984.

In order to preserve the range and combat capability of the F-105D, Republic elected to extend its fuselage by 31 inches for the F-105F through the fitment of a “plug” ahead of the air intake line. The two cockpits were given separate canopies and the electronics compartments were moved behind the rear cockpit. The rear fuselage was strengthened and a new vertical stabilizer some five inches taller and 15 per cent larger in area was also added. These changes, together with beefier landing gear components, added 3,000lbs to the overall weight. Nevertheless, the F-105F could fly the same strike missions as the D-model jet, with the front-seat pilot performing most of the mission-related tasks.

Interest in the F-105F as an anti-SAM electronic countermeasures platform began in August 1965 after several US aircraft had been destroyed by SA-2s. However, the scarcity of F-105Fs meant that the more plentiful, though slower, two-seat F-100F was chosen to flight-test equipment for detecting and suppressing SAM sites. In record time, Applied Technologies, Incorporated (ATI) adapted existing ECM devices and produced the Vector IV RHAW set (based on its System 12 for the U-2), the IR-133 panoramic S-band receiver to locate emissions from the SA-2’s “Fan Song” guidance radar, and the WR-300 receiver that warned of the imminent launch of an SA-2.

Combat-tested in four F-100Fs, this equipment set, codenamed Wild Weasel I, enabled a flight of F-105Ds led by a Weasel Super Sabre to destroy a SAM site only five months after the first SA-2 shoot-down of a USAF fighter. However, the IR-133 was susceptible to jamming by USAF EB-66 aircraft operating in the same area and unable to home onto a “Fan Song” while the F-100F was maneuvering energetically. The

equipment did not indicate whether the aircraft was being tracked by a SAM either. 11

As part of their dominant role in the air war over North Vietnam, F-105D and F-105F Thunderchiefs attacked SA-2 sites as soon as permission was granted to do so. In this typical 1970 scene at Takhli RTAFB, Lt Col Jack Spillers, commanding the 355th TFW’s 357th TFS, begins a take-off roll in the relatively spacious single cockpit of F-105D 62-4229, named after his wife. Note that the Mk 83 1,000lb high explosive bombs attached to the jet’s center pylon have been fitted with fuze extenders. (Mrs J.

Spillers via Norman Taylor)

Republic Aviation had already tested an AN/APS-107 RHAW in an F-105D but rejected it in September 1965 in favor of the Vector IV as an urgent means of reducing the escalating attrition amongst Thunderchief units over North Vietnam. ATI and the Sacramento Air Material Area (SMAMA) successfully completed an installation in F-105D 62-4291 within five days, and a second aircraft was ready on 27 October 1965. This F-105D (61-0138) was fitted with a Bendix DPN-61 homing receiver, a fin-cap radar-warning receiver (RWR) and a SAM threat warning CRT display as the

F-105G-1-RE 63-8336 PATIENCE of the 17th WWS/ 388th TFW in February 1973. This aircraft entered service as an F-105F with the 23 rd TFW in September 1964, and in March 1968 the jet went to war as a single-seat Combat Martin jammer aircraft with the 388th TFW at Korat RTAFB, although it actually flew most of its missions in a strike or Iron Hand role. Transferred to the 355th TFW in May 1969, 63-8336 then served with the 18th TFW at Kadena AB, prior to being flown back to the USA and placed in storage under 23 rd TFW management at McConnell AFB. Converted to F-105G configuration in 1972, the aircraft returned to the war torn skies of North Vietnam with the 17th WWS for Operation Linebacker I. The Thunderchief continued to fly Wild Weasel missions from Korat RTAFB until October 1974, when it was transferred to the 35th TFW and thence to ANG units and final storage at Davis-Monthan AFB in April 1982, with more than 4,000 flying hours on

first attempt to equip the jet for the SEAD role under project Wild Weasel II. This included F-105F 62-4421 using the AN/APS-107, the US Navy’s AN/ALQ-51 and external QRC-160-1 jamming pods.

The project was quickly replaced by Wild Weasel III, which focused solely on the F-105F with the AN/APR-25 (Vector IV), AN/APR-26 (WR-300, conceived by ATI’s Bill Doyle) and IR-133 — basically the Wild Weasel I suite. It was initiated on January 8, 1966 by Brig Gen Kenneth C. Dempster, who headed the USAF Anti-SAM Task Force from August 13, 1965. His brief from the outset had been to develop effective systems for tactical aircraft that allowed them to protect themselves from radar-directed weapons. A primary objective was the evolution and speedy deployment of fast hunter- killer teams to locate SA-2 sites using WildWeasel detection aircraft and destroy them with Iron HandF-105Ds equipped with 2.75-inch rockets, bombs and 20mm cannon. Republic and SMAMA had quickly modified the prototype F-105F (62-4416) to serve as the Wild Weasel III test-bed by February 3, 1966, and work began on six more F-105Fs while the prototype started a hasty test program at Eglin AFB.

The speed of the latter caused numerous quality control and technical problems with the installations, particularly the AN/APR-25, which failed to equal its performance in the F-100F because of inadequate co-axial cabling. With an imminent deployment to Korat RTAFB looming for five of the Thunderchiefs, all seven aircraft were re-worked and re-tested repeatedly, while six more F-105Fs were re-fitted in May 1966. An additional system was installed to help pilots locate SAM sites, particularly when they were well camouflaged. This ATL AE-100 system used a pattern of small antennas around the F-105F’s nose to receive azimuth and elevation information on an emitting “Fan Song” and display it so that a pilot could establish the direction of the threat radar. Delays in installing this gear, and in testing the rival AEL Pointer III system and the QRC-317 SEE-SAMS threat detection and evaluation system, meant that the five WildWeasel III-1 aircraft could not fly to Korat until May 28, 1966.

