Category And Colors

Gen. Arnold was taking a keen interest in the use of camouflage on the AAF’s combat aircraft and wanted to find out if the various USAAF Commanders world-wide would accept the deletion of camouflage on all airplanes except transports. He asserted that the airplanes would gain about twenty to twenty-five miles per hour in speed without camouflage.

Eglin Field issues report on Test of Confusion Camouflage for Fighter type Aircraft, March 27, 1943

In its continuing tests of various types of camouflage for aircraft, Eglin Field revisited the use of confusion camouflage for fighter type aircraft. They ran these tests on a P-51 A aircraft painted in a disruptive scheme of insignia blue and white chevrons. This scheme was applied to both sides of the fuselage and the vertical tail and all lower surfaces of the P-51, but not to the top of the fuselage or the wing and horizontal tail surfaces. For the purposes of the tests no star insignia or radio call numbers were used on the aircraft.

The results, reported in document 3-43-29, dated March 27, 1943, showed that the disadvantages of the scheme far outweighed any possible advantages, and the report recommended that no further use be made of this type of camouflage. (Note: this was a replay of similar testing done by the Air Corps Board in Study No. 42 and came up with the same negative results. See author’s volume on the Air Service and Air Corps).

Camouflage materials change for Douglas C-54A, ordered April 9,1943.

Douglas Aircraft was told to change the camouflage finish materials for the Dark Olive Drab and Medium Green colors to meet the requirements for photographic infra-red reflectance in accordance with AAF Specs. 14106Aand 14109A. This was to be effective on C – 54A 42-107426 and subsequent aircraft. It was permissible to use up existing materials, as long as the called for effectiveness was met.

At WF, the Tech. Exec, forwarded to the Prod. Div. (WF), information received from Prod. Branch, Mat. Div. (Wash,), giving results of tests of night camouflage made at Eglin Field. Eglin Field reported that black camouflaged aircraft appeared “silvery” white in search­light beams and recommended that both P-61 and P-70 night fighters be finished in the standard dark olive drab and neutral gray. This recommendation also met the requirements of Mil. Req. Policy No. 15, dated May 29,1942.

Wright Field informed that camouflage was to be removed from all aircraft, October 14, 1943.

The Deputy C/S at WF was informed on October 14,1943, in a call from the CG, Mat. Com. (WF),lhat all camouflage finishes were to be removed from all new production aircraft, except for those destined for Maj. Gen. C. Chennault, CG, Fourteenth AAF. The Deputy С/ S requested that the Prod. Div. (WF), contact MM&D (Wash.) and obtain a directive to that effect.

Gen. Eaker sent a letter to the CGs,, Ninth Air Force, VIII Bomber Command and VIII Fighter Command, on January 2,1944. This stated that in the near future, certain types of aircraft arriving in the theater would be uncamouflaged. The Generals were directed to notify the VIII Air Force Service Command as to their intentions regarding the use of uncamouflaged combat aircraft, at the earliest possible date. The final decision in this regard was to remain in the hands of the responsible Tactical Commander.

The policy in the theater concerning use of uncamouflaged aircraft would be established through the decisions reached as above. This letter gave the Tactical Commanders concerned the authority to operate their combat aircraft without camouflage if so desired.

On January 15, 1944, Ninth Air Force HQ. replied to F. aker’s letter, stating that their policy would be as follows:

a. Fighter Aircraft. All operational fighters used by IX Fighter Command would be camouflaged, and any uncamouflaged aircraft received would be camouflaged. This would cause extra work for the depot and service units and they would prefer to receive all fighters destined for IX AF in camouflage. They also would, if possible, polish the camouflage paint to attain the equivalent of an RAF “fighter finish”, as this would give them the same performance as uncamouflaged aircraft.

b. Bomber Aircraft. The IX Bomber Comand would use either camouflaged or uncamouflaged aircraft, in an “as received” state. Aircraft delivered uncamouflaged would not be painted, nor would paint be removed from those already camouflaged. No change in operational tactics was anticipated for uncamouflaged aircraft.

c. Troop Carrier Aircraft. The IX Troop Carrier Command did not want to use uncamouflaged aircraft, and any uncamouflaged aircraft delivered to them would be camouflaged before delivery to combat units.

