Category The Genesis of Air Power

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s the threat from the air grew, states took measures to counter it. However, although air defence developed hand-in-hand with airforces, the idea of uniting the two into a single structure met with no success in peacetime. By late 1905 it was clear that France was assessing seriously the possibility of using airships for military ends. Thus the issue of how to prevent aerial attack from airships acquired primary importance. The very first theoretical ideas hit a completely unexpected obstacle. Initially, it was expected that the artillery would be more effective against airships than the infantry. Germans viewed their 1904 model 100mm howitzer, and the light field howitzer, as particularly suited for the role. Both could adopt the required elevation angle without especial preparations or ac­cessories. Flight altitudes until 1914 rarely exceeded 1200m, which explains why the light field howitzer retained its air defence role despite its indifferent ballistic quality.

It was down to practical experience to show the road ahead. The limited area of land testing grounds pointed the military to the sea, and particularly inland waters. This was helped by large arms manufacturers. In 1911, Germany’s Krupps and the Rhein Machine and Metal Products Factory (‘Rheinmetall’) built a 77mm air defence weapon mounted on a truck, with a special mount being designed for it the following year. After their first test firings, the infantry and cavalry pinned their hopes on massed small arms and machine gun fire directed against aircraft which still flew relatively low and within range of these weapons.

Air defence artillery weapons also found a naval application. Since naval installa­tions were fixed, what counted most was good ballistic properties and increased cali­ber, hence firepower. The 88mm ship board gun looked most promising because of its high initial velocity and elevation angles of up to 70 degrees. Powerful spotlights were also foreseen against nocturnal attacks.

Realistic combat-condition testing was still a problem. Unmanned target drones were still in the future. The few aeroplanes available were rather too expensive to be wasted in such tests. Pooling the efforts of the various arms under a single command might have resolved many problems, major ones being taking precise aim in a new way, using principally new weapons, and using principally new instrumentation.

France was one of the leaders in air defence technology. There, the 75mm field gun turned out most suitable for firing at airborne targets. It was also to be mounted

I Highly mobile anti aircraft machine gun platforms such as this one entered service with infantry and cavalry units

on a truck later, and by 1914 equipped mobile batteries within several artillery regi­ments. Combat to come was to show that this was far from adequate.

Other nations failed to create air defence structures until the Great War. Even though the final manoeuvres threw some light on suitable air defence tactics, hard and fast decisions on air defence structures appeared premature. Initially, air defence units were appended to field artillery regiments guarding national borders. Large or­ders were placed for the reasonably capable mobile artillery weapons.

Anti aircraft artillery tactics aimed to disturb enemy flying. The greater the use­fulness of aerial artillery direction and correction, the greater the need to hamper its precision and effectiveness. The necessity of assigning anti aircraft weapons to cavalry corps and divisions became obvious. Tactics used to counter enemy flying, and cam­ouflage as a most effective passive means of air defence were thoroughly overhauled. Less mobile animal-draught artillery units were assigned to protect important targets in the rear. Corps commands which received anti aircraft weapons, machine guns, projectors and communications equipment were advised to act as they saw fit.

The extent of defence afforded depended on target importance. The range of options covered anything from infantry small arms fire to the combined use of rifles, machine guns, field guns and projectors. A communications network began to emerge, to speed the passage of information on enemy aerial movements.

I A French Morane-Saulnier mono­plane in flight

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hether or not air power exists depends on the individual components which constitute it when taken together. In the difficult period when air potential begins to be created, the greatest contribution is made by the scientific and experimental base. Thus, it was unthinkable that man would fly without first having a grasp on the properties of gases; and evolution in the knowledge of gases went alongside knowledge of aerodynamics. Having acquired some understanding of how water behaves (hydrodynam­ics), learned people began experimenting with gases. Their discoveries about lighter-than – air gases were quickly applied in late 18th Century aeronautics. Starting in 1804, Cayley and later Chapman studied different aerofoils, and how they behaved at different inci­dences. As learned societies were established with the purpose of researching flight, indi­vidual endeavour gradually became systematic and shared by the scientific community. The first scientific society was established in France in 1852. Britain’ s Aeronautical Soci­ety was founded in 1866, and the Russian Technical Society’s turn was in 1881. The fruits of this pooling of effort were not slow to emerge: using a home-made wind tunnel, Briton Phillips showed the lift benefits of cambered aerofoils, patenting a number of profiles in 1884. Not five years after Phillips’s work, Lilienthal proved these profiles’ benefits in prac­tice by designing and flying gliders which paved much of the way to powered flight. (Con­current studies of aspect ratio and of the best angle of incidence were no less important.)

Though early knowledge was rather limited, and though experiments were rather less than rigorous and used rather primitive equipment, the body of knowledge ac­quired was a basis for the early successes.

Another major barrier in the way of powered flight was the lack of suitable power – plant. There were two schools of thought among scientists. One stressed further improve­ments in steam engines. And indeed, such engines relative power increased, and times to building up steam pressure reduced. Between 1868 and 1872, steam engine efficiency nearly doubled! The second school of thought on powerplant sought principally new types of engine. Trial use of electric motors for propulsion showed that they were unsuitable. However, the discovery of the internal combustion engine was an important breakthrough for aeronautics and aviation. The working principle of internal combustion dated back to

the 17 th Century. However, the high cylinder temperatures could not be attained with the materials of the time. It was only in 1860 that Frenchman Lenoir built a working model of an internal combustion engine. It was water-cooled and burned lighting gas. But both this engine, and the much later Otto – Langlen one had nothing much to offer set against steam units. Only the four-stroke power unit designed by German Otto late in the late 1870s was worthy of development. Daimler refused to use lighting gas, choosing petrol instead. This removed the need for bulky and heavy gas storage vessels. With time, the needs of aviation began to influence internal combustion engine development. Such powerplant became standard due to its compact size, quick starting and unmatched relative power. At the end of the period under review, their output varied from 40 to 100hp (Table 1, Graph 2) (experimental FIAT units ran at 300hp and even 700hp).

Daimler led the water cooled engine field, followed by Argus. Despite the weight of coolant, such engines were more powerful, longer-lasting and more reliable. How-

T a b l e 1: Aeroengine Weight and Output, 1913-1914 Make Origin Type of engine Ouyput, hp. Cylinders Relative Weight Air-Cooled Gnome France Rotary 50 5 1,5 Gnome France Rotary 80 7 1,2 Rhone France Rotary 80 9 1,4 Renault France V-Formation 100 12 2,9 Water-Cooled Argus Germany Inline 100 6 – Mercedes Germany Inline 100 6 2,0 Astor-D Germany Inline 100 6 2,2 ENV Britain V-Formation 120 8 2,0 Salmson France Radial 130 9 1,8 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

ever, many builders preferred the air-cooled French Gnome engine despite its great frontal area (and hence drag): it was lighter and cheaper. Aeroplanes using it were light, had shorter take-off and landing runs, and were more manoeuvrable (yet not as reliable…). Air-cooled engines also burned more lubricant. Yet, controversial aspects aside, the Gnome was licensed for production in Germany and Britain.

Science and research remained the driving force behind the creation of air potential until the close of the first decade of the 20th Century. By that time, a relatively stable base had been established to assist the pursuit of certain tasks in the air. The period began with large-scale production of Parcival-Siegsfeld balloons, the vesting of the DELAG paramil-

itary/civilian Zeppelin operator, and initial series production orders for Wright, Bleriot, Farman, Voisin, Etrich and other aeroplanes. Before the start of the Great War, science determined air power, as demonstrated by the scramble to squeeze ever better technical indicators from all manner of aerial devices. It was also science that sourced the people who were to form design teams and apply their scientific skills in a commercial direction.

Manufacture also grew apace, with 2718 aeroplanes being made in 1914: 1348 in Germany, 541 in France, 535 in Russia, 245 in Britain, and 49 in the USA. Performance grew along with production capacity. Frequent air shows and competitions became an added stimulus for designers and pilots to challenge range, endurance and speed records. Amply subsidised by state and private funds, these events also became marketplaces. Graphs 2, 3, and 4 show how rapidly flying machines progressed in that period.

However, it was clear that these achievements had to have a context of clear and specific requirements. Having emerged, the aeroplane had to become civilised: it had to be made capable of showing its superiority vis-a-vis other types of airborne vessel in practice by becoming a competent and comfortable platform able to perform set tasks

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with ease. Thus, the demonstration of air power was the only way air potential could be actualised. In other words, a sufficient number of aeroplanes had to be utilised by national services specifically formed to operate them. This logically leads to one of the major issues in aviation from its emergence to the present: the issue of security. This in turn depends on the requirements of another important component which came to the fore after the first air arms had been formed: the availability of a sufficient number of reliable and competent aeroplanes.

Poor safety affected aviation development adversely. If 29 pilots had died by 1910, in 1911 they numbered 74, in 1912: 127, and in 1913: 154 (plus several hundred injured survivors). (Graph 5)

Graph 5: Humans’ casualties in airo accidents, 1910-1913

Seattle, Washington: the pilot loses control during a risky demonstration flight and heads into the grandstand. Onlookers fled for their lives, but three died and 12 were hurt

Clearly, if aeroplanes were not to remain an exotic plaything, much had to be done to improve their reliability and safety. Flight safety became a concern from 1910 on­wards. To get things going, the state in the face of relevant offices such as war ministries, set aside prize money for air safety. Britain led the way here, sponsoring some excellent aeroplanes such as the BE2, the Avro 504, a Sopwith, and others. These saw active use into the 1930s, the Avro even serving in Soviet flying schools as the У-1 (U-1). The statistics showed these main causes of accidents: pilot error; poor aeroplane stability causing upsets in bad weather or in inexperienced hands; insufficient aeroplane strength causing structural failures; powerplant unreliability. The stability issue was tackled in two ways. The first one was to enhance aeroplanes’ natural aerodynamic stability. The key here was to select a suitable configuration. In-depth studies were undertaken of wing profiles, control surface action, trim, and propeller/rotary engine torque. The re­sult was an advance in enlightened scientific methods of selecting a configuration. Val­uable data was obtained in early wind tunnels built in Britain, France and Russia. Using data from the Royal Aircraft Factory Research Centre, the British built the RE 1 biplane which flew for ten minutes without any control inputs from its pilot. Apart from being pleasant for the pilot, this ability coincided with military requirements for stable aerial observation platforms. Thus emerged a trend to overestimate the significance of aero­plane stability. This trend was to rule supreme until the first dogfights, when its delete­rious effect was shown. Similar events took place in Germany, Russia, and France: all countries leading aviation ‘fashion’ at the time. The second way in which the stability

Farman aeroplanes enjoyed a good reputation among pilots for their enviable stability

Щ The Curtiss twin-engined flying boat, specially built to fly the Atlantic, is notable for featuring one of the earliest autopilots

issue was tackled was to create a device allowing straight and level flight without pilot input. Such a device had to restore steady flight after atmospheric upsets or involuntary pilot inputs. Over 120 such devices were invented and patented before the First World

War. The poor level of knowledge and experience at the time were reflected in the many and serious defects of such early ‘autopilots,’ rendering all of them impracticable.

Aircraft structures were a great safety problem in themselves. In the dawn of aviation no stress calculation techniques whatsoever were applied to aeroplane struc­tural design. French and British stressmen began static testing of airframes only after the first wing failure crashes in 1911. Little by little, designers relinquished timber for major stress bearing elements, adopting various kinds of metal instead. Another result of the stress studies was the preference for the stiffer biplane configuration, which was to stay in vogue until the mid-1930s. (Graph 6)

Engine reliability also improved, as evidenced by the first flights measured in hours. Multi-engined aeroplanes able to maintain flight and land safely after an engine fail­ure, also appeared. Russia led the way here, Igor Sikorski’s trials of his Russkiy Vityaz and Ilya Muromets proving that the multi-engined formula was a contribution to safe­ty. The latter type was also the world’s first strategic bomber and strategic reconnais­sance aeroplane to enter service.

The arrival of the parachute was another great boost to safety. Known to man for a long time before aero­planes, parachutes were first used for egress from balloon gondolas. The first rucksack parachute was designed by Kotel’nikov in 1911. Similar designs quickly appeared in the USA (1912) and Germany (1913). The first life saved by this progenitor of modern emergency escape devices was that of American pilot Lowe in 1912.

Efforts to improve safety went hand in hand with another very important

u 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914

Graph 6: Monoplanenes % from all aeroplanes production, 1909-1914

component of air power: the availability of adequately trained air and ground personnel. The newly created flying schools began not only to impart flying skills to pilots, but also to train mechanics in aeroplane maintenance. Legislative instruments were adopted to regulate the operation of aeroplanes in the air and on the ground and define rights and responsibilities. The first textbooks and flight manuals were published.

As the number of aeroplanes grew, so did the number of national offices con­cerned in one way or another with their operations, and so did the requirements for crew training. As the nature of tasks performed by crews evolved, so did flying school curricula. The first military flying schools opened, training pilots in the specialist arts of aerial observation and reconnaissance, and the skill of flying at above 1000m: the altitude then considered optimal for such purposes. As mentioned above, those wish­ing to serve in the emergent air arms had to have military wings. Bearers of military wings were specifically trained to fly specially designed army and navy aeroplanes. For instance, one difference between civil and military flying schools was that while the former rarely strayed above 600m, the latter were trained to reach observation alti­tudes of 1000m or more, dive to 600m to avoid artillery fire, and practise dead stick landings with an idling or switched off engine.

By 1913 improving aeroplane reliability and performance allowed quite daring aerial manoeuvres. Independently of one another, Nesterov and Pegoo flew loops, proving that aircraft were capable of sustaining great loadings in the air. This was the start of aerobatic training which included learning spin recovery skills. A danger to the unwary to this very day, spins are uncontrolled falls at high angles of attack while rolling, pitching and yawing. The number of aerobatic-trained pilots grew rapidly, reaching 30 in Russia alone by early 1914. Thus, despite the greater com­plexity of aeroplanes and flying, the flight hours per accident indicator im­proved twenty fold. Whereas in 1909 an accident occurred once every 200 flight hours on average, by 1914 it occurred once every 4000 hours.

Convinced of aeroplanes’ military and civil utility, the governments of nations able to develop aircraft and airship manufacturing set aside con­siderable funds for equipping their new air arms. By 1913, over 1000 aero­planes had entered military service around the world.

An early procedural trainer used to give ab-initio skills to future Antoinette pilots

German pilots duringintensive training a week before the start of the First World War: the helmet has become a compulsory part of the kit

Graph 7: Finance funds spending for aviation in 1913 (in mln. dol.)

Military aviation budgets for 1913 came to 7.4m dollars in France, 5m dollars in Germany and Russia, 3m dollars in Britain, and 2.1m dollars in Italy. (Graph 7)

The trend was for these sums to grow apace, and moreover for the share of avia­tion to grow at the expense of aeronautics. Aeroplanes were gradually becoming rec­ognised as more versatile for the range of tasks set before aviation and aeronautics. Initially, the military bought proven designs for sports and private-owner use, but specialist military designs emerged from 1912. The latter all had two crew members

and stronger landing gear, and were easily reconfigured for transportation by road, riv­er or sea. Before impressment into service, such aeroplanes were tested by special ac­ceptance bodies, often on top of having proven their qualities in numerous fly-offs and competitions. This was then a new de­parture which later found its way to other areas due to its effectiveness.

Alongside the development of aero­planes as such, another component of air power was taking shape: on board and ground equipment. Pre-First World War army and navy aeroplanes were decidedly multi-role. Much experimentation with dif­ferent equipment thought useful for the various armed forces which employed aer­oplanes took place. Specialised airborne cameras appeared whose images helped de­termine the precise location of enemy forc­es. Reliable cameras with moderate focal length optics, comfortable for use from aer-

A Type L planview camera fitted to a B. E.2a

Щ A machine gun equipped Nieuport 4

oplanes and tethered balloons, entered production. This in turn led to the design of mobile photographic labs to process the cameras’ output for immediate use. However, the money involved was huge, and thought unjustified amid prevailing expectations that the coming war would be so swift and mobile, events would overtake photo­graphic intelligence. Thus mobile labs were not mass produced, reliance being placed on field laboratories instead. Observation equipment derived from the artillery also entered wide scale use, especially in naval aviation.

Initial attempts to arm airborne vessels with firearms date back to this period. Their use was directed at both the ground and the air. Despite significant advances, the fitting of machine guns to aeroplanes was still very much an experiment prior to the Great War. The major problem was the difficulty of firing safely through the pro­peller disc, which limited the use of machine guns. Also, the available machine guns were either too primitive, or too heavy.

Experience of manual bombing in the Tripolitanian and Balkan Wars showed that its effect was more psychological than genuinely damaging to the enemy. The bombs used had unknown ballistic properties: they were mostly adaptations of infantry hand grenades. Purpose designed aeroplane bombs, though of a modest size in keeping with the capacity of early aeroplanes, gradually acquired the shape we know today. Most widespread were ‘bat cubs,’ weighing five kilos, drop-shaped and finned so as to drop vertically. Their ap-

| Bombing trials with training bombs near Los Angeles, California; the aeroplane seen is a Farman biplane

pearance led to the design of special bombsights and bomb-holders. Though patented devices were insufficiently effective, individual pilots demonstrated exceptional bombing precision during training or in competitions. One such was Lieutenant Gobert who scored 12 hits in a 20m circle from a height of 200m with his 15 bombs (make not recorded) during a 1912 international military display. In the next heat, the same officer scored eight hits of a 120x50m target from a height of 450m. Other pilots of the period were not far behind, including Bulgarian ones during the preparations for the second stage of the First Balkan War. However, airmen in general entered the Great War unarmed but for their handguns (which they indeed used in anger in the conflict’s opening stages!).

The period saw early attempts to protest airmens’ seats against ground fire. Though easy to fit, however, the steel plate used was too heavy. Armour plating had to wait for sturdier airframes and more powerful engines.

The means and equipment which ensure effective use of military aeroplanes are another important component of air power. Initially, this included bases where men could train and equipment could be tried, and manufacture and maintenance work­shops. Army and navy orders gradually encouraged factory-based aircraft manufac­ture. Specialised engine and propeller companies emerged. By the start of the Great War, the world had no fewer than 75 aircraft and 23 aeroengine makers capable of turning out 1600 aeroplanes and 2200 engines a year. This was in addition to fully equipped military workshops and airfields.

Command and control, the last but not least important component of air power, remained most problematic in its nascence. The reason for this was that radio com­munications were not yet adapted for routine air-to-air or air-to-ground operation. This circumstance introduced delays in the passing on of aerial reconnaissance infor­mation. Even though initial trials in 1910 brought very encouraging results, radio sets were too heavy and bulky for the typical aeroplane then.

However, radio was not the only concern of commanders who had to juggle bal­loons, dirigibles, and aeroplanes around the battlefield. Limited experience had not yet suggested the sort of unit structure that would be right for aviation and aeronau­tics. Part of engineering or communications corps, their commanders lacked the in­dependence and flexibility.

Experience from manoeuvres and local wars gave some clarity on how different types of flying machine are best employed. Those first airborne weapons, spherical balloons, were on their way out. However, despite their known disadvantages, they were still used for secondary and auxiliary tasks such as defending fortresses and tar­gets to the rear. Their place at the battlefront was taken by tethered kite balloons, which were stable observation platforms. In recognition of their still limited mobility, they were intended for static and defensive warfare. Aeroplanes and airships were to be the proactive agents on the battlefront, with aerostatic balloons being used for

observation, aerial reconnaissance, and artillery correction. Forward-positioned aero­stats would conduct stereoscopic photography of enemy formations, allowing their locations, firepower, and force concentrations to be determined precisely. In attack, aerostats were only assigned the artillery correction role.

Observation altitudes reached 1300m, with some 600 to 1000m being average, and 400m being the minimum. Aerostats could only carry one aeronaut to maximum altitude, which made effective data transmission more difficult. A normal three of four-strong crew could ascend to no more than 600m.

Aerostats’ distance from the frontline depended on observation altitude and the pres­ence of enemy artillery (especially long-range guns), and was usually four to six kilometres.

Observers’ effectiveness depended on locale (the presence of characteristic fea­tures) , on how well enemy manpower and equipment was camouflaged, and on the weather. Major weather indicators were visibility and wind speed. Parcival-Siegsfeld balloons could cope with no more than some 15m/s of wind. Fair visibility constituted anything over ten kilometres. Given such conditions, experienced aeronauts could locate a single artillery battery 15 to 18km away by looking for gun flashes.

Aerostats’ good visual range and ability to fly equally well from shipboard as from the shore made them valuable to the fleet, especially in naval blockades. Apart from conducting general lookout and recce duties, naval aeronauts could spot enemy sur-

A French balloon unit filling its vessel with hydrogen

I An Italian semi-rigid airship

face and submarine shipping and mines, correct artillery fire, and relay ship-to-ship or ship-to-shore messages.

Operational and strategic intelligence duties were assigned to airship crews. The last peacetime manoeuvres proved that general staffs’ requirements of early 1914 could only be met by airships. These requirements included the ability to penetrate enemy airspace to a depth of 500 or 600km at a height of 2400m: indicators far beyond the ability of any mass produced heavier-than-air craft at the time.

Another great advantage of airships was their great loadability. This enabled them to bomb fortresses, troop and equipment concentrations, harbours, stores and indus­trial establishments. In penetrations of the order of 600km, airship warloads were not less than 300 kg, with corresponding increases at shorter ranges. However, the fact is that prior to the Great War very few airships boasted anything like the above indica­tors. Those that did were mostly German. (Graph 8)

Wisdom from the initial manoeuvres and local wars in which aeroplanes were involved seemed to suggest they would be most useful for operational reconnaissance. The same events also showed some aeroplane utility in tactical recce, and in artillery

Graph 8: Airships’ payload and range growth, 1900-1914

correction, but this was ignored. Apart from mistrust of aeroplanes among commands, and short-sightedness on the part of military bureaucrats, this was also due to pilots’ dislike of such hard and risky missions which required concerted training and offered no guarantee of success. Yet artillery correction soon became a routine task for avia­tors, especially against well camouflaged targets. Since no manuals and agreed proce­dures of any kind existed, flyers and gunners would thrash things out informally be­fore a flight. Naturally, results were patchy, took long to arrive and were often at odds with gunners’ real needs. Military theoreticians correctly surmised that informal ‘ne­gotiations’ would be unthinkable in the mobile general war they expected, and began developing formalised procedures. Things did not get much further than those early developments, being overtaken by the outbreak of war.

The next task assigned to aviators was to strike enemy targets. The Tripolitanian and Balkan Wars, in which aviators from many non-combatant nations volunteered, convinced experts that there was considerable likelihood of success in bombing from aeroplanes. They concluded that aeroplanes would be best used against targets that were large or covered a great area. Working heights would be between 800 and 1000m. Two approaches were fore­seen: star patterned and squadron attacks. The former involved individual aeroplanes ap­proaching the target from a variety of directions, whereas the latter involved a group ap­proaching together. In both cases the aim was to saturate the target with bombs to an ade­quate extent. In any case, considering the relatively small number of aeroplanes, no special­ised bombing units were formed before the Great War, commanders having to rely on what (if any) strike capacity happened to be available in units under their command.

The Balkan Wars brought the dogfight a stage nearer. Though isolated, the encoun­ters on the Bulgarian/Turkish and Bulgarian/Servian fronts did not escape analysts’ no­tice. However, neither designers, nor strategists offered coherent views on dogfighting. The very idea of one aerial vessel being attacked by another was only addressed in the

I Good portability was among the conditions set before candidates to supply aeroplanes to the military: here a Breguet is seen readied for transportation by road

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case of some airships, which were accordingly fitted with machine guns. Aeroplanes lacked such defensive armament. While France, Britain, Belgium, Russia and Austria – Hungary did some defensive/offensive armament trials, conclusions drawn and solu­tions implemented were disparate. For instance, influenced by the forward-positioned engine and puller propeller, the Austro-Hungarians decided to position the observer aft and let him handle the weapon. Others felt it was better to site the engine aft, use a pusher propeller, and put the observer/gunner at the front.

The use of aeroplanes for liaison between distant columns or units was another long-drawn contentious issue. Since everyone expected a mobile war, aerial liaison scenarios were tried at manoeuvres, and in 1911 some pilots called for a purpose – designed swift and light aeroplane. The call was heard only in Britain, where the satisfactory Scout flew eighteen months later.

Stemming from man’s earliest attempts to break the bonds of gravity, the genesis of air power saw early aeroplanes used not just by the military, but also for transporta­tion and other civilian business. This genesis stimulated great scientific and industrial effort. The following general conclusions may be drawn:

1. Even at their nascence, air power and air potential became a priority in indus­trially developed nations which could afford to keep pace with advancing research and technology;

2. The emergence and development of air power’s various components was evolu­tionary, and was governed as much by the new environment as by the objectives set by national political and military leaders;

3. The tasks set before early aviation led to the creation of specialised institutions at the government and private enterprise levels;

4. The improvement of aeroplanes’ capabilities led to enhanced status for the specialised institutions which started on their way to becoming pillars of national military and economic might;

5. As the components of air power and air potential grew in importance, they began to form a system with its typical interconnections, points of entry and exit, and sources;

6. The major development stimulus for air power and air potential was the drive for supremacy in the new environment of the air. The first local conflicts in which the nascent components of the new system played a part proved that this system had a future in the attainment of political, business and military goals.

The first shots of the world’s first general war put an end to the period of emer­gence in the development of air power. Although regarded romantically today, this period saw many rational solutions which hold true to this very day. Later, air poten­tial would draw on experience gained in this period to develop both its peaceful civil­ian aspects, and its military side.

