Category Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?

India has designed an Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) to provide itself and neighbouring countries with the position navigation and timing (PNT) service. This project has been approved by the government and may become operational by 2014. Initially, the system will have seven satellites, and the number will later go up to 11 [8]. It would be an independent seven satellite constellation built and operated by India with indigenous capability—three in GSO and four in non-GSO (inclined 29° with equatorial plane) [9]. India was expected to start launching satellites by end of 2011 with a frequency of one satellite every six months; however, it appears that some delay in happening. The IRNSS would provide an absolute position accuracy of approximately 20 m throughout India and within a 2,000-km region around it.[222]

India is developing the GPS-aided geo augmented navigation (GAGAN) system. GAGAN will be interoperable with GPS and provide greater reliability than GPS alone. GAGAN has been designed primarily for civil aviation over India and is expected to be completed in 2013. GAGAN would especially be useful in aircraft landing where a 6-m accuracy is desirable.[223] GPS services have some limitations in this regard which forced India to develop GAGAN. The IRNSS is expected to cater for the presence of GAGAN. It would be designed to maintain interoperability between GAGAN and other regional augmentations to the GPS for global navigation [9].

India had some setbacks because of the failure to launch the GSAT-4 satellite. The first GAGAN transmitter was integrated into the GSAT-4, which was part of the launch mission that failed on April 15, 2010.[224] Subsequently, the first GAGAN navigation payload was launched on May 21, 2011, on board the GSAT – 8 communications satellite. With this satellite in position now, the process of certification has begun for India’s Satellite-Based Augmentation System (SBAS) and is expected to get over by June 2013.[225]

Like many other states, India is also using GPS for various operations. India had taken a keen interest in the Galileo programme too. However, after an initial commitment for investing in the programme, India appears to have dissociated itself. The EU wanted to renegotiate with India in 2007,34 but nothing significant appears

to have emerged from the deliberations. On the other hand, India’s engagement with GLONASS appears to be progressing well.

Under various pacts signed in December 2004, and subsequently, India and Russia have agreed to closely cooperate in the development of new-generation GLONASS-K navigation satellites and launch them from the Indian space centre to speed up the completion of the GLONASS system amid growing competition.[226] On Feb 26, 2011, the first GLONASS-K satellite was launched by Russia but not with India’s help. India has its own pressing needs to launch its satellites, and hence it looks unlikely that any future GLONASS satellites would be launched by India.

India and Russia also signed an agreement (Dec 2010) to share high-precision signals from the GLONASS for defence as well as civilian use. As per the agreement, Russia will provide access to the GLONASS high-precision navigation signals to India. In 2010, India has also signed deal to set up a joint venture for providing navigation and information services on the GLONASS platform.[227] During Indian prime minister’s Dec 2011 Russia visit, both the sides have expressed mutual interest in the use of Russia’s global satellite navigation system GLONASS and have also expressed the intentions to promote cooperation in this area, including joint production of satellite navigation equipment and services to civilian users.[228]

However, overall there is a less amount of clarity with regard to how India intends to benefit from both IRNSS and GLONASS when both the systems will be available at the same time and capable of doing almost the same job.

Today, the contemporary Asia’s security environment is essentially different from that of the Cold War era when Asia was considered basically a mediocre security region dominated by the influence of either the US or the erstwhile Soviet Union. In twenty-first century Asia has emerged as a hub for various global activities. The dynamics of security in Asia is more dependent on the interaction of interests and priorities of states in the region than getting dominated by the interests of major powers [3]. Asia is encountering various security challenges which fall in realm of both military and non-military threats. The direction of any regional conflict and the process of conflict resolution are having their moorings largely in regional and local dynamics. Simultaneously, most extra-regional actors are found attempting to influence the conflicts in Asia. In various cases such powers are found unable to manage the conflict but at the same time are found continuing with their efforts and not ready to surrender their interests. Because of their bilateral and multilateral relationships with some Asian states, their position to influence the conflict and dependence of few Asian states on their military strengths is not allowing their influence to wither. Also, their interests in Asian affairs to support the sustenance and growth of defence industry back home should not be disregarded. However, over last few years with overall economic growth witnessed by Asia and with the rising power status of few states in Asia their relevance in conflict resolution is getting limited. Also, in certain cases their manipulative behavior to suit their interests is becoming too obvious, making Asian states to distance themselves.