Four Boeing B-17Gs of the 323rd BS, 91st BG, 1st CBW, 1st Air Div, Eighth Air Force, over clouds with bomb doors open. Lead aircraft is in Dark Olive Drab and Neutral Gray, with yellow code letters OK-K, others all in natural metal, code letters OK-C, S, and K. Note how the red tail markings show up the different color triangles on the Olive Drab and natural metal aircraft. (ESAF)

Material Command issues Military Requirements Policy No. 60, concerning AAF insignia on leased commercial aircraft, Janu­ary 6, 1944.

To clarify any misunderstanding concerning the camouflage of AAF aircraft, Material Command issued Military Requirements Policy No. 60 on January 6, 1944. This stated that Army camouflage, insignia and markings were not to be used on any commercial aircraft leased to the AAF, but not flown by AAF crews. Such camouflage, etc., was to be used on any commercial aircraft leased to the AAF for a continuous period exceeding ninety days, which was flown and maintained by AAF personnel. Any AAF aircraft loaned to any other government agency and not flown by AAF crews were to have all Army camouflage, insignia and markings removed before delivery.

If possible, stripping should be done in the open air but not in direct sunlight. To be satisfactory, inside locations must be well ventilated. Personnel should be kept out of the airplane during stripping and the subsequent clean-up procedure. Aircraft should not be stripped on asphalt floors or runways as the paint remover will attack asphaltic base materials.

In order to allow workmen to apply the remover over large areas, arrange ladders and platforms to permit easy access to the surfaces which are to be stripped. Rubber-surfaced equipment should not be used because contact with the paint remover will make it very slippery.

Mask off or remove all exposed parts consisting wholly or partly of plastic, rubber, fabric or other поп-metallic materials, and all painted areas not to be stripped. For masking, use waterproof cloth or a double thickness of Kraft 40-pound paper and masking tape. Because the parts to be removed or masked off differ from one model to another, the following list will serve only as a general guide.

1. De-icer boots and attaching fairing strips. Overlap the camouflage finish approximately 11/2 inches from the trailing edge of the fairing strip.

2. Windows, windshields, navigator’s dome, and the weather sealing used around these parts.

3. Fabric-covered control surfaces: These surfaces should be removed unless they can be masked off completely and adequately. If removed, place them a safe distance from the airplane to avoid possible splashing or excessive exposure to fumes from the remover.

4. Landing gear and tires: In addition to masking off the landing gear and tires, the airplane must be jacked tip and placed on blocks at least one inch thick to avoid possible contact with the remover.

5. Air scoop, oil cooler, and other openings and vents: Mask off all openings through which the remover can gain access to the interior surfaces of the airplane.

6. Demountable power plant assemblies: The antidrag rings and cowl flaps should be removed and the complete power plant assembly covered with waterproof cloth.

7. Propellers, hubs, and domes.

8. All open seams, such as those around the pilot’s door, escape hatches, cargo compartment doors, and fuel tank access doors.

9. All weather-sealed joints between the nose section and the fuselage, between various sections of the fuselage, and between the fuselage and the tail cone.

10. Ail miscellaneous rubber, neoprene, Plexiglas, and other non metallic parts, and all painted areas not to be stripped which may be contacted by the paint remover.

Two-inch letters will be stenciled directly beneath the type, model, and series designation on the fuselage of aircraft (with insignia red paint materials) in the following categories. This stenciling will be applied by activities at which the affected aircraft are now stationed, and will also include affected aircraft received in the future without these markings:

a. The letter “W” will be stenciled on ail war-weary aircraft which have not undergone a complete DIR. The term “WAR-WEARY” applies to any aircraft returned permanently from service in an overseas theater.

b, The letter “Q” will be stenciled on all war-weary aircraft that are processed through a depot for DIR. This symbol will replace the “W,” which will no longer appear on the aircraft.

c. The tetter “S” will be stenciled on all aircraft which have been declared by Headquarters, Army Air Forces, excess to the military requirement or surplus to the War Department or both. (Reference paragraph 9.a., AAF Regulation 65-86.) Under no circumstances will the letters “S" be used to indicate, or be interpreted to mean, “storage.” In cases where the symbol “W” or “0” is required to be placed on the aircraft, the “S” will be stenciled directly after that symbol. Example: “WS” – “QS.”