No	Designation/ N ante	Year	Origin	Volume, m3	Length, m	Diameter, m	Power, kWt	Payload, kg	Speed, km/h	Type
1	LZ-1	1900	Germany	11,300	128	11.65	21	n. a.	28.1	Rigid
2	LZ-2	1905	Germany	11,300	128	11.65	126	2800	39.6	Rigid
3	LZ-4	1908	Germany	12,200	136	11.65	144	2900	43.9	Rigid
4	Lebed’	1909	Russia	3700	61.4	11.1	51	920	36	Semi Rigid
5	LZ-5	1909	Germany	15,000	136	13	144	4600	48.6	Rigid
6	Grif	1910	Russia	7300	700	14	162	3700	59	Soft
7	LZ-7	1910	Germany	19,300	148	14	264	6800	60.1	Rigid
8	LZ-10	1911	Germany	17,800	140	14	321	6500	75.6	Rigid
9	Schute-Lanz SL-1	1911	Germany	19,500	131	18.4	368	4500	70.9	Rigid
10	Mayfly	1911	Britain	18,760	156	14.6	265	n. a.	n. a.	Rigid
11	LZ-14	1912	Germany	22,465	158	14.86	363	9400	76.3	Rigid
12	P	1912	Italy	4900	62	12.6	103	1490	65	Semi Rigid
13	PL-17	1912	Germany	9830	85	16	250	2150	64.8	Soft
14	PL-16	1913	Germany	9830	94.15	15.48	265	2716	67.6	Soft
15	LZ-21	1913	Germany	20,870	148	14.86	396	8800	73.8	Rigid
16	Astra	1913	Russia	10,000	78	15	294	5400	59	Soft
17	PL-18	1913	Germany	8800	84	15	265	2200	67	Soft
18	PL-20	1914	Germany	9830	92	15	265	3300	78.1	Soft
19	M	1914	Italy	12,500	82.7	16.9	287	5300	70	Semi Rigid
20	LZ-24	1914	Germany	22,470	158	14.86	441	9200	80.6	Rigid

Designation	Origin	Year	Type	Engine, Rating	Crew	Span, m	Length, m	Wing Area, sq m	Gross Weight, kg	Max Speed, km/h	Range/ time
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Flyer 1	USA	1903	Biplane	Wright, 12hp	1	12.3	6.4	47	340	approx 18	285m/59s
Flyer 2	USA	1904	Biplane	Wright, 16hp	1	12.3	6.4	47	360	approx 47	4.8km/5m 4s
Flyer 3	USA	1905	Biplane	Wright, 2 lhp	1	12.3	8.5	47	388	approx 60	39km/38m 3s
14 bis	France	1906	Biplane	Antoinette, 50hp	1	11.5	9.7	52	300	approx 60	220m/21.2s
Voisin-Delagrange	France	1907	Biplane	Anotinette, 50hp	1	10	n. a.	40	n. a.	n. a.	500m/n. a.
Bleriot VI	France	1907	Tandem Wing Biplane	Antoinette, 50hp	1	5.9	n. a.	20	280	n. a.	184m/n. a.
Voisin-Farman 1	France	1907	Biplane	Antoinette, 50hp	1	10.2	13.3	40	520	approx 45	771m/52.6s
Wright A	USA	1908	Biplane	Wright, 30hp	2	12.5	8.9	47.4	500	approx 60	125km/2h 20m 23s
Bleriot VIII	France	1908	Monoplane	Antoinette, 50hp	1	11	10	22	425	approx 76	14 km
REP 2	France	1908	Monoplane	n. a., 30hp	1	8.6	n. a.	15.8	350	n. a.	1.2 km
Verber 9	France	1908	Biplane	Antoinette, 50hp	1	10.5	10.7	30	400	40	500m/n. a.
Cody 1	Britain	1908	Biplane	Antoinette, 50hp	1	15.8	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	45	450m/n. a.
Voisin-Farman 1 bis	France	1908	Biplane	Antoinette, 50hp	1	10.2	13.3	40	530	54	40km/n. a.
Antoinette 4	France	1908	Monoplane	Antoinette, 50hp	1	12.8	11.5	50	450	65	155km/n. a.
Voisin Standard	France	1908	Biplane	Antoinette, 50hp	1	10	12	40	550	55	n. a.
Grade 1	Germany	1908	Triplane	Grafe, 16hp	1	10	8.5	25	230	70	60m/n. a.
Bleriot XI	Germany	1908	Monoplane	Anzani, 25hp	1	7.8	8.2	14	300	60	n. a.
Golden Flyer	USA	1909	Biplane	Curtiss, 50hp	1	8.7	8.7	24	376	60	n. a.
Farman 3	France	1909	Biplane	Gnome, 50hp	1	10	11.2	40	550	60	223km/n. a.
Antoinette 6	France	1909	Monoplane	Antoinette, 50hp	1	12.8	11.5	50	520	85	180km/n. a.
Kudashyov-1	Russia	1910	Biplane	Anzani, 35hp	2	9	10	32	420	n. a.	60m/n. a.
Gakkel’ 3	Russia	1910	Biplane	Anzani, 35hp	1	7.5	7.5	29	560	80	400m/n. a.
Grizodubov	Russia	1910	Biplane	ARB, 30hp	1	12	10.9	n. a.	600	70	4.4km/n. a.
Laner Simon 1	Austria- Hungary	1910	Biplane	Anzani, 25hp	2	13	n. a.	47	550	70	n. a.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Etrich Taube	Austria- Hungary	1910	Monoplane	Clerget, 50hp	2	14	10	34	430	80	75km/n. a.
C-6A [S-6A]	Russia	1911	Biplane	Argus, lOOhp	2	11.8	8.8	35.4	990	111	n. a.
Curtiss A1	USA	1911	Biplane Flying Boat	Curtiss, 75hp	2	8.74	8.43	30.75	714	105	n. a.
Bristol R1	Britain	1911	Monoplane	Gnome, 50hp	1	9.2	n. a.	15	372	105	n. a.
Fokker Spin	Germany	1911	Monoplane	Argus, lOOhp	2	11	7.75	22	400	90	45km/n. a.
Nieuport 4	France	1911	Monoplane	Gnome, 50hp	1	11.6	8	18	600	105	330km/n. a.
Farman MF7	France	1912	Biplane	Renault, 70hp	2	15.8	n. a.	48	728	90	n. a.
Flenriot D	France	1912	Monoplane	Gnome, 50hp	1	8.9	n. a.	14	480	120	n. a.
Albatros	Germany	1912	Biplane	Argus, lOOhp	2	14.4	n. a.	39	950	100	1200km
Bristol Scout	Britain	1912	Biplane	Gnome, 80hp	1	6.7	n. a.	14.3	280	150	n. a.
Dun DB	Britain	1912	Flying Wing Biplane	Green, 50hp	1	10.97	6.4	21.35	772	97	n. a.
Farman 22	France	1913	Biplane	Gnome, 80hp	2	15	n. a.	41	680	90	n. a.
BA2A	Britain	1913	Biplane	Renault, 70hp	2	10.68	9	32.7	726	112	480km
Caudron G-3	France	1913	Biplane	Gnome, 80hp	2	13.9	n. a.	30	625	90	n. a.
Avro 504	Britain	1913	Biplane	Gnome, 80hp	2	11	8.91	32	625	100	280km
Albatros B2	Germany	1913	Biplane	Mercedes, lOOhp	2	12.8	n. a.	36	900	100	600km
Morane Parasol	France	1913	High Wing Monoplane	Gnome, 80hp	2	10.3	6.38	18	680	115	300km
Morane-Saulnier	France	1913	Monoplane	Gnome, 80hp	1	9.2	7	16	500	130	250km
Sopwith Tabloids	Britain	1913	Biplane	Gnome, 80hp	1	7.8	6.1	22	480	148	n. a.
Deperdussin	France	1913	Monoplane	Gnome, 160hp	1	6.7	6.1	10	500	200	n. a.
Russkiy Vityaz	Russia	1913	Biplane	4 x Argus, lOOhp	4	27	20	120	4200	90	380km
llya-Muromets	Russia	1913	Biplane	4 x Argus, lOOhp	4	32	23	182	4650	95	380km
Curtiss M	USA	1913	Biplane Flying Boat	Curtiss, 85hp	2	8.7	n. a.	32.9	550	80	n. a.
C-10 [S-10]	Russia	1914	Biplane Flying Boat	Argus, lOOhp	2	14	n. a.	36	1080	100	n. a.
Albatros	Germany	1914	Flying Boat Biplane	Mercedes, lOOhp	2	16	n. a.	50	1240	105	n. a.
Rumpler 4S	Germany	1914	Monoplane	Mercedes, lOOhp	2	14	n. a.	29	1000	110	n. a.

[1] 2 Translator’s rendering from the quotation in Bulgarian.

[2] Paradoxically Lilienthal, who did more than anyone before him to breathe life into fixed wings, believed without any reservation that the future lay with ornithopters.

[3] This construction was retained for all Lilienthal’s future gliders.

[4] Of Maxim Gun fame; using recoil energy, his machine gun found worldwide success.

[5] Today he would be Romanian. Translator.

[6] R-7 in Latin script. Translator.

[7] Al’batros in Latin script. Translator.

[8] More usually known as Igor Sikorsky; the complete Russian transliteration is given for comleteness and uniformity. Translator.

[9] Russkiy Vityaz or Russian Knight. Translator.

[10] Il’ya Muromets or Elijah of Murom. Translator.

[11] Province. Translator

[12] Lapseki is on the Asia Minor side of the Dardanelles. Translator.

[13] Notable

Even the scant attention given to the Wright brothers’ glider trials between 1900 and 1902 stimulated French aeronautics students’ desire to build real aeroplanes. After Lilienthal’s death, European progress in heavier-than-air flying apparatus had come to a standstill. French artillery officer Capt Ferdinand Ferber made the first effort to a resumption. In early 1902, Octave Chanute sent him a copy of the paper on gliding delivered by Orville Wright the previous September. Ferber decided to make a glider similar to that of the Americans, but without the roll control system. He used bamboo and normal timber, and completed the job in 1903. The glider was intended to be powered, and Ferber acquired a 6hp Bouchet internal combustion engine for the purpose, marrying it to two puller propellers. The aeroplane was tested later the same year, being put through its paces while suspended from the gib of an 18 metre high stand. This showed up the engine’s insufficient power: it had to sustain a 235kg machine in flight.

In 1904, Ferber improved the aeroplane, fit­ting a tailplane aft of the wing. The wings were given some anhedral in an attempt to improve longitudinal stability. A new and more reliable

I Ferber’s attempted free flight in 1905

Peugeot engine, again rated at 6hp, was fitted. The puller propeller was between the wing assembly and the forward mounted elevator.

A flight attempt was made on 27 May 1905 when Ferber intentionally cut the holding rope. However, all that the weak engine did was merely reduce the gradient of the precipitous glide. Nevertheless, the puller propeller/biplane aerodynamic configu­ration was rational, and was to spread far and wide a few years hence.

The enthusiastic gunner went on to build a third aeroplane in 1906. This featured a significantly more powerful Antoinette engine, whose output reached 24hp at 600rpm. Regrettably, the aeroplane was destroyed by a storm on 19 November, a little while before its planned first flight.

When the Wrights stopped flying, aviation advance palpably slowed. Ferber was not the only one to try and acquit the Old World. Transylvanian[5] Traian Vuia, who lived in France, conceived a Flying Automobile. Its road-going progenitor left a strong imprint on the finished article which had four leaf-sprung, pneumatic-strutted and tyred wheels; a steering wheel controlled the rudder. The wing folded for easy trans­port by road. Control was to be achieved by tilting the wing, and longitudinal trim: by sliding the seat fore and aft. The steel tube and cloth article weighed 192kg, had an erect span of 8.7m and a wing area of 20sq m. The engine, a 24hp Serpols unit, drove a two-bladed puller propeller with a 1.5m diameter.

The Vuia 1 entered testing in March 1906. On 18 March it took off and flew for 12m at a height of a metre. Five months later, this distance was doubled but the landing was a crash. Despite the modest achievements, these hops boosted interest in monoplanes. Vuia’s later improvements to his apparatus, which included modifying the controls, led nowhere: testing in October showed it to be incapable of sustaining level flight.

Traian Vuia with his Aerial Automobile at its debut on 18 March 1906

Gabriel Voisin was one of the most famous of pioneer aviators. He was a French mechanic who had designed and built his own gliders. In 1905, he made a float-equipped glider with a strange wing. It took off by being pulled along the Seine by a motor boat, and testing proved that boxing the wing as in a kite resulted in good stability, as well as improving structural strength for a given weight.

Using his glider experience, in spring 1906 Voisin built the Bleriot III (thus called because it was or­dered by Louis Bleriot, later to be a renowned design­er, maker and flyer in his own right). In profile, the wing was ellipsoid. The idea was to box it and give it anhedral for roll stability in one. The rudder was within the wing. The aeroplane was intended to depart and alight from and on water, as the glider had, and it was fitted with two fore and one aft floats. A 24hp engine drove two forward propellers via bicycle chains.

Testing began in May 1906 and soon revealed that the powerplant caused strong wing vibrations at cer­tain regimes. Nevertheless, on 12 September the de­signer did fly a distance of 42m at a metre above the surface, and an average speed of 57km/h. It turned out that such hops afforded no control whatever. The

The float-equipped Voisin glider being towed on the Seine at Paris in 1905

The Bleriot III, in which the later-famous Bleriot first tried to fly

attempt to get rid of vibrations by fitting two engines, each driving its own propeller, ended in failure: the heavier machine could not improve on its earlier parameters.

After a fruitful summer, Gabriel and Charles Voisin formed the world’s first aero­plane making company. Orders piled in, especially after a famous flight by eminent aeronaut Santos-Dumont. The Bazilian had designed the 14-bis aeroplane. A hybrid between the Wrights’ Flyers and Hargrave’s kite, this was a canard biplane with a biplane forward elevator and a pusher propeller. A peculiarity of the design was its pronounced dihedral. The engine was a 24hp Antoinette. The structure was of tim­ber and bamboo. The pilot stood upright in a basket-like container. The rest of the fuselage was of square section, entirely cloth-covered.

Santos-Dumont began tests in 1906. The Aeroplane was towed behind a dirigible (again designed by himself, hence the bis in the designation). In late August, an attempt was made to fly free, but the contraption failed to get off the ground. Subsequent run­ups ended in failure. One reason for this was the weak engine, which was changed for a more powerful 50hp Antoinette. The modi­fied aeroplane flew for some 70 to 80m at 3m on 23 October. This was enough for all mem­bers of a French Aero Club committee, who witnessed the flight, to admit that Santos – Dumont qualified for the Prix Archdecon, instituted for the first man to fly a distance of not less than 25m.

On 21 November the designer won a sec­ond similar prize, this time for a flight cover­ing not less than 100m. This time he rose to

6m and covering a distance of 220m. Of course, this was not the first powered aeroplane flight, and indeed the 14 bis was only just an aeroplane, being immensely unstable and yawing uncontrollably. The yawing was not cured even after ailerons were installed. Its great many imperfections make it clear that the credit for its flights lies mainly with the excellent engine and well-chosen weather. A crash in early 1907 was the natural end to its career. Nonetheless, the enormous enthusiasm caused by reports of its flights stimu­lated the efforts of many pioneers, and the acclaim of the public.

One of Voisin’s early clients was French sculptor Leon Delagrange. His Viosin – Delagrange 1 was a motorised version of the Voisin-built floatplane glider. The engine was the proven 50hp Antoinette, and a wheeled undercarriage replaced the floats. The aeroplane had a biplane elevator, with the side members of the tailplane acting as rudders. Span was 10m and wing area, 40sq m. Fitted directly to the engine output shaft, without a reductor, the metal pusher propeller spun at up to 1000rpm.

First trials set tor 28 February 1907 re­sulted in some successful hops. On 30 March Charles Voisin covered a distance of some 80m. Then the wheeled undercarriage was removed and replaced with floats, but when this did not increase flight lengths, the de­signers reverted to wheels. On 3 November 1907, Leon Delagrange flew a distance of 500m but crashed on landing.

The Antoinette engines which were be­coming favourites to inventors of early aero­planes, were designed by French engineer Leon Levavasseur. Initially intended for light maritime applications, they were later adapt­ed for airborne use. Two major versions were Ш Leon Levavasseur, 1863-1922

Щ On 30 March 1907, a Voisin-Delagrange covered a distance of 60m

made: 24hp and 50hp, both extremely compact for the time. In seeking potential Euro­pean buyers, Levasseur tried to make his own aeroplane. It was to share the name of the engine, which had been named after Levasseur’s employer’s daughter, Mademoiselle Antoinete Gastambid. The Antoinette 1 was to have been a canard monoplane with a pusher propeller, but regrettably the project did not reach conclusion.

In 1908, Levavasseur designed a second monoplane. This had a long fuselage and a rather advanced wing profile, with a great thickness to chord ratio and different upper and lower curvatures. The wing planform was a trapeze with an area of 24sq m and a span of 10.5m. Weight reached 350kg. The more powerful 50hp engine was chosen for the aeroplane, but even this was insufficient for a proper flight, trials result­ing in a few hops. This did not out off the designer, but rather, spurred him on. In July 1908 he completed detail work on the Gastambid-Mangen-2 by fitting it with triangu­lar ailerons at the wing tips. On 21 August the new machine flew a circular flight lasting 1m36s. The Gastambid-Mangen-2 was the first manned monoplane to fly.

The Antoinette 4 appeared in 1908. Similar to Levasseur’s early designs, this had a trapezoid wing, a puller propeller, and a long thin fuselage. All-up weight reached 460kg. The engine was the same as in the previous design. To cut drag, the cloth covering the wing’s upper surface was varnished to a gleam. Wing and body structural elements were made of metal. The undercarriage was of the single pivot type, with pneumatic damping. The wing undersides had skids, with another skid guarding the propeller from striking the ground in heavy landings.

The aeroplane showed excellent qualities, prompting French pilot Latham to at­tempt to fly the Channel. On a good July day in 1909, he set off superbly, but shortly before reaching the English coast problems developed and the machine had to land on water. In August the saem year, an Antoinette 4 piloted by Latham flew the dis­tance of 155km in 2h17m at the first international air races in Rheims. The aeroplane was widely exported in the years before the Great War.

The builders of the Gastambid-Mangen 2 checking its undercarriage before a flight attempt

A year earier, in July 1908, Ferber completed his last aeroplane, the Ferber 9. Built by Antoinette, it was a puller propeller biplane and a forward positioned elevator. Span was 10.5m, wing area was 30sq m, weight was 400kg, and the engine was a 50hp Anto­inette. Trials began in the summer and were successful. The aeroplane was exceptional­ly stable, covering a distance of 500m in September. This was Ferber’s first and last aeroplane to make it into the air. The designer was to die in an air crash in autumn 1909.

As mentioned above, Maj Parcival was a successful designer of non-rigid airships. On leaving the army in 1907, he organised airship manufacture for civil and military use. Between 1909 and 1913, his company built 18 examples, some of which went on to transport passengers, while others were bought by the German, Austro-Hungarian, British, Italian, Japanese, Russian, and Turkish armies.

The British became worried by the interest the German military lavished on the LZ-4. Disquiet became pronounced with the news that after the craft’s widely publi-

An Antoinette 7 before its second Channel flight attempt on 27 July 1909 …

… and after it

THE FERBER 9

The Ferber 9, also known as the Antoinette 3

cised demise, patriotically minded Germans had subscribed money for yet more air­ships. At a time of intense Anglo-German naval rivalry, it became clear that Germa­ny, possessor of Europe’s (and possibly the World’s) most powerful land army, was now aiming for naval and aerial supremacy.

How was this challenge to be met? The question turned out rather difficult. In 1907 the Army Balloon Factory built a small sausage-shaped airship. Named the Nulli Secundus, its first flight covered the distance between Farnborough and Crystal Pal-

A Parcival P IV non-rigid airship

ace, overflying St Paul’s Cathedral en route. Covering the fifty miles took a little under three and a half hours. In 1908 the vessel was modernised, but the resulting Nulli Secundus II was also rather tardy to have any military significance.

In fact, British hopes of competing with the Germans rested with large rigid airships. This was the class of vessel the Admiralty wanted. The task was assigned to Vickers, Sons and Maxim Ltd (soon to be just Vickers after Sir Hiram Maxim left the board). The company had built Britain’s first submarine. Initial plans included the wide scale use of duralumin, a new German-discovered light alloy, which Vickers also made.

When the project was first presented, head of the Maritime Armaments Depart­ment head Capt Bacon was dissatisfied and decided on a course of constant inspections during construction and preparatory work. Thus he personally supervised compliance between what was wanted by the War Office Maritime Design Department and what was being done at Vickers. Bacon was a firm adherent to the ideas of air power and of adapting airships for Navy needs. His findings found favour with the Admiralty which in turn held him responsible for their implementation. Sadly, no sooner had the project started than Bacon resigned as part of a heated argument between Admiral Lord Charles Beresford and First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir John Fisher. Bacon was succeeded by Capt Murray Suiter, another firm adherent of naval aeronautics. Sadly, Suiter knew little about aeronautics. He took the job of Inspecting Captain well aware he had to trust Vickers. The responsibility for failure was thus passed down to Vickers’ maritime design managers who had no aeronautic experience, and no background in the construction of rigid dirigibles or the new special materials used in them.

To construct the vessel, Vickers began building a huge airship hangar near Bar­row-in-Furness. This turned out so hugely expensive that it absorbed the entire project’s budget. Suiter turned to the War Office for additional funds. His application led to another round of inconclusive discussions about the number of airships versus aero­planes on order for the Navy and Army.

When the job was nearing completion, a mathematician consulting Vickers on stresses reported that the numerous departures from initial design specifications meant the airship would lack the requisite strength. Nonetheless, completion went ahead with the added proviso of additional ground tests prior to first sailing.

In late spring 1911, the 137m long Mayfly, as it had been popularly dubbed, was ready to fly. Moored at a purpose built tower, it had overcome strong winds successful­ly. However, serious defects were discovered in its lifting engines, and it was walked back into its hangar for modifications. The date of 24 September was set for further tests. As the Mayfly was being walked out on that day, its upper parts struck the hangar, sustaining irreparable damage. Fortunately for posterity, photographers man­aged to document its final appearance shortly before the accident. Navy officers present were unanimous in declaring the airship “more the work of lunatics than anything

I Russia’s most competent pre-World War airship was the Al’batros

else”. An enquiry reached the verdict that structural weakness had lain at the bottom of the events, recommending the cessation of further work. The hundred thousand pounds Sterling spent on the Mayfly project were ultimately written off, the Admiral­ty redirecting efforts at heavier-than-air apparatus.

Some years after the defeat of the Russo-Japanese War, in early 1909 the Russian Army and Navy bought indigenous and foreign-made airships. By 1912, the Army had ten dirigibles. They were of the semi-rigid class, with a single long gondola for the pay/warload. Largest was the P-7[6], a 70m long Parcival type vessel which had a radio station broadcasting within a 500km radius. By 1914, Russian dirigibles had grown to 15: German, French and British designs, some of them manufactured in Russia. Elev­en of them had limited performance, being limited to some 50km/h. Only four genu­inely met military specifications. Best among them was the Al’batros,[7] a 10,000cu m design with a ceiling of 2000m, and a 75km/h true cruise speed. Its complement was between eight and twelve men.

The aeronautical situation in France and Italy was similar. Germany was the un – oubted leader in giant airships. Their performance allowed them to perform a great variety of tasks, with operational and strategic reconnaissance assigned as their main use in a future war.

Meanwhile, the performance of heavier-than-air machines was improving by the day. Progress threw up new names fated to become legends in aviation. One such was Henry Farman. Known in France as ‘Henri,’ he was one of the three sons of British journalists working in that country. Fascinated by the achievements of pioneer flyers, he ordered an aeroplane from the Voisins. This was to be the constructors’ first depar­ture from their early aeroplanes’ trademark box-wing biplane construction. The aero­plane had an unusual layout. It was a triplane with a span of 6.3m, an elongated body,

The Voisin-built biplane in which Henry Farman made his first successful flight

Henry Farman speaking with a trainee pilot about to fly a Farman

and a biplane tail. It was fitted with a Renault automobile engine driving a pusher propeller. Elevators and rudder were forward-mounted. No evidence of flights with this strange machine survives. Farman must have been disappointed and began mod­ifying the design. The new version had four ailerons: one on each of the four wingtips. They deflected only downward, but their large area made them effective enough. Wing area was 40sq m with a span of 10m. The engine remained the same, its 50hp rating being sufficient for the 530kg all-up weight.

Initial tests showed adequate flying qualities. On 2 October 1908, Henry Farman set a distance and height record for a French built aeroplane by flying 40km in 44m 31s. On 30 October the same machine performed aviation’s first city-to-city flight when it

The Farman 1 biplane

ifcfe. «****** Щ The Standard Voisin had a box wing construction

departed from Bouis and landed in Rheims (the two are 27km distant). This marked the end of the Voisins’ fruitful period of cooperation with Farman.

The former truned their attention to their ‘Standard Voisin’ which was assembled and towed out in December 1908. This was to be their first series-produced design. Within six months, 16 machines were built for clients which included the Odessa Aero Club in Russia. The original Voisin glider could still be divined in the aero­plane’s appearance. Engines were different, but all drove a pusher propeller. Major materials were timber and cloth, the latter covering only the upper surface of the wing, and the exterior of the ‘stabilisers’ and some parts of the body. Only the under­carriage was of steel for strength. The biplane had the same span and wing area as Farman’s design, and a length of 12m. Maximum recorded speed was 55km/h.

The lack of ailerons (or an other means of roll control) meant the machine was not particularly manoeuvrable. Turns had to be flat, taking a long time and covering a great area. Despite this shortcoming, the aeroplane was among the most popular de­signs of the next few years. Thanks to its stability, even in strong wind, the Standard Voisin was preferred for initial pilot training. It saw action as a recce and light bomb-

THE STANDARD VOISIN

ing platform in the Tripolitanian, First and Second Balkan, and the initial stages of the Great War.

The crash of the 14 bis did not set that eternal seeker, Santos-Dumont, back. He built the 15 bis, which however inverted on its first take off and was damaged. Santos – Dumont resotred it, but did not fly it any more, directing his efforts at monoplanes.

The 19 was finished in late 1907. The machine was extraordinarily compact and rational looking. Span was barely 5m, and wing area was 11sq m. This was history’s first micro aeroplane. To cut weight, bamboo and cloth had been used almost exclu­sively. Calculations showed that a 20hp engine would be sufficient to haul the sub – 200kg craft into the air and give it good controllability. Yet the lack of ailerons and the ineffectiveness of the other controls meant a difficult test career.

The aeroplane suffered a failure on its third takeoff attempt. The Brazilian refused to repair it, preferring to devote what means he had to the 20, or the Demoiselle, as the 19’s modified successor was to be called. The structure was strengthened with thin metal piping used instead of bamboo for structural elements. Without practically any change to the craft’s appearance, the control system was changed to allow the pilot to control the aeroplane by shifting his body around, as well as by moving levers. The same 30hp engine type as in the previous version was located between the two wing halves, near the leading edge. Despite being flown successfully and attaining a 90km/h

Щ The 15 bis biplane being towed by designer Santos-Dumont; the visibly great dihedral was intended for roll stability

H Santos-Dumont’s Demoiselle looked similar to his 19 and 20

speed, the Demoiselle was insufficiently developed. It was to be the eminent Brazilian’s ultimate design.

The appearance of European designers able to attain impressive indicators shook the Wright brothers’ conviction that they would remain unchallenged for a long time. Their patent was threatened: aeroplane making was developing well regardless of their absence. In order to salvage something from their invention, in 1905 they cut the asking price for a French licence by half to 500,000 franks. Flyer III was sold to the US Government for 25,000 dollars. Negotiations started with British and German aviation hopefuls. One of the contracts called on the Wrights to fly demonstrations in an aeroplane similar to the Flyer III, but with two seats, and with pilot and passenger sitting upright. The fuel tank was also increased for greater range and endurance. The new pilot position called for modifications to the controls. The engine, another Wright,

Щ Alberto Santos-Dumont surrounded as usual by an adulating crowd

THE SANTOS-DUMONT 19

I A Wright single-seater

THE WRIGHT TYPE A

was also new, this time producing 30hp. Length was 8.9m, span was 12.5m, and wing area was 47sq m. There was still no undercarriage, the aeroplane landing on skids.

In May 1908, before departing for Europe the Wrights began testing their new type. History’s first biplane flight with a passenger on board was on 14 May. The passenger was W. Fernas, Wilbur Wright’s assistant, who was in the air for a total of 20 seconds. Soon after, Orville Wright notched up a 3m 40s flight.