Although SEE-SAMS was initially rejected, development continued by North American Aviation and an improved SEE-SAMS B variant was evaluated in the Korat aircraft. In a period of experimentation with evolving ECM technology and tactics, together with the frequent development of relevant new products by the US defense industry, the WildWeasel F-105s received constant modification so that each aircraft soon had minor differences from the rest.

At Korat and Takhli RTAFBs the Weasels expanded the tactics pioneered by Wild Weasel IF-100F crews, although they initially continued to use the F-105F as a pathfinder/flight leader for three F-105D bombers on Iron Hand hunter-killer operations. With the adoption of the US Navy’s AGM-45 Shrike ARM from March 1966, however, the F-105F could now also make stand-off attacks on “Fan Song” radars rather than merely marking them with 2.75-inch rockets for F-105D bombers.

The employment of the Shrike also changed the role of Weasel crews during 1966-67, for missile-equipped F-105s could now suppress SAM batteries simply through their mere presence, forcing a “Fan Song” team to shut down rather than attract a radar-homing missile. It was no longer necessary to risk life and limb 14 physically knocking out an SA-2 site with bombs and/or rocket projectiles.

Another batch of 18 F-105Fs was pulled out of the training program from July 1966, these jets being fitted with ER-142 receivers operating in the E-G frequency bands in place of the IR-133 — the new receiver displayed its information on two panoramic cockpit scopes. The ER-142 was in turn superseded by the ER-168 (AN/APR-35), installed with the AN/ALT-34 jamming system. An improved SEE – SAMS set (eventually re-designated AN/ALR-31) boasting additional wing-tip antennas was installed in a number of F-105Fs in 1968.

Various built-in jamming systems, including the US Navy’s AN/ALQ-51 deception jammer, were tested to provide anti-SAM protection. All F-105s operating over North Vietnam were required to carry jamming protection, but pylon-mounted QRC-160- 1/8 pods used up a weapons station and could interfere with the Wild Weasel equipment. The solution to this problem came in the form of “split” AN/ALQ-101 pods, attached to either side of the lower central fuselage, housing QRC-288 (later QRC-335) jammer components. As the AN/ALQ-105, this system equipped the ultimate Thunderchief Wild Weasel, the F-105G.

The jet’s most important enhancement was the provision of AGM-78A Mod 0 Standard ARM capability. This weapon — another US Navy initiative — had a warhead three times larger than the Shrike’s and a range three times greater than its 12-mile radius. The latter meant that aircraft could now fire an ARM from outside the effective range of an SA-2. And while the Shrike had to be launched almost directly at its target, the Standard ARM could be made to turn up to 180 degrees before homing on a

hostile radar. If that radar was turned off (which would cause a Shrike to break lock and fail), the AGM-78 used a memory circuit to log the last known position of the radar signal and continue to head towards it.

Fourteen F-105Fs were modified to carry the AGM-78 from September 1967, and eight of these entered combat fromTakhli in early March 1968. A year later the ECM suite was radically updated to handle the AGM-78A Mod 1 missile and, in due course, the AGM-78B. Retaining only the AN/ALT-34 jammer and AN/ALR-31 (SEE – SAMS), the new installation used an AN/APR-35 panoramic receiver and AN/APR-36/37 sensors in place of the AN/APR-25/26. New missile control panels, a tape recorder and a tracker to feed back information on the missile’s flight in order to estimate its likely success rate were also installed. Deliveries of revised “Mod 1” aircraft began in January 1969, and the jets’ success in combat persuaded the USAF to standardize all surviving F-105F Weasels as Mod 1 airframes, re-designating them F-105Gs. With the addition of 12 new conversions, this placed 61 F-105Gs in the active inventory. They all received the AN/ALQ-105 suite in due course too, although a few F-105Gs entered combat before these external fuselage pods were added.

In this guise the F-105 Wild Weasel fought through the final stages of the Vietnam War in 1971-73, out-performing its intended replacement, the F-4C Phantom II Wild Weasel TV. The latter lacked AGM-78 capability, and from 1966 onwards never reached the standard of electronics systems reliability achieved by the F-105G.

In March 1946 Gen Carl Spaatz, commanding the US Army Air Forces, asserted that “Strategic Air Command will be prepared to conduct long-range offensive operations in any part of the world”. The success of heavy bombers during World War II had demonstrated their devastating power. Post-war, Strategic Air Command (SAC) acquired 2,042 jet-powered B-47 Stratojets and then 744 B-52 Stratofortresses capable of delivering nuclear weapons at 550kts over a 3,000-mile combat radius.

Faced with the formidable task of defending its vast land area against both this threat and high-flying US spyplanes, the Soviet Union urgently promoted a new generation of interceptor fighters, but for the defense of its cities another layer of protection was required that would be more effective than fighters or guns. In 1945 Soviet scientists used captured data from German surface-to-air guided missile projects to design first-generation SAMs, but internal political competition prevented their completion. By 1951 Joseph Stalin had instigated a new project, codenamed Berkut, which surrounded Moscow with SAM batteries and radars connected by ring-roads. The first batteries were declared operational in 1956, using the V-300 (NATO codename SA-1 “Guild”) missile conceived by fighter designer Semyon Lavochkin.

A second, mobile system was needed for the protection of wider areas of the Soviet Union, and in November 1953 the Almaz design bureau’s Boris Bunkin headed a team that conceived the S-75, with Lavochkin-trained Pyotr Grushin as principal designer.