Category THE RACE

The rapidly increasing costs of the U. S. space program, and particularly its civilian component, continued to trouble President Kennedy after he sent his $3.787 billion Fiscal Year 1963 request for NASA to the Congress in early 1962. There was no parallel single national security space budget request; Department of Defense and intelligence space programs were incorporated into the general DOD budget, rather than receiving separate budget treat­ment. However, increasing DOD expenditures for space were also of con­cern to the president. To obtain a total overview of the U. S. space program, Kennedy asked the BOB in June 1962 to carry out a comprehensive review of all U. S. space efforts.

Initial Budget Concerns

After NASA administrator Webb met with Kennedy on May 3, 1962 to deliver a copy of NASA’s revised long-range plan, he reported that Kennedy “was quite concerned about the high level of expenditures involved in our program, plus the military program, and urged that everything be done that could possibly be done to see that we accomplished the results that would justify these expenditures and that we not expend funds beyond those that could be thoroughly justified.” Webb also reported that the president “had expressed some concern” about the geographical distribution of NASA funding; Kennedy noted that he had received complaints from states such as “Michigan, Pennsylvania, and the eastern states” that NASA was focusing its expenditures on California, Florida, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Kennedy was “quite anxious” that NASA “maintain the best geographical distribu­tion of contracts and still get the most efficient job done.” To provide the White House with its own channel of information on NASA procurement actions, Kenneth O’Donnell sent Richard Callaghan, a Kennedy loyalist and congressional staffer, to NASA as a special assistant to Webb. According to one account, “Callaghan’s job was to arrange for a more equitable distri­bution of contracts, which would relieve congressional pressure on Kenny O’Donnell, and find out whether [Senator Robert] Kerr and [Vice President] Johnson were pulling strings for their friends at NASA.” With respect to this latter mission, Callaghan found no evidence of undue Kerr or Johnson influence on NASA’s contract awards.30

Webb responded to Kennedy’s concern regarding geographical distribu­tion in a June 1 letter. He told Kennedy that during 1961, states west of the Mississippi River received 56 percent of NASA prime contracts; states east of the Mississippi, 44 percent. One reason for this distribution was that “major aerospace and electronic companies have concentrated their growth within a few areas of the country.” However, Webb continued, when both prime con­tracts and first-tier subcontracts by the prime contractors were considered, 53 percent of the work was in the East and 47 percent in the West. Webb also noted that in the second half of 1961 Massachusetts had received 64 percent more in NASA funding than it had received in the first half of the year. In summary, Webb told the president, “the NASA effort is being spread broadly throughout the United States.”31

The reasons why President Kennedy chose to propose such a major step in U. S.-Soviet space cooperation were well summarized by Theodore Sorensen: I

A New "Strategy of Peace"

In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy sought ways of lessening the U. S.-Russian tensions and mistrust that had led to that situ­ation. He first tried to once again engage Nikita Khrushchev in discussions on a test ban treaty, but progress toward that objective was slow. By June 1963, he was ready for a broader approach—a new “strategy of peace.”8 In a June 10 commencement address at American University in Washington, DC, Kennedy outlined his approach to a “more practical, more attainable peace,” one based on “a series of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interest of all concerned. . . Both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, have a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace. . . Genuine peace must be the product of many nations, the sum of many acts.”9

President Kennedy did not mention space cooperation in this speech, an omission seen as “striking” by Harvey and Ciccoritti “in view of the great stress he had placed earlier on space as a means of bridging differences between the two countries.” They suggest that “Kennedy for some time had been having second thoughts about pushing space cooperation under existing circumstances.” They offer as evidence for this view Kennedy’s disappoint­ment with the results of the 1962 space cooperation agreement and the fact that “Kennedy had become more and more enthusiastic over the competitive aspects of the space endeavor.” Kennedy, they suggest, “was really interested [in space cooperation] only if the Russians should prove ready to cooperate in a manner and on a scale that would involve meaningful movement toward a genuine rapprochement between the two countries. Otherwise, the US would continue with its program in strict competition with the USSR, since he considered it essential to the national interest that the US continue to develop the capabilities for the full mastery of space.”10

A somewhat different interpretation of Kennedy’s views at the time is more convincing. As suggested in Sorensen’s view cited earlier, in the post-Cuban missile crisis detente atmosphere of 1963, and with the increasing costs and mounting criticisms of the lunar landing program, it is likely that President Kennedy was even more interested in U. S.-Soviet space cooperation than had previously been the case. The President in mid-1963 was actively consider­ing resurrecting the idea. He certainly did not seem to think that he was “in pursuit of an illusion,” but rather pursuing a course of action that was in the U. S. interest. Other than a call for negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty, Kennedy did not mention any other area for potential U. S.-Soviet coopera­tion in his American University speech, so the fact that he did not mention space cooperation specifically is less than “striking.” It was logical for him to return to a proposal for cooperation in the lunar landing program as one of the “concrete actions” needed to implement his “strategy for peace.”