The demonstration flights began in August 1908. The brothers parted, Wilbur going to France. In the short time between 8 and 31 August he performed 104 flights lasting a total of 25 hours over the Old World. His last flight, in which he covered 129km in 180 minutes won him a 20,000 frank prize. Meanwhile, Orville flew near Fort Myer, Virginia, demonstrating the second example fo the new design. He made ten flights, four of them lasting over an hour. The last one, on 17 September, ended in a crash. The reason turned out to be a defect in one of the propellers. The pilot was badly hurt, and his passenger, friend and Army engineer Thomas Selfridge, died.

The European aviation community was impressed with the manoeuvrability of the Wright brothers’ aeroplane. They witnessed turns with banks of up to 25 degrees, executed not just with a rudder (as in contemporaneous European types), but also with ailerons and wing camber control which moreover were not just used for coun­tering the odd involuntary roll.

Another good idea was the use of gearing for the propellers. Thanks to the Wrights’ reductor, they used larger timber propellers which worked more efficiently. European designs had more primitive metal props with direct drives. As a result of its superiority,

I Moments after Orville Wright’s crash which killed passenger Thomas Selfridge

the Wright A flew considerably better with almost half the installed power of Voisins, Levasseurs, and Santos-Dumonts.

The Europeans reacted swiftly: ailerons became a compulsory feature of subse­quent designs, gearing was fitted to reduce propeller speeds, and the latter were now made of timber and grew in size. By early 1909, newly-designed French aeroplanes could match or outdo the Wright A. Some were more stable and controllable, while others had lighter and more powerful engines and were more autonomous due to their wheeled undercarriages.

I Wrights during detnonstrations in France

Щ A Wright in front of a hangar

The Wrights’ most serious competitor was one of aviation’s legends: French­man Louis Bleriot. His road to success and fame was hard. After a short and not altogether satisfactory spell of working with Gabriel Voisin, Bleriot modified his private Voisin and renamed it the Bleriot IV. Fitted with floats for testing from water, this failed to get airborne, as it also failed when using a wheeled undercar­riage: the engine was too weak. But the designer was also clear that the overall concept needed changing. The Bleriot V of April 1905 was the first of a series of trademark monoplanes. It was a canard with a span of 7.8m and a wing area of 13sq m. The engine was a 24hp Antoinette driving a pusher propeller in the aft fuselage. Gross weight was just 236kg thanks to, among other things, the ma­chine’s paper covering. It was this aeroplane that rewarded its creator with his first hops of a few metres each. The last of these ended dramatically. Being inex-

| The Bleriot V after its crash-landing

Louis Bleriot’s tandem monoplane

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perienced in the use of the elevator, Bleriot handled it roughly, causing the mon­oplane to stall, drop its wing and crash. While its maker was unhurt, the aero­plane was so damaged that repairing made no sense.

The next attempt involved seeking the ideal configuration. Bleriot chose a tan­dem with great dihedral. Spanning just 5.9m, it had a 20sq m wing area. The engine was as before. The control method was changed. The forward wing had elevons at its tips, in addition to which the designer used balancing by sliding his seat fore and aft for pitch control.

The Bleriot VI was tested in July 1907, being flown also by Ferber and Peyret. Distances flown had now grown to over 100m. The designer felt that a yet more powerful engine was needed, and fitted a 60hp Antoinette. The heavy six-cylinder unit affected trim in what was already a rather unstable machine. The anticipated control problems reared their head, a trying first flight ending with a heavy landing; only Bleriot’s cool head avoided a worse outcome. Worse for wear, and with his un­gainly creation in even poorer shape, he received an Aero Club prize for covering a distance of 184m.

The next step was the building in November 1907 of the Bleriot VII. This was a clean looking machine some 20 years ahead of its time. The low-wing monoplane with its long and entirely cloth-faired fuselage, forward propeller, and tailplane and fin evoked more a 1930s feel than a pioneering effort. Structural materials were moixed, steel tubing being used in an attempt to bargain between lightness and strength; tim­ber, cloth and paper appearing elsewhere. Eight metres long, spanning 11m, and with a 25sq m area, the monoplane weighed in at 425kg. A powerful 50hp Antoinette spun a four-bladed metal prop.

I The Bleriot VII monoplane

Щ The Bleriot VIII after its crash; note the empennage

In November and December 1907, Bleriot made six flights of up to 500m. The few timorous attempts at manoeuvring confirmed fears of ineffective controls, espe­cially in roll. This defect was the reason for the crash on 18 December.

The energetic Frenchman needed just six months to synthesise his achievements so far and create the Bleriot VIII. Layout was the same, and was to prove its worth in the years to come. However, the controls were changed. For the first time, the design featured modern ailerons faired within the wing contour. Elevators were also fea­tured. Dimensions remained approximately unchanged. What change there was aimed to affect trim. This was how Bleriot’s first businesslike aeroplane emerged. On 6 July 1908 he flew it in a circle around his testing ground for 8m 28s. On 31 October, he flew the 14km distance from Tours to Artenes in 11 minutes.

The successes of aeroplane makers increased in geometric progression. While France had attained pole position, other nations were not far behind. Despite Germany’s fascination with airships, Otto Lilienthal’s rich testament was not for­gotten. Karl Jato was an amateur birdman who had first flown in a Lilienthal-type glider. In 1903 he built an aeroplane with an internal combustion engine. This was a tailless triplane with no built-in longitudinal or pitch stability whatever. Four fins positioned between the upper and mid wings acted as rudders. Testing of the unusual device began in August 1903. A gust of wind at the end of that month inverted it, and when repairing it Jato decided to get rid of the uppermost wing. Tests resumed but the best that could be attained by the unstable and almost uncontrollable craft powered by a 12hp Bouchet engine was a 60m hop at a height of two to three metres.

Building on his experience, in 1908 Jato made his second aeroplane. This was a biplane with a wing area of 54sq m and a 35hp engine driving a 2.5m diameter

Jato’s biplane before an attempted flight in summer 1903

propeller. The elevator was forward mounted. Longitudinal and pitch control were by means of the upper wing whose incidence was variable, as well as by elevators mounted between the wings. Despite the more powerful engine, the aeroplane’s

Щ Carl Jato’s 1907 design

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Щ Hans Grade’s 1908 triplane

behaviour was about the same as before, and Jato failed to become Germany’s first powered aeroplane flyer.

Another German, Ing. Hans Grade, had better chances. His fascination with fly­ing had also formed under the influence of Lilienthal. He began designing his aero­plane in 1902 but only finished it in 1908. The triplane wing spanning 8m had an area of 25sq m. The empennage comprised elevators and a rudder. Basic materials were bamboo and thin cotton. The engine, of Grade’s own design, was a six-cylinder unit producing 36hp. Several hops were achieved by the year’s end, by when it was clear that the design was incapable of more. Modifications involved increasing the wing area, improving the controls, and fitting a more efficient propeller. The result was Germany’s first aeroplane flights. Barely covering several hundred metres, they were sufficient to enter Grade into history as Germany’s first designer of a heavier-than-air flying machine to fly it successfully.

Щ Grade’s aeroplane in modified form

THE GRADE AEROPLANE (1909)

British-domiciled American Samuel Cody designed kites for the Royal Army. In 1907 he fitted a 12hp Bouchet engine to a kite of his own design which spanned 12m. Initial tests were unmanned, the kite being tethered in an intricate way. Analysing his experience, Cody improved the design with the result that the Army Balloon Factory began building an aeroplane with a military purpose in 1907. The Wrights’ Flyers acted as patterns, as is obvious from a glance at the machine. The Cody 1 was a biplane with two pusher propellers and a forward mounted elevator. It had a wheeled undercarriage and an aft mounted fin. Roll control was by wing twisting. The bamboo structure was cloth-covered.

Several attempts to get off the ground were made in September. Despite the lack of success, trials continued, Cody managing a 50m hop. His biggest success was on 16 October, when he flew 450m at a speed of 45km/h. Sadly, the return to earth was a crash landing. The craft was repaired and improved. In May 1909 Cody flew a mile in

I Cody’s Army Aeroplane being towed in September 1908

Cody’s biplane as modified with elevators

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it; in July, he covered almost six miles; and in September he achieved a record 39 miles. Despite being a foreign subject, Cody was recognised by the Royal Aeronautical Society as the first man to fly successfully in Britain.

Meanwhile, the British War Office was funding another aeroplane which looked strange even by the standards of today when practically anything has been tried. It was a flying-wing biplane. Stability was granted by the wings’ shape. It spanned 12m and was swept back 30 degrees. Lt John Dunn, who led the project at the Balloon Factory, chose a 12hp Bouchet engine driving a two blade pusher propeller. No struc­ture testing methods were available at the time, nor were there yet any means of calculating stresses. The Dunn 1 fell apart during its first takeoff run. The military lost

Lieutenant Dunn’s ‘flying wing after a successful flight

Lieutenant Dunn’s ‘flying wing after a successful flight

interest in the project, but the Lieutenant continued developing it, increasing engine power, improving controls and structural stiffness, and ultimately coming up with the Dunn D.5 in 1910: the first successful flying wing.

The Wrights were not America’s only aeroplane makers. As early as late 1900, an exceptionally far-sighted and inventive man by the name of Glenn Hammond Curtiss founded an aeroplane company. The company’s first design was the Golden Flyer. This was similar to the Silver Dart which Canadian Mark Curdey was to fit with a Curtiss engine in 1908. The difference was in its lighter structure and the 50hp produced by the Curtiss V8 engine. Between June and September 1908 the

THE DUNN 8 (1912)

I Glenn Hammond Curtiss

aeroplane made 54 flights. Since the Wrights had not registered their achievements officially before the end of that year, Curtiss was declared the first Amreican to cover a kilometre, and the first to fly a circling flight. In 1909, the same craft flew at the international air show near Rheims, reaching a speed of 70km/h and winning a prize for this speed. Over the next few years, Curtiss was to design a number of excellent aeroplanes which exported widely.

Russians were also trying to keep in step with developments. For a long time, efforts to design heavier-than-air machines were dogged by failure. It was only in May

I Curtiss’s John Bag in flight, 1908

I Curtiss’s Golden Flyer biplane in front of the Curtiss Company’s hangar at the 1909 Rheims Air Show

1910 that Kiev Polytechnical Institute lecturer Aleksandr Sergeevich Kudashyov su- ceeded in building an aeroplane. The design was a canard triplane with a length of 10m, and a span of 9m. The craft was fitted with an 35hp Anzani engine. The design­er had flown near Nice in the company of famous Russian pilot Efimov and felt com­petent to test-fly his creation. On 23 May 1910 he managed to make a few hops at a height of two to three metres. The event was not officially registered since the appro­priate institutions had not been invited to witness it.

A month later, electrical engineer Yakov Modestovich Galkkel’ completed a most original aeroplane. The Gakkel’ 3 was the world’s first biplane with an inverted section wing: the leading and trailing edges were turned upward rather than down. The aeroplane had a tailplane, elevator and rudder. The engine, a 35hp Anzani, drove a two-bladed forward propeller. Structure was cloth-cov­ered timber, weighing 560kg.

THE GOLDEN FLYER

THE GAKKEL-3

On 6 June 1910 an All-Russian Aeroclub committee recorded the first flight of a Russian designed aeroplane. However, poor engine performance resulted in disap­pointing performance. The problem was later solved and Gakkel’s biplanes and his monoplane were to be equal to any.

Despite Hans Grade’s flight, German political and military leaders were becoming concerned at otherwise falling behind in aviation. To make up for this, in 1910 they bought the licence for the Austro-Hungarian Taube monoplane. That aeroplane’s story was rather interesting. The wing’s profile and planform were a replica of the winged seed of the tropical Zanonia plant. German scientist D. Alborn was impressed by this seed’s flat glide and surmised that it might serve as model for a flying machine.

I A Taube’s unfaired structure

I A sports Etrich Taube with an Austro-Daimler 100hp engine

THE ETRICH TAUBE

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The idea was developed by industrialist Hugo Etrich and engineer Franz Wells in the form of a glider rather similar to the natural original. The designers performed several flights in it in 1906, rearing distances of over 200m.

After the Zanonia flying wing was fitted with a 24hp Antoinette engine driving a two-bladed propeller, and with a twin-wheel undercarriage, it was tested again. Fears that the lack of an empennage would damage controllability were confirmed. An empen­nage was successfully designed and fitted lat­er the same year, giving birth to the famous ■ The flying seed of the Zanonia plant Taube: most widely used German and Aus – which impressed Alborn trian aeroplane in the 1910 to 1915 period,

I The Zanonia glider built by Etrich Taube in 1906

Щ The Zanonia-derived Antoinette-engined flying wing monoplane

The Zanonia-derived Antoinette-engined flying wing monoplane

and the first enemy aeroplane to fly over Paris after the outbreak of the First World War.

Aeroplane production was now picking up. The tense international situation made the military look more closely at the new-fangled, rather unreliable, kite-like flying machines. The main quality measure of the emerging component of the new measure of each nation’s potential was what records had been set and what achievements notched up. Bleriot was again among the leaders. In January 1909 he finished work on the Bleriot XI: the design that would bring him worldwide fame. On 25 July the same year, he flew it over the Channel. This was a leap forward in aviation development, which showed its great potential for the future.

The Bleriot XI was a high wing monoplane with a space-frame fuselage whose forward portion (housing the cabin and engine) were cloth-faired. Instead of ailerons, roll was controlled by wing warping. This was controlled by the same lever which moved the conventionally sited elevator. The rudder was pedal-controlled. This is how today’s aeroplane controls work!

Major structural material was chestnut. The wing was cloth-faired on both surfac­es. The aeroplane was 8m long, had a span of 7.8m, and weighed 300kg. Maximum recorded speed was some 60km/h.

In My 1909, before his historic flight, Bleriot had modified the design. Instead of the capricious 30hp R. E.P engines, he fitted an Anzani motorcycle unit and married it to a new, more efficient prop, and a sealed fuel tank which gave buoyancy in case of a forced landing on water.

The aeroplane’s excellence apart, luck was also on Bleriot’s side. The most crit­ical moment came when the engine overheated above the blue expanse of the strait.

I The Bleriot XI at the 1909 Paris Automobile and Aeroplane Salon

Louis Bleriot on arrival in England on 25 July 1909 after his historic Channel crossing

The cliffs of England were clearly visible, but height was insufficient to allow a dead – stick landing. At that moment, Providence itself seemed to help, sending cooling rain down and speeding Bleriot on.

The Bleriot XI became as celebrated as Bleriot the aviator. The machine was built in some numbers and exported widely. Its appearance and configuration were to influ­ence many other enthusiasts.

Without a doubt, the most successful Bleriot XI development was Edouard Nie – uport’s aeroplane. Externally, it was almost identical to its progenitor, but had a broader body. This made it more aerodynamic: both in itself, and because it now housed the engine, cabin, and fuel tank. Less drag meant more range, a 50hp engine propelling the machine for over 100km.

THE BLERIOT XI

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I The Nieuport monoplane designed in 1910

The Nieuport 4 was most popular, being licence-produced in Russia and Italy. The machine was very manoeuvrable, and it is probably no accident that Russian pilot Nesterov performed the world’s first aerial loop in a Nieuport 4. The type’s mil­itary career began as a reconnaissance platform, but more importantly the type went on to become the world’s first fighter.

The first great air race near Rheims caused a ripple of interest in aviation to circle the world. Held in late summer 1909, it was attended by leading aircraft and aeroen­gine makers. Demonstrations of 38 aeroplanes were scheduled, 23 of these actually managing to make it into the air. Only three of the demonstrations were by the Wright brothers, the show being dominated by the French: Voisin, Bleriot, Farman, and Le – vasseur.

Many nations sent observers, including military men intent on seeing things at first hand and gathering comparable information. The British Government was one of those which monitored the event, subsequently resolving to boost the design and production of British aeroplanes. The first step was to subdivide the War Office de­partment responsible for aeronautics into two, to address lighter and heavier-than-air vessels. The Army Aeroplane Factory was founded in 1911, renamed the Royal Aer­oplane Factory when the Royal Air Corps was established a year later. Private enter­prise was invited to lead the process of setting aeronautical standards.

This is an example of how emergent air power was incorporated into national structures. Each nation followed its own road in the resolution of problems linked with its presence in the air, this being determined by what others were doing, as well as by affordability and the intellect of is political and military elites.

Aviation fora continued to serve as signposts of progress. Involvement in them by national institutions, i. e. the state, also grew. The process was possibly best exempli­fied by developments in Britain. In summer 1912, some 30 aeroplanes took part in an

THE NIEUPORT 4

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I Pilot Eugene Lefebvre banks a Wright a couple of feet off the ground as he turns around the control pylon at the Rheims demonstrations

Captain Ferber watches the Henry Farman fly from his vantage point in the Curtiss (left)

air show near Salisbury. The ulterior motive behind this must have been purely mili­tary: performance assessments included aeroplanes’ maximum level and landing speeds, rate of climb and other parameters important in a combat setting.

Undoubted winner of the show was the twin-seat BE2 biplane designed at Farn – borough. Designer Geoffrey de Havilland failed to win a personal award, yet in flying his machine, he reached a speed of 112km/h, a landing speed of 65km/h, a rate of climb of some 120m per minute, and a ceiling of almost 3500m. These indi­cators were achieved with a second man on board and a fuel load sufficient for a three-hour flight. Later de Havilland was to improve his design, retaining its speed and manoeuvrability, yet imparting phenomenal pitch and roll stability to it and sig-

THE B. E.2A (1913)

nificantly easing controllability. Over the next few years the Royal Air Corps was to take delivery of over 2000 of this exceptionally simple and rational aeroplane.

As distinct from their march in France, monoplanes failed to impress the British. The findings after a series of crashes in summer 1912 (which cost the lives of two pilots) were that this layout was insufficiently strong. This was to leave a strong im­print on British aircraft manufacture. Notwithstanding the attainment of the amazing (for its time) speed of 200km/h by a Deperdussin at the 1913 Rheims air show, the British put their bets on biplanes with forward propellers.

An early exponent of this layout was the Bristol B. S.1 Scout. Designed by de Havil – land, it was compace and weighed 280kg. The powerful 80hp Gnome engine permit-

THE BRISTOL TABLOID (1913)

ted a speed of 150km/h. The machine had a conventional elevator and rudder. Roll control was by wing warping, later replaced by ailerons. The aeroplane was intended to be a racer, but its high speed and good manoeuvrability recommended it to the military, and it was soon to equip the first high-speed reconnaissance units. After being fitted with a machine gun, the Scout was a reasonable fighter. Typical of British aeroplanes of the Great War, its configuration was repeated in the 1913 Avro 504, whose great conservatism did not stop it becoming one of the world’s most popular aeroplanes, being used in training establishments until the early 30s.

Armand Deperdussin’s 1913 racing monoplane was the undoubted peak of the French design school. A development of Bleriot and Nieuport’s ideas, everything in it

THE AVRO 504 (1913)

was subjected to the reduction of drag and the attainment of the maximum possible speed. The fuselage was a monocoque, with load-bearing 4mm plywood skinning. Deperdussin faired-over and smoothed everything that could create drag. The ma­chine was compact: 6.1m long, and spanning 6.6m, gross weight was 500kg. Engine was an air-cooled 14-cylinder two-row Gnome developing 160hp.

THE DEPERDUSSIN B (1911)

I The World Speed Record Deperdussin racer

The objective was reached. On 29 September, pilot Maurice Prevot covered a 200km distance in under an hour. The record was to stand for almost a decade, and remains one of the most outstanding ones. To contemporaries, the Deperdussin racer was not just an excellent flying machine, but also a fighter in sheep’s skin. However,

The Albatros B-l teas Germany’s standard intelligence gatherer after the outbreak of the First

World War

Reinhard Boehm with his Albatros after their record flight on 10 and 11 July 1914

both the British and French were to prefer biplanes for this role, and would pay heav­ily for this at the start of the Great War.

With the accumulated experience of Taube construction and operations, German designer Groman drew the twin-seat Albatros. The aeroplane lacked sparkling per­formance, yet had an irreplaceable quality preferred by pilots: great reliability. This was mostly attributable to its water-cooled 100hp Mercedes engine. Even though on the heavy side compared with French Gnomes and Rhones, this powerplant worked unfailingly and burned little fuel and oil. On 10 and 11 July 1914, pilot Reinhard Boehm flew an Albatros non-stop for 24 hours 12 minutes, beating all endurance records. The Albatros’s 100km/h maximum speed and its 300km combat radius made it one of the most successful aeroplanes of the First World War. During the conflict, the aeroplane was to be used mainly as a recce platform, and later as a pilot trainer.

Despite lagging behind, Russia left a lasting trace in pre-Great War aviation history. The major contributor to this was Igor’ Ivanovich Sikorskiy,[8] creator of the world’s first multi-engined aeroplane. The design of ‘a large aeroplane for strategic reconnaissance’ began in 1911. Construction at the Russo-Baltic Carriage Works in Riga took until early 1913. The result was a biplane with a 27m span and a wing area of 120sq m. Nothing else had anywhere near these dimensions. Powerplant installation was intersting. The four 100hp Argus engines were originally located in

THE RUSSKIY VITYAZ

I The Russkiy Vityaz: world’s first multi-engined aeroplane

twin tandems, two per lower wng-mounted nacelle. Thus two propellers pulled, while the oth­er two pushed. When it was found that the efficiency of the pusher props was rather low, all four engines were given individ­ual nacelles on the lower wing.

The fuselage was long and thin, its aft end supporting the tail. Forward was a large glazed cabin comprising a control com­partment, two passenger cabin,

and compartments for tools and

spares. The nose was occupied by an open deck. Rather than being for promenad­ing in flight, this was intended for night observation spotlights, or for machine guns. The giant was controlled by ailerons, rudder, and elevator. It had an eight-wheel undercarriage.

Few believed the aeroplane would fly. Some were of the opinion that it would be doomed if an engine failed in mid-air. Tests were to prove them entirely wrong. The Russkiy Vityaz[9] could return safely to base with just two working engines. Its maxi­mum level speed was 90km/h. On 2 August the crew and seven passengers flew non­stop for two hours, recording a world record. The famous Il’ya Muromets[10] the world’s

I One of Sikorsky’s most famous project: the Il’ya Muromets strategic reconnaissance and bomber aircraft first flown in 1913

first strategic reconnaissance and bombing aeroplane, which was produced in some numbers, was a development of the Russian Knight.

The era when the first component of air power was created came to an end. A difficult start was followed by stormy advance. The total number of aeroplanes built during Europe’s five ultimate years of peace was significantly larger than anything seen before. But the ability to design aeroplanes capable of fulfilling set combat tasks was not sufficient to guarantee an aerial presence to the nations that could afford it. Additional requirements soon made themselves felt, all of them acquiring key impor­tance in the emergence of air power.

The creation of stable and reliable flying machines and their spread suggested that the time for air navigation and aviation to be taken seriously by soldiers and statesmen had arrived. And this is indeed what transpired. Production facilities grew apace, especially after the Summer 1911 Agadir Crisis. It became clear to all that a gigantic clash of arms was approaching.

The creation and structuring of air forces as an element of armed power went almost parallel with technical advance. The earliest such units had been established in revolutionary France. Two air navigation units were set up, based upon the Ecole Nationale de Navigation Aerienne, established in 1792. During the defence of Antw­erp in 1814, French Aeronaut Carnot used a tethered balloon to observe the enemy. In the Italian War of Independence, another Frenchman, Godard, carried out recon­naissance from a balloon gondola before the Battle of Solferino. The Aerial Bridge organised during 1870 using aerostats allowed the besieged garrison in Paris to main­tain links with the outside world.

Employing the modest experience accumulated in war, and the greater background of civilian postal operations, in 1886 France created the Administration Centrale de Navigation Aerienne Militaire. This comprised four newly created and suitably equipped units. Included in Engineering Regiments, they participated in military ex­peditions in Madagascar in 1894-‘5, China in 1900-‘1, and Morocco in 1908, inter alia. During 1912 the units had ten flying machines of indifferent quality.

Despite failing to accomplish the first flight of a heavier-than-air machine, the Av – ion-3 tests in 1897 attracted the attention of military specialists. Impressed by reports of

what the Flyer-3 could do, in 1905 the French War Ministry sent a delegation to the USA. This had powers to purchase a licence to produce aeroplanes from the Wright brothers. Negotiations ended unsuccessfully for a number of reasons, major among which was the extortionate sum demanded by the inventors. Nevertheless, in 1908 the Wrights did sell a production licence for their machines to the civilian Compagnie Generale de Navigation Aerienne. This was the company through which, on 12 July 1909, the French War Ministry purchased the first aeroplane for the army. The order resulted from the great interest created by Wilbur Wright’s triumphal demonstration of his biplane’s great ability. Regardless of the fact that France’s first aeroplane was American, there was commitment and finance for indigenous designs. The first results of this followed soon: two of Henri Farman’s aeroplanes, a Louis Bleriot monoplane and a Wright biplane were ordered, all being delivered in 1910. The same year the Aeroclub Francaise published the first Regulations for the Awarding of Air Pilots’ Wings.

Aviation entered a period of rapid organisational development. By 1909, French military air navigation and aviation comprised four army balloon units, commanded by Colonel Hirchauer and included within the Engineering Corps. The formation of aeroplane units within these units was commencing, with finance being made avail­able for equipment purchase and crew training. The only French military pilot at the time was Captain Lucas Girardville, who had been trained at the Wright Brothers’ Po school in 1908-‘9. Another ten officers entered training the following year at the Bleriot, Wright, and Farman schools, and at the Antoinette school in Chalonne. First to get his wings was Lieutenant Cammermann, awarded Wings No33 on 7 March 1910. Merely a year later the military began issuing their own wings. The first of these was awarded to Tricarnot de Roz on 7 February 1911. Up until then the War Ministry had earmarked 2500 francs for pilot officer training at private schools.

The first aeroplane was officially commissioned for service on 10 June 1910 after acceptance testing by Captain Eteve. It was a copy of the Wrights’ Flyer-3. The Avia­tion Exhibition at Rheims did not go unnoticed by French military experts, being followed by orders for Farman and Bleriot. After studying the designs at the exhibi­tion, artillery officers began looking into the possibilities of arming aeroplanes. French War Minister General Brunn made funds available to buy aeroplanes specifically for research purposes. Colonel Estienne was appointed head of the Aviation Inspectorate, and following a parliamentary debate, a Military Aviation Administration was estab­lished under Lieutenant Cammermann’s command. Based near Chalonne, this came into service in April 1910 and its organisation was complete by 9 June when the first reconnaissance sortie was flown. At 4:30pm, pilot Lieutenant Frecon and observer Captain Marcone departed the Military Aviation School airfield in their Farman and flew the 145km to Vencan in two and a half hours. Despite various crises on board, they managed to take a variety of intriguing aerial photographs.

The new structure grew more experienced by the day. On 10 August, Captain Manorie, Commander of the elite XX Corps deployed along the border with Germa­ny, requested a reconnaissance flight along the Corps front. The same day another aeroplane directed fire during artillery training near Nancy, and its positive contribu­tion to precision was noted.