The impact of globalisation on Asia’s security calculus has been noteworthy. The nature of this impact is complex. Few parts in the region have acquired immense benefits from this process and economic development has lessened the reasons for conflict. It has been observed that the interdependence enforced by globalisation compels states to cooperate with each other. Hence, globalisation has potential to bring in the shift in the balance of power. However, it is important to note that the conflicts in the region are for varying reasons from territory to governance. Also, there are certain interstate and intrastate conflicts. Communal violence and terrorism are the major threats the region is encountering for the last few years. The region also suffers widespread environmental degradation and resource scarcity. Other security challenges from human security, food security to energy security are dominating the existing security concerns. Hence, only economic prosperity is not the solution for conflict resolution in Asia.

Security dynamics of the region is significantly influenced by the nuclear realities. Existing nuclear powers like China, Israel, India, and Pakistan; a dwarf nuclear power like North Korea; a prospective nuclear power like Iran; and a state hinted to be interested to become a nuclear power like Myanmar (Burma) reside in Asia. Also, Japan is one country in the region probably with a ‘wild card’ credentials in nuclear weapons arena. Nuclear deterrence dictates the security scenario of certain parts in the region. Also, presence or likely presence of nuclear weapons with certain states in the region is dominating the global security discourse.

Asia has witnessed some of the significant revolutions of the twenty-first century. Such revolutions have occurred, owing to various reasons—autocratic leadership, military regimes, corruption, patronage, nepotism, etc. The Jasmine Revolution during 2010-2011 started outside Asia in Tunisia but ended up playing a ‘motivating’ role in altering the political landscape of West Asia (Middle East). A major upheaval beginning in Egypt on January 25, 2011 successfully uprooted the government in power for more than 30 years. The cries for democracy become dominant in the region after the uprising in Egypt. Presently, the entire region is witnessing the agitations against mostly the autocratic regimes in the power. Part of the region is witnessing leadership vacuum, and the lack of alternative political structures is a major cause of concern. Few military leaderships of the region had shown considerable amount of restrain during the phase of uprising. However, it cannot be guaranteed that few states in the near future would not witness the re­emergence of military rule.

The major security worry of Asia attracting global attention is the Israel – Palestine conflict. This conflict could be traced back to many years in the history. This essentially a Zionist versus Arab conflict is about the claims to the area called Palestine by two parties, the Palestinians and Israel. This is more of a unique conflict which could be viewed through the prisms of interstate or intrastate conflict. There are non-state actors involved in the conflict, and various acts carried out during the conflict have been viewed as acts of terrorism.

Part of Asia has been under intense global scrutiny post the September 11, 2001 attack on the might of the sole superpower in the world. Parts of West Asia and South Asia have been at the centre of the US global war on terror. Osama bin Laden, the

most wanted fugitive of the century, was found and killed in South Asia. Asia has witnessed/is witnessing one of the major military campaigns in the recent history. The 2001 and 2003 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are (were) being fought by the extra-regional powers, mainly by invading these countries. Almost one decade has gone by since the beginning of these military campaigns, but the security situation of this region has only shown only marginal improvements. The rise of the Taliban has not remained restricted to Afghanistan alone, and Pakistan also has a Taliban operative from their soil. These forces are found fighting intense and bloody battles.

India has fought four wars since its independence in 1947. The most recent war fought by India was the Kargil conflict (May to July 1999)—it was a full – scale war. Actually, it was the battle fought to stall the infiltration of militants and Pakistani soldiers acting as militias on the Indian side of the line of control (LOC-a de facto border in India and Pakistan in the Jammu and Kashmir region). Unresolved border disputes have been the main reason for the continuation of tension between India-Pakistan and India-China. There are few other issues of differences involved amongst these states like unresolved water dispute, etc. It is important to remember that all these three powers are nuclear powers. Both India and Pakistan are found to be the victims of terrorism. However, unfortunately, Pakistan itself is using terrorism as a covert state policy to wedge a war against India.

Korean peninsula is another region of active conflict volcano. One of the major conflicts fought during the early years of the Cold War was the 1950-1953 war which divided North and South Korea near the 38th parallel. This war actually ended with an armistice rather than any official formal peace treaty agreement. For many years, a number of skirmishes are happening; however, in recent past, acts of provocation against South Korea have increased significantly. Both the Koreas were and are supported by external powers. Unfortunately, while helping the process of conflict management and conflict resolution, these powers are found using this opportunity to gain geostrategic advantage for themselves too. No solution to the problem appears to be in site.