An August 9 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) memorandum on “The New Phase of Soviet Policy” provided evidence that Kennedy’s strategy was well conceived. On July 25 the Soviet Union agreed to sign a Limited Test

Ban Treaty, including a prohibition on tests in outer space. The CIA analysis thought that Nikita Khrushchev in the post-missile crisis period had “a vested interest in perpetuating. . . the impression that a new era in East-West relations has begun” and that “the USSR intends to sustain an atmosphere of reduced tensions for some time.” These observations were certainly sup­portive of a proposal for enhanced space cooperation as part of President Kennedy’s new approach.11

By mid-1963 there was increasing criticism of the lunar landing program from both sides of the political spectrum. Theodore Sorensen was asked whether by 1963 “the size of this [space] program and its rate of growth were beginning to worry the President, and that he was more eager to stress the cooperative issue because he was dubious about either the wisdom or the possibility of maintaining the rate of increase that NASA was suggesting.” Sorensen replied that Kennedy “was understandably reluctant to continue that rate of increase. He wished to find ways to spend less money on the program. . . How much that motivated his offer to the Russians, though, I don’t know.”12

As he began during the summer to think again about suggesting to the Soviet Union that sending men to the Moon become a cooperative under­taking, President Kennedy was faced not only with the lingering doubts regarding whether Russia in fact was intending to go to the Moon, but also questions regarding the possible hostile purposes of the Soviet space pro­gram. The August 1963 issue of the widely read Reader’s Digest featured an article headlined “We’re Running the Wrong Race with Russia!” that asked “are we suffering from moon madness?” and suggested that “the over­publicized ‘race’ to get a man on our faraway neighbor has obscured an imminent threat to our security—Soviet strides toward military conquest of the space just over our heads.”20

Not surprisingly, this article caught President Kennedy’s attention. On July 22 he sent a memorandum to Robert McNamara and James Webb, not­ing “the lead article in the Reader’s Digest this month states that the Soviet Union is making a major effort to dominate space while we are indifferent to this threat. I wonder if you could have some people analyze this and give me a response to it.” A week later, he wrote a similar memorandum to Vice President Johnson: “The attack on the moon program continues and seems to be intensifying. Note Reader’s Digest lead article this month.” Kennedy asked the vice president to develop answers to two sets of questions: (1) “Did the previous administration have a moon program? What was its time schedule? How much were they going to spend on it?” and (2) “How much of our present peaceful space program can be militarily useful? How much of our capability for our moon program is also necessary for military control in space?” Kennedy added: “I would be interested in any other thoughts that you may have on the large amounts of money we are spending on this program and how it can be justified.”21

In his response to this second Space Council review, Webb suggested that “all” of the civilian space program “can be directly or indirectly militarily useful.” An important justification for the sums being spent on the NASA program, said Webb, was to develop “the power to operate in space” and “as insurance against surprise and as the building of the necessary underlying capacity” for an accelerated military space program, should the United States decide that such a speed-up was needed. The Department of Defense reply to Kennedy’s questions was signed by deputy secretary Roswell Gilpatric. He told the president that “the article is based for the most part on Soviet propaganda statements, faulty and greatly exaggerated interpretation of technical data, quotes by U. S. authorities taken out of context or distorted, excerpts from Air Force magazine articles, and the author’s personal opin­ions and unsupported statements.” Gilpatric added: “At the same time, he [the author] deliberately ignores or is strangely uninformed about our on­going military space program.”22

A rapidly convened meeting of the Space Council on July 31 discussed the appropriate reply to the president’s questions. Vice President Johnson noted that “we had entered a very tricky period,” and that there seemed to be a “political basis” for much of the criticism of the lunar landing program, with “more trouble to be expected as we get closer to [election year] 1964.” Johnson suggested that “we are facing a Congress where a majority is for the program, but there is a very vocal minority.” The group discussed the language to be included in the response to the president, and agreed to have Edward Welsh draft that response, which took the form of a one-page letter signed by Johnson that told the president that “there was no Administration moon program until your message to Congress in 1961.” Johnson, agreeing with Webb’s argument, added that “all of the scientific and engineering abil­ity in space has direct or indirect [military] value” and that “the space pro­gram is expensive, but it can be justified as a solid investment which will give ample returns in security, prestige, knowledge, and material benefits.”23

Webb on August 9 sent to the White House a separate response to Kennedy’s original July 22 memorandum, noting that NASA had also “received from the Vice President a number of questions which we under­stand he is answering.” This somewhat disingenuous comment, since Webb had participated in the July 31 Space Council meeting, was indicative of the preference on Webb’s part to report directly to the president rather than working through the Space Council. Webb associated himself with the views in Gilpatric’s July 31 memo to the president and added that Apollo would require extensive operations in near-earth orbit and that “75-80% of the cost of the Apollo program will be devoted to the development of a capabil­ity for conducting near-earth orbital operations which could form a basis for any military systems we may require.” Webb noted that “the Reader’s Digest article ignores the fact that these basic resources—large launch vehicles, advanced spacecraft, extensive and complex ground facilities—are vitally important resources for future military missions as well as in fulfillment of the NASA program.” Webb’s belief in the military value of NASA’s activities was not shared by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Webb observed that McNamara “was unwilling to stand up and be counted for the [NASA] program.” He told President Kennedy later in 1963 that “the Secretary of Defense will not want to support the program as having substantial military value.”24

John F. Kennedy’s late July 1963 questioning of the justifications for con­tinuing to spend large amounts of money to get to the Moon before the Soviets came at the same time as very public discussion of the suggestion that the Soviet Union in fact did not have a lunar landing program. At the end of August, Kennedy in a conversation with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin “raised the question of activities in outer space, pointing out that these are very expensive.” “If outer space was not to be used for military purposes,” thought Kennedy, “then it became largely a question of scientific prestige, and even this was not very important, as accomplishments in this field were usually only three-day wonders.”25 This was certainly a rather dif­ferent attitude toward Project Apollo than what Kennedy had been saying publicly, and may well have reflected his emerging doubts about proceeding with the lunar landing program at its planned pace and increasing costs.