Considering the moment propitious, General Roques, head of the Military Aerial Fleet Inspectorate, and his dep­uty Hirschauer proposed that aeroplanes and crews be included in the large scale September manoeuvres in Picardy. Ex­amining the good results of the 10 Au­gust flights, the Supreme Command granted assent. General Roques pre­pared for the manoeuvres in earnest. Experienced civillian school pilots, among whom Hubert Latham, Louis Bleriot and Louis Poland, were invited to take part.

Despite the very modest number of aeroplanes (two Framans, a Sommer, and a Bleriot in the Second Corps, and two Framans, a Wright, and a Bleriot in the Ninth Corps), results exceeded Ц Hubert Latam prior to the start of military ma – Roques’s, Hirschauer’s and their pilots’ noeuvres in 1910

I Left to right: the President of France, General Roques, and Colonel Hirchauer visiting an airfield during the Picardy Manoeuvres

I A two seat military Bleriot

expectations. The consequences of this brilliant showing in the September manoeu­vres were twofold.

First, the purchase of a large number of new aeroplanes was permitted: 20 Bleriots and 20 Farmans. Seventeen of the Bleriots were to be two seaters, enabling observa-

A Bleriot military model with seats for pilot, observer and flight engineer

tion. All 20 were to be delivered over two months. Seven of the Farmans had to accommodate two observers apiece, and the 20 had to be delivered over a three month period. The contracts specified the new machines’ performance: a 60km/h speed, range of up to 300km, and a 300kg payload capability.

Second, the French Senate granted semi-autonomous status to the Military Avi­ation Administration within the Army. A Resolution of 22 October 1910 transferred General Roques away from the Engineering Corps and promoted him to the rank of General-Inspecteur. He used this favourable circumstance to put into practise two of his ideas which would influence the future of French military aviation greatly. The training of combat pilots came under the military. Roques also gave impetus to the changeover from existing civilian aeroplanes to ones designed specifically for military purposes. By October, the military aviation of the Republique Francaise comprised 20 Farman Ils, six Farman IV, six Sommer-4s, six Voisins, 20 Bleriot IV, four Antoinette-2s, three Nieuports, two Henriots, and two Breguets, inter alia. It had a total of 71 aero­planes delivered and on order, of which 30 were combat ready. However, no less than 11 types of machine were operated, and this affected operations adversely.

The Flying School commenced work. Three airfields were largely used for combat pilot training. The trend was for each group to use one type of aeroplane. The system involved theoretical and flying exams prior to the awarding of wings. A similar profi­ciency check was used for pilots who had gained wings at civilian schools and now

wished to make a career as army pilots. In 1910 only 31 pilots gained combat wings from a total of 52 checked. Civil pilots upgrading their skills at private schools could enlist as Engineering Battalion reservists. In this way France created a system for preparing the second major component linked with sufficiently trained flight and ground personnel. These people’s life was now subjected to specific flying duties, ful­filling set army requirements, and carrying out set tasks in the army’s interest.

As mentioned above, an important condition on the road to a fully fledged Air Force is the availability of combat aeroplanes designed for genuine combat conditions and actual combat tasks. The Military Aviation Command decided to give designers and manufacturers ample time to meet these requirements. The first competition for new combat aeroplanes was set for October 1911. Apart from performance, each design was to be assessed on its ability to be easily disassembled and stowed for transportation by road or rail, to use fields overgrown with grass, to carry a pilot and observer plus a mechanic when necessary. Headed by General Roques, the assessment commission in­cluded many senior officers and civilian specialists employed by the Military Aviation Command. The British War Ministry also delegated three observers.

The competition’s initial round saw 140 aeroplanes by 43 manufacturers com­pete. Most of them had been over optimistic: only 31 designs reached the testing stage, nine coming out as finalists. Nieuport won, followed by Breguet and Deper – dussin. The winners received monetary awards and immediate orders for ten Nie – uports, six Breguets and four Deperdussins. Similar orders boosted the process of pro­viding the nascent air arm with all it needed for its newly formed units. The French aircraft industry at the time was sufficiently powerful to assume the role of a compo­nent, and figures prove this point best.

During 1911, 135 aeroplanes and 1400 aero engines were produced. The respec­tive figures for 1912 were 1425 and 2217; and for 1913: 1148 aeroplanes, 146 float­planes and 2440 engines. Propeller production numbered over 30,000. The greater part of this output was for export. Tests of the first machine guns mounted on a Far – man began. Other tests involved air to ground radio telegraph transmissions. These demonstrated an affective range of 30km. This was dictated by the logic of develop­ment of ground and airborne equipment which enabled the more eficient use of flying machines. However, it would be premature to speak of a separate Air Force compo­nent at this stage: this was still the experimental stage.

The crisis in Franco-German relations caused by the Agadir Crisis of summer 1911 raised the profile of the bipartite French Army manoeuvres of the late summer. Involving the Sixth and Seventh Corps, the exercise aimed to practise cover and defence of the borders in an attack from the East, and providing sufficient time for mobilisation and the deployment of reserves. A 25-aeroplane unit supported the Sixth Corps, with as many pilots. Ten of the latter were civilians specially mobilised for the

Transporting a Bleriot aeroplane by rail

Щ A Breguet aeroplane stowed for transportation

manoeuvres. The unit was commanded by Captain Eteve, Commandant of the Ver­sailles Military Aviation School. The Seventh Corps was commanded by Etampes Military Aviation School Commandant Captain Felix, whose tenure was marked by several fatal accidents at the outset of action.

Crews’ performance over the ‘battlefield’ was assessed highly. The wonderful plan photographs of a camouflaged field artillery battery taken by observer Captain Lebon came in for particular praise. Manoeuvre commanders discussed aerial reconnais­sance, observation and artillery direction sorties, concluding that:

– aerial reconnaissance aeroplanes were to be two seaters, and were to be capable of use from improvised aerodromes close to the front line;

– it was desirable to afford armour protection to aeroplanes’ more important parts and assemblies, including the crew;

– where possible, aerial reconnaissance data on the enemy were to be duplicated;

– due to the important nature of data from aerial reconnaissance, it was desirable that crews (especially observers) ought to be aware of army staff modi operandi.

Homogenous units began to be formed: these had permanent establishments and were equipped with aeroplanes of one type only. The process began in 1912, with the formation of the first Escadrille (Squadron). This comprised six aeroplanes, flight and

Soft dirigibles accompany mobile cavalry units during the 1912 manoeuvres

technical personnel, transportation, and hangars. Commanded by a Chef d’Escadrille with the rank of Captain, the unit had an alphanumerical designation which showed the type of equipment used: for instance, Escadrille D6 meant ‘Number six Squadron equipped with Deperdussin aircraft’. By mid 1912, the French Army had five Escadrilles:

– HF1, flying Henri Farmans and based at Chalons;

– MF2, flying Maurice Farmans and based at the Buc Flying School airfield;

– B3, flying Bleriots and based at Pan;

– D4, flying Deperdussins and based at Saint Cyr; and

– MF5, flying Maurice Farmans and based at Saint Cyr.

Another organisational change was the appointment of Colonel Hirchauer as head of French military aviation units. He took up the post in April 1912. General Rocault was appointed Commander of No7 Infantry Division. An order of 29 March 1912 removed the Escadrilles from the Central Army Group and established three Aviation Groups:

– First Group, based near Versailles and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Butnot;

– Second Group, based near Rheims and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Breton;

– Third Group, based near Lyon and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Estienne.

The Groups were independent of each other and each had its own logistic and

other support. Each Group had airfields where its individual units (Escadrilles) were deployed. Non flying personnel was deployed in support or logistics centres. Lieuten­ant Colonel Vouyes was appointed Head of Air Supply.

Aviation’s growing independence was underscored by the late 1912 decision to create separate uniforms for its personnel. In fact, pro temps officers continued wear­ing their usual garb, to which were added navy tunics with emblazoned winged stars. Hirschauer was promoted to Brigadier, receiving his new epaulettes on 12 December 1912. Regardless of the ongoing dispute as to whom he should report to (chief rivals

Щ The first French aeroplane hangar in North Africa: Morocco, 1911

I A French pilot prepares to depart on a reconnaissance sortie in support of colonial forces: Morocco, 1912

were the Artillery and Engineers), he continued Gen Roques’s work, winning assent for a 400-aeroplane order. These machines entered Escadrille service in the first half of 1913. The enhanced air arm also conducted the first air-only manoeuvres at Azennes near Toulouse. To reach this region, the Escadrilles overflew almost all of France. The exercise showed improved reconnaissance and artillery direction standards.

Successful manoeuvres in the mother country led to the thought of using aero­planes to monitor bands led by hostile chieftains in the colonies. First to suggest a ‘Desert Air Corps’ in October 1910 was the Commander of the Algeria based XIX Corps. Meanwhile the Governor of French West Africa called on the government for aeroplanes and aviators to cover his large and strife torn area.

Accordingly, a six-aeroplane Escadrille was despatched to Algiers, and the young French air arm flew its first combat sortie on 17 February 1912, at the infantry’s re­quest. Army officers praised the effects of working with the new type of arm highly, and requests for air support soon grew apace. Escadrilles were sent to Tunisia and Morocco, and four aircraft were sent by sea to the Governor of West Africa. All units flew as intended until the outbreak of the First World War.

A short time after the murder of the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince Franz Fer­dinand, mobilisation was declared. This applied to French military aviation units, whose strength comprised 21 Escadrilles:

– MF2, ‘5, ‘8, ’16 and ’20, flying Maurice Farman biplanes

– HF1, ‘7, ’13 and ’19, flying Henri Farman biplanes

– V14 and ’21, flying Voisin biplanes

I A French infantry unit and Maurice-Farman aeroplanes at a field airstrip during one of the last pre­War manoeuvres

– C11, flying Caudron biplanes

– Br17, flying Breguet biplanes

– B9, ’10, ’13 and ’18, flying Bleriot-XI monoplanes

– D4 and ‘6, flying Deperdussin monoplanes

– EP15, flying Esnault-Peltrier monoplanes

– N12, flying Nieuport monoplanes

– BIC2 and ‘5 Cavalry Escadrilles, flying single seat Bleriot monoplanes.

At the close of July 1914, the French had 132 first line aircraft, with 136 reserve aeroplanes. Since it was thought that the war would end soon, a decision was taken to close flying schools. Their pilots were distributed among the Escadrilles, ground staff going to infantry units.

Aerial reconnaissance was the main task of French aviation units. Some Esca – drilles were set apart for the needs of the Supreme Command. Information centres were created for them at Moulins de Mesieres, Verdun, Thulle, Belfort and Epinal. Remaining Escadrilles were brougth under the direct command of Army and Corps Staffs to carry out tactical and operational aerial reconnaissance.

British interest in military aviation dates back to 1878 when the War Office allo­cated 150 pounds sterling of budget funds for the order of an aerial observation bal­loon. Results from its sailings were encouraging, and 1884 saw the launch of the Ar­my’s first balloon unit. The successful employment of balloons in Victorian colonial wars and police actions led to the emergence of a balloon business and the establish­ment of a balloon factory. Opened at the close of 1884 at Farnborough near Alder­shot, the latter made and repaired lighter-than-air Army flying apparatus. Apart from observation balloons, the turn of the 19th Century saw the factory producing kites,

including ones capable of lifting a man. Design and research were led by the afore­mentioned Cody. However, what tangible results were attained were only good for a few years at best. The experience in kite design came in useful when it became clear that the future lay in aeroplanes. Lieutenant John Dunn of the Wiltshire Regiment joined Cody in his efforts. This young man was captured by the dream of flying upon his return from the 1899-1900 Boer War. There the British successfully used tethered spherical aerostats, and he had witnessed this. However, he decided to pursue his dream down a different route, embarking upon the design of an aeroplane in 1906 andcompleting work on it the following year.

The Dunn D.1 was built at the Farnborough Balloon Factory. We have already described its original design. The 12m span biplane had no tail surfaces and featured 30 degrees of sweepback. It broke up on its maiden flight but financing continued despite this setback. Work was carried out in conditions of strict secrecy since the flying machine was intended for Army needs. However, the expected success failed to materialise. The 2500 pounds sterling disbursed on the Dunn and Cody aeroplanes seemed rather profligate to the government, and in April 1909 all expenditure ceased.

This decision was absurd against the background of spending on similar projects in neighbouring countries. For instance, over the same period Germany spent the equiva­lent of 400,000 pounds for the same purpose. French expenditures were commensurate with German ones. Louis Bleriot’s cross-Channel flight in his Type 11 convinced the British of the error of their ways. Yet despite everything, the War Office and the Admi­ralty only approved the Nulli Secundus Army and the Mayfly Navy programmes, both for airships. No money was forthcoming for aeroplane design and construction. British con­servatism stayed aloof from the stormy development of aviation on the Continent.

In the event, the burden of progress towards military aeroplanes fell upon the shoulders of three Royal Field Artillery officers. They were: Lieutenant Gibbs, who had completed the Farman flying school at Chalonnes; Captain Bertram Dixon, who

I Captain Dixon preparing to fly his Bristol Boxkite during the 1910 Royal Army Manoeuvres

THE DUNN D.6

had his own Farman aeroplane; and Captain Fulton, who had completed the Bleriot school and also had his own aeroplane: a Bleriot. In 1910 Dixon left the Army and joined the British and Colonial Aeroplane Company (later Bristols) where he used his Army connections to arrange for the participation of company aeroplanes and crews in the September 1910 manoeuvres. Despite scepticism from senior Army officers, Dixon and Robert Lorraine flew a Bristol Boxkite and Gibbs flew his Farman, carrying out several successful recce missions. Lorraine also attempted radio contact with ground personnel at one of the command centres.

This successful showing by aeroplanes and pilots at the autumn manoeuvres led the War Office to broaden Balloon School activities by including aeroplane flying. First step was to separate the School from the Balloon Factory. The latter was given a new design office for heavier than air machines. Its first leader was a hitherto un­known automotive engineer, Frederick Green.

But the floes of British conservatism had yet to melt. Despite the efforts of the young and enthusiastic officers who had financed their own flying lessons in late 1910, the government officially announced that it was still not prepared to fund the purchase of aeroplanes for the Army. However, the dynamic development of avia­tion across the Channel began to bear upon British political and military leaders’ thinking. The first positive step came on 28 February 1911: a War Office order decreed that as form 1 April the same year, a Royal Engineers’ Air Battalion would come into being, to be commanded by Major Alexander Bannerman. It would com­prise two squads. One, flying lighter-than-air apparatus, would be commanded by Captain Maitland. The other, flying aeroplanes, would be commanded by Captain Fulton who would be head of the United Kingdom aerial fleet. Upon formation, the aeroplane squad had a Bleriot, a Flyer, a Farman, a Rulhan which had been in a crash, and an FEI. From summer 1911, six additional Bristol Boxkites, a Farman, a Flyer and a Bleriot were purchased.

Despite the cancellation of the 1911 autumn manoeuvres, the aeroplane squad was cleared to test its combat skills in East England. Sorties were flown as originally planned for the cancelled manoeuvres. Bad luck dogged the exercise from the start. Four aeroplanes were withdrawn due to defects. Only two of those which took off made the exercise grounds, and just one returned. The fiasco seemed a godsend to the sceptics who formed the majority of War Office staff. However, the rapid develop­ment of French and German air navigation and aviation compelled the Imperial De – fence Committee to debate the future creation of an effective air arm. This was to comprise units equal to the demands of the period. The poor showing by some of the types flown by the aeroplane squad during the improvised exercises dictated an Army Staff statement to the effect that the nascent air arm would need new aeroplanes designed and built at the Army Aeroplane Factory. The task of creating a new and

stable platform for airborne monitoring and aerial reconnaissance was given to de Havilland, Green and Edward Vooske.

The Agadir Incident in July 1911 confirmed Germany’s aggressive intentions. Apart from a magnificently armed and drilled land army, Germany also possessed an impressive amount of lighter-than-air machines. German flying schools were ex­panding and local aeroplane makers were achieving initial successes. At the same time, trained British pilots numbered 11 in the Army, and nine in the Navy. Aero­planes could be counted on the fingers of both hands, and there were just two dirigibles: experimental at that. Growing tensions in Europe led the Imperial De-

THE DE HAVILLAND AEROPLANE

fence Committee to hasten the creation of an air arm. Much disturbed by the force imbalance in the air, Prime Minister Sir Herbert Asquith assisted the process. The Royal Air Corps was formed on 13 April 1912. From May that year it included an air battalion and support services. Parliament approved an initial budget of 308,000 pounds sterling for the new Corps.

The RFC comprised an Army and Naval Wings, the Royal Aeroplane Factory (later the Army Aeroplane Factory) at Farnborough, and the Central Air School charged with training pilots for both Wings. The Naval Aerial Service was disbanded in January 1912. Immediate reason for this was the September 1911 crash of the sole serving dirigible.

Initially, all 22 RFC officers served in the Naval Wing. The Admiralty continued to seek a certain independence for ‘its’ part of the Corps and indeed, the Royal Naval Air Service (не e ли Fleet Air Arm) did come into being soon after. The RFC was regarded as being a purely Army structure, rather than an Army and Navy conglom­erate on equal terms.

First Commander of the Army Wing was Captain Sykes. The War Office decided that the Wing should have two 13-aeroplane Squadrons (12 for ordinary pilots plus one for the Squadron Leader). It further decided that reserve strength should match the strength of units on active duty. War Office calculations showed that 364 pilots were needed for a viable combat ready structure.

A young British pilot preparing to fly a Bristol Boxkite

Training these men was the task of the Central Air School, with all trainees being officers. The RFC needed to grow to seven Squadrons. By early 1912 there were only three, one of them flying lighter-than-air apparatus. The Squadrons were staffed by establishment officers and quartered at Farnborough and Lorkhill.

The equipment issue continued to occupy the forefront. August 1912 saw Brit­ain’s first military aeroplane trials. Main rivals were Cody and de Havilland. The lat­ter’s BE2 demonstrated remarkable qualities and was ordered into series production. Cody got an order for just two aeroplanes. In general, prior to the First World Was the RFC largely favoured the Royal Aeroplane Factory, while the Fleet Air Arm patron­ised private makers like Sopwith and Short Brothers.

This was de facto an experimental period for the RFC. Strategists held that the Corps’ purpose was to employ its strength for aerial reconnaissance for Army and Navy needs, and any ideas which eased information gathering and gave greater precision to the results were given the change to prove themselves. The major issue was communication between airborne personnel and their land based equivalents, in whose interest air activity took place. To stimulate efforts in this direction, an RFC Experimental Department was estab­lished in 1913. Headed by Major Herbert Musgrave, its main task was to investigate kite, balloon and aeroplane flight and explore options of aerial bombing, artillery direction, reconnaissance and photography. Much was done in equipping aeroplanes with special lightweight radio transmitters and receivers for artillery direction purposes.

I Francis McLean flies beneath Tower Bridge in his Shorts flying boat

Army manoeuvres in late 1912 and early 1913 highlighted the usefulness of a number of ideas. No3 Squadron which specialised in artillery direction but was yet to adopt radios, tried various methods of communication such as written messages thrown to the ground, or flag or light signals similar to Navy ones. Despite some progress, it was clear that these were mere improvisations. The same Squadron flew recce mis­sions for the ‘defence side’ and the precise and timely data it supplied on the attacking forces helped secure a victory.

The manoeuvres also highlighted a number of weaknesses in flight organisation and ground force operations. These led to robust discussion among aviators. Howev­er, staff officers remained aloof from polemics: an attitude that was to prevail until the start of the World War.

Spring 1913 saw a settlement to some outstanding aspects of the RFC’s status. On 1 September, a Military Aeronautics Administration was established at the War Of­fice. Brigadier David Henderson was appointed to head it, with Captain Sefton Bren – carr as his deputy. The Administration had three sections: personnel administration and training; unit equipment; and economics, the latter entering into contracts with aircraft manufacturers. A million pounds sterling was allocated from the budget to breathe life into the new structure.

Despite support from First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, the last years of peace were difficult for the Fleet Air Arm. Among the reasons was the cir­cumstance that, while RFC terms of reference were set, those of the FAA were very much ‘up in the air.’ An official announcement that Naval aeroplanes were to patrol and reconnoitre the coast came only in late October 1912. This required the estab­lishment of stations which were to be set at intervals determined by the combat radius of aeroplanes used. The first of these was at Eastchurch, and the second: on the Isle of Grain. Another four came into being by mid 1913, the process continuing until by the start of the World War the FAA had 11 stations.

By late 1913 the Royal Naval Aviation Service had some 100 pilots and a consid­erable number of aeroplanes, floatplanes and lighter-than-air apparatus. Due to the Service’s great importance to the nation, the Admiralty continued to insist on its full independence. The final administrative division between Naval and Army aviation came on 1 July 1914. By the start of hostilities, the RNAS managed to form Squad­rons and Wings, but none of these attained official designation. Combat readiness was tried at the Spithead exercises held between 18 and 22 July 1914. All available flying machines took part in these: 17 floatplanes and two landplanes.

The proximity of war was clear to everyone in Europe. The British government decided to test the state of Army and Navy preparedness. For the fleet this meant the aforementioned exercise, while the RFC was gathered at Netheravon airfield. Nos 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 Squadrons flew there in June 1914. Personnel numbered over 700. No1

Squadron was being reequipped, while No7 Squadron remained on duty at its Farn – borough base. Main aeroplane types were the de Havilland BE2 and BE2a, Farmans, Avro 504s, Sopwith Tabloids and Bleriot-XIs. The Corps had a total of 179 aircraft, but a comparatively small part of them were combat ready.

Prior to the start of the First World War, Britain had 113 combat ready aeroplanes and six non-rigid airships. This was commensurate with French numbers, but France had greater reserves which proved their worth during the War.

The British air contingent sent to the Continent comprised 105 officers and 63 aeroplanes. They were commanded by Brigadier David Henderson: an exceptional

I A float equipped Avro 504

Щ The Avro 504 was Britain’s most successful pre-War biplane

man and officer, who first sat in an aeroplane to commence pilot training at the age of 49. Lieutenant Harvey-Kelly was the first British pilot to arrive in France, landing his BE2a in the early hours of 13 August 1914 near Amiens: a place that would live on in British aviation history.

THE HANDLEY-PAGE E AEROPLANE

I The Royal Air Corps at Netheravon airfield, 29 June, 1914

Щ Lieutenant Harvey-Kelly’s BE2a ‘347:’ first British military aeroplane to land in France at the start of the First World War

Like other advanced nations which formed airborne units before the First World War, Germany accumulated initial experience using balloons. The first Railway Forc­es’ Aeronautics Detatchment was established in early 1884. Its duties were more to do with research than with direct support of the force it belonged to. Becoming indepen­dent in 1897, by 1901 the command had grown to Battalion strength with two com-

panies. As early as 1896 spherical balloons were replaced by kite (dragon) balloons designed by Major von Parcival and Hauptmann von Siegsfeld.

Sailings by German aeronauts contributed much to upper atmosphere research. Significant attention was paid to aerial photography as well as information exchange. The latter was initially by carrier pigeon, and later by radio telegraphy.

Balloons were followed by large controllable airships. Graf Ferdinand von Zeppelin is rightly called Father of the Dirigible. These enormous flying balloons captured German imagination and seemed to offer a way to world domination. The Army and Navy includ­ed dirigibles as a major means of strategic reconnaissance deep behind enemy lines or in the open seas. Of the 26 dirigibles the world had in 1910, 14 were German. France had five, Italy: two, and Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Britain, Russia, and the USA: one apiece.

German enthusiasm for airships meant that this nation began developing heavier – than-air flying machines comparatively late. This did not mean that the General Staff failed to monitor aviation development closely, ready to take advantage of this new technology for its ends. The first step was taken on 1 October 1908: a Special Techni­cal Department was established at the General Staff. Its brief was to watch and report on advances in radio communications, transportation and aviation: all of them items seen as decisive in a highly mobile future war. The department was established at the

| German infantrymen watch the raising of a Parcival-Siegsfeld type dragon balloon

recommendation of Hauptmann Thomsen of the General Staff’s Fourth Department. He succeeded thanks to enthusiastic support by General Erich Ludendorff, head of the Second Department.

Soon after coming into existence, the Technical Department published a report supporting the view that aeroplanes would soon become useful attack weapons and stable observation platforms. These conclusions essentially rested on the views of Major Gross and Hauptmann de la Roy, aeronautics advisers to the War Ministry. Occupy­ing this post since 1906, Gross had monitored and financed German aeroplane mak­ers. Since no promising design had appeared by 1910, it was decided that Army offic­ers should begin training using foreign machines. Dr Walther Hude of the Albatros Aeroplane Company bought a Farman biplane and paid the French company for the training of one pilot. After this pilot’s return to Germany, he became an instructor in the newly created Combat Pilots’ School near Dobrenz. Ten officers were trained between 10 July 1910 and late March 1911, Hauptmann de la Roy being one of them.

The General Staff was still sceptical regarding the practical use of aeroplanes in com­bat, but it did provide a modest sum for training officers to fly heavier-than-air machines. Trials of aeroplanes designed especially for combat and for the specific conditions expect­ed in such combat, also began. After these tests, the War Ministry allocated 150,000

I Mixed feelings as a Prussian cavalryman contemplates a Wright A built under American licence at a German aeroplane factory: the advent of aviation meant the end of whirlwind cavalry charges

marks to purchase seven aeroplanes: one Etrich Taube, two Flyer biplanes, a Farman, an Albatros-built Farman, an Aviatik-built Farman and an Albatros-built Sommer.

This order finally gave the German Army flying machines which were heavier than air. A Military Aviation and Transport Inspectorate was created. The aviation service still suffered from lack of clarity as to its functions and were insufficiently developed to figure in the military budget. Thus a special resolution of the War Min­istry and the General Staff of 1 April 1911 allocated a further 500,000 marks to pur­chase aeroplanes and asociated equipment. This bought another 30 aeroplanes (19 single engined Type B biplanes and 11 Etrich Taubes) which were delivered by the year’s end. The Army now had 37 aeroplanes and 30 pilots.

The best aeroplanes and crews took part in the autumn manoeuvres, practising skills expected to be useful in wartime. To hasten military aviation development, pilots who had completed civilian flying courses were to be brought into compliance with emerging military standards at courses in Strassbourg and Metz. Special observer train­ing courses were also organised. The period also saw General Staff head General-Oberst Helmut von Moltke and the War Ministry administration locked into contention as to the future of the air arm. Von Moltke succeeded in imposing his view that two or three field aviation squads and a support squad (a Station) should be at the disposal of each Army Command. Moreover, each Corps Command (whether in active service or the reserve) should also have an aeroplane unit after the start of hostilities. According to Moltke’s plan, 34 air squads had to be ready by April 1914: eight of them at Army level,

I A Taube under assembly in the Rumpler workshops

and 26 at Corps level. The air arm was to be separated from the transport command, and subjected to its own inspectorate.