In parts of East Asia, Southeast Asia and South China Sea region, certain old disputes are continuing. A century-old border dispute between the Cambodian – Thai people has resurfaced again since June 2008. Indonesia is fighting terrorism while the US forces are involved in assisting Philippines to tackle insurgency and terrorism. China, Vietnam and few other states are yet to resolve their disputes over a number of small islets and reefs in the South China Sea. China is witnessing unrest in the region dominated by the Uighur Muslims and also in part of Tibet Autonomous Region. The major flashpoint in the region could be the issue of Taiwan. Currently, this issue is in the semi-dormant state. This one issue has potential to affect the Sino-US security dynamics totally.

Asian states are also facing various nontraditional security challenges. Cyber warfare is one area making states in the region more responsive. Certain parts of Asia are facing ever-increasing threats from transnational crime, money laundering, fake currency business and drug trafficking. Natural disasters associated with the issues related to climate change, and public health epidemics have potential to challenge the security apparatus of the states.

For centuries many Asian states have followed a tradition of non-interventionist and non-interfering powers. The present threat matrix of Asia could alter its security environment over the next few decades. The possibility of any full-scale war amongst the powers within the region is unlikely. However, maintaining and increasing the status of military preparedness by states would remain an important instrument of policy. To maintain regional stability, militaries will play an important role, and hence, their growing importance is eminent. The dependence of these militaries on technologies is obvious.

The purpose behind analysing the security milieu over Asia over here is not to get into the micro details of Asia’s security challenges but just to undertake delineation in order to contextualise the relevance of militarisation and weaponisation of space. This becomes important mainly because the European discourse of security including space security at times takes a very idealistic position without appreciating the differences between the European and Asian security milieu. Any form of military expansion and participation in arms race by a state is essentially its response to the security environment and the same could be true in respect of space. Hence, it is essential to appreciate the security connotations of the region before contextualising space in the military realm.

The states in the region are probably looking at space at two levels: one, as an instrument for intelligence collection and an aid in communication and navigation and two, a tool for political bargain brinkmanship. The challenges for Asian states particularly in geopolitical and geo-economic theatres are different than many other regions of the world. The overall military investments made by states in Asia are based on their own threat perceptions. It is important to appreciate that space assets are viewed (also) as an instrument to enhance the military potential of a state. Space technology is all pervasive, and its dual-use nature makes it more attractive for the militaries. This technology has potential to challenge the existing notion of deterrence. Hence, investment in space for military should not be viewed with a narrow prism only as additional equipment for the armed forces, but it has a potential to bring in a modern security paradigm. Space weaponisation could also lead to the space arms race. Asian ‘military’ investments in space need to be looked at the backdrop of various above discussed realities.

Only three Asian states (Japan-China-India) have so far attempted deep space missions, and they have been discussed in detail elsewhere in this book. All these states have a definitive roadmap regarding their future Moon missions. They are preparing themselves for robotic and human landings on Moon/Mars. The USA and Russia are associating themselves with the deep space mission programmes of these states. However, the present approach of these states indicates that they are likely to pursue mostly an independent path for their Moon programme but are keen to undertake collaborative programmes for Mars missions.

The interests of these states regarding Moon range from pursuit of scientific activities, exploration of resources to establishment of human colonies. Moon missions offer them opportunities to test various technologies which could have strategic, technological and commercial relevance. Any significant success in the field of deep space could even play some role (in whatever limited form it may be) in changing the present unipolar world into one with multiple power centres.

South Korea also has plans to land a probe on Moon by 2025. However, the present scale of growth of their space programme does not offer much of confidence. By 2030, China may succeed in putting human on the Moon. Japan has plans of developing a Moon base for further planetary exploration missions. Any mission failures in this arena during next two decades could bring a significant technological setback to these states.

Space discipline has attracted the attention of many for more than six decades. I first got allured to space science and astronomy as a student of Physics. Subsequently, as a part of my profession as an aviation meteorologist over a decade and half, I was the user of space technologies. For a decade or so, while working in a policy think tank on international relations and security issues, I am trying to juxtapose the theme of strategic technologies on a security domain. This book is an attempt to contextualise these efforts to develop an explicit idea.

This book attempts to describe the current state of space programmes of various Asian states. It provides a summary of their programmes and highlights their major contributions. This work also deliberates about the strategic significance of various Asian space programmes. It is an attempt to find a connection between technology, interests, strategic relevance and power with regard to Asia’s space agenda.