Steady progress in the development of new camouflage finishes and requirements inevitably led to continued amendments to Spec. 24114. Unfortunately, Amendment No. 2 has been lost (therefore there is no exact record as to what was said in it). Amendment No. 3 dated May 9, 194І, specified that all propeller blades and hubs should be painted matt black on all surfaces. Paragraph E-5 required that:

All external surfaces of airplane propellers and hubs, after the provisions of Paragraph E-la have been complied with, will be sprayed with one coat of zinc chromate primer, Specification No. 14080. The final finish shall consist of one light coat of cellulose nitrate camouflage lacquer, Specification No. 14105. The color of all external surfaces shall be black in accordance with 14080. The final finish shall consist of one light coat cellulose nitrate camouflage lacquer. Specification No. 14105. The color of all external surfaces shall be black in accordance with Shade No. 44, Bulletin No. 41. After the propeller and hub have been camouflaged and prior to installation, the propeller assembly will be checked for balance.

This was to be the last amendment to Spec. 24114 issued by the Air Corps, later ones being issued by the Army Air Forces.

Boeing B-17B of the 19th BG, March Field, shows the standard “U. S. ARMY” marking under the wing. The two underwing cocardes were replaced by a single one under the right wing in Spec. 24114. (March AFB Museum)

Boeing B-17E-BOs, 41-9141 and 41-9131, flying near Seattle are in two different finishes. The nearest one has been repossessed from an RAF batch and is painted in dark green and dark earth over deep sky, with an RAF fin flash, while the other one is in dark olive drab and neutral gray. 512 of this version were built and were considered to he the first real combat-ready B-17. (USAF)

Colors for TVaining Airplanes (Specification 98-24113)

Colors for Advanced, Primary, and Basic trainers were called out in Spec. No. 98-24113-А, dated September 9,1938, and the appli­cable portions follow (with the colors corrected to the new Army-Navy Porcelain Color Plates of September 1,1938):

NOTES:

(1) Parts and surfaces fabricated from the following aluminum alloys and corrosion resistant steels are used in the natural metal finish without paint coatings, except anti-glare coating:

Aluminum covered Aluminum Alloy, Specification No. 11067.

Aluminum Alloy, Specification No. 11072.

Aluminum Alloy, Specification No. QQ-A-359.

Aluminum, Specification No. 57-151-1.

Corrosion Resistant Steel, Specification No, 11068.

Parts and surfaces manufactured from other metals or fabric shall be finished with aluminum, enamel, lacquer or dope as specified.

(2) Yellow Green is prepared by mixing:

Zinc Chromate Primer, Specification No, 14080 -1 gallon.

Black Enamel, Specification No. 3-98 – 1/10 gallon.

Aluminum Powder, Type B, Specification No. TT-A-476 – 4 ounces,

Toluene, Specification No. 50-11-38 -1 gallon.

(3) Flat Bronze Green is to match color chip No. 9, Color Card Supplement Specification No. 3-1. The lacquer or enamel shall produce a matt appearance of minimum gloss.

These requirements covered primary and basic training airplanes finished in the true blue and orange yellow color scheme, together with advanced trainers finished in aluminum or natural metal finishes. This spec, also covered the interior yellow-green color; this was not matched to any specific color chip, but was prepared by mixing zinc chromate primer, black enamel and aluminum powder, as specified.

Thus, just prior to entry into World War II, the Army Air Forces had no less than three standard trainer aircraft finishes; (1) the orange yellow and true blue scheme; (2) aluminum paint finish; and (3) natural metal finish.

The War Department Circular No. 273, August 18, 1942, required that all trainer aircraft would have to have the star insignia painted on the fuselage, aft of the wing. The Southeast Air Forces Training Center, Maxwell Field, AL, pointed out that to meet this rquirement, not only would they have to expend a lot of effort on painting the insignia on all of their approximately 4,600 aircraft, but that they would also have to remove the field letters and numbers on all of these aircraft. They felt that the letter and field numbers were necessary for ready identification of aircraft in their training program. Thus, they requested if it was possible to have trainer aircraft excluded from the requirements of the circular.

The HQ. Air Forces Flying Training Command, Fort Worth, TX, to whom the above objection had been sent, in turn wrote to the Director of Individual Training, AAF, Washington, stating that there were approximately 15,500 training type airplanes in the Flying Training Command that would require a change of insignia in order to comply with W. D. circular No. 273. They requested that to avoid interruption of training schedules, and to conserve labor and materials, that the Circular be amended to exclude training type aircraft assigned to the AAF Flying Training Command.