The set of judgments that led President John F. Kennedy to decide to send Americans to the Moon combined lasting characteristics of the American peo­ple, a conviction of American exceptionalism and a mission derived from that conviction, the geopolitical situation of early 1961, and the individual values and style that Kennedy brought to the White House. Apollo was a product of a particular moment in time. Apollo is also a piece of lasting human history. Its most important significance may well be simply that it happened. Humans did travel to and explore another celestial body. Apollo will forever be a milestone in human experience, and particularly in the history of human exploration and perhaps eventual expansion. Because the first steps on the Moon were seen simultaneously in every part of the globe (with a few exceptions such as the Soviet Union), Apollo 11 was the first great exploratory voyage that was a shared human experience—what historian Daniel Boorstin called “pub­lic discovery.”30 John Kennedy’s name will forever be linked with those first steps. Like other ventures into unknown territory, Apollo may not have fol­lowed the best route nor have been motivated by the same concerns that will stimulate future space exploration. But without someone going first, there can be no followers. In this sense, the Apollo astronauts were true pioneers.

Leaving the Earth gave the Apollo astronauts the unique opportunity to look back at Earth and to share what they saw. The Apollo 8 “Earthrise” picture is surely one of the iconic images of the twentieth century. It allowed us, as poet Archibald McLeish noted at the time, “to see earth as it truly is, small and blue and beautiful in that eternal silence where it floats” and “to see ourselves as riders on the earth together, brothers on that bright loveli­ness in the eternal cold—brothers who truly know that they are brothers.”31 That perception alone cannot justify the costs of going to the Moon, but it stands as a major benefit from going there, one that has influenced human behavior in many ways.

I hope that sometime in the future—if not in the coming decades then in the coming centuries—humans will once again choose to venture beyond the immediate vicinity of Earth. I believe that the urge to explore—to see what is over the next hill—is a fundamental attribute of at least some human cultures. Michael Collins, the Apollo 11 astronaut who remained in orbit as Armstrong and Aldrin experienced being on the Moon, has commented that the lasting justification for human space flight is “leaving”—going away from Earth to some distant destination. As future voyages of exploration are planned, I also hope that the United States chooses to be in the vanguard of a cooperative exploration effort involving countries from around the globe. There are two things I judge as certain, whenever those voyages take place. One is that they will not be like Apollo, a grand but costly unilateral effort racing against a firm deadline to reach a distant and challenging goal. The other is that President Kennedy’s name will be evoked as humans once again begin to travel away from Earth. As he said in September 1962, “We set sail on this new sea because there is new knowledge to be gained, and new rights to be won, and they must be won and used for the progress of all people.” John F. Kennedy, like the astronauts who traveled to the Moon during Apollo, was a true space pioneer.

[1] have asked Jim Webb, Dr. Wiesner, Secretary McNamara and other respon­sible officials to cooperate with you fully. I would appreciate a report on this at the earliest possible moment.

[2] “The pace at which the manned lunar landing should proceed, in view of the budgetary implications and other considerations,” and

2. “The approach that should be taken to other space programs in the 1964 budget, i. e., should they as a matter of policy be exempted from or

[3] think the President had three objectives in space. One was to ensure its demilitarization. The second was to prevent the field to be occupied to the Russians to the exclusion of the United States. And the third was to make certain that American scientific prestige and American scientific effort were at the top. Those three goals all would have been assured in a space effort which culminated in our beating the Russians to the moon. All three of them would have been endangered had the Russians continued to outpace us in their space effort and beat us to the moon. But I believe all three of those goals would also have been assured by a joint Soviet-American venture to the moon.

The difficulty was that in 1961, although the President favored the joint effort, we had comparatively few chips to offer. Obviously the Russians were well ahead of us at that time. . . But by 1963, our effort had accelerated con­siderably. There was a very real chance we were even with the Soviets in this effort. In addition, our relations with the Soviets, following the Cuban missile crisis and the test ban treaty, were much improved—so the President felt that, without harming any of those three goals, we now were in a position to ask the Soviets to join us and make it efficient and economical for both countries.7

[4] think the President had three objectives in space. One was to ensure its demilitarization. The second was to prevent the field to be occupied to the Russians to the exclusion of the United States. And the third was to make certain that American scientific prestige and American scientific effort were at the top. Those three goals all would have been assured in a space effort which culminated in our beating the Russians to the moon. All three of them would have been endangered had the Russians continued to outpace us in their space effort and beat us to the moon. But I believe all three of those goals would also have been assured by a joint Soviet-American venture to the moon.

The difficulty was that in 1961, although the President favored the joint effort, we had comparatively few chips to offer. Obviously the Russians were well ahead of us at that time. . . But by 1963, our effort had accelerated considerably. There was a very real chance we were even with the Soviets in this effort. In

To develop background material on the various issues he would have to address during his presidential campaign, Senator Kennedy in December 1958 established a “brain trust” drawn primarily from the faculties of Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Even before the presidential campaign began, Harvard law professor Archibald Cox began collecting research memoranda and reports from experts at both universities and from across the country. According to the authoritative account of the Kennedy campaign, “The professors were to think, winnow, analyze and prepare data on the substance of national policy, to channel from university to speech writers to Cox to Sorensen—and thus to the candidate.” This process failed in its execution. While an impressive amount of material was generated, little of it was read by Kennedy or used during the campaign. Regarding the products of Cox’s efforts, Theodore Sorensen comments that “not all of their material was usable and even less was actually used. But it provided a fresh and reassuring reservoir of expert intellect.”10 The differ­ent perspectives of those caught up in the frenzy of Kennedy’s presidential campaign, such as Sorensen, and those with the time to reflect on issues that Kennedy would have to address if he was elected were a continuing source of campaign tensions.