The War Ministry and the Central In­spectorate opposed von Moltke’s plans. Both bodies felt aviation was too new and weak to be afforded such a degree of inde – pendence. Regardless of this disagreement, from 1 October 1912 the German air arm began reforming along the lines proposed by von Moltke. Doberitz, Strasbourg, Metz and Darmstadt became the first Air Stations, or bases, staffed by 21 officers, 306 NCOs and privates. As reorganisation progressed, it became clear that the funds allocated were most inadequate. At the close of 1912 the Chancellor was asked for additional fi­nance. The air arm was indirectly helped by the National Air Support Foundation led by Prince Heinrich of Prussia, which col­lected seven million marks. This mostly went to finance civil aeronautics and in­digenous aeroplane designs which oblique­ly boosted the development of the air arm.

THE FOKKER SPIN III

Despite resistance by some War Ministry circles, the General Staff resolved to begin replacing lighter-than-air apparatus with aeroplanes. Of rigid and semi-rigid construction, the outgoing machines had been used for tactical reconnaissance. The 15 rigid construction airships were henceforth to specialise in air strikes and strategic reconnaissance on behalf of the Supreme Command.

Air arm structures continued to evolve in 1913. The Military Aviation Inspec­torate was created on 1 October. Oberst von Erhard was appointed Chief Inspector, commanding four Air Battalions each with three Squads, located as follows:

– No1 Air Battalion at Doberitz and Grossenheim

– No2 Air Battalion at Posen (now Poznan), Graudentz and Konigsberg (now Kaliningrad)

– No3 Air Battalion at Cologne, Hannover and Darmstadt

– No4 Air battalion at Strasbourg, Metz and Freiburg.

The semi autonomous Bavarian Army had a separate two Squad Bavarian Air Battalion.

In case of war, these airfields were to remain as main bases of the internal Squads. The reform foresaw the creation of 57 Field Air Squads and 46 Field Air Squads by 1916, and the creation of one air unit for each infantry division after eventual mobilisation. This appeared unrealistic due to tight deadlines and insufficient manufacturing capacity. Com­pelled to review timescales and organisational goals, the General Staff decided to concen­trate on acquiring four Air Units, each with 12 six-aeroplane Air Squads, by 1 April 1914.

Since it was impossible for the air arm to secure a base for each Corps, aviation remained subordinate to the transport arm. Experience from the 1913 manoeuvres

I A Rumpler Taube with fictitious serial number ‘84’: disinformation for the enemy

The real Taube No84 with a 100hp engine, strengthened landing gear and enlarged radiator

also lent support for this status: air units still depended greatly on road and rail trans­port for mobility. Experience of incidents in combat conditions led the War Ministry to demand new and more reliable aircraft with stronger airframes. To this end, the Transport Army Experimental Section increased its establishment and changed its tasks, becoming the Directorate of Technical Transportation Testing. Combat pilot training also changed, becoming more intensive in the last months of peace to satisfy the growing need for pilots and observers.

The theory and practice of aerial reconnaissance for the needs of Army and Corps commands and staffs, as well as aerial artillery direction, marked significant advances. However both tasks were hampered by the lack of suitable communication. The lack of any onboard armament also meant limitations to aircraft use, the experiments in mounting machine guns and bomb racks on aeroplanes having enjoyed only modest success. Despite this, German political and military leaders assessed the place of avia­tion in a future conflict realistically, financing the programme for developing an air arm generously. Between 1906 and July 1914, military aviation was funded to the tune of 11,800,000 marks.

After the declaration of mobilisation on 1 August 1914, military aviation began war preparations in earnest. Comprising five aircraft and six airship batallions, with the latter supporting 33 field air detachments: 30 Prussian and three Bavarian. Ten of these were set aside to support the forces defending Strassbourg, Metz, Cologne, Posen (Poznan), Konigsberg (Kaliningrad) and Graudenz, and the major military centres of Beuen, Breslau (now Wroclaw) and Glogau.

The airship battalions comprised strength and discharged duties as follows:

– eight field airship units, each with an active and reserve kite balloon and a hydrogen production station;

– 15 castle airship units, each with a kite balloon and a total of a handful of shared spherical balloons, and

– 12 airships with 18 crews.

The air arm also had six reserve aeronautical units and five reserve field air battal­ions whose main duty was to replenish active units’ personnel and equipment.

Mobilisation took five days. The Armies were deployed and ready for action. A field air detachment was put at the disposal of each Army and Corps Staff. The su­preme command had no aircraft or crews under its direct command. Field air units were subordinate to Army Staffs, and Castle Aeronautical units, being in larger in­dustrial centres, served as a reserve.

After mobilisation, the German air arm comprised 254 pilots, 271 observers, and 246 combat ready aeroplanes. Half of the latter were Taube monoplanes, the rest being Albatros and Aviatik biplanes. Field air detachments had six aeroplanes each, and Castle Air Detachments: four each. The naval aviation unit managed to prepare 20 pilots for action. It had six aeroplanes, of which just half were serviceable: a strength completely inadequate for the provision of maritime patrol.

The first heavier than air machine was flown in Italy in 1908 by French aviation pioneer Leon Delagrange. He flew a series of demonstration flights over Milan, Rome and Turin. Beauty and emotion are close to the Italian spirit, and many Italian youths were soon enthusiastic about flying. Not a few of them were in uniform, though initially they set

I A pilot warming up the engine of an Albatros B prior to departing to a forward base near the border with France

pursued their dream privately. Mario Calderara was one of Italy’s first pilots. His training included 23 lessons given by Wilbur Wright during his Italian visit in spring 1909.

At the time, military interest in aviation was purely theoretical. Since there was no objection to officers receiving flying lessons in their own time, using their own money, their attendance at the first flying school near Rome in 1910 surprised nobody. Flying soon became fashionable and six similar schools sprang al over Italy in a matter of months.

Tenente Savoia’s sensational 1910 flight captured the Italian imagination. He flew a Farman from Murmelon to the Rome suburb of Cintochelle, where on 2 August he took aloft Italian War Minister General Spinardi. Eleven days later, Tenente Vivaldi became the first Italian to die in an air crash while attempting to overfly Italy from Rome to Cit – tavecchia. Despite the tragedy, the year saw significant progress, 31 soldiers getting their wings, of whom 16: Italian wings (the rest had trained mainly in France and Germany).

Two military flying schools opened in 1911. Along with the paramilitary school at Cintochelle, they embarked on specialist and active military training programmes. Both were situated in the more industrialised Italian north. One was at Aviano near Udine, and the other: at Soma Lombardo. The larger school in Aviano opened its doors in April 1911 and had a mix of types: five Bleriot monoplanes, an Etrich Taube monoplane, a Nieuport monoplane, and three Farman biplanes.

The Italian military first used aeroplanes in manoeuvres during the annual exercises from 22 to 29 August 1911, led by Tenente Generale Polio. Capetane Carlo Piazza with a Bleriot, Capetane Ricardo Moisa with a Nieuport, Tenente Constantino Coagglia with a Savoia biplane, and Tenente Junio Guiglio Gavotti with an Etrich Taube flew for the Reds. Blue pilots were Tenentes Manlio Ginocchlio and Francisco Roberti with Bleriot monoplanes, Tenente Junio Hugo de Rossi with a Nieuport monoplane and Tenente Leonardo de Rada with a Farman biplane. The manoeuvres took place close to Monferrato, with the aeroplanes based at an improvised airfield near Novi, from where they flew a great many recce sorties. At the close of the manoeuvres, many military pilots took part in the September Air Races. Capetane Piazza and Tenente Giunio Ga- votti were awarded the Medaglia d’Oro for services to military aviation.

Italian military flyers had to show their skills in earnest all too soon. On 29 Sep­tember 1911 their country started a war with Turkey in an attempt to increase its influence in North Africa at the expense of the crumbling Ottoman Empire. Military Council deliberations concluded that the cavalry was unsuited to difficult desert con­ditions. Accordingly, seven aeroplanes and 30 of the best trained aviators (including five pilots) were shipped to join the expeditionary force in Tripolitania, tasked with supplying reconnaissance.

Set up using Aviano Flying School aeroplanes, the First Aeroplane Flotiglia de­ployed near an old Jewish cemetery at Jafrah near Tarabulus (now Tripoli). Aeroplane reassembly began on 15 October, and several days hence a Nieuport, two Farmans,

I The Italian crew of a soft dirigible

Wheeling a stowed Taube across the field airstrip near Tripoli

two Etrich Taubes and two Bleriots were lined up on the improvised airfield, ready for testing. Difficult atmospheric conditions, high temperatures and sand storms hindered normal operation. However, heavy losses caused to the Italian infantry by Turkish cavalry at the Sharah Shatt Oasis compelled expeditionary force commanders to re­sort to using aeroplanes as the sole means of observing enemy movements. The first combat sortie was on 23 October 1911. At 0619hr Tenente Piazza departed for Asisia, 60km south of italian positions, in his Bleriot-XI. After more than an hour’s flying, he returned with valuable intelligence on Turkish forces and their Arab allies. Similar flights became routine in subsequent days, bringing invaluable help to the infantry.

On 28 October, Capetanes Piazza and Moiso observed artillery bombardment from the battle cruiser Sardegna from the air. This led to the idea of using aeroplanes to direct artillery fire. A system of communication was agreed with naval officers, com­ing into operation a week later.

On 1 November Tenente Junio Gavotti carried out history’s first aerial bombard­ment when he threw four hand grenades. The use of hand grenades against enemy infantry and cavalry was to become routine for Italian pilots in future sorties. Natural­ly, the effect of this was more psychological than anything else. Following one of these flights, the Turkish authorities accused the pilots of bombing a field hospital. Investi­gations led to legal disputes: the 1899 Hague Convention permitted aerial bombard­ment, but only from lighter than air apparatus. Aeroplanes were missing from the Convention for obvious reasons. Article 25 of the 1907 Hague Convention forbade aerial bombardment of undefended targets even where they were otherwise targeted by land forces, if it put civilian lives and property at risk.

Despite the successes of the young Italian air arm which had attained combat effectiveness rapidly, the situation of Italian land forces in Cyrenaica remained dif-

Taube pilots taking their seats

ficult. Improvised airfields near Tobruk (now Tubruq) and Derna were inadequate for air support. This dictated the setting up of a second aerial Flotiglia near Bengha­zi. This included 29 men, including four pilots. The three aeroplanes (a Bleriot, a Farman, and an Asteria) and the 110 metre airstrip only became operational on 29 November. A few days earlier, on 24 November, Capetane Mioso directed artil­lery for the first time in genuine combat. His flight, and subsequent ones, met ever better organised opposition. Small arms fire, largely futile at 1000m at which aero­planes flew, was joined by artillery weapons mounted on special carriages allowing them to aim at aerial targets. Tenente Giunio Roberti’s aeroplane was hit under such circumstances. The danger led to pilots’ seats being lined with thick sheet steel during the January lull in fighting.

Another result of combat experience was the fitting of mechanical bomb holders to aeroplanes. Also, on 24 January 1912, Capetane Piazza’s Bleriot was fitted with a still camera delivered from Italy. After this, he flew aerial photo reconnaissance sor­ties, and the unit he commanded took part in mapping the area between Tarabulus and Al Gharian. On 4 March 1912 Capetane Piazza jointly with Gavotti flew the first night reconnaissance sortie, and carried out the first night bombardment. The con­flict also took aviation’s first war victim, with the death of pilot Pietro Manzini on 12 August 1912. Other tasks of the Italian air arm included dropping propaganda leaflets behind enemy lines.

Two groups of volunteers from the Royal Italian Club led by its President Carlo Monti also arrived at Tobruk and Derna. Each had four men, and each was commanded by an officer. They flew their eight aeroplanes in a total of 150 sorties. One of these groups experimented with radio as a means of transmitting intelligence. One of the aeroplanes was fitted with a small radio set which received a signal sent from a warship.

A Bleriot is readied for the next reconnaissance flight at a field airstrip near Tripoli

The experience of Italy’s nascent air arm in Libya proved to the world that, thought novel and consisting of fragile aeroplanes with weak engines, air power was sufficient­ly effective and mobile to play a significant role in the outcome of conflicts. Two main ways were developed for reconnoitring from the air: visual and photographic. Also tested was the delivery of strikes from the air (however symbolic, it became routine), directing artillery fire, and dropping propaganda behind enemy lines. In other words, many of the tasks performed by today’s air forces were first tried then.

Analysing the results of the war, Italian political and military leaders decided to boost combat aviation. Between April and October 1912, some 3,250,000 lire was spent on new aeroplanes and organisational development of this new form of service. Its emergence as a separate formation began after March 1912, when Colonel Vittorio de Montemozzolo recommended the formation of the Royal Italian Military Aviation Service on his return from an inspection in North Africa.

One of the first steps in the creation of this new service was the formation of a floatplane unit to patrol inland waters and the coast. Even before its creation, maritime aviation pioneer Capetane Alessandro Guidoni had begun testing aerial bombardment and aerial torpedo launching against shipping. His tests were successful and mark an important stage in the aeroplane’s conversion into an important and effective weapon.

Another novelty was the creation in 1912 of a Colonial Aviation Service. This further boosted fleet expansion, and by early 1913 Italian military aeroplanes numbered 50, and lighter than air apparatus: 14. Several flying schools were very active, including a floatplane school near Venice. The Army had 13 airfields, hosting the following units:

– Aviano: a flying school with Bleriots

– Bologna: Esquadriglia VIII

– Busto Arsisio: Esquadriglia V

– Cintochelle: Esquadriglias IV and XI

– Cuneo: Esquadriglia III

– Mirafiori: Esquadriglia I

– Padua: Esquadriglia VII

– Piacenza: Esquadriglia XVI

– San Francesco: Esquadriglias IX and X

– Soma Lombardo: a flying school

– Taliedo: Esquadriglia VI

– Venaria Reale: Esquadriglia II.

Esquadriglia designations changed by mid 1913 with the adoption of Arabic nu­merals. Aerial reconnaissance and artillery direction tasks were successfully carried out during the September manoeuvres. The Reds had two Esquadriglias, each with 11 Bleriots and Savoia-Farmans, while the Blues also had two Esquadriglias, each with ten Savoia-Farmans and Nieuport-Macchis.

By 1914 Italian army aviation comprised 13 Esquadriglias and two flying schools based on 14 airfields. Italy declared neutrality, but even though a direct threat by the Central Powers was not foreseen, aviators were training intensively for combat. Train­ing involved mainly aerial reconnaissance skills, including those needed in strategic reconnaissance for the supreme command. The appearance of Giovanni Caproni’s trimotored aeroplanes led to theorising about their possible use as strategic bombers.

A Military Air Corps was founded on 7 January 1915. This had a headquarters and two commands (aeronautical and aviation) which controlled Dirigible Battal­ions, Esquadriglia Battalions, and Flying School Battalions. Italy entered the Great War on 24 May 1915. Its Air Corps comprised 15 Esquadriglias armed with 86 aero­planes and staffed with 72 pilots. The Navy had 12 ground-based aeroplanes, some dirigibles which were not realistic weapons due to their limited performance, and 15 aeroplanes supported by a mother ship.

Russia is a country with a significant tradition in flying lighter than air apparatus. In 1904, Russians became the first to use kite balloons in combat. Several such balloons were taken to Port Arthur and took part in its defence. In the maritime theatre, tethered bal­loons supported the Vladivostok cruiser detachment. The possibility of using other flying machines continued to be studied after Russia’s defeat by Japan. Dirigibles were bought from France and Germany, and indigenously designed ones were put into production.

Official interest in heavier than air machines began in 1910 with the establish­ment of the Central Army School of Flying at Gatchino, near Sankt Petersburg. A similar school for the Navy opened a year later in Sebastopol. As early as 1909, mon­ies from the military budget were allocated to the purchase of five Wright biplanes

I A Caproni Ca-33 three engined strategic bomber

and several Bristol Boxkites. Russia has ten trained pilots who formed a special mili­tary reserve. At the opening of the Gatchino School, all airworthy aeroplanes were transferred there.

Even though early aeroplane building efforts brought no fruit, the enormous po­tential of Russian engineering thought brought some advances, particularly in mili­tary aeroplanes. In 1909 Porokhovchikov designed an aeroplane with an armoured cabin. Igor Sikorski and Yuriyev came up with many of the breakthroughs needed for the future helicopter. The state itself attempted to boost efforts at creating indigenous aeroplanes. Two aeroplane factories opened near the capital between 1907 and 1909, both with full financial support from the Russian Imperial Technical Society, which formed an Aviation Section in 1910.

Aviation rapidly gained popularity in Russia and enjoyed universal respect and attention, including advocacy from senior public figures. They not only sympathised, but also did all they could to ensure that the new challenge would be widely taken up by Russians. Grand Prince Aleksander Mikhailovich was among the foremost of these advocates. He used the two million roubles donated voluntarily by the public during the Russo-Japanese War for torpedo carrier construction, the training of Russian of­ficers in France, and the purchase of several Bleriots and Voisins from France. Private donors also lent great financial support. The Grand Prince’s advocacy was reflected the place he occupied in the emerging structure of military aviation. He was appoint-

I Chief Pilot Abramovich with a student

A Russian Bleriot at the Kubinka airfield near Moscow

ed General Inspector of Aeronautics and Field Aviation. Until mid 1912, command over aviation rested with the War Ministry Technical Department. Thereafter it went to the Defence Council: the body responsible for overall Russian army and Naval combat readiness. An Aviation Division was formed on 30 July 1912 under the com­mand of a Major General reporting directly to the General Staff. Its deputy com­mander was to be a suitably commissioned Senior Engineer. Organisation copied the French structure, and included a training department for field aviation, and a techni­cal and field supply department.

The structure underwent more changes in 1913. Two bureaux were opened in the General Staff. One was the Chief Military Technical Administration, and the other, the Chief Administration of the General Staff. Russian military administration at the time was territorially divided. Each Governorship[11] had at least two Corps, and each of these had a six-aeroplane aviation Otryad. Similar Otryads were attached to fortress garrisons, special purpose commands, and commands tasked with operational and tactical reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. The idea behind this form of or­ganisation was for a six-aeroplane (with two to six reserve aeroplanes) Otryad to be available to support to each Corps and each fortress garrison. The reorganisation was

THE GRIZODUBOV G-2 202

planned to be complete by April 1914 which turned out a pipedream in view of limit­ed finance.

In 1910 the Navy created its own aviation organisation. However, this faced the same technical resource problem as its Army equivalent. To resolve the issue, a Mili­tary Air Contest was organised at Gatchino in 1911. Gakkel’s biplane came first, but the authorities preferred to buy foreign aeroplanes. Army aviation bought French, German, British and American machines, and the Navy bought Curtises. With the exception of some Sikorski designs, Russian aircraft makers made only licenced copies of foreign designs.

The significant sums made available led to rapid development of the new air units. If Russian military aviation in 1910 comprised not more than 40 aeroplanes and three dirigibles, by 1911 these numbers had risen to 100 and nine respectively, reaching 150 modern and 100 older aeroplanes and 13 dirigibles by 1 April 1913. By August 1914, Russian military aviation, aeronautics, and aerostatics comprised some 263 aeroplanes, 15 dirigibles and 46 tethered spherical and kite balloons. Despite these impressive numbers, the air arm’s combat readiness was impacted by negative trends started dur­ing its very nascence. Relying on foreign made aeroplanes led to spares problems: the heterogenous fleet included no fewer than 16 tipes. The proportion of airships which were genuinely combat ready was minute, the mainstream being decidedly passe. Even though Russia had several aeroplane makers with great production capacities, their output was tiny compared with the volume of imports.

The Sikorski S-9 was exceptionally aerodynamic for its time

THE KIEV DIRIGIBLE DESIGNED BY F F ANDERS IN 1911

The Tsar and government got around to recognising that the early withdrawal of support for indigenous designs was one reason behinds this state of affairs. In April 1914, the War Ministry authorised production of 326 aeroplanes, 13 dirigibles, and ten Ilya Muromets bombers. However, the time factor was working against them and things remained practically unchanged by the outbreak of the First World War.

In America, both the Army of the Potomac and Confederate forces had used tethered balloons in the 1861 -‘5 Civil War. As related earlier, the former force even had a seven-vessel Balloon Corps. Commanded by the energetic Thaddeus Lowe, this existed until 1863.

The Nieuport 4 was among the most popular aeroplanes in pre-War Russia

Post-Civil War interest in aeronautics among US soldiers was weak or non-exis­tent, ballooning being practised only as a sport. Things changed after the appoint­ment of Gen Adolph Greely as US Liaison Forces Commander. An enthusiastic aero­naut, Greely succeeded in establishing aeronautical units in Liaison Corps. French balloons were purchased for these units, some of them seeing action in the 1898 Span – ish-American War. Indeed, one of them was hit and destroyed by Spanish fire, its loss increasing the general scepticism of aeronautics among US Army commanders. In fact, interest in all forms of flying took a blow after Samuel Langley’s failure to fly his aeroplane despite spending the then-lavish amount of 50,000 dollars. All too soon, the only remaining balloon unit was disbanded.

US soldiers failed to see much military advantage in the air even after the successes of the Wright brothers and other Amrerican and European pioneers. It took until 1 August 1907 for an Aeronautical Division to be formed within the Liaison Corps. Its first com­mander was Charles Chandler, with just two NCOs reporting to him. An airship was duly ordered, being commissioned the following year under the designation Army Airship No1.

Meanwhile, the American Aero Club was the subject of no less than presidential interest by Theodore Roosevelt. Despite the crash which injured Orville Wright and killed Lt Thomas Selfridge, the effect of the brothers’ biplanes was becoming such that the Army undertook to fund a replacement machine. Flown on 2 August 1909, this was taken on strength as Aeroplane No1. For the following two years, this remained Amer­ica’s sole heavier-than-air military flying machine. The contract with the Wrights in­cluded the training of two officers in piloting skills. They were Lt Lamb and Lt Frederick Humphreys. However, even though they were the USA’s only pilots with wings, they soon had to return to their old cavalry jobs due to the lack of aeroplanes.

I One of the Wright Brothers’ workshops

The Wright Model A was America’s first warplane. It had no armament, flew at 70km/h, and cost taxpayers 25,000 dollars

In March 1911, Congress finally approved funds for aviation development. An­other five airships were ordered for the Aeronautical Division. Its establishment also expanded, allowing a number of experiments on the military uses of aeroplanes. But here too, enterprising Glenn Curtis had stolen a march on the military. In late spring 1910 he flew a trial sortie armed with training bombs. The objective was to destroy a ‘ship’ marked by buoys with flags. With each pass, more and more bombs hit the target. In January 1911, the Wright brothers threw genuine bombs onto an impro­vised test ground near San Francisco. Meanwhile, Army officer Raleigh Suit had de­signed a specialised aeroplane bomb along with a basic aiming and release device. Despite successful trials, he failed to convince the military to buy his invention. Other testing involved endurance flying, aerial photography, and machine gunning ground targets from aeroplanes.

By November 1912 the Aeronautical Division had grown to nine Wright, Curtis and Burges aeroplanes, 14 Pilot officers, and 39 NCOs and troops. The decision was taken to move the unit South for the winter. The Wrights and their auxilliary person­nel travelled to Augusta, Georgia, the Curtis went to North Island near San Diego, California: site of Curtis’s private flying school which began acting as the USA’s first military flying school.

The Mexican Civil War which broke out in 1911 began to spread. This troubled the US Government and in January 1913 the Aeronautical Division was detailed to support the Second US Army Division. It then moved to Texas City, Texas, where No1 Squadron was formed in March. The unit was not directly involved in combat

but the severe climate and terrain impacted its everyday tasks of flying, observing and patrolling the border. In June most equipment and personnel relocated to San Diego, leaving two aeroplanes, three pilots, and 26 NCOs and troops at Texas City. An in­spection soon afterwards revealed a sorry state of affairs. Of the twenty aeroplanes purchased until then, nine were scrapped due to crashes or other damage. Eleven of the forty pilots had died in accidents. Of the 11 Wright and Curtis aeroplanes inspect­ed, just five were pronounced fit for flying, and that only subject to thorough over­haul. The findings forced the grounding of the unit. Luckily, a new Cutis biplane with pusher propellers had just been successfully test-flown, and 17 were duly ordered.

THE CURTISS A.1 FLOATPLANE

I A Curtiss landing on the USS Pennsylvania

Щ Just hours to go before this Curtiss is to depart from a specially rigged strip on the USS Birmingham

Gradually aviation became a routine part of the US military scene. B 18 July 1914 the Liaison Corps Aviation Department had a personnel of 60 unarmed Pilot Lieu­tenants, and 260 NCOs and troops. These were unr Gen Scraven’s overall command. A senior liaison officer, he was known for his progressive views on the planning and conduct of warfare. By the end of the same year, the General proposed that US mili­tary aviation shld expand further, to reach 18 Squadrons with 12 aeroplane each. However, this idea had to wait until the USA entered the Great War.

The first aeroplane flight over Belgium took place on 26 May 1908. Pilot was Frenchman Leon Delagrange. The event inspired many young and not so young Bel­gians to fly. The following year Professor Emile Allard and Pierre de Gaterre succeed­ed in flying, whereas Julien de Lamin got his wings in France, at the Farman school. In

1910 he bought a Farman III and demonstrated it by flying from a field near Antwerp.

Flying from the same field on 7 July 1910, Lamin flew a historic flight with Belgian

War Minister General Helebaut on board. Strongly impressed, the General decided it was time to start training pilots for the Belgian Army. Enthused, Lamin offered to organise things. However, the General Staff turned down his offer, and did not ap­prove a flying training curriculum it had commissioned from the Balloon Company CO. Instead, Belgian pilots were to train in French flying schools.

Two artillery officers, Lieutenants Baldouin de Montes d’Osterick and Alfred Sar – til, went first. Their example fired the dreams of young officers and the General Staff was flooded with applications for seconding to flying schools. This made Gen Hele – baut turn to Lamin to organise flying training, and the Ministry bought a Farman biplane for training purposes. Two artillery Lieutenants entered the new school: Eman – nuel Brone and Robert Denis, and another two were sent to France.

The first airfield was also established near Antwerp, comprising personnel quar­ters, maintenance workshops and spares and fuel storage facilities. This airfield be­came the birthplace of the Service Belgique d’Aviation, formally founded in spring

1911 with five pilots, two mechanics, a carpenter, and one aeroplane.

The opening of the Military Flying School on 5 May 1911 was an important step forward in the development of Belgian aviation. The event was marred by the tragic death of Lt Brone. The School’s specially purchased Farman which he was flying was also destroyed. Some months later, in September, the two surviving Farmans took part in the autumn manoeuvres near Antwerp. Several successful intelligence sorties were flown. By the year’s end, 13 Belgian officers had acquired wings. In November they also went through an observer course.

The following year began with a General Staff study on the options for aviation in a future war, and how it could influence infantry operations planning and execution. This coincided with the appointment of Gen Michel as War Minister. He brought new ideas, inluding ones with a bearing on aviation. The Flying School’s activity intensified.

Meanwhile, Belgian military engineers began trials of a new lightweight air­cooled machine gun designed by American Col Isaac Lewis. After his design was rejected in the USA, he had come to Europe. Despite being underdeveloped, the Lewis Gun was a breakthrough in weapon design and was as usable in the air as it

THE FARMAN F20 AEROPLANE

was on the ground. The first of four Farman F20 biplanes delivered to Belgium on 9 July 1912 had the first Lewis Gun mounted on it. Trials on 12 September were successful.