Meanwhile, Maxwell Field, on September 29,1942, sent a letter to the Director, with recommendations for applying the star insignia to the fuselages of in-service training aircraft.

In reply, on October 12, 1942, the Director stated that the Aeronautical Board had proposed the following suggestions regarding the fuselage insignia; these were, if approved, going to be issued as anA-N spec. A maximum diameter of 50 inches and a minimum diameter of 20 inches were to be used for the fuselage insignia, standard sizes to be in multiples of 5 inches. The diameter to be used was the standard size which came closest to being 75 percent of the fuselage depth at the selected location. It was believed that the specified size and location of the fuselage insignia would leave adequate space on training airplanes for their identification markings.

It was also stated that, pending more definite information and the issue of appropriate instructions and technical orders, no action was to be taken by Flying Training Command to alter the markings on their aircraft.

Boeing B-17F-27-BO, 41-24639, was the last of the -27 block and is seen flying near its Bassingbourne, England, base in late 1942. It carries the yellow code letters of the 323rd BS, 91st BG, assigned to the 1st Bomb Wing, Eighth Air Force. (USAF)

Curtiss P-40C-CU, 41-13468, of the 31st FS in the 6th AF, Caribbean area. It is shown in its net-covered revetment; note the shadows on the aircraft’s camouflage. Photo taken in December 1942. (USAF)

Yellow outer ring added to lower wing and fuselage insignia for aircraft destined for use in invasion of North Africa, in Amendment to Op. Memo No. 9 for operation “Torch," dated September 30,1942,

In preparation for Operation “Torch”, the Allied invasion of French North Africa, an amendment dated September 30, 1942, to Operation Memorandum No. 9, dated September 25, 1942, was issued by Allied Force Headquarters under Gen. Eisenhower’s command. This amendment added a yellow ring around the star insignia on the fuselage and under the wing of all American aircraft taking part in this invasion. Intended for ground recognition, it was not required for use on the upper wing insignia. (However, it is obvious from photographs that many aircraft also carried the ring on the upper wing insignia – author). An order adding a two-inch thick ring to the fuselage star insignia was also issued by Gen. Spaatz on October 1,1942, in England for USAAF aircraft in the European Theater of Operations. It has been suggested that this yellow ring was added to the insignia to make it more resemble the British roundel and thus help reduce resistance to the invasion by the local French troops: they were considered to be more friendly to the U. S. forces than to the British forces, who had recently shelled the French Fleet in its home port to prevent it falling into Axis hands. (The later adoption of RAF type red, white, and blue fin flashes on USAAF aircraft serving in North Africa also lends credence to this suggestion – author.)

The replies from the different theater commanders were collected and are paraphrased below as far as bombardment types were con­cerned:

London. – Subject appreciable increase in speed, removal of camouflage from heavy bombardment types favored. Removal same from underside only of medium types favored. Bases reasonably safe from surprise attacks due to modem radar so value of passive defense of camouflage in air is deleted.

Alaska. – With 20 miles per hour increase in speed, believe non camouflage of airplanes more desirable in this theater if nets are available for camouflage of aircraft on ground. Believe speed increase due to weight reduction rather than glossy surface.

Brisbane. – At this time do not desire removal of camouflage from airplanes for this theater.

Cairo. – Further camouflage not required as long as airplanes given dull neutral color not reflecting sunlight.

4th and 11th Air Forces, – Desirable removal of camouflage all types except transports.

Hawaii. – Recommend no paint on top, sky blending camouflage on bottom, propellers to be painted antiglare. In ac cordance with background, top to be camouflaged locally.

As a tentative conclusion, it was suggested that:

Due to the early warning and vectoring capabilities of radar, camouflage is losing its importance when weighed against the cost in speed and weight.

A compromise along the following lines was suggested for bombardment types:

(1) Reduce the weight of the camouflaging materials to as low a weight as possible consistent with changing the metallic sheen of the ship to a less conspicuous appearance.

(2) Allow the surface to be roughened to a minimum extent to somewhat reduce reflection consistent with the smoothness of surface required for low drag. Some reflection could be tolerated if a minimum of roughness was obtained,

(3) Following documents noted as having important bearing on subject:

(a) Final report on Experimental Camouflage Finish for Aircraft, dated March 8,1943 (Eglin Field).