Kennedy himself on September 2, 1960, asked Cox to contact Trevor Gardner, former assistant secretary of the U. S. Air Force for research and development, and a man to whom Kennedy looked for advice on space and missile issues. Kennedy wanted from Gardner “an account of the Administration’s failures in missiles, 1953 to today” and his “judgment on the significance of our being in a secondary position in space in the sixties.” Kennedy also asked, “Will the Soviet Union have a reconnaissance satellite before we do, and what will it mean?”11

Another source of largely unused but remarkably prescient input into Kennedy’s campaign was the Advisory Committee on Science and Technology of the Democratic Advisory Council, which in turn reported to the Democratic National Committee. Among its inputs was a September 7 “Position Paper on Space Research.” Leading the preparation of this paper was physicist Ralph Lapp, who, after working in the Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bomb, spent most of the rest of his career warning about the dangers of nuclear war. The position paper pointed out that “the United States has failed to define its real objective in space. If purely scientific, this should be so stated so that the American people and others understand our objective. If aimed at ‘winning the space race’ then this must also be stated and the U. S. program must be directed toward this goal.” The paper went on to discuss landing a man on the Moon as a possible objective of a compet­itive space effort, asking, “Can the United States afford to allow the Russians to land on the moon first?” and noting that the answer to this question was “more political” than technical, since “there is no great scientific urgency” in a manned lunar landing. It noted that “in the psycho-political space race the rewards for being first are exceedingly great; there is little pay-off for second place.”

The paper outlined two alternative space programs. One of the programs was “an imaginative and vigorous program of research in space science and technology and to exploit useful applications of this new technology. . . in collaboration with other nations.” The other suggested program aimed at “American supremacy in the exploration of space,” including “early attain­ment of a thrust capability consistent with manned flights to the Moon.” The paper noted that “Senator Kennedy must make the decision, essentially political in character,” between the two programs. The costs of the politi­cally driven second program were estimated to be $26 billion from 1960 to 1970, compared to the then planned expenditures during that period of $12 to 13 billion. The scientifically oriented but faster-paced program was estimated to cost $19 billion. While this paper was unlikely to have been read by Kennedy or his top advisers, it was a quite insightful statement of the central space issue that would occupy Kennedy once he entered the White House, and its cost estimates were surprisingly close to the actual costs of the program that President Kennedy in 1961 chose to pursue.12

Yet another input into Kennedy’s position on space during the campaign was a briefing paper prepared for the candidate’s “Position and Briefing Book”; this was a resource that traveled with the campaign team as a ready source of speech material and responses to media questions. The briefing paper suggested “eliminating the unrealistic distinctions between civilian and defense space projects” and said that there should be “one coordinated space program with joint civilian and military space uses.” The paper pro­posed that Kennedy should “place one man in charge of all space activities, reporting directly to the President.”13

In the wake of President Kennedy’s pressure, a new name was suggested, apparently to Lyndon Johnson by Senator Kerr and independently to President Kennedy by Wiesner. Wiesner later argued that his suggestion was the one that was decisive, although other accounts suggest that it was Lyndon Johnson who first brought Webb’s name to White House attention. The new candidate was James E. Webb, a businessman and lawyer with prior experience in high-level government posts. During the Truman administra­tion, Webb had been head of the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) and then the number two person under Dean Acheson at the Department of State. Webb also had experience in managing large organizations; he had worked in Oklahoma heading one of Robert Kerr’s companies from 1953 to 1958. After leaving Kerr’s employ, Webb had been active on issues of science and engineering education, in the process becoming well known to many of the leaders of the scientific community, including Wiesner.

According to Wiesner, Kennedy asked him to check whether Johnson agreed that Webb would be a good choice. Johnson did agree, and because he had had such little success with the people he had contacted, asked Wiesner to call Webb. On Friday, January 27, after clearing the contact with the presi­dent, Wiesner telephoned Webb, who was at a luncheon in Oklahoma City, and asked him to be in Washington the following Monday to meet with the vice president to discuss the NASA position.

Webb left Oklahoma City on Friday and spent the weekend in Washington discussing the prospects for space under Kennedy with several former associ­ates in the BOB and the Kennedy White House staff and with others whose views he valued. One of them was Webb’s longtime friend Lloyd Berkner, who was the current chair of the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences, NASA’s primary source of scientific advice; Berkner had himself been approached for the NASA job and had said that he was not interested. By Monday morning, January 30, as he arrived at Johnson’s Capitol office, Webb felt that he had a fairly good idea of what was going on with respect to space and had concluded that “I would not take the job if I could honorably and properly not take it.”

Before meeting with Lyndon Johnson (whom he did not know well), Webb chatted with acting NASA administrator Hugh Dryden, who was there for the meeting, and Frank Pace, who had been Webb’s successor as director of the BOB in the Truman administration. Webb had also known Dryden since the late 1940s. Both Pace and Dryden agreed with Webb that he was not the right man for the job, and Webb asked Pace to convey that view to Johnson. Pace tried to do so, but Johnson was unwilling to listen and in essence threw Pace out of his office. Webb then met with Johnson, who, Webb says, was “very anxious” for Webb to accept the NASA job. Webb made it clear that he would only accept the position on the basis of a direct offer from the president. Arrangements were quickly made for Webb to meet with Kennedy, whom Webb previously had met only once or twice on social occasions.

After lunch with Dryden, Webb met with Kennedy one-on-one in the Oval Office. Kennedy told him that he did not want a technical person for the NASA job, saying that “there are great issues of national and interna­tional policy” related to NASA, and that Webb, with his previous govern­ment experience, was well qualified to address such issues. Webb felt he could not refuse the president’s direct invitation, and so accepted the nomination.