I owe my gratitude to the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and my previous and present Directors General Mr N S Sisodia and Dr Arvind Gupta for encouraging me to undertake research on this subject. The IDSA library, a large storehouse of information I have ever came across, made my job simpler. I would like to thank particularly Mr Pitambar Datt and Mr Mukesh Kumar Jha for all the assistance provided to me in obtaining various material and data. Over the years, I have been interacting with various policy makers and academicians both within and outside India. I am grateful to them for many useful discussions.

Lastly, my gratitude to my parents and wife Pramada and son Nipun for their support. The contents of this manuscript reflect my own personal views.

South Asia is the region of immense richness and diversity with great cultural heritage. Over centuries, it had developed trade and cultural links with the rest of the world. In the twentieth century, the region was destabilised by the cold war machinations, and in the twenty-first century, the region is facing the second Afghan War. The region is famous because of the India-Pakistan rivalry, and the US dilemma is taking Pakistan’s help to fight the global war against terrorism. In this region, mainly affected by boundary wars and internal conflicts, India is found emerging as an island of prosperity. India is the only spacefaring nation from this region. This chapter and next chapter discuss the space agendas of two important states within the region, namely, Pakistan and India.

Investments in space technologies for states like Pakistan need to be viewed at the backdrop of strategic realities of the region. Military parity with India has been an obsession of many Pakistani rulers in the past. Because of its strategic intimacy with global powers like the US and China, to an extent, Pakistan has succeeded in procuring some of state-of-the-art technologies in military hardware to match India. Presently, Pakistan has, to a certain degree, achieved missile prowess and, most importantly, a nuclear weapon possessor status. Such achievements were possible only because it could, either overtly or covertly, borrow these technologies from other states. But, at the same time, the strategic vision shown by the Pakistani leadership for ‘managing’ these technologies should be commended.

Based on current trends in acquisition of new weapon technologies by Pakistan, it could be safely concluded that it is investing in the revolution in military affairs (RMA). Interestingly, Pakistan has made limited progress in space technology field. Compared to India’s space programme, Pakistan’s space programme seems diminutive. In the present RMA era, when space is regarded as the fourth dimension of warfare, what is the Pakistan’s standing in the field of space technologies and other related technologies? This chapter attempts to address these questions. It

This chapter is an updated version (with few additions) of Ajey Lele, Pakistan’s Space Capabilities, Air Power, New Delhi, Spring 2005, pp. 129-148.

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7_4, © Springer India 2013

is argued that in near future Pakistan may not go all out for the development of indigenous space technologies and may depend more on joint collaborations with countries like China and also on commercially available satellite-derived products.

Pakistan has unique security considerations. It is a state which appears to be always under the perpetual threat of conflict in some form or other. The state appears to have developed somewhat lopsided security policies. It continues to suffer from terrorism within but at the same is using terrorism as tool (covertly) to address differences with its both western and eastern neighbours. Post 9/11, the most wanted global fugitive Osama bin Laden was found staying in this country for many years, and finally, the US had to launch a secret mission on Pakistani soil to eliminate him (without taking the Pakistani government into confidence). There are concerns at global levels about the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. In spite of threat from terrorism within and knowing fully well that its adversary India has no territorial ambitions, still Pakistan is making significant investments in its conventional security infrastructure and also covertly developing asymmetric strategies. Because of such peculiar security milieu, this chapter attempts of undertake the analysis of Pakistan’s space programme bit differently than the treatment given in other chapters to understand the space discourse of other states within the region. This chapter attempts to understand the Pakistan’s space investments mainly at the backdrop of the defence connotations of such investments.

Southeast Asia a humid tropical region is located around the equator and also has various geographic contrasts too. Since the sixteenth century, the region has been under European and Japanese colonisation for many decades. Various countries in the region regained their independent existence approximately four to five decades ago. The region, in general, has been characterised by high economic growth and closer regional integration.

In space arena, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam have made important investments. They are mainly focusing towards the communica­tions, control of resources and educational aspects of space technologies. Varying degrees of investments are being made by these and few other states within the region mainly depending on their science and technology support and economic situation. Some of them are just in the process of starting their space programmes, while some have been making investments for long. Various states in the region are fully aware that they being the late starters they should attempt to reinvent the wheel but derive benefits from the already developed technologies. They are found using various commercially available space applications and also making an attempt to obtain dedicated satellites services for themselves by launching their own satellites with the help of other spacefaring nations. States like the USA are found helping many in the region. It has already launched satellites for Vietnam and has sealed deals with Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines backed by loan guarantees. China has promised to build and launch a communications satellite for Laos. India has helped Indonesia to launch their satellite.