(b) Memorandum Report on Camouflage of Aircraft in Flight, dated October 27,1942 (Eglin Field).

(c) Report on Conference on Special Camouflage for Anti-Submarine Aircraft at Langley Field, Virginia, dated September 16,1942, (Eglin Field).

These comments and recommendations were withheld from further distribution until all answers had been received from the theater commanders. However, a memo to the Bombardment Branch of the Requirements Division, the Air Support Branch (of the same divi­sion) stated:

Six replies had been received with five widely varying answers. If these answers were typical of the other replies to be received, camouflage would have to be provided for each type of theaters requirements. To date, a sky blue to dull drab camou­flage had been desired by two of the theaters. Camouflage had to fit the terrain condition, the tactical tasks being performed and the passive type of protection required for the theater.

Further remarks could not be made until all replies had been digested. However, it appeared that it would be necessary to provide camouflage for each theater as necessary to fit the particular situation.

The Mat. Lab. at WF in a letter, dated October 16,1943, advised the AAF Representative at Northwest-St. Paul Modification Center that B-24s being modified to F-7s for photographic purposes, should be thoroughly cleaned, sprayed with a hiding coat of aerial blue enamel, followed by sufficient coats of shadow blue enamel to produce shading over visible bottom surfaces. (Note: this is a most remarkable letter, because it contains reference to two enamel colors, aerial blue and shadow blue, which have never appeared anywhere in any paint orders, standard color listings, etc.! Research has not been able to find any other official reference to these colors, nor did they ever find their way into any of the AN standard aircraft camouflage colors).

Paint manufacturers query the variety of color standards in use, October 1943

The Forbes Varnish Company, Cleveland, OH, on October 22, 1943, asked the Material Division, Wright Field, OH, whether or not certain of the gloss colors in the Army-Navy Porcelain Color Standard had been superseded by certain color chips in “Color Card Supplement to US Army Spec. 3-1, revised April 21,1943.”

The Production Engineering Section replied that the Color Card Supplement colors did not supersede any of the Army-Navy Porcelain Standard colors, and pointed out that in each instance the correct color standards to use would be those referenced in the applicable detail specifications (see Chapter 7 for full details).

Gen. Arnold signs order eliminating camouflage on all aircraft, October 30, 1943

On October 30, 1943, the Prod. Eng. Sect. (WF), informed by teletype the Western Procurement District, Los Angeles, CA, that Lt. Gen. 13. Giles, С/As (Wash.), had signed an order, which had been counter-signed by Gen. Arnold and Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz (Northwest African Air Force), eliminating camouflage from all aircraft. WF had not then officially received the order, but suggested that the District withhold for one week, approval of any funds for paint buildings.

Eglin Field prepared a long and detailed report on the principles applicable to the camouflage of aircraft in flight. This stated that there were four fundamental variables in the perception of any visual object, – (1) size, (2) contrast with background, (3) illumination, and (4) duration of observation. The only one of these that could be controlled to any extent for the camouflage of aircraft in flight was the contrast of the airplane with the background. Camouflage was obviously a protection to a plane only when it could not be seen; success

of camouflage in flight was achieved, if when at the distance at which it would normally be visible, it still could not be seen. The report discussed camouflage of the various sections of the plane as top, side, and bottom surfaces plus various types such as sea search, night, gloss, confusion and temporary camouflage, plus that for photographic reconnaissance aircraft.

Camouflage could affect the performance of aircraft in two ways; by the increased weight of the paint and by increased drag if the paint was rough. In a generalized aircraft camouflage evaluation, the report stated that (1) top surface camouflage was very effective, (2) side and under surface average camouflage was of doubtful value.

It concluded that camouflage should be weighed solely on its merits of concealment. If camouflage was needed and was proven, opera­tional efficiency need not be sacrificed. If aircraft were required for special purposes where the operational altitude remained reasonably constant and operational conditions similar, camouflage could be selected which was effective and worthwhile. The report included a bibliography containing twenty-nine documents pertinent to the subject, including eighteen final reports issued by Egltn Field in 1942 and 1943.

Material Command initiates use of gloss black camouflage paint, January 12, 1944.

Material Command requested on January 12, 1944, that Production Division order all night fighter aircraft in production (P-61 and P-70) to be camouflaged with gioss black paint; this order superseded all previous orders for the camouflage of night fighters.