He asked Kennedy to keep Hugh Dryden as deputy administrator, and he also asked the president whether he was being hired to implement a prede­termined policy. Kennedy assured him that this was not the case and that he was looking to Webb to propose the best direction for NASA. Kennedy then escorted Webb from the Oval Office to the office of press secretary Pierre Salinger, who took Webb to the press room to announce his nomination. Only then could Webb call his wife to tell her what had happened; she had already heard the news on the radio.16

Webb’s confirmation hearing before the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, with Robert Kerr in the chair, was held three days later, even before Webb’s formal nomination papers reached Capitol Hill; there were no questions after Webb’s opening statement. The committee voted unanimously to support the nomination; the Senate followed suit on February 9. Lyndon Johnson swore in Webb as NASA’s second administrator on February 14, and Webb set to work with the goal “to end uncertainty, to make unmistakably clear . . . support for manned space flight, to define necessary additions to the budget for Fiscal Year 1962 . . . and to establish personal and official relationships conducive to effective leadership.”17 It was thus clear from the start of his tenure that James Webb had a different, more ambitious, vision for the future of NASA than his predecessor. Getting this vision accepted would not be an easy task. In preparation for Webb’s first meeting with the new director of the BOB, David Bell, on February 16, the BOB staff suggested that “we are pretty much still in the dark as to what position the [Kennedy] administration desires to take in the space field, or whether any general direction has been decided upon.”18

In addition to getting President Kennedy’s agreement to continue Hugh Dryden as deputy administrator, Webb also asked Robert Seamans to stay on as associate administrator. He was happy to learn that Seamans was a Republican, since that would give a bipartisan appearance to the top NASA management team. Webb told Dryden and Seamans that he wanted NASA to be managed jointly by the three of them as a “triad,” hammering out the major decisions together. Webb would handle NASA’s external political and public relations, Dryden would be the primary link to the U. S. and interna­tional science communities, and Seamans would act as NASA’s general man­ager. Seamans describes the arrangement: “Jim was the charismatic leader with long-range vision and a great knack for understanding how policy and politics interacted in Washington. Hugh. . . possessed a quiet, invaluable sense of practicality. . . I managed NASA’s programs while Jim lined up out­side support and Hugh provided sound guidance on our goals.”19

As he took on the NASA job, Webb was fifty-four years old. He was “stocky and voluble, vigorous, noisily garrulous, and with a broad North Carolina accent.” He had a strong physical presence; “though not a tall man, his strong, square head and bullish neck, his sturdy chest, an obsti­nate jaw and narrowed grey-blue eyes lent him a dominant demeanor.” Sorensen notes that “Webb was not. . . a Kennedy type individual. He was inclined to talk at great length, and the President preferred those who were

more precise.” He adds, however, that “I don’t know that the President ever regretted his appointment of Webb.” Wiesner remembers that Kennedy “understood that he had somebody with real ability in Webb” and adds that he never heard Kennedy say anything “snide or negative” about him. One account of Project Apollo, however, comments that “only because Kennedy was indifferent to space did Jim Webb end up in the administrator’s position.” While a number of other men had turned down the job because of NASA’s uncertain future, if they had “known that four months later NASA would become a custodian of the nation’s honor, most of them would have snapped up the job. If the men in the White House had known, they would not have chosen anyone like Jim Webb.” The president’s brother Robert Kennedy agreed with this view. He commented in 1964 that if his brother “had realized how much money would be involved and how impor­tant it [the space program] was going to be, he never would have made Jim Webb the head of it.” Robert Kennedy added that Webb “talked all the time and was rather a blabbermouth. . . The President was very dissatisfied with him.”20

On Monday April 10, 1961, John F. Kennedy threw out the opening day baseball pitch as the Washington Senators played (and lost to) the Chicago White Sox on a chilly and damp afternoon. Baseball was not the only thing on the president’s mind that day. Sometime early in the game, Kennedy’s deputy press secretary Andrew Hatcher told him that the United Press International news service was about to report that the Soviet Union had successfully recovered the first human to orbit the Earth. Kennedy asked Hatcher to check on the report; he had known for several weeks from intel­ligence briefings that such a launch was imminent. The Soviet Union had successfully completed one-orbit missions of a spacecraft carrying a dog as a passenger on March 9 and March 25. It was almost certain that the next step would be a mission with a human on board. Hatcher reported back a few innings later that the news reports “have not materialized” and that “elaborate Russian plans to make this anticipated announcement have been abandoned for today.” Also, said Hatcher, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) “could not confirm or deny the report” of the Soviet launch.1

By the end of the next day, April 11, the CIA did report that the Soviet launch was likely within the next few hours. Press Secretary Pierre Salinger prepared and Kennedy approved a statement for the president to issue once the Soviets had announced a successful mission. The president also had an approach ready to take if the launch were unsuccessful and the cosmonaut died. Famed journalist Edward R. Murrow, whom Kennedy had chosen to head the U. S. Information Agency, in an April 3, 1961, memorandum for McGeorge Bundy had suggested that “in the event of a Soviet manned shot failure we should express, with all the sincerity we can muster, the deep regret and distress of the President and the people of the United States.” Simultaneously, suggested Murrow, one of the Mercury astronauts might “publicly express the regret of his group” and his confidence that “the Soviet astronaut was prepared,” as were the Mercury astronauts, “to give up his life for the advancement of human knowledge.” However, “covertly, the

U. S. might encourage commentators in other countries to deplore the low regard for human life which prompted the Soviets to attempt a manned shot ‘prematurely.’ ”2 As he retired for the evening on April 11, Kennedy told his aides that he did not want to be woken if the Soviet announcement came while he was sleeping.