Various states in the region are found making both bilateral and multilateral agreements in the space arena. Indonesia has signed the APSCO[135] (Asia-Pacific

Space Cooperation Organization) convention. States like Malaysia and the Philippines also have interest in this organisation. Following sections of this chapter offer the present status of the space programmes of the few important states within the region.

The third UN conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was held in 1999. During this conference, it was asserted that ‘there is a need to improve the efficiency and security of transport, search and rescue, geodesy and other activities by promoting the enhancement of, universal access to and compatibility of, space-based navigation and positioning systems’. As a reac­tion to this, in 2001 the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) established the Action Team on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) under the chairmanship of Italy and the USA. India, China, Japan and Malaysia were the action member states in this team (38 member states and 15 intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations).[229] Subsequently, the UN

along with the USA organised an international meeting on the use and applications of global navigation satellites in Vienna in December 2004. Here, West Asian states like Egypt, Syria and Turkey were also present. The meeting addressed various issues relating to the institutional framework with relating to service providers and made recommendations regarding specific global navigation satellite systems applications. The chief recommendation was for the creation of an international committee on global navigation satellite systems (ICG).[230] This committee was formed in Vienna in December 2005, and its members work on voluntary basis as part of an informal body for the purpose of promoting and cooperating on matters of mutual interest related to civil satellite-based navigation and value-added services, as well as compatibility and interoperability among the GNSS systems, while increasing their use to support sustainable development, particularly in developing countries.[231] Various meetings of ICG have been held till date—India hosted the second meeting (2007). The navigational systems of India, China and Japan are part of these arrangements. Asian states are playing their role to enhance compatibility and interoperability among current and future system providers.[232]

For more than five decades, space technologies are being used for the pur­poses of earth observation, remote sensing, space photography, surveillance and reconnaissance, navigation, communication, broadcasting, meteorology, education, astronomy and scientific experimentation. Such usage falls in the realm of ‘civilian uses of space technologies’. All such activities have become possible because of the rapid growth in the technology. The nature of data collected in twenty-first century is far more accurate than the earlier period because of the progress made in satellite resolution and contrast-matching technologies. Also, improvements in various sensor technologies have taken place over the last few years. This more accurate data availability has widened the client base. The dual-use nature of these technologies is allowing nation-states to consume them for military purposes too.

Along with the rocket science and sensor technologies, the simultaneous progress made in information technologies and information sciences has significantly helped the satellites to improve their performance. Along with this, the process of data management and interpretation has improved largely, owing to the developments in information technology. With the advent in revolution in military affairs (RMA), the importance of technologies has increased multifold for the militaries. Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence, Reconnaissance, Surveil­lance (C4ISR) systems have become central to various armed forces and have brought in various doctrinal changes. The C4ISR strategies and policies are heavily technology dependent. Such command and control systems operate on various transformative principles essentially focusing on the use of space technology for communication services and military information networking and for purposes of reconnaissance and intelligence gathering.

Major technology development programmes for various nation-states would mostly have a military DNA, and the same should be the case with space programmes. However, normally it has been observed that like nuclear weapons pro­gramme, the (military) space programmes are also developed typically away from public eye. In recent years, few states are found openly discussing about the military utility of the space assets. In Asian context, various states are dependent on the major powers outside the region for technology assistance. Most of them are found abiding by various international regimes in regard to technology acquisition and transfer. They are found cooperating with the major powers in respect to the international arms control or disarmament provisions. In regard to the strategic utilisation of the space assets, various non-spacefaring states from Asia are found noncommittal. They fully understand the importance of space utilisation for influencing the warfare on earth but, because of their technological and geopolitical limitations, are not found taking any hard positions. Also, since the space security domain is still in an embryonic stage, these states are probably reluctant to take any firm positions. By doing this, they are also keeping their potential enemies guessing.

South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam are found investing in satellite resources for the purposes of communication services, television broadcasting, resource management and education. Other small states in the region also have more or less similar interests. All these states are depending on spacefaring nations to help them to provide technological assistance to manufacture satellites and also to launch them. Some of them are not making any significant investments in satellite technology but probably are directly depending on outside agencies for supply of information based on various satellite-derived products. Under such circumstances, a significant reliance of these powers on space inputs for the purposes of military use looks distant. They could receive the inputs which are openly available in the market for the military purposes. Their dependence on their own assets could be minimal mainly because their systems have been manufactured by outside powers for specific civilian purposes. They could exploit the duel-use nature of this technology like others. The threat index to these regions and investments made by them into state-of-art military hardware which is mostly dependent on satellite technology indicates that particularly states like South Korea and Pakistan must be feeling the pinch of non-availably of indigenous space architecture to operate such systems to their fullest potential.