A Royal Decree of 16 April 1913 declared the formation of an Aviation Company and a Balloon Company. The Belgian Army comprised four Divisions, and the idea was for each to have its own Squadron in the future. After mobilisation, the Squad­rons would grow to six, as would the Divisions.

In May 1913 some crews and aeroplanes took part in Army manoeuvres near Beverloo. There they astonished ionfantry officers with the speed and precision of data on adversary positions and force strengths. Mainstream vehicles were the Far – man F20s. Repeat orders had brought their number to 20 by July 1913. This was sufficient for the planned four Escadrilles to be formed. Each had four aeroplanes, eight pilots, and adequate surface transport to become an effective and mobile com­bat unit. The new organisational structure was tested in the August manoeuvres, which also confirmed the great effectiveness of aerial reconnaisance. After the ma­noeuvres, No1 Escadrille was assigned to No2 Division, and No2 Escadille, to No4 Division. The other two Escadrilles were judged insufficiently combat ready.

I Four Royal Belgian Air Force pilots and their Farman F20

After the declaration of mobilisation on 2 August 1914, the 38 military pilots were joined by eight civilian conscripts, some of whom brought their own aeroplanes. Of 22 serviceable aeroplanes, eight were sent to the front line to support the Belgian Army which was deploying in the border areas.

Even though the first decade of the 20th Century was a time of decline for Austria – Hungary, the country was still a Great Power. This prompted its political and military leaders to maintain a modern and well equipped army. Several Etrich Taubes were pur­chased in 1911, and four trained pilots returned from abroad, among them Gen Schleger. Austria-Hungary created her air arm in 1912, after French and German aerial might had grown significantly, and as the initial lessons from the use of aeroplanes in the Tripolitani – an War were becoming known. The exceptionally erudite Emil Uselak was chosen as Commanding officer. He began flying at 44, later becoming one of the Empire’s best known pilots. Uselak test-flew every new aeroplane type to enter Austro-Hungarian service. The Dual Kindgom had good aeroplanes of indigenous design, and its strategists had at once realised that the presence of an observer was compulsory for effectiveness.

By the start of the First World War, the Austro-Hungarian Army had eight avia­tion units with six aeroplanes each. The total of available aeroplanes, 70, was below the real requirement. In view of the nature of the relief and the war theatre, signifi­cant attention was paid to the design of a so-called ‘mountain aeroplane.’ The Loner biplane, which had a take-off run of just 30m, was eventually selected. The poor

I Austro-Hungarian pilots from the first graduation class of the Imperial Flying School at Wiener Neustadt pose before a Taube monoplane

The Austro-Daimler engined Etrich Taube was one of the main Austro-Hungarian military avia­tion’s aircraft prior to the start of the Great War

industrial base could not match growing Army demand and aviation needs were ever more dependent on Germany. This trend was to continue until the very end of the World War and the country’s collapse and disappearance.

The Imperial Japanese Army and navy created aviation units almost at the same time in 1912. However, interest in aeronautics and aviation in the Land of the Rising Sun dated back much earlier. The Army’s first balloons dated back to 1877. Balloons were successfully used in the 1904 Russo-Japanese War in the Siege of Port Artur. Six years later Capt Yoshitoshi Tokugawa was sent to a French flying school, with Capt Kumazo Nino going to a German one. Several aeroplanes were bought from abroad in 1911, more officers were sent to learn to fly, and later in the same year flying training began in Japan itself. The Army Transport Command formed an Air Battalion equipped with European aeroplanes and Japanese-made licenced copies.

I The Farman biplane which made the first flight over Japan in 1910

In June 1912 the Imperial Navy formed an Aviation Research Committee. A little while later six officers were sent to train in France and the USA. They were also tasked with researching the flying boat market. It was two of these pilots who later performed the first flight over Japanese territorial waters on 2 November 1912. The new flying boat base at Yokosuka saw a floatplane-equipped Farman and a Curtis take-off. Soon the other pioneer pilots returned from abroad. The first Navy Aviation Unit was formed, receiving in 1913 the mother-ship Wakamio Maru to transport and supply its flying boats.

As distinct from their Army colleagues, Japanese naval aviators saw some action. In September and October 1914 they flew active recce missions over the China Sea, sinking a German minelayer with bombs.

Another Far Eastern nation with aeronautical traditions began developing its aviation at the turn of the 20th Century. Russian pilot Aleksandr Kuzminskiy’s Ble – riot demonstration flights over Peking in 1910 were the impulse behind this. During the same year, enthusiasts Liu-Zun Ch’eng and Li-Pao Chung began building their own aeroplane. This was flown in April 1911 but crashed on its maiden flight due to engine failure. A General Staff decision of the same year set up China’s first Military Aviation Centre, with two Etrich Taubes being bought from Austria-Hungary for its needs.

The start of the Chinese Revolution provoked the return of many progressive and patriotically minded emigrants. One of them was the famous US sports aviator Feng Ru. He arrived in China with two aeroplanes of his own design, which he

I A Taube about to depart for China

offered to the Army. This also marks the creation of China’s airforce. When Feng Ru died in an air crash in 1912, he received funeral honours befitting the founder of the nation’s air arm.

In 1913 the Peking government decided to create China’s first Aviation School in Nanking. China’s first qualified pilot, Zi-Yi Lee was appointed to head it. A dozen Caudron GIII and GIV were bought from France for its needs, and French instructors were invited to China. The same year maintenance workshops opened in Nanking and Kwanghe, marking the start of an aviation industry. Their first success was the building of a combat aeroplane with a machine gun in the nose, in 1914. Despite these successes, the development of Chinese aviation and aeronautics lagged behind that in Europe and Japan.

Spain and Portugal also created military aviation structures, albeit gradually. The foundations were laid in 1912. Personnel was mainly trained in France. Young Span­ish pilots did get a whiff of gunpowder before the First World War (in which neither nation participated). Influenced by the French Army which activel yused aeroplanes in North Africa to observe warlords’ cavalry movements, the Spanish Supreme Com­mand sent an aeroplane unit to Morocco. Their task was to fly recce missions and map the theatre of action. Commanding officer Capt Kindelan was an excellent pilot and officer with enviable theoretical knowledge in warfare (later he became Gen Franco’s head of aviation during the 1936 to 1939 Spanish Civil War). However, his period of command falls outside this volume’s scope.

The appearance of air arms touched nations like Australia (which armed its first Squadron with B. E.2as in 1913), Canada and South Africa. All of these dominions’ pioneer military pilots were trained in Britain in the run up to the Great War.

Without doubt, the major testing ground for trying the new type of weapon was the Balkans. This was where a number of pilots from Balkan nations and further afield

A Farman III at Biserda

(Russia and Western Europe) got their first combat training. Turkey was not going to leave its European lands without a fight, and the clash between her and the newly emerged and rapidly developing nations was unavoidable. Part of the preparations for this clash included the creation of new air arms.

The dawn of aviation in the Kingdom of Roumania is linked with three names: Traian Vuia, Henri Coanda, and Aurel Vlaiku. As young students in the Bucharest Polytechnic in 1909, they were fired with the idea of flying. Aurel Vlaiku designed his first aeroplane in early 1910. The Vlaiku 1 was first flown early on 17 June 1910. This date is considered the start of Roumanian air arms: a valid judgement, since it was the military that first showed an interest in the flight. Funds set aside from the military budget, and help from another young man, Paris Ploytechnic graduate M. Cerkez, bought four aeroplanes from France: two Farman IIIs, a Wright B-Type, and a Santos – Dumont. Cerkez also won the right to licence-produce Farman IIIs. The machines were assigned to the Pilot School set up in the late spring of 1910. This first flying school on the Balkans had its airfield not far from Bucharest. Its first instructor was French pilot F. Guillaume. In summer 1910, M Cerkez and N. Filipescu completed training and were awarded wings.

War Ministry interest in aeroplanes did not end there. The first six pilots were sent to the Pilot School in spring 1911. They were Maj Makri, Capt Ionescu, Porucik Boiangiu, Porucik Protopopescu, Podporucik Nigrescu, and Podporucik Drutu. French instructor Viallardes headed the course, deputised by Cerkez; basic type flown was the Farman III.

By summer, three of the officers got their wings and training continued with the rest. Cerkez used the favourable circumstances to open a second Pilot School at Engi-

| A Farman III with auxiliary forewheels

neering Corps. As the clash of arms on the Balkans drew nearer, it was renamed the Scoala Militara de Pilotaj. Pilots were trained on Bleriot XIs, Farman IVs and Farman IIIs. The first use of Roumania’s new military aviation came in the 1913 Second Balkan War.

In June 1913, Roumanian forces crossed the Bulgarian border and started hostil­ities against their recent First Balkan War ally. Both sides had military aviation, but the Bulgarian units were committed on the Western and South-Western approaches. The Roumanians had two Escadrilles.

Escadrille No1 was commanded by Capt Fotescu and had 11 Bleriot XIs, of which eight had 80hp engines, two had 50hp engines, and one had a 70hp engine. The other two aeroplanes were 70hp Renault-engined Farmans.

Escadrille No2 was commanded by Capt Bibascu and had roughly the same strength, apart from the Vlaiku 2 aeroplane, piloted by its designer.

Escadrille No1 reported to an Army Corps commanded by Gen Cutescu, with No2 remaining directly at Supreme Command disposal. The pilots flew recce missions, cor­rected artillery fire, and observed from the air. Porucik Protopescu and observer Porucik Avion were most active. Between 24 June and 13 July they flew 15 combat missions in their Bleriot XI, flying a total of 20 hours. On 13 July, Protopescu flew a recce mission near Sofia which was 180km distant from forward Roumanian positions.

After the war, convinced of the effectiveness of the new type of weapon, the Roumanian Ministry of War decided to build on what had been achieved and create an Aerial Corps. In June 1914 this had 44 aeroplanes, of which 12 were Farman MF7 and MF9s, 12 Caudron GIIIs, six Morane-Saulnier L-10s, eight Voisin IIIs, and six Bleriot XIs.

In Bulgaria, air navigation for military ends began with the formation of the First Airship Unit (Otdelenie) within the Railway Drujina by Order of the War Ministry dated 24 April 1906. Otdelenie strength was 37 men of whom two were officers; it had a 360 cubic metre spherical balloon imported from France. A second Godard balloon

I The Bleriot-XI was among the most numerous aeroplanes used in the Roumanian invasion in Bulgaria

Voisin aeroplanes entered Roumanian service after the end of the Balkan Wars

Number of Airplanes 300 France Britain Germany Russia Italy Belgium Austria – Roumania Hungary

Graph 1: numbers of aeroplanes in service on the eve of the First World War of 640m2 was supplied in 1911, and the Sofia-1 balloon was manufactured using Rus­sian materials in 1912. Otdelenie staff began growing: two more Bulgarian officers were sent to the Airship College in Russia, enabling an expansion of the Railway Drujina’s technical side in 1912.

Interest in air navigation and aviation grew after manoeuvres in France, and the successes of the Italian air arm in the Tripolitania War. The ultimate decision to create military aviation in Bulgaria was taken by the close of 1911. Funds were made

I A Bulgarian balloon preparing for launch in 1909

available for the purchase of five aircraft: a Bleriot XXI monoplane, a Voisin biplane, a Sommer biplane (all three from France), a Wright biplane (from Germany), and a Bristol biplane from Britain. Thirteen pilots and two mechanics went to the supplier countries and to Russia in April 1912.

The first flight by a Bulgarian pilot in Bulgaria took place on 13 August 1912 when Poruchik (Lieutenant) Simeon Petrov tested the newly arrived Bleriot XXI. The nascent air arm’s combat readiness was tested at the Shumen manoeuvres in early September 1912. These saw participation by the balloon unit with the Sofia-1 and by three pilots flying the combat-ready Bleriot XXI. These manoeuvres also saw the first reconnaissance sortie, flown at the infantry’s request.

General mobilisation was announced on 17 September 1912. Up to this moment, six Bulgarian pilots had received their wings and returned from training. The remain­ing seven were recalled later, some flying combat sorties as observers. An aeroplane Otdelenie was created only after the start of war, on 2 November 1912. It comprised three Pilot Officers, three aircraft, and had an overall strength of 62 men.

The Bulgarian army entered the war with a balloon unit equipped with two bal­loons and a Bleriot aeroplane. Supplies of more aeroplanes from Russia, France, Ger­many and England were studied.

The ascent of the Sofia-1 on 15 October is accepted as the start of active duty. The following morning the Otdelenie deployed south-eastwards near the village of Kemal, where it supported Bulgarian artillery. The Aeroplane Otdelenie received three new Albatros aircraft. On 16 October 1912, Poruchik Radul Milkov and Poruchik Prodan Tarakchiev flew the Bulgarian air arm’s first combat sortie. Their task was to reconnoitre Turkish positions near Odrin (Hadrianople), and army strength in the

Bulgarian trainee pilots at Etampes airfield near Paris

Щ Simeon Petrov and his Bleriot XXI: Etampes, 5 June 1912

city itself. The pilot also threw two bombs without much effect. A second balloon sortie aimed to observe Turkish movements at tactical depth. This was the first in­stance in history where air navigation and aviation units were used jointly in actual combat on the same stretch of front.

The Bulgarian air arm continued to receive supplies. Nine Bleriots arrived from Russia. On 17 October 1912, Timofey Yefimov, one of Russia’s most experienced pi­lots, flew one of these. Formation of a Second Aeroplane Otdelenie started on 3 No­vember in Corlu. The increased number of combat-ready aircraft also permitted a new method: simultaneous aerial reconnaissance and ground attack. Four aircraft flew such a sortie on 14 November over various objects of interest near Hadrianople and threw bombs. Departures were at small intervals, each aircraft then flying a differ­ent route to the target areas, which were close to each other.

Another historic flight took place on 17 November. An enemy target was photo­graphed from the air for the first time in the Balkan War, and an international crew flew a combat sortie for the first time, pilot Giovanni Sabelli and observer Major Zlatarov throwing propaganda leaflets and two bombs in the vicinity of Hadrianople.

The Aeroplane Otdelenie remained at Kemal until the armistice, supporting Bulgar­ian and Servian infantry units. The Aeroplane Otdelenia now had 13 serviceable flying machines and flew 15 combat sorties in the nine days noted as having flying weather.

An observation balloon presented by Russia to Bulgaria near Hadrianople during 1912

I A Bulgarian Bleriot XXI being prepared for a combat sortie

Once all 19 aircraft ordered had arrived, the Third Aeroplane Otdelenie was formed. The nascent Bulgarian air arm had a total of 13 trained pilots, of whom eight were foreign volunteers. The armistice saw organisational improvements at air navigation and aviation units. These resulted in the following organisation:

– the First Aeroplane Otdelenie (four aircraft and three pilots) based at Svilengrad airfield;

– the Second Aeroplane Otdelenie (four aircraft and four pilots) based at Corlu, Cerkezkoy and Kabakcakoy airfields;

– the Third Aeroplane Otdelenie (one aircraft, one pilot and two observers) based at the Urma airfield; and

– the Balloon Otdelenie (two balloon stations with a spherical balloon and a teth­ered balloon).

Bombing came to be accepted as part of combat, for the first time in armed con­flict beginning to assume the features of a mainstream activity. This dictated test and training sorties which tried out specially designed Russian and Bulgarian air drop bombs. Conducted at the Svilengrad airfield, these involved almost all pilots, who gained much useful experience.

After the resumption of hostilities on 21 January 1913, the contribution of aviation increased. Analysis of aerial reconnaissance became part and parcel of the duties of Bul-

Air drop bombs being prepared for training at Svilengrad airfield

garian army staff. By the second armistice of 1 April, which led to the London Peace Treaty of 17 May 1913, all Bulgarian air navigation and aviation units had seen action, flying 55 sorties. Nine sorties involved bombing, using either special air delivery bombs or standard issue hand grenades, and six sorties involved leaflet drops over enemy positions.

On 26 January 1913 the First Aeroplane Otdelenie flew a recce sortie involving all four serviceable aircraft: an Albatros, a Farman, a Voisin, and a Bleriot. This was the

second time this new method had been used in aviation history; aerial recconnais- sance would later become the task of specialised air force units. The dropping of bombs was a secondary task for the crews, again using both specialised bombs and standard issue hand grenades.

Another remarkable sortie took place on 15 March 1913. Second Aeroplane Otde – lenie pilot Ernest Burie, flying a Farman, flew recce both near Carigrad (Constantino­ple) , and overhead the Ottoman metropolis itself. Setting off on the return leg, Burie noted that he was being followed by a Turkish biplane. Probably this was one of the Doppel Taubes recently delivered to Turkey from Germany. Overhead C atalca the ene – my closed the gap to the Bulgarian aircraft, coming to within three kilometres. Con­vinced that continuing the pursuit was pointless, the Turkish pilot turned south and threw two bombs close to Bulgarian positions without visible effect. The Farman landed successfully at Cerkezkoy airfield after 2hr 20min in the air. Enemy aircraft had also been noted overhead the C atalca lines on 23 February and 9 March, but this was histo­ry’s first encounter between adversaries in the air. Naturally, it would be premature to contemplate dogfights. The machines were unarmed and insufficiently capable of this, and in any case the armistice postponed dogfighting until the First World War.

Bulgarian military aviation’s last sortie in the First Balkan War was by the interna­tional crew of Giovanni Sabelli and Penjo Popkrastev. Their objective was to recon-

| Poruchik Mankov in his Voisin

I A Bulgarian dragon balloon being raised for artillery direction purposes: March 1913

noitre Turkish units in the Dardanelles area. Departing on 23 March 1913, they flew both over the Galipoli (Gelibolu) Peninsula, and over Asia Minor. This was the first aeroplane flight over two continents. In the course of the sortie two bombs were dropped: at Gelibolu and Lapsaki (Lapseki).11

Due to poor weather, the Balloon Otdelenie saw limited action. It was based in the Hadrianople area and conducted reconnaissance and artillery direction operations.

The Second Balkan War started on 16 June 1913. At its start Bulgarian aviation had eight serviceable aircraft, eight trained pilots, and two observers. Supporting ac­tion by the First, Third and Fifth Armies on Bulgaria’s western flanks, the Second Aeroplane Otdelenie, with four aircraft and four pilots was based at Slivnica airfield. The Third Aeroplane Otdelenie similarly supported the Second and Fourth Armies and was stationed at Syar (Seres) airfield.

The Second Aeroplane Otdelenie undertook four reconnaissance sorties, all flown by the most experienced Otdelenie pilot, Poruchik Simeon Petrov. It was during one of these sorties that the second encounter between adversary aircraft took place. Most likely this was the 2 July flight, when the Poruchik flew to Vranya (Vranje) and back, and met a Servian monoplane in the air. Servian sources substantially confirm a similar encounter.

The Third Aeroplane Otdelenie flew three sorties under exceptionally difficult con­ditions on the ground. The Otdelenie lost two of its aircraft, a Voisin and a Bleriot, mostly due to the shortage of fuel and lubricants needed for them to be ferried to another base. [12]

The Balloon Otdelenie was also de­ployed closer to combat areas. But though garrisoned near Slivnica,12 it did not see action.

Bulgarian aviators fell on hard times after the nation’s defeat in the Second Balkan War. Yet, despite limited means, the desire for revenge gave added impe­tus to find a way out of the difficult situ­ation. Seven more pilots were sent to train, and three Bleriots, two Aviatiks, and two kite balloons were ordered, but the outbreak of war halted delivery of all but two of the Bleriots. Due to limit­ed finance, Bulgarian military aviation structures retained their Balkan Wars shape.

When mobilisation was declared on 10 September 1915, the Aeroplane Otdelenie comprised five aeroplanes (three Bleriots and two Albatros) and five trained pilots. The Balloon Otdelenie had a Bulgarian-made kite balloon and two trained Observer Officers.

The development of Greek aviation dates back to the publication in 1907 of a study by eminent lawyer Alfredos Atanasoulias, later reissued under the title The Progress of Aerial Flights. In spring 1908 came the country’s first attempted flight. Ec­centric theatre producer Leonidas Arniotis who had studied aviation in France bought his own 30hp engined Bleriot and chose a grassy field near Tathios as suitable for his attempt. After a few unsuccessful attempts the monoplane flew, rising to some 10m before diving vertically. The pilot survived, but his aeroplane was beyond repair.

Greece’s first proper flight came a year later, when Russian aviator Utochkin flew a Farman for ten minutes near Paleos Faliros near Athens.

First Greek to fly over his homeland was Emanuil Argiropulos. During his studies in Germany this youth developed the desire to fly, going on to France to study pilot­ing. Having got his wings, and acquired his own Nieuport, he arrived in Greece in January 1912. The aeroplane was assembled by the Ruf Barracks Engineering Unit troops. After a few days of preparations, on 8 February 1912 Argiropulos was enjoying the view from 300m, watched by huge crowds. An hour after landing, he was up again, this time carrying Greek Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos.

Six weeks after this memorable flight, Argiropulos organised and air race with Greece’s second pilot, Alexandros Karamanlakis, who had arrived with his own Bleri – ot. The date was set for 28 March 1912. However, the initiative fell through because

1 The village of Slivnica to the west of Sofia was close to the Servian border. Translator.

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Karamanlakis’ monoplane was wrecked due to a failure during the take-off run. Luck­ily, its pilot was unhurt and minded to continue aviating. He managed to repair his aeroplane and flew a series of impressive flights. At the conclusion of one of them, bad weather forced him to put down 200m off the Lygaea shore, where he drowned in rough seas. He was Greece’s first, and the world’s 193rd, aviation casualty.

In late 1911 the Greek Ministry of War announced a competition for officers wish­ing to train as pilots in France. Almost sixty applications were filed, but just three won: Senior Artillery Captain Dimitrios Kamberos, Senior Engineering Corps Lieutenant Mihail Mututus, and Cavalry Lieutenant Hristos Adamidis. A second three-man group was sent to train in April 1912: Sen Capt (Infantry) Lucas Papalucas, Sen Capt (Artil­lery) Markos Drakos, and Lt (Cavalry) Panutsos Notaras. Both groups trained at Henri Farman’s flying school at Etampes airfield near Paris.

Along with training its staff, the Greek War Ministry, also started negotiating to buy aeroplanes. The delegation included the National Defence Committee chairman. Perhaps influenced by their pilots’ schooling, the Greeks eventually bought two Henri Farman bi­planes for 123,000 French francs. The machines were delivered in May. After they had been assembled, Sr Lt Dimitrios Kamberos was summoned back from France to test fly them. He did so between 13 and 15 May, crashing harmlessly in the process. On 15 May he reconnoi­tred for the ‘Invasion Force’ in manoeuvres which involved him until their end on 19 May.

The successful manoeuvres resulted in the formation of a Squadron under the com­mand of the Engineering Corps Liaison Battalion in Larissa. The Squadron eventually boasted four 50hp-engined Henri Farmans, four qualified pilots, and fifty auxilliary staff. The unit was based at Greece’s first military airfield at the Trian field near Eleusina.

I The Greek Henri Farman before its reconnaissance sortie in support of the ‘invasion forces’ on 19 May 1912

I A float equipped Farman III: the first Greek floatplane was similar

The creation of an army aviation unit soon led to the idea of a naval one. Sr Lt Kamberos championed this by fitting floats to a Henri Farman with the help of a group of army engineers and French mechanic Savot. The modified biplane first flew on 22 June 1912. The outbreak of the First Balkan War put paid to plans for a Greek naval air unit.

The nation’s first aviators went into action led by Engineering Corps Colonel Georgios Skoufos. The Squadron was at the direct disposal of the General Staff, which was also located at Larissa.

By the close of 1912, the Henri Farmans were obsolete and insufficiently effective. In particular, their inability to carry a second crew member was a major disadvantage. Apart from that, only one of them turned out to be fully serviceable. This was enough to prompt the order of 80hp-engined Maurice Farmans from France immediately the war broke out. These aeroplanes could carry an observer and had longer endurance.

The nascent Greek air arm first saw action in the beginning of First Balkan war at day time the infantry filed a request for the Skomia and Tsaritsani areas to be recon­noitred. Sr Lt Kamberos departed Larissa just after noon, later landing near Tirnavos to write his report to the High Command.

The same pilot flew his second sortie the next day, this time throwing several hand grenades over Turkish positions, and his aeroplane received numerous small arms hits. The following day recce flights were flown by the other Squadron pilots, who threw hand grenades ad-hoc. On 11 November, Sr Lt Kamberos penetrated enemy airspace by 60km, performing the first operational reconnaissance, by the standards of the day.

The Greek army swiftly moved north, beyond range of the old Farmans. The Squadron had to move to the new Kotsani airfield, along with the Army Staff.

I The Maurice Farman biplane in prototype form: aeroplanes ordered by Greece had more powerful engines and significantly better performance

Щ An Henri Farman aeroplane takes off on a reconnaissance mission

There Sr Lt Kamberos and Sr Lt Mututis tried a newly delivered Maurice Farman, using the opportunity to reconnoitre over Turkish positions, and ending in a forced landing due to engine failure.

This incident led to a reduction in recce flight frequency. At the same time, the adversary tried his hand at the game, a Turkish Henriot flying overhead Greek posi­tions at the Battle of Antsion. The aeroplane was flown by a French mercenary. Greek advances put paid to such flights. The aeroplane was captured in fully serviceable condition, later gathering reconnaissance for its captors, flown by newly impressed Lt Emanuil Argiropoulos (who had volunteered along with his private Nieuport).

After the Greeks had attained their operational objectives in Macedonia, the Squadron was detailed to the Epirus front. The old Farmans turned out to be unsuit­able for operation from the mountain airstrips. The three newly delivered Maurice Farmans were despatched from Athens to by ship, eventually reaching Preveza. There the unit retained its strength of four aeroplane, four Greek and one French pilot, a French mechanic, and 57 auxilliary personnel.

In late November the Squadron began flying from its new base. The first combat sortie was on 5 December 1912, involving recce of the Jannina region and the throw­ing of several hundred improvised bombs. Greek aviation saw action in Epirus until the capture of Jannina on 21 February 1913. On that day, Lt Adamidis landed his Maurice Farman on the Town Hall square, to the adulation of an enthusiastic crowd.

On 13 December 1912, Sr Lt Mututis, then based in Epirus, was detailed to Ath­ens to help create a naval air unit. A month later, the first floatplane arrived from France: a 100hp Renault-engined Astra. Mututis arrived in Athens on board the req­uisitioned Varvaras vessel and made for the Midras naval base. After the Astra’s first

A Greek Henri Farman after redeployment to Preveza airfield

flight on 12 January 1913, Navy Commander Admiral Kuduriotis decided to use his new weapon to reconnoitre Turkish shipping in the Dardanelles.

The mission was planned for 24 January 1913. The pilot, Sr Lt Mihail Mututis, and Observer, Naval Standard Bearer Aristidis Moragitinis, took their seats in the float­plane. The engine was warmed and the machine, with 115 litres of fuel and four hand grenades on board, accelerated for takeoff. The crew headed for the Turkish naval base at Nagara. Near Imbros they landed to refuel. They flew overhead their target at 1350m altitude, from which excellent weather allowed them to make a sketch map of the base and shipping in it. The hand grenades were thrown to no real effect, but the data sup­plied was exceptionally useful. The flight resonated in the world press, including the Turkish one, with unanimously high assessments. The pilots were lionised. The fascina­tion was justified bearing in mind the mission’s complexity and the fact that the aero­plane was a constant target for enemy fire both on its outward and return legs.