The expression of regret was not needed. Within a few seconds of the launch of the first human in space at 1:07 a. m. on April 12, Washington time (11:07 a. m. at the launch site in Soviet Central Asia), U. S. intelligence systems knew that it had taken place. They monitored the in-orbit communications during the single-orbit flight and decoded the television transmissions from the spacecraft that showed the cosmonaut moving about.3 It took several hours for Moscow to announce the successful mission; the Soviet dispatch said that “the world’s first space ship Vostok with a man on board has been launched on April 12 in the Soviet Union on a round-the-earth orbit. The first space navigator is Soviet citizen pilot Maj. Yuri Alekseyevich Gagarin.” Science adviser Wiesner called Salinger at 5:30 a. m. with this news. The pres­ident was informed of the Soviet achievement when he woke up around 8:00 a. m.; he authorized Salinger to release the prepared statement, which said: “The achievement by the USSR of orbiting a man and returning him safely to ground is an outstanding technical accomplishment. We congratulate the Soviet scientists and engineers who made this feat possible. The exploration of the solar system is an ambition that we and all mankind share.”4

Later that morning, NASA administrator James Webb and Senator Robert Kerr came to the Oval Office for a previously scheduled meeting with the president to discuss a planned national conference on space to be held in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Webb brought with him a model of a Mercury space­craft. Theodore Sorensen recalls that Kennedy, “who had no real grasp of the enormous technology involved, and remained skeptical about the cost and importance of space missions,” quipped about the “Rube Goldberg – like contraption” that “Webb might have bought it in a toy store. . . that morning.”5

President Kennedy had a previously scheduled news conference on the late afternoon of April 12. Inevitably, the questioning turned to the Soviet space achievement. The first question was relatively friendly, and Kennedy’s response predictable:

Q: Could you give us your views, sir, about the Soviet achievement of putting a man in orbit and what it would mean to our space program, as such?

Kennedy: Well, it is a most impressive scientific accomplishment, and also I think that we, all of us as members of the [human] race, have the greatest admiration for the Russian who participated in this extraordinary feat. I have already sent congratulations to Mr. Khrushchev, and I send congratu­lations to the man who was involved.

I indicated that the task force which we set up on space way back last January, January 12th, indicated that because of the Soviet progress in the field of boosters, where they have been ahead of us, that we expected that they would be first in space, in orbiting a man in space. And, of course, that

has taken place. We are carrying out our program and we expect to-hope to make progress in this area this year ourselves.

Then the questioning became a bit more pointed:

Q: Mr. President, a Member of Congress said today that he was tired of seeing the United States second to Russia in the space field. I suppose he speaks for a lot of others. Now, you have asked Congress for more money to speed up our space program. What is the prospect that we will catch up with Russia and perhaps surpass Russia in this field?

Kennedy: Well, the Soviet Union gained an important advantage by securing these large boosters which were able to put up greater weights, and that advantage is going to be with them for some time. However tired anybody may be, and no one is more tired than I am, it is a fact that it is going to take some time and I think we have to recognize it.

They secured large boosters which have led to their being first in sputnik and led to their first putting their man in space. We are, I hope, going to be able to carry out our efforts with due regard to the problem of the life of the man involved this year. But we are behind and I am sure that they are making a concentrated effort to stay ahead.

We have provided additional emphasis on Saturn; we have provided addi­tional emphasis on Rover; we are attempting to improve other systems which will give us a stronger position—all of which are very expensive, and all of which involve billions of dollars.

So that in answer to your question, as I said in my State of the Union Message, the news will be worse before it is better, and it will be some time before we catch up. We are, I hope, going to go in other areas where we can be first and which will bring perhaps more long-range benefits to mankind. But here we are behind.

Earlier in the press conference, Kennedy had mentioned one of the areas “where we can be first” and which might bring “more long-range benefits to mankind”—desalinization of sea water. He told the press conference, “we have made some exceptional scientific advances in the last decade, and some of them—they are not as spectacular as the man-in-space, or as the first sputnik, but they are important.” For example, added Kennedy, “I have said that I thought that if we could ever competitively, at a cheap rate, get fresh water from salt water, that it would be in the long-range interests of human­ity which would really dwarf any other scientific accomplishments.”6 Over the next few days, as he absorbed the political reaction in the United States and around the world to the Soviet achievement, Kennedy would change his mind; by the evening of April 14, he would say “there’s nothing more important” than finding a way to overcome the Soviet lead in space.

The thirty-page report, classified “Secret,” was titled “Recommendations for Our National Space Program: Changes, Policies, Goals.”10 It called for an additional $686 million for the space program above the increases that President Kennedy had already approved in March; all but $137 million of that amount was for NASA. In particular, “to achieve the goal of landing a man on the moon and returning him to earth in the latter part of the cur­rent decade requires immediate initiation of an accelerated program of space­craft development”; the report called for adding $210.5 million dollars for developing the Apollo spacecraft. At the time in mid-1960 when it was first identified publicly as the project to follow Project Mercury, the objective of

Project Apollo had been to support a three-person crew either in Earth orbit or on a circumlunar flight; now the Project Apollo was to carry Americans to a lunar landing. An additional $112.5 million was requested to allow NASA to accelerate development of the large F-1 liquid-fueled rocket engine and related facilities; $62 million was requested for DOD to develop a large solid propellant rocket motor in parallel to F-1 development. Another $15 million was allocated to DOD for a back up to the Centaur upper rocket stage that NASA was developing. Other increases included an additional $50 million to NASA for communication satellites; $75 million for meteorological satel­lites, $22 million of that amount for NASA and $53 million for the Weather Bureau; and $30 million for nuclear rocket development, $23 million for NASA and $7 million for the Atomic Energy Commission.

The specifics of what programs would receive additional funding was NASA’s primary input into the report; the second section was based on John Rubel’s draft material. That section argued that “projects in space may be undertaken for any one of four principal reasons.” These included “gain­ing scientific knowledge,” “commercial or chiefly civilian value,” “potential military value,” and “national prestige.” The report noted that the United States was not trailing the Soviet Union in the first three categories, but that “the Soviets lead in space spectaculars which bestow great prestige.” The central argument of the report was:

All large scale space projects require the mobilization of resources on a national scale. They require the development and successful application of the most advanced technologies. They call for skillful management, centralized control and unflagging pursuit of long-range goals. Dramatic achievements in space, therefore, symbolize the technological power and organizing capacity of a nation.

It is for reasons such as these that major achievements in space contribute to national prestige. Major successes, such as orbiting a man as the Soviets have just done, lend national prestige even though the scientific, commercial or military value of the undertaking may by ordinary standards be marginal or economically unjustified.

The nation needs to make a positive decision to pursue space projects aimed at enhancing national prestige. Our attainments are a major element in the international competition between the Soviet system and our own. The non­military, non-commercial, non-scientific but “civilian” projects such as lunar and planetary exploration are, in this sense, part of the battle along the fluid front of the Cold War.

In order to undertake such projects, suggested the report, “what was needed were management mechanisms capable of centralized direction and control.” It was “particularly vital” that the United States avoid the “error of spreading ourselves too thin.” The report analyzed the results of the rapid build-up of defense capabilities in the 1950s, suggesting that “we have over­encouraged the development of entrepreneurs and the proliferation of new enterprises.” While the report did not suggest that the United States should “apply Soviet type restrictions and controls,” it said that “our American system can be and must be better utilized in the future.” It added that “we must stress performance, not embellishment. We must insist from the top down, that, as the Russians say, ‘the better is the enemy of the good.’ ”

The final section of the report spelled out the specific new space goals that were being recommended. They included the following:

• “Manned Lunar Exploration”: Webb and McNamara recommended “that our National Space Plan include the objective of manned lunar exploration before the end of this decade. . . The orbiting of machines is not the same as the orbiting or landing of a man. It is man, not merely machines, that captures the imagination of the world.” The report noted that there was no information about Soviet plans for a similar program, but suggested “even if the Soviets get there first, as they may, and as some think they will, it is better for us to get there second than not at all.”

• “Worldwide Operational Satellite Communication Capability”: Webb and McNamara noted that while “advances in technology will make it pos­sible to set up an operational satellite-based telecommunications capability within a few years,” it was “too early to be sure what kind of capability we should create.” Even so, they were “confident that an operational satel­lite capability can have far reaching applications and implications for the U. S.”

• “Worldwide Operational Satellite Weather Prediction System”: Such a sys­tem, Webb and McNamara suggested, “would be of great value to people in every country, to public and private interests in the U. S., and to our military forces.”

• “Scientific Investigation”: Webb and McNamara suggested that it was “essential that the national space sciences program be broad and compre­hensive both in content and in participation by the scientific community of the world.”

• “Large Scale Boosters for Potential Military Use”: Webb and McNamara noted that while “the military potential and implications” of space tech­nology were “largely unknown. . . without the capacity to place large pay­loads reliably into orbit, our nation will not be able to exploit whatever military potential unfolds in space.”

The Webb-McNamara report was necessarily vague with respect to whether the Soviet Union was already embarked on a lunar landing program. It noted that while the United States was “uncertain of Soviet intentions, plans, or status,” the Soviet Union had announced a lunar landing as a “major objec­tive of their program” and that the Soviet Union “may have begun to plan for such an effort years ago” and “may have undertaken important first steps which we have not begun.” The memorandum suggested that Soviet suc­cesses in space were the result of “long-range planning” and that the slow pace and disappointments in the U. S. space effort “are symptoms of the lack of adequate national planning and guidance for the long pull.” It concluded that “even if the Soviets get there [to the Moon] first. . . it is better for us to get there second than not at all. . . If we fail to accept this challenge it may be interpreted as a lack of national vigor and capacity to respond.” These words were certain to resonate with President Kennedy.

Beginning in late June 1962, the BOB began a review that was intended to lay out in a consistent format the five-year space programs of the Department of Defense, NASA, the Atomic Energy Commission, and, although it could not be acknowledged at the time, the National Reconnaissance Office, the organization developing and operating U. S. reconnaissance satellites, the very existence of which was highly classified. This review was in response to President Kennedy’s specific request “for a consolidated presentation of the space programs and estimates of all agencies” and “that 1964 estimates for space programs be given an especially critical review.”

According to Willis Shapley of the BOB, who was in charge of the review, one question that prompted the review was a White House “reeval­uation of whether the Apollo program should really proceed.” It is not clear whether it was the president himself who was raising this question; given his interest just a few months later to push for an earlier date for the first lunar landing attempt, this seems unlikely. More probable was that his budget, technology, and policy advisers, who were in general more skeptical of the value of Apollo than was the president, were making sure that Kennedy recognized the full implications of his space commitment. In addition, there were short-term concerns in mid-1962 about a possible recession, talk of a temporary tax cut, and a desire to avoid an unbalanced federal budget; this meant that Kennedy was paying particular attention to controlling rapid increases in spending in discretionary areas such as space and defense.32

By August 15, the BOB had compiled some 250 “data sheets,” one for each of the principal space projects of the government. These were put into two loose-leaf binders and, because intelligence satellite programs were included, classified at such a high level that only relatively few people inside the gov­ernment were cleared to possess the binders. Shapley recalls that he was “not too proud” of the review, “because it was really pretty bureaucratic.”