Greek military aviation claimed its first victim. On 4 April 1913 Lt Argiropulos died when his captured Turkish Henriot crashed. Fate decreeed that the first Greek to fly over his homeland would also be the first one to die.

The Greek air arm saw no action against the Bulgarians in the Second Balkan War. In fact, it was to stagnate until 1916. As the prospects of Greece’s joining in the Great War increased, so did a process to improve aviation combat readiness. A pilot training centre opened at Sedes. After its first class had graduated, No 532 Recon­naissance and Bombing Squadron was formed, armed with Breguet 14s. This was the first unit to see action on the Macedonian front after Greece’s formal adherence to the Entente and its joining the War in 1917.

Servia endeavoured to keep pace with her neighbours. The process began with French aviator Simon’s demonstration flights in Belgrade in May 1909. In his Anzani,

Russian pilot Maslyennikov and his Farman at the Banica airfield near Belgrade

he performed the first aeroplane flight over the Kingdom. Later the capital also wit­nessed flights by Russian pilots Maslennikov, Chermak, and Agafonov. Engineering Corps Kapitan Kosta Miletic was sent to Russia for training, and two balloons were bought from Germany: a 540 cu m free-flying spherical Kugelbalon, and a Parcival – Siegsfeld kite balloon. They were officially named the Srbija and the Bosna i Herzegov­ina at a ceremony. Due to various money problems, formation of the balloon Ceta took until the outbreak of the First Balkan War.

Despite the lack of money, in December 1911 the Ministry of War declared a com­petition for aviators. The decision to do so was influenced by the results of the previous year’s French Army manoeuvres in Picardy, where the aeroplane had shown its utility as a means of reconnaissance, and by the Tripolitanian War. Bulgarian and Greek efforts to create indigenous air arms and air potential undoubtedly also played a part. Limited funds forced only one candidate to be selected: Porucnik Borce Blagojevic. In the event, even he had to stay at home and await better times instead of travelling to France.

A second competition was announced in February 1912. This time, a group of three officers and three NCOs was formed. The Ministry of War contracted a loan of 30,000 dinars for their training and to purchase equipment and materials. On 29 April 1912 the group departed for Etampes, 60km from Paris. Three of them entered the Maurice Farman school and began flying two-seaters, while the other three went to fly single-seat Bleriots. As distinct from the Bulgars, the Servians sent no trainee engineers and mechanics, which was later seen to be a mistake.

Training took four months. Exams were sat and wings issued: for civil piloting. No military skills such as climbing beyond 1000m, observation, and dead-stick landings were studied. Trainees’ technical knowledge was also very vague. At the request of

I Preparing a Deperdussin for a demonstration flight: summer 1912, Banica airfield near Belgrade

the two groups’ leaders, Iljic and Jugovic, the government made extra funds available. The 50,000 dinars were also earmarked for the purchase of three 80hp Gnome-en­gined Henri Farman biplanes, a 50hp Gnome engined Bleriot XI, and two twin seat Bleriot XI-2s with 70hp Gnome engines. Negotiations also began for the purchase of two 80hp Gnome-engined Deperdussins. In trials of one Farman, Servian aviators conducted their first aerial photography, albeit over a foreign land.

Щ Trainees at Eouis Bleriot’s flying school at Etampes near Paris. The first two frotn left are Porucnik Ilic and Porucnik Tomic. Two Bulgarians are also in the group

Porucnik Jugovic, Narednik Petrovic, and Podnaredmk Novicic at the Farman pilots’ school at Etampes

On 26 November 1912 the Servian airmen and their machines set off home by ship, headed for the First Balkan War which had raged for nearly two months by then. They arrived home on 2 December and began establishing an aviation unit near Nis. This consisted of a balloon Ceta and an aeroplane Eskadra. By late December the Servians had nine trained pilots, two mechanics, two observers, two balloons, and nine aeroplanes (including the Russian Duks brought by Agafonov).

The two R. E.Ps ordered by Turkey had arrived at Belgrade Station at the out­break of the conflict and were requisitioned by the Servian authorities. Servian pilots expressed little liking for them in trials, condemning them unfit for action in moun­tainous or forested areas. The R. E.Ps were therefore not taken on strength.

The renewal of hostilities marked a new stage in Servian military aviation devel­opment. The successful use of aeroplanes over the Eastern front by Bulgarian and Russian pilots accelerated the newly formed air units’ incorporation into the infantry which was to be detailed to the Skodra (Shkodar) fortress, then besieged by the Mon­tenegrin Army. Relocation was to be in two stages: first by railway to the newly taken

port city of Salonica (Thessal­oniki) , and then by ship to the vicinity of Ss kodra. The contin­gent comprised a single and a twin-seat Bleriot Xls, a Deper – dussin, and a Farman. the Servi­an pilots were joined by French­men Godfroid and Kirstein, tak­ing personnel numbers to 33. The remaining pilots and ground

Changing the Gnome engine on a Dux staff remained at Mh.

Щ An R. E.P. aeroplane being delivered to Topolnica railway station near Nis for testing and possible combat duty

The contingent set off on 19 February 1913, boarding the Greek steamer Marika on 27 February. On the way, the steamer was attacked by the Turkish cruiser Hamid – iye. The equipment was undamaged, but there were deaths among the personnel. At length, the battered flyers disembarked and made for the village of Barbalus near the fortress.

Servian pilots were keen to show their nation and fellow officers the capabilities of aviation in support of their own and the Montenegrin infantry. The aeroplanes were readied for flying by 7 March. Weather was warm for the season and clear, with the snow-covered jagged peaks ringing the airfield plainly visible. Some of these peaks, rising to over 800m above sea level, were on the direct approaches to the field. Cold winds blew down them, warning the aviators of tough times ahead.

The experienced French mercenaries who drew some 1000 dinars a month each, found a variety of reasons to refused sorties over Skodra. Despite having basic skills and a tenth of the pay, Servian flyers had the edge in morale. On 20 March, Aerial Com­mand CO Miletic gave the order for trial flying to start. First to take his Farman aloft was Porucnik Jugovic, who returned 13 minutes later. He was followed by Porumik Stanko – vic who returned in his Bleriot after 25 minutes. At best, both pilots had climbed to not more than 900m: totally inadequate to escape fire from the besieged fortress. Third to fly was Narednik Mihajlo Petrovic. Finding a way to turn the powerful winds and limited area available to his advantage, he climbed to some 1200m. He then set for the fortress and flew over the Servian positions. On returning to base he again encountered a sud-

I Commissioning a Bleriot-XI at the Trupalsko polje airfield near Skodra (Shkodar). The mounted figure is Knez Arsen Karaporpevic

den downdraft and was not so lucky this time. He lost control of his fragile machine which dived, killing him. The Servians gave their first aviator victim.

On 22 March Porucnik Stankovic, followed by Frenchman Godfroid, reached Skodra. However, the first proper aerial reconnaissance of the fortress was on 29 March by Porucnik Stankovic and Narednik Tomic. Lasting 45 minutes and was conducted at a height of 2200m above sea level. A total of seven similar flights at infantry request were flown before the second armistice. Some sources claims that bombs were thrown during one such sortie but the adversary side does not corroborate this.

After the armistice, command of the Aeroplane Eskadra passed to Capt Milos Ilic, Capt Jovan Jugovic being given command of the Balloon Ceta. The contingent left Skodra on 6 April 1913 and returned to their Nis base 20 days later. As the threat of war with Bulgaria grew, the Supreme Command detailed Capt Stojkovic, Capt Ilic;, and Narednik Tomic; and two Bleriots to an improvised airstrip at the village of Vojnika near Kumanovo. The strip turned out small and surrounded by mountains. The personnel

gathered gradually, reaching a strength of 37. Reserves in­cluded a Bleriot and a Deper – dussin which had been left pi­lotless after the French had gone home at the conclusion of the armistice.

At the outbreak of hos­tilities along the Bulgaro – Servian line of demarcation, the unit came under Gen

. . . . . Pavel furicic’s command.

The Servian air arm’s first victim, Narednik Mihajlo Petrovic,

posing before his Farman III The General s army was ad-

vancing to Kustendil along the Cunino Brdo, Kriva Palanka, Kratovo line. Aviators conducted recce on behalf of the army command.

The Bulgars also had an air presence along the same front. During a sortie over Kriva Palanka, Narednik Tomic encountered an adversary in the air. The pilots waved at each other and set off to their respective airfields. One possible reason for such pleasant manners was the lack of any armament. Another was that some Bulgarian flyers had studied at Bleriot’s school at Etampes together with their Servian colleagues. The hour of the dogfight had yet to arrive…

Action lasted little over a month, during which time the Servians flew 21 observa­tion and tactical recce sorties. Some requests for intelligence on the Kustendil front had to be denied since the area was barely within range and reaching it would have involved overflying mountain massifs. The Servians still harboured a healthy respect for strong winds at altitude! The unit had no trained observers and Capt Ilic proposed that two infantry officers be specially coached for the role. However, the conflict’s brevity pre-empted this initiative.

Meanwhle, Capt Jugovic’s Balloon Ceta had deployed near Crvena Reka near Pirot, and was preparing to use its sole surviving Russian tethered balloon for observa­tion. Personnel numbered 45, and a field near Jamin Rid was selected as suitable. The Ceta entered action on 15 June 1913, marking its first success a week later near Nesk – ova Visa. On 25 July the unit finished its duties and returned to Nis.

The Kingdom of Servia left the Balkan Wars a victor with an almost doubled land area, but its economy was in a sad state. A new danger loomed all too soon, this time from the north. Time, and most of all money, did not allow for any significant change in the aeronautical command. Its personnel remained the same as did the number of aer­oplanes, yet the lack of spares told on combat readiness. After mobilisation on 25 July, it took the Eskadra seven days to assemble, the Ceta taking 20 days. France was approached for aid in the shape of a dozen aeroplanes with pilots and technicians, but pressure on the French in the early weeks of war put such help beyond the realm of the possible. Servian aviators were to be left to their own devices for the first nine months of the war.

Having been heavily defeated by the Italians and having lost a major tract of its North African territories, Turkey now faced a new challenge. The objective of the military alliance of Balkan nations were more than clear: to seize and share among themselves the collapsing Ottoman Empire’s European lands. Despite the financial exhaustion of the recent war with Italy, combat experience dictated the recognition of the aeroplane and balloon as important attack and defence weapons, and as facili­tators of naval artillery effectiveness. In fact, the first Turkish aeronautical decisions were linked with the establishment of anti-air artillery units. One of these indeed saw action in the final stages of the defence of Tripoli. These were also the first air defence units to see action anywhere in the world.

By mid 1912, eight Turkish officers began flying trining in French schools, another four going to Britain. A flying school headed by infantry Major Cemal bey was also set up in the Constantinople suburb of Yesilkoy. Two twin-seat and one single-seat De – perdussins, a twin-seat Bleriot, four twin-seat and two single-seat R. E.Ps, two twin – seat Bristols, and two twin-seat Harlands were ordered for the school and for future combat. However, the contract for the Bristols fell through due to delayed delivery prior to the outbreak of the First Balkan War, whereas two of the R. E.Ps were cap­tured by the Servians in transit as related above. A little before the outbreak of hostil­ities the trainees were summoned back from abroad. The eight who had been to France returned with wings, while the four who had gone to Britain had not completed their courses. To strengthen its air arm, the Turkish command hired three French and four German pilots, and three French and two German mechanics. Two of the Germans arrived in a DFW Mars which the Turkish authorities later purchased.

There was no time for training flights, save for two sorties around Constantinople by Lt Nuri, on which he reached 1500m. He was later awarded an illuminated address by the Military Inspectorate for his historic achievement.

On 9 October 1912 the Turkish Prime Minister declared a general mobilisation. Operational war plans called for six aeroplanes to be in active service under the com­mand of the Chief Military Engineering Inspectorate. Three groups of two aeroplanes each were formed. One was to secure the Eastern Army, another: the Western Army, and the third: the Hadrianople Fortified Region. The sole kite balloon (750cu m) also went to Hadrianople where it failed to see action due to the lack of a gas station.

Capt Cemal’s group, equipped with two Harlands and with two German pilots, went to the Eastern Army. Capt Fesa, Lt Nuri and a French pilot went to the Western Army with twin-seat Bleriots and an R. E.P The third group failed to deploy due to the rapid Bulgar advance. Its CO, Capt Revfik, pilots, ground personnel and two aero­planes remained at Yesilkoy airfield.

Щ The French R. E.P. was the Turkish forces’ first combat aeroplane. This is the one seat version, suitable for aerial reconnaissance

The first reconnaissance request came from the Eastern Army command and called for intelligence of the Kirklareli region. However, low visibility and driving rain pre – cluded flying. The Turks sufered another defeat, and the aeroplane group joined the retreating columns. Prior to departing, it is likely that the personnel thoroughly torched set the two Harlands. (A telegram despatch by Bulgarian Lt Gen Radko Dimitriev claims they were captured but Turkish sources deny this.)

The Western Army group enjoyed more success. Personnel and equipment de­ployed at Selanik (now Thessaloniki). The aeroplanes based at a specially prepared forward airfield in Koprulu, from which they flew several recce sorties. The retreat soon forced the aeroplanes to relocate to Selanik. Additional observation and recce flights were performed by 10 November around Karafare. After the Greeks approached Selanik, the pilots decided to torch the aeroplanes and take refuge in the home of a local bey.[13] Later the British Consul arranged safe conduct for all the pilots, bar one who had been captured by Greek Andartes. The Turks were shipped to Constantino­ple, the Frenchman returning home.

The situation of the Hadrianople garrison was growing more and more critical. Cut off from their hinterland and surrounded by a well trained adversary enjoying high morale, its chances of standing fast were reducing by the day despite Turkish conviction that the fortifications were impregnable. Hadrianople Garrison CO Sukri pasa insisted on air support, mostly to direct artillery fire. In this, he wanted to follow the example set by the Bulgars in their actions against his garrison. The lack of a gas station had rendered the fortress’s sole Parcival-Siegsfeld balloon unusable, hence aviation remained the only hope.

All serviceable aeroplanes (two newly arrived DFW Mars, two Deperdussins, two Bristols, and four R. E.Ps) were assembled at the Flying School’s airfield at Yesilkoy.

Щ French R. E.P. and Deperdussin were assembled at the Flying School’s airfield at Yesilkoy

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I Hidroplan attempt flight over Mediterranean sea

However, this was 210km from Hadrianople. Turkish pilots had insufficient endur­ance flying training, while the French ended their conacts for one reason or another, ultimately leaving Sukri pasa without air support. However, all was not forfeit. The opportunity was used to conduct for intensive flying training of pilots and observers. The more experienced among them, such as Capt Selim and Sr Lt Fethi, flew recce sorties above Bulgarian positions on the Cs atalca front. Meanwhile, a detachment of two Turks and two Germans was detailed to the Galipoli peninsula, charged with supplying reconnaissance to units counterattacking the Bulgars there. While in tranit by sea, the detachment encountered a storm and emerged with damaged equipment. The Germans them made their way back to Constantinople and returned home.

Hostilities resumed in early February, after an armistice. Though much reduced in strength, Turkish aviation showed commendable activity right from the start. One factor for this was the concentration of its forces in the most vulnerable sector, anoth­er being the intensive recent training. The defence of the Cs atalca lines was critical to

Щ A Turkish piloted R. E.P. about to depart for training flight

the nation’s survival. It was entrusted to an elite command, reinforced by considerable numbers of German and French advisers. Right from the start, the Army Staff sent requests to aviators for intelligence on Bulgarian artillery positions. A Deperdussin piloted by Sr Lt Fethi accordingly departed, carrying General Staff Major Sadat as observer. The crew spotted the Bulgarian batteries from a height of 800m. The flight lasted 1hr 10min and was a constant small arms target for Bulgars and Turks alike. The same crew flew two further recce sorties, but despite warnings, Turkish soldiers continued shooting at their own aeroplane. Capt Fesa flew over the next few days, his observers including Maj Cemal and Capt Kenan.

On 22 February Fesa and Kemal flew a two-hour long recce mission near Silivri. The flight was most fraught, a Bulgarian division concertedly firing on the aeroplane and causing it plentiful superficial damage. However, the information supplied was of im­mense import to the success of the defensive operations. The positions of a deploying Bulgarian regiment and its supporting artillery were pinpointed with great accuracy. The Commander of the Tenth Corps awarded the pilot ten gold lira for his heroism.

On 22 March German pilot Mario Scherf flew along the Kumburgaz, Corlu, Cerkezkoy route, discovering Bulgarian preparations near Corlu. Two days later Sr Lt

I A Deperdussin ready for take off

Щ The Deperdussin single seat trainer was among the most widely used Turkish army aeroplanes prior to the First World War

Fethi flew recce near Karakoy along with Lt Col Enver bey, tenth Corps Chief of Staff. They reached the Black Sea coast and returned safely to base. Mari Scherf and Capt Kemal crossed the Sea of Marmora, flew over the C atalca lines, reached Hadrianople and returned safely after a four-hour flight. The sortie was also remarkable for the fact that Kemal bey threw several egg-shaped bombs over adversary positions near the village of Kavakca: the first such use of an aeroplane in Turkish history. On 29 March Scherf and his observer Capt Kemal flew recce near Karaorman.

After the second armistice Yesilkoy hosted just three serviceable aeroplanes: a Ble – riot, a DFW, and an R. E.P Despite efforts to buy new aircraft from Germany and France, the number was to remain unchanged until 13 July when Turkey renewed hostilities against Bulgaria. Flights were flown by pilots Fesa, Nuri, Selim, Fethi, and Fazil.

On 21 July Sr Lt Fethi overflew Hadrianople in a DFW Mars. The following day Turkish units retook the city. An order on 26 July detailed Capt fesa with a Bleriot to the Right Flank Army, where on 28 July he flew recce along with a General Staff officer. The nascent Turkish air armflew recce and partol sorties until mid September 1913, losing one aeroplane when Sr Lt Fethi crashed his Mars into the Merica river (he survived, being temporarily hospitalised in Constantinople).

As part of plans to improve military and national potential, a P9 non-rigid air­ship manufactured by the Parcival Luftfahrt Flugzeuge Gesellschaft company ar­rived in the metropolis. It had been purchased in April 1913, but the Austro-Hun­garians refused to grant it passage and it had had to be transferred by sea via Con – stanca. The 2400cu m dirigible was 48m long and weighed 2000 kg. It had a 50hp engine, a crew of six, and offered a 1200m cruise at 41km/h. Along with it, some 40 kg of grenades were delivered for throwing from the gondola. On arrival of the impor­tant consignment, an Aeronautical Unit with five officers and 100 NCOs and troops was formed at the harbour. Two mechanics and the engineer/aeronaut Haxter ar­rived from Germany as advisers. An airship hangar was erected at Yesilkoy airfield. The first sailing was on 5 August, with Haxter, Capt Fevzi, Navy Lt Murat, Lt Sakir, and a German mechanic in the gondola. They rose to 200 or 300m and flew around Yesilkoy and Bakirkoy for 1hr12m. More training sorties were performed in the fol­lowing few days.

The authorities also directed efforts at increasing the number of aeroplanes. For the purpose, a delegation led by Veli bey, head of the Flying School, toured Austria – Hungary, Germany and France. Two months later, in March 1914, 20 Moranes were ordered for the Army, along with 15 Nieuport flying boats for the Navy. Capt Marcus de Goys, a French officer personally recommended to the delegation by Gen Bernard, assumed command of the Flying School.

De Goys arrived in Turkey in May and was promoted to Major. A short time later, three newly manufactured training Bleriot Delfins arrived, and a strenuous programme

THE CURTISS AEROPLANE FROM 1912

I Pilot Fethi bey helps Sefket haneme, first Turkish woman to fly in an aeroplane, alight from his Deperdussin two seater on 30 October 1913

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of training for officers began. Newly arrived French mechanics repaired old aeroplanes which had been given up as ready for scrapping, boosting the fleet to pre-War levels. De Goys turned out to be an excellent flying instructor and educator. He proposed that all aviators should wear a new uniform, and also that a commission should meet to formu­late a programme for the development of a Turkish airforce. This new command was to have 35 aeroplanes for army support, and 15 for naval support. Another six Caudrons

I The Curtiss floatplane had a single 100hp engine driving tivin propellers

Щ The Turkish General Staff hoped the Caudron III order would improve combat effectiveness signifi­cantly before the start of The First World War

and three Farmans were ordered from France. These were expected to arrive within two months, but the outbreak of the First World War put paid to the plans. In reality, the Ottoman Empire had just nine aeroplanes, of which just four were suitable for aerial reconnaissance: three 60/70/80hp engined R. E.Ps, and a 70hp engined Deperdussin. The Navy had three flying boats: a Curtis and two Nieuports. This strenght was badly below par, and the Empire would soon pay a heavy price for it.

I Twenty one year old Richard Raymond-Baker: one of scores of young men volunteering for RFC service at the outbreak of the Great War. As this photograph was taken, he was not to know that he would be killed in 1918, entering aviation history as the last victim of the conflict’s most famous ace, Mannfred von Richthoffen

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G

od created man according to his image and inspired him with a constantly searching spirit. The spirit that gives birth to progress and leads our civilization to the tempting future of a better and free life. Freedom as notion has been defined in various ways and the definition is the product of the hard labour of many great scientists. The feeling of real freedom comes to us, the people, only when thanks to our common sense and skills we succeed to over­come the gravitational law and we leave the warmth of our natural earth environment, heading for the sky. This is a hard way and its beginning lies in ancient times when the dream, and later the idea to fly, was born. This era was followed by centuries of acquiring necessary knowledge and decades of unsuccessful trials used by man to break his earth chains. All of this was compensated by our civili­zation with the blood of its elite of intelligent, searching and brave men whose self-sacrifice was the base to build our heavenly future.

Why was it necessary for man to fly? What is the purpose of dwelling in a space not assigned by God? These are all logical ques­tions answered by scientists hundreds of years ago. Even at that early time, scientists foresaw that the three-dimensional space over us offers unlimited opportunities for making progress and its imple­mentation by man using man-made aircraft would give exceptional chances for rapid development of civilization. Now we understand

how far-sighted this great effort of human mind and will was, irre – gardless of the cost of thousands of human lives. We, contemporary generations owe those heroes the memory and reverence in return to their great deeds.

Commandant of Bulgarian Defence and Stuff College “G. S.Rakovski” Major General Manev

T

he use of airborne weapons in combat characterizes armed con­flict since the end of the 19th Century, and especially since the start of the 20th Century. Today the significance of airborne weap­onry has grown to the point where it plays a decisive role in the outcome of armed and political crises.

This book is dedicated to 100-anniversary from the first control humans‘ flight, aims to clarify the genesis of air power, uncover its essence, and trace the evolution in this term during certain stages of its currency. Official historiography, memoirs, and scientific pa­pers form the base for research.

Subject of the study is air power: how the term emerged, what was meant by it as it developed historically, how it influenced the formulation of doctrines for the utilization of airforces and national air potential as a whole, and how it made its debut in the years prior to 1914. The very new moment is a special part for creation of Air Power in Balkan countries and meaning of new components for the military operations in Balkan wars (1912-1913).

A well-known rule in science is that a phenomenon cannot be understood and studied in each of its aspects. Thus this book seeks to contribute to further clarification of terminology and processes: a clarification which would assist a future streamlining in the devel­opment of national air potential on the road to integration into col-

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lective security systems. Ultimately, arrival at a uniform terminolo­gy, and its clarification and amplification are the first steps to genu­ine integra

I

dentifying critical issues and finding optimum solutions to them is a fundamental task of politicians and soldiers at the start of the 21st Century. Methodologies for this include modelling techniques and intensive computer use.

Nevertheless, the road to pinpointing the major problems of today remains thorny. A major job for experts is to clarify the meaning of words and to apply terms rationally and correctly. Anyone who has tackled any significant issue knows the process well.

One may apply a variety of techniques for such purposes. One possibility is to take commercial procedures and modify them as needed. ‘Commercial procedures’ implies Stanford L. Optner’s ideas in Systems Analysis for Business and Industrial Problem Solving. This looks at industry and government, including the military. Is­sues may involve national security and military capacity: particularly tough topics of considerable consequence, and ones comprising a multitude of quantitative and qualitative components. Yet, exactly this sort of elaborate and intractable issue is so fundamental today.

Scientists and researchers are particularly involved in medium and large-scale issues, including air power. Resolving such issues entails creating new hierarchies or modifying existing ones, and adopting policies that may obtain over a long period. The longer the period, the greater the risk of failure. (Moreover, risk here may imply that a policy line initially makes things worse, improving them over a longer term.)

The issue of air power is topical in Bulgaria, a nation going through a trying patch in the history of its sovereign existence. Yet, air power has never been subjected to in­depth professional research, particularly as regards its role as an instrument for attain­ing specific political, economic or military objectives.

Why is air power topical? Because:

– it has existed, exists now, and will continue to exist into the future

– it has always presented planners with a broad range of options, does so now, and will continue to do so in future

– it calls for significant capital investment entailing large measures of risk

– it is highly dependent upon national scientific and technological potential

– it is an exceptionally convoluted and complex matter where decision making and implementation call on a whole range of disparate resources

– it is central to national security.

The methodology for addressing similar issues does not call for a precise definition of success. (Some systems analysis authorities even claim that such issues do not need too close a formulation to be researched.) However, national security matters such as air power and its role in armed conflict are overridingly important. Therefore, it is incumbent before specialists studying air power to define it, and the options for its development, to the greatest attainable degree of precision.

In pursuing the exercise’s objectives, one has to adhere scrupulously to objectivity and logic. Objectivity is essential in monitoring and data processing. Logic is a way of thinking which aims at rational conclusions. The body of evidence under considera­tion forms the substance of the transparency and clarity essential to such studies. Empirical monitoring is the process whereby data gathered forms a system, which in turn provides grounds for recommendations. The latter, in their turn, are logical con­clusions resting on properly selected fact.

As stated above, Bulgarian military science has not yet grappled with the meaning of air power. Due to post-Second World War historical divisions, it still employs Soviet terminology. Yet, contemporary realities call both for the introduction of air power as a concept, and for new ways of interpreting it. They would reflect contemporary na­tional priorities, and enable a proper appreciation of air power in the context of the recent conflict near Bulgaria’s Western borders.

While retaining the hierarchy of fundamental issues, it is crucial to redefine air power, and examine it as an element or subset of national power.

As national potential develops, so do science and technology. They in turn promote further development. National potential determines how nations rank in the world league: a nation’s ability to attain political, commercial and military objectives depends upon it. Never has this been truer than today, as leading na­tions (‘the Superpowers’) enter the information society. However, regardless of the era a country is in, its development depends on proper harnessing of whatever potential it has. National power may be defined as the extent to which national potential can be actualised in the pursuit of set political, commercial or military objectives. It determines a country’s vitality, its ability to endure hard times, and to go on to prosper.

If national power is the extent to which national potential is actualised, we may view it as the result of a process: the outcome of a system of mutually linked components. We may prove that such a system exists by noting its intrinsic com-

ponentry, and its point of entry (the presence of an object affected by the process at play within the system).