The BOB did prepare a late August “draft staff report” based on the review. The report noted that “the central decision to be confirmed or modified is whether the manned lunar landing program should proceed at an optimum pace as contemplated in present NASA plans, or whether a deci­sion should be made to stretch out the program to avoid as great an increase in expenditures in 1964 and 1965.” The report examined the short-term budget impacts of slipping the target date for the first landing attempt until late 1968. It concluded that “under all feasible alternatives, barring a com­plete reversal of the MLL [manned lunar landing] and other augmented space program decisions of May 1961 . . . substantial increases in expendi­tures appear unavoidable in 1964 and 1965.” The staff report mentioned that this situation had been pointed out as the decision to accelerate the space program was being made a year earlier; the BOB had noted that the decision “was a long term commitment involving increasing expenditures for a period of several years.” At the end of the section of its report dealing with NASA, the BOB recommended a course of action that recognized “that nei­ther the total fiscal situation nor the space program alternatives and implica­tions are clear enough now to permit a definite decision on the program and budgetary guidance to be given to NASA.” The BOB recommended that “the issue should remain open until the final 1964 budget decision period in November or early December.”33

As the BOB was finishing its review, James Webb was once again reminded of President Kennedy’s concern about the rising costs of the NASA program. On August 15 Kennedy sent a brief memorandum to Webb, asking him about press reports that the cost of the new Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston had increased from $60 million to $123 million. Kennedy asked: “Is this correct? Who are the architects and the builders and under whose control is the Space Center building to be put up?” Webb replied on August 18, saying that the costs Kennedy was quot­ing were those in a statement by Senator William Proxmire (D-WI), who was questioning “the prudence with which the space program is being administered” and implying that “the increase in cost. . . resulted from a lack of budget discipline.” Webb said that “the figures quoted are substan­tially correct; the implications are not,” and provided a lengthy explanation of the reason for the higher cost figure. This explanation did not satisfy President Kennedy. In a note to budget director Bell, the president said that it seemed to him that the cost of the new center was “excessive,” and the cost increase “does raise the question of funding of the entire program. This needs the most careful continuing scrutiny.” Kennedy asked Bell for his “suggestions on the recent appropriations for this space program— what programs are essential and desirable and how we can make them meet the cost estimates more precisely.” He added: “This program has so much public support that unless there is some restraint there is a possibility of wasting some money.”34 This tension between Kennedy’s desire to be first in space and his concern over the very high costs of Apollo was to run throughout 1962 and 1963.

One issue as Kennedy considered resurrecting a cooperative proposal was whether the U. S.-USSR race to the Moon was real. The White House in 1963 in fact did not know whether there was an ongoing Soviet effort to send people to the Moon. A December 1962 National Intelligence Estimate regarding the Soviet space program had observed: “Our evidence as to the future course of the Soviet space program is very limited. Our estimates are therefore based largely on extrapolation from past Soviet space activi­ties and on judgments as to likely advances in Soviet technology.” The estimate went on to say that “the top Soviet leaders have not committed themselves publicly to competition with the US in achieving a manned lunar landing, and it is highly unlikely that they will do so. . . On the basis of present evidence, we cannot say definitely at this time that the Soviets aim to achieve a manned lunar landing ahead of or in close competition with the US, but we believe that the chances are better than even that this is a Soviet objective.”13

It seems as if the president was not aware of this intelligence estimate. He asked CIA director John McCone on April 29, 1963, “Do we have very much information, and if so, what does it indicate, on the Soviet effort in space?” Kennedy that day had read an article in The Christian Science Monitor sug­gesting that there was an increased Soviet effort in space and asked McCone “What is our view on it?”14

A formal response to Kennedy’s question did not come for several months. In a CIA analysis dated October 1, 1963, and titled “A Brief Look at the Soviet Space Program,” the agency gave an even less precise estimate of Soviet capabilities and intentions than it had the prior December, saying that the Soviet space plans

unquestionably include manned lunar landings. . . but there is no evidence that the program is proceeding on a crash basis. . . It is believed that the Soviets intend to compete vigorously in the early exploration of the moon and that this effort will include manned flights, although probably not early manned landings.

It is not yet possible to settle with assurance whether the Soviets are engaged in a manned lunar landing program competitive with the United States. Definitive indications of the Soviets being in such a race have not been found, but could be submerged to such an extent that they might exist with­out being so identified. In December 1962, it was estimated that there was a better than even chance that the Soviets had a competitive manned lunar landing program though no firm conclusion could be reached. A later review of pertinent material produced essentially the same judgment. At present there is still no firm evidence of the existence of such a program, but because of the passage of time, it is estimated that a competitive program aimed at the 1968-1970 time period is somewhat less likely than before. Though the flight testing of a new larger booster and a new manned capsule have been predicted, no firm evidence of their early introduction has as yet been noted.15

The uncertainty in the United States at this time about the exact character of a Soviet program to send men to the moon is in retrospect understand­able, since the situation in the Soviet Union was both complex and confus­ing. While design work on a large booster able to carry out a manned lunar mission was already underway, those developments were not yet known to U. S. intelligence services. There was a debate within the Soviet space system over both the wisdom of a lunar mission and the assignment of responsibil­ity for such a mission, should it be initiated. Final Soviet approval of a lunar landing mission did not come until 1964.16