New realities require a broader view of national power as a whole, and of each of its components. In researching the issue, the fact that one is observing an open system in which air power is an entry point is significant. Once we agree to regard national power as a system, we also agree to examine its environs: finite objects with a definite influence on the system. Vital to the system’s existence, each of these objects is a source of input into the system. We may call the sources of national power ‘tangible’ and ‘intangible’ (Diagram 1).

Tangible sources include, inter alia, geography, economic potential, infrastructure, the extent of technological development, human resources, and the armed forces. Intangible sources include, inter alia, culture, ideology, national will and morale, gov­ernment powers and resolve, diplomatic skill, and significant political and military success or failure in the past.

Depending on the objectives set before it, national power may be military or non­military. This subjective distinction derives from the sources of national power, which may also acquire the same distinction in turn. The subjectivity deepens by the emer­gence of an information society in advanced nations. There, links between compo­nents of national power grow stronger, while bounds between them grow weaker.

Nevertheless, in your Author’s opinion, the distinction is still necessary because few nations are ‘advanced,’ remaining (according to Toffler’s definition) at the indus – trial/agrarian stage.

According to the same author again, industrial nations’ striving to retain a status quo that gives them world leadership and the ability to shape that world according to their interests, is natural. This striving is one of the reasons for sharp political and economic crises, frequently leading to the use of armed force.

Unarmed power derives from non-military sources that feed the part of the system relating to national political and economic potential. Armed power derives from the military. Both sources may be tangible or intangible, and determine the methods and resources used in pursuing objectives: political and economic, or military goals. The recent clash of arms in the Balkans bears out the correctness of such a classification: it has been degrading Bulgarian national potential for the past ten years.

Discourses on national armed power are particularly apposite in view of the na­ture of the issue under review. Armed power is the sum total of material and morale at national/class/international alliance level, and as the ability of that nation/class/alli – ance to mobilise these resources for combat objectives or in the resolution of other issues. Military prowess depends upon national business, social, scientific and techno­logical prowess, and national morale. A country’s armed forces and their ability to attain objectives set by political leaders are its direct expression.

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Intangible Sources of National Power: -Culture -Ideology -History -National Will and Morale -Government Power and Resolve -Diplomatic Skill -Past Success and Failure in Peace and War
Tangible Sources of National Power: Geography – Economic Potential Infrastructure Technological Development Human Resources Armed Forces
National Power: The Degree of Actualisation of National Potential in Attaining Objectives
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Components of by Purpose
National Power and Source
Components of National	Power by Environment
On the High Sea and Waterways
In the Air
Extent of Actualisation of National Air Potential
Diagram 1: The sources and components of national power

Armed forces are classified according to their environment: army, airforce, and navy. The ability of each to perform depends on its armed power. Armed power is the totality of material factors and morale characterising the state of the armed forces and their ability to attain combat objectives. It depends directly on, inter alia: personnel numbers, morale and training, the quantity and quality of combat equipment, and good command. Armed power is the ability and potential to attain a set objective in the context of a specific set of conditions. The major components of armed power (Diagram 2) are:

– personnel and equipment in direct combat: people and machines basic to com­bat potential

– reserve personnel and equipment: technical and logistics backup providing sus­tainability

– command strength and mechanisms: management potential.

Combat potential is basic to armed power. It is the state and potential of person­nel and equipment in direct combat: those directly committed to attaining set com­bat objectives.

Before delineating the bounds of air power as a subsystem of national power, the point that national power is classified by environment (land, water or air) repays reiteration. This best enables countries to utilise land, water and air for objectives relevant to their prosperity and ability to endure.

Diagram 2: The components of armed power

Hitherto, air power theory has been the exclusive province of West European and United States’ theoreticians and experts. Attempts to formulate and explain air pow­er date back to the infancy of aviation. Concepts of naval power provided starting points. Early air power theorists borrowed ideas and basic postulates from naval war­fare fairly uncritically. This worked only occasionally.

The concept of naval power is firmly linked with Alfred Dyer Mahan. He defined naval power as the ability to use the seas for military aims, and thwart the enemy in doing the same. Mahan pointed out that the seas could be used not only as a setting in which to destroy enemy forces representing a genuine threat, but also as one in which to exercise indirect but nonetheless decisive influence on military potential. Mahan’s 1890 treatise, The Influence of Naval Power upon History, also contained the rather too absolute prescription of superiority as a prerequisite in all naval operations: nothing was to be undertaken before superiority was secured. What was needed was a large, centrally commanded fleet whose basic purpose was to destroy enemy capital forces.

Another naval strategy theorist, Sir Julian Corbett, regarded the high seas in their normal state as uncontrollable. His great contribution was to separate the attainment of superiority from its exercise, which he treated as a distinct aim of naval power. These twin aims in turn dictated different armaments, training, and unit structure. Specialists will readily find analogies with contemporary views of air power.

What is the nexus between naval power and air power? At the turn of the 20th Century, it was the striving to seek superiority or mastery in a largely uncontrollable environment. In addition, both naval an air power depended upon — and served the needs of — land operations. This gradually led to the triune configuration of national power, enabling nations to pursue their objectives not only on dry land, but also on the high seas, and in the air.

What were the properties of the new environment over which politicians and soldiers felt challenged to seek superiority?

The first and essential one is its universality. The earliest flying machines suggest­ed to strategists that the new leap of human ingenuity had a future: with develop – ment, it would render any point on Earth accessible, moreover at speeds unknown to land and naval vehicles. Speed gave the new environment its second advantage: greater mobility, granting intrinsic privileges to owners of flying machines. The third advan­tage stems from the ability to move in three dimensions, thus gaining a large measure of invulnerability. Graf Zeppelin’s dirigibles and the Albatros Company’s aeroplanes

abruptly ended a British geographical immunity bestowed by 36 kilometres (21 miles) of English Channel. This immunity had held since the Norman Conquest in 1066, yet henceforth no nation was beyond invasion from the air.

Early flyers grasped the opportunities offered by the new environment (viz. Profes­sor Charles’s views, and Orville Wright’s letters to his government almost a century hence). However, the first soldier and theoretician to state notions of the changes about to hit warfare, was Giulio Douhet. In 1909, this unknown artillery Maggiore wrote:

“It may well seem improbable that the sky shall turn into a battlefield no less important than the land and the seas. However, it would be better if we accept this probability now, and prepare our services for the conflicts to come. The struggle for aerial superiority shall be arduous, yet ostensibly civilised nations shall strive to pros­ecute war insistently, and with all means at their disposal.”[1]

By 1913, Colonele Tenente Douhet was firmly of the opinion that aerial forces must form a separate command. Criticising Italian high command strategy, he de­clared:

“Aerial space shall be independent. A new type of weaponry is being born: aerial weaponry. A new battlefield is being opened: the air. The history of warfare is being infused with a new factor: the principle of aerial warfare has been born.”2

The first military leader who not only saw the significance of nascent air power but also began active work to elevate it as a primary pillar of national power, was the Head of the German General Staff, General-Feldmarschall von Moltke. Before the First World War, he formulated and applied a programme for the promotion of this new weaponry, and for the creation of properly functioning Army and Navy air units.

During the Great War, Generals Trenchard and Mitchell were the first to breach the Klausewitz postulates on warfare (which Foche was following). British soldiers had principal differences with Klausewitz’s paradigms: they had attained and main­tained a 150 year superiority not through set-piece wars but through manoeuvre, lim­ited warfare, attrition and threat. Major General Trenchard and Brigadier Mitchell proved that rather than being tied to close support of the infantry, aerial forces ought to co-operate with them, yet pursue independent objectives.

Reviewing Tripolitanian, Balkan and Great War experience, Generale Douhet attempted the first definition of air power in his 1921 book, Command of the Air. He and subsequent theorists regarded air power merely as a tool for mastery, even after the advent of missiles. For instance, writing in the January 1956 issue of the Air Force Journal, Major Alexandre Seversky defined air power as a function of speed, height, range, mobility, and the ability to project armed power with pinpoint accuracy in time and place at maximum speed.

To this very moment, air power tends to be regarded as a component of national armed power. In this sense, its definitions tend to recycle general concepts of armed power and combat potential. Treating the airforce as a prime command, they address its armed power, combat potential, state, and ability to attain set objectives within a discrete timeframe.

However, there are grounds for believing that air power is in fact the rational combination of all means for operating in the air, and of all means for defending the national interest. Air power determines a country’s ability to harness the military and business benefits of the air for its own ends. In this sense, air power may also be defined as the extent to which national air potential is actualised: the extent to which the elements of national air potential are given tangible shape.

It is reasonable to regard air power as a system comprising components, links and dependencies. In unbreakable unity with their environment — the air — they display interrelationships that give the system its wholeness.

Specific historical conditions determine the significance of air power’s individual components. The dominating significance of its contents is a matter not only of today, but also of tomorrow. In the context of this volume, the military aspects of air power are particularly important, since your Author examines the current and future role of airforces in warfare.

The structure of the air power system is markedly hierarchical. It comprises basic components (ones instrumental in the performance of business or combat tasks), and elements influencing the performance of such tasks to one extent or another. The number of components and elements in the proposed system is not fixed. It, and the extent of their development, depend on a variety of factors and have a purely national character. These factors include, inter alia: degree of national economic development; priority objectives set before nations; major points in national military doctrines; and the political and geographical environment. For instance, most nations have chosen a tripartite armed forces structure; but some (like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam and former USSR) have a quadripartite structure, with air defence the fourth part. Never­theless, the principles for determining the major components obtain for the force structures of any nation with aircraft and an infrastructure for their operation.

These basic components of air power have been nominated (Diagram 3):

– the Air Force (including air defence forces, with the proviso that in the afore­mentioned countries they are separate commands)

– state and private airlines and general aviation companies

– the naval air arm

– police and border patrol air units

– state and civic air clubs and voluntary defence support organisations

– the air traffic control system

Repair & Airports Maintenance Network
Science & Research Establishment
Flying Schools	Manufacturing Base
Diagram 3: The Major Components of Air Power

– the entire air operations infrastructure

– the research and development (R&D), education and training (E&T), and man­ufacturing sectors.

A proper legislative base is crucial in delineating air power and ensuring normal function to its structures. While one cannot define it as a component of air power, it affects processes and task performance directly, particularly in peacetime.

One may regard each component of the air power system as a subsystem of con­stituent elements. For instance, airforces comprise units which discharge peace and wartime tasks. One may also regard aviation as one of these elements as a subsystem comprising types of aviation. However, your Author is loath to overanalyse the system and thus risk obfuscation.

Certain components of air power play a special role in its development. There­fore, they repay especial examination whose findings may be used as an entry point into the air power system. They are: the entire air operations infrastructure; R&D, E&T, and manufacturing.

Within the former, one may discern two basic elements: the repairs and mainte­nance sector, and the airports and airfields network. The R&D, E&T and manufac­turing component comprises the entire national science and research establishment, the aviation industry, engineering design and consultancy bodies, and flying schools. Although here these elements rank as mere parts of larger components, and although their presence in most nations’ air power systems is token or nonexistent, their signif­icance to flying and aviation is immense.

National air potential is the basis of air power. Air potential is the state and ability of the components of air power, or the state and ability of forces and material directly involved in task performance. It is not necessary to tap the full measure of national air potential at all times. The precise extent depends on many factors, chief among them the nature of tasks.

One may regard air potential as succour for the air power system, and as a system of several elements (Diagram 4) grouped according to the possibility of actualisation of air power components and elements. They may be regarded as an entry point into the system of air potential, whose final product is the degree of its actualisation.

The elements of air potential include:

– aircraft number and quality

– ground and air personnel numbers, training and career satisfaction

– air and ground equipment state and availability

– state and scope of available backup

– command structure powers and effectiveness.

Air power is the extent to which air potential becomes reality. The assessment of this extent is of necessity subjective. It depends on the extent of actualisation of

various elements of air potential. There are cases where for one reason or another components of air power, or elements of air potential, are missing or undeveloped. This does not mean that air power is absent, or that it cannot rise beyond a certain level. However, it does mean that the ultimate degree of air power is circumscribed.

Apart from depending on objective conditions, the extent of available air power may also be fixed by politicians and soldiers with a view to adequacy in the pursuit of set objectives.

The proposed view of air power makes it obvious that it is an element of national power able to discharge duties both in peace and in wartime. One may glean a fuller picture of its multifarious peacetime duties from this list:

Diagram 4: The Components of air potential 21

– deterring potential aggression

– assisting in disasters or crisis situations

– assisting national business, science and research

– patrolling and controlling national airspace

– maintaining combat readiness and preparedness for a smooth transition from peace to war.

Manifestations of the business role of air power include:

– state and private sector airlines

– R&D establishments and firms with interests in aviation

– the air design and manufacturing sector which bridges the gap between funda­mental research and manufacturing

– the aviation community (those who earn a living in aviation and related interests).

The airforce as a component of air power plays a special role in peacetime. As part

of the armed forces, it is able to display national armed power on the international arena. Politicians often make use of this to demonstrate a threat to adversaries. Ger­man politicians pioneered this use of air power. A similar display arsenal for the use of diplomacy was widely used during the Cold War and remains deployed today. Demon­strations of aerial might often allow the attainment of political objectives without recourse to combat: the mere threat of potential superiority or mastery supplants spilt blood.

In this sense air power has always been an instrument of national policy and a major buttress to peacetime diplomacy. This is helped by the nature of the airforce: constantly combat ready, mobile, and able to concentrate forces rapidly with great accuracy. The ability to influence adversaries simply because the airforce is there bring the creation of air power to the forefront as a priority national issue, and to the fore­front in international politics. Here, Bulgaria’s lack of an adequate level of air poten­tial, and the process of downgrading air potential (in progress as these words are writ­ten) erode Bulgarian leaders’ positions on the international arena.

At the same time air power, along with the other elements of national power, is there to defend the nation in case of attack. Thus, its importance for national safety grows in line with military threat. Primary expression of this aspect of air power is a country’s ability to repel aggression. However, this does not mean that air power ends with the airforce. One must interpret air power primarily as a nation’s ability to har­ness all resources and opportunities at its disposal to the end of utilising airspace. The basic aim here is to boost national prosperity, with defence as part of this aim.

Regarded thus, air power may to some definite extent be seen as synonymous with national economic prowess, whose inalienable constituent it indeed is. It is economic power that determines the level of armed power (hence also of air power); air power has both commercial and military origins.

The reason people invest air power with military meanings is mostly to do with international factors. Threat, and the concomitant need for defence, are immanent in international relations. In this sense, tasks before air power in a conflict include:

– controlling national airspace

– controlling enemy airspace

– continuous aerial reconnaissance and intelligence gathering using the advantag­es of the third dimension

– transport operations.

The relative importance of army, airforce, and navy, has always depended on po­litical and strategic considerations, geography, and international alliances. The army has played first fiddle in some historical periods; in others, primacy has rested with the airforce or navy. The place and role of each armed force in peace and war depends on the technical level of adversaries, their potential, and their geography.

Experience shows that each of the forces makes a definite and always significant contribution to victory. Over the last century (since the arrival of air power) there have been no pure infantry, naval or air wars; neither do military experts foresee any in future. One thing remains unaltered: only the army can secure the results of a campaign or a war. Its sheer physical presence on the ground consolidates the con­quests of hot conflict.

Conditions for the attainment of set objectives arise only where organised, well­armed, and well-trained armed forces are available. Each of them has a specific sphere of application, and modes of interplay with the others. The appropriate utilisation of this specificity determines the degree of success of an operation, campaign, or war. Precisely because of this, the pursuit of balance between the different armed forces (and within each of them) is a major procedure in modern military science. National interests guide this procedure closely as do, inter alia, tasks set by political and military leaders, political and military developments in the region and beyond, national po­tential, and geography. The procedure is also the key to a broader challenge: striking a balance between the components of air power.

In constructing air power, attention must be paid to blend its components most advantageously, and to maintain this blend thereafter. This is only possible after thor­ough scientific analysis of all influences on civil and military aviation. Balancing thus involves military science and addresses historical and technical developments. The issue of balancing also intrigues per se, inviting examination in an historical and mili­tary science aspect.

Military doctrine and national security postulates, as well as the national consti­tution, have to form the basis of balanced development of air power. They must deter­mine the role and place of air power and the airforce within the hierarchy of national power, and national armed power. They must fix its relative weight in the system, its

tasks in peace and war, and the composition and purpose of various force commands and civic volunteer formations.

A conclusion valid for nations with Bulgaria’s economic potential, is that balancing the components of air power means bringing them to a state and blend which allows air power to be multi-role (able to perform a variety of peace and wartime tasks).

In view of the basic requirements before air power (to perform set tasks using its peacetime strength while taking account of geography, and to manoeuvre using avail­able resources), another major procedure is to determine human and material strength. Here, it must be borne in mind that force renewal in today’s swift wars is highly problematic, and generally considered impossible. Thus, the issue of balancing and creating air power is mainly a matter of peacetime planning.

Balancing the components of air power is an ongoing process. It evolves according to historical circumstances. Major factors determining such evolution include: politics (changing balances, military blocs, and changes of regime); economic realities and changes in national commercial/military potential; developments in indigenous and world sci­ence; and changes in the tasks before air power. Tasks set by political leaders and the level of national economic development are prime among these factors.

History is replete with examples of defeat or distress resulting from poor (or non­existent) balance among elements of national power and components of air power. Most of these relate to financial straits, mistaken military doctrines, or short-sighted foreign policies. The national economy then has to make up for such defeat and distress.

Systems analysis represents system objects symbolically; denotes their structures (func­tion, links, organisation, and development), events, properties, objective laws, and for­mal relationships between them; and displays structural similarities, properties, compo­sition, communication, and development as evidence of functional system integrity.

To apply systems theory to a phenomenon means to study that phenomenon thor­oughly, but without recourse to classical experimentation. The aim is to discover the phenomenon’s structure and behaviour. This entails using methods from a number of disciplines. (Indeed, the benefits of the systems approach stem from the fact that it is isomorphic, breaching historical bounds between sciences claiming to study entirely different phenomena.)

Attempts to study air power as a system date back some decades. To your Author’s knowledge, Stephen Possony made the first such attempt in 1949. Writing on Ele­ments of Air Power in the Infantry Journal Press, he listed 15 elements of air power:

– materiel and fuel

– industrial potential; a high level of technological progress and instrument devel­opment

– a network of bases and forces to defend them

– communications and electronics

– logistics support

– auxiliary services

– airborne forces

– guided missiles and nuclear weaponry

– aeroplanes and other aircraft

– human resources

– training

– morale

– intelligence

– inventions and research

– tactics, strategy, and planning.

Possony then described the significance of each element, but ended his article short of stating the need to apply a systems approach.

The 1992 Air Force Manual exhibited a similar level of perception in treating the United States’ aerospace doctrine. Possony was cited verbatim, but without clarifying things in the least; what was omitted includes:

– the internal organisation of air power, and modes of interplay between its com­ponents

– the functions of air power components

– horizontal and vertical links between air power and other structured systems

– mechanisms and factors for system preservation, improvement, and development

– methods and phasing in air power development with a view to defining its histor­ical prospects.

But why examine air power as a system? Indeed, is the systems approach suitable to air power? It recommends itself because:

– air power is created by man and involves components with different natures

– air power has a purpose, and each of its components has an aim (tasks whose performance generally involves the air)

– the scope of air power is very broad, as witnessed by the variety of its compo­nents, and the number of functions and values involved

– air power is sufficiently complex to merit study as a unity. Any internal or envi­ronmental change begets other significant changes. Moreover, inputs and outputs are non-linear, which renders mathematical modelling both exceptionally complex and far too subjective

– inasmuch as adversaries always strive to downgrade air power, it contains an element akin to competition. In the aforementioned business systems, commercial competitors assume the adversary role.

In examining air power, the systems approach entails study of a series of aspects, each of them important, viz.:

– system elements

– system structure

– system function

– system communications

– system integrity

– system history.

The system elements aspect tells us what the system contains. The components of air power are listed above, along with their major elements where relevant. This ought to have made it clear that the system’s net product is to enable a country to use the air in the pursuit of its political, business and military objectives: a topical issue today. This issue has long represented a major priority before any national and military lead­ership that has ever set its public ambitious tasks for the pursuit of national prosperity. It has become particularly pertinent in the light of plentiful recent examples of the benefits of air superiority. These benefits stem from the advantages of three-dimen­sional space, great speed, manoeuvrability, the mobility and flexibility of airborne plat­forms, and the multiplicity of tasks performed.

The conclusion has to be that the system under review has a great many interre­lated properties. These properties do not derive merely from the properties of individ­ual components, nor are they reduced to them. They also depend on the environ­ment and on the elements and subsystems of components. Air power is part of the hierarchy of national power, and is itself a hierarchy: a complex system with a great many interdependencies. This renders formal mathematical descriptions practically impossible: such descriptions would transgress any levels of conditionality deemed useful in practice.

In this and similar cases, the systems approach is not a stage on the road to math­ematical modelling. The main task is not to employ mathematics to detail structures, links and functions —but to research trends. In Bulgarian conditions, this may be paraphrased as finding how to guarantee the retention of air power, and how to main­tain a reasonable level of air potential.

The system structure aspect shows how the system is put together, and how its components may interact. Though they may be shown as equal, the development of one or another of them is a matter of priorities and affordability. Factors determining the relative import and degree of development of individual components include:

– national economic potential

– political and military leaders’ air priorities

– national human resources’ potential (in demographic, intellectual and educa­tional terms)

– national scientific potential

– geography and regional geopolitical encumbrances

– heritage and development prospects.

The degree to which an air power component is present or absent affects the links between others, and may impose system restructuring. For instance, in Bulgaria an element of one of the components (flying schools) has to stand in for the entire head­line component (R&D, E&T, and manufacturing): the rest barely exists. (It must be stressed that the lack, or underdevelopment, of any system component degrades over­all system effectiveness. That is why balancing between components while keeping account of national interests and abilities is so necessary.)

The reason this system is proposed is to facilitate better understanding of the issue, and ultimately to promote better policy in its regard. The system may be used to determine the role of air power in the conduct and outcome of armed conflict. The formation of most components of air power is revealed when examining system func­tion aspects.

On the one hand, the system communications aspect helps delineate the system under review. On the other, it sets air power in the broader context of the system of national power. The formation of some components (due for examination later in the volume) was not only a process of emergence, but also of gradual fitting into the national power hierarchy, and of linking with land and sea power. We shall review this aspect in subsequent volumes, which will cover air power’s increased importance, and its attainment of equality with the other two elements of national power.

Today, air power is a decisive factor in the performance of strategic national tasks. This in no sense downgrades its functions in securing air superiority or mastery, or in offering adequate resistance in the defence of sovereignty over land or sea. On the contrary: it is the very ability of this element of national power to react most rapidly and appropriately to any threat, irrespective of where it arises, that gave it its domi­nating significance vis-a-vis the other two forces.

However, regardless of how great the success at the end of hostilities, consolidat­ing it is down to land and sea power. This mutual dependence has been confirmed repeatedly, and will continue to be confirmed in your Author’s opinion.

The system integrity aspect of air power cannot be regarded as a constant. As will be obvious from the very infancy of air power, the emergence of its various components was evolutionary and uneven in time. It continues to this day, and will continue. Air power is an open system; protagonists at its entry and exit points are both the tangibles and intangibles listed above (Diagram 1), and the tasks and objectives before it.

Air power’s system history is possibly its most important aspect in the context of this study. It provides answers as to how the system came about, what development stages it underwent, and what prospects it faces. History is basic to this volume, and it will inform future volumes in the series. The intention is to show how air power evolved into a system over clearly defined periods, and to attempt to glean general trends for the near future. Apart from that, air power is the product of various nations’ air po­tential: an item also subject to evolution in set periods, and to trends in the future.

The study of air power leads to these conclusions:

– Air power is among the major indicators of national economic and military prow­ess. It expresses a country’s genuine ability to utilise the air in the pursuit of its inter­ests. Thus, it is undoubtedly a primary element of the national security system, and a measure of national prosperity and potency.

– The benefits bestowed by air power and the possession of air potential stem from the air as an environment (high speed, long range, three dimensional manoeuvrabil­ity), and from the promise of further development as science progresses. The air al­lows high mobility, flexibility and universality, and offers politicians and soldiers rapid and effective solutions to complex problems. This helps rank air power as a prime element of national power. The primacy of air power, and its growing importance, means that it is a major issue that would repay study as a system with a set of clearly defined components.

– The number of components and the degree of their development express prior­ities and objectives nations set themselves. They are explicit in national security doc­trines and implicit in geography, and in the state of tangible and intangible sources of national power. This state varies with time. It also relates to the links between system components. In this sense, air power is a complex open system whose entry point features its components and their subsystems, and whose major source is air potential.

– Air power has a multipurpose nature in both peace and war. It is involved in a variety of tasks, each drawing upon a different set of components, thus calling for a proper balance which may be determined according to set principles and criteria. Experience shows that imbalance in component construction and development re­sults in limited ability to perform tasks, and degraded ability to tackle subsidiary tasks. In this connection, the balanced arranging of components, and their subsequent ma­nipulation in order to maintain a suitable balance between them is a challenge to national business, intellectual, and political leaders.

– The utilisation of air power depends on the proper interaction of components which are heterogeneous in nature. Thus, utilising air power does not imply merely summing these components’ potentials, but rather invoking an altogether higher de­gree of unity and potency. Attaining proper balance in the structure of air power depends to a decisive degree on the complex process of scientific management during

its construction and maintenance. This in turn may call for adequate funding; obtain­ing it ought not to be a problem, since air power is always a matter of adequate suffi­ciency in a national context.

– Armed conflicts are direct stimuli for the development of air power and air potential. They have played an unbroken shaping role ever since air power’s emer­gence. Experience from assigning one role or another to air power’s components has read across to military science, and to the formulation of national priorities as a whole. Armed conflict is an extreme state that most rapidly tests the veracity of peacetime assumptions. What is necessary is a thorough study of the influence of air power on the course and outcome of armed conflict (particularly of the influence of air power’s major wartime component: the airforce). Because of their properties, airforces also manifest themselves as prime instruments of national policy in a variety of historical circumstances.

The emergence of air power occupied a relatively brief period. However, this pe – riod was rich in the variety and dynamism of processes it witnessed. Events influenc­ing the emergence of air power and determining its place in the system of national power were numerous. Therefore, your Author proposes to review only the major ones among them. There is also a wish to forecast the future of air power in the context of the information society. Thus, subsequent volumes in the series shall re­view air power and conflict in successive periods:

– the First World War, featuring the rapid evolution of national aerial forces into separate commands able to tackle tactical tasks independently, influence operations, and undertake strategic duties

– the interwar period, marked by developments in doctrinal thinking, and by air power’s growing importance in periodic local armed conflicts

– the Second World War, which conformed airforces’ strategic significance as sep­arate commands equal to the army and navy in determining the outcome of strategic operations

– the postwar period, which witnessed the gradual imposition of a state where leading industrial nations honed their aerospace forces’ readiness to react to any threat immediately and in a measured way, and when these forces assumed the role of prime deterrent in international relations.

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