The overall gamut of space technology could be viewed under two categories, one, technologies like communication or imaging technologies and two, technologies required for space experimentation, planetary research, etc. The technology output is visible and quantifiable in regard to China-Japan-India, but as for other states in the region, research is an evolving process and would require special efforts to convince their politicians and citizens for sustained monitory investments.

For China and India, budgetary constraints have not been an issue for the last couple of years. The success of Chinese space programme in various fields during the last two decades clearly demonstrates the state support. China’s space budget remains relatively opaque. Various estimates put China’s spending around US$2 billion to 3 billion. Out of this, significant amount is spent on ambitious

space missions like manned space programme, lunar mission and space station. The case is reversed in the case of India. The pattern of spending is more on projects of socioeconomic relevance. At present, the value of ISRO’s overall assets is approximately US$25 billion [12]. Over a period of last 10 years, ISRO’s budget has shown steady increase and has almost doubled from 1999 to 2009. It is important to note that the ISRO spends more than 85% of its US$1 billion budget on development-related missions and only remaining 10-15% on advanced research and development, and on missions like Moon mission.

Japan’s space programme never started under any unified body. Almost for three decades, many of the organisations responsible for the developments in space arena were reporting to different ministries in the Japanese government. Naturally, for overall growth of the programme, such diverse reporting channels and different budgeting allocations were hazardous. The period 1996-2003 witnessed a major setback to Japan’s space programme because of series of failures. This had adverse impact on budgetary allotment too.

Presently, Japan also spends aroundUS$2.5 billion on space ambitions. However, in the past, their space programme witnessed some budget cuts. Now, after the establishment of a unified body called Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) in October 2003, Japan’s space programme has stabilised. They have made significant investments in ISS too. South Korea spends around US$250 million, Iran around US$100 million per year and Pakistan US$10 million. Most of the other Asian states being the beginners in this field, no authentic information about their budgetary provisions are available.

The overall trend indicates that states would continue to provide necessary economic support for their space programmes and their investments are going to increase multifold in coming years. The big three from Asia have a very clear – cut roadmap for the next two decades, and no extravagant budgetary requirements are being envisaged. Their space agencies have already started earning revenue, and their space industry is expected to grow in years to come. Malaysian and South Korean ambitions are not being matched on ground with respect to their accomplishments. Therefore, political leadership in these states may not provide the requisite support for highly ambitious and long-term projects. Apart from its nuclear and missile ambitions, Iran wants to grow as a technologically advanced country, and hence, it will continue supporting its space programme. Uncertainties can take the form of significant unmanageable economic crises. Under such circumstances, states would mainly cap funding of ambitious programmes like colonisation of Moon and human space flights, but other programmes of socioeconomic importance will continue to grow or at least status quo would be maintained.

This book attempts to explore the character and counters of the investments made by various Asian states in the space arena. It is an attempt towards understanding the geopolitical and geostrategic relevance of space technologies for the Asian states. It is also an attempt to understand the nature of contest amongst the Asian states in this regard.

Today, in Asia, China, Japan and India appear to be investing in space tech­nologies with similar social and scientific but divergent military goals. Few other states in the region like Israel, South Korea and Malaysia are also developing their space agenda. On the other hand, states like Iran and North Korea are using space launches as a demonstrative tool to achieve strategic objectives. Various states within the region are found cooperating as well as competing with each other in this field. Both at global and region level, nothing could be said with certitude in regard to the space becoming future battlefield in near future. No definitive trends of immediate confrontations in space are visible in this regard; however, there are certain indications of suggestive propensity.

Over the years, officials from various Asian states have denied the existence of any rivalry amongst them in space field though many analysts have expressed an opinion that an escalating space race is taking place amongst the major Asian states. Fears have also been expressed in regard to space race turning into arms race. Hence, it is very important to debate about the existence and/or prospect of space race in the region. Is Asian space race for real or it is a subject more of an academic debate? Are there inconsistencies between the broad world view suggestive of the existence of Asian Space Race and actual ground realities? This book is about understanding the substructure of background thought upon which the lines of arguments are normally based in this regard. It attempts to recognise the presence or absence of the ‘space race’ in the Asian context. The book is not a theoretical, technical or technological discussion of the subject. It follows more a path of social science analysis with a scientific objectivity bias.

This work attempts to discuss the investments in space technologies made by some Asian states towards accomplishing their socioeconomic mandate. Some of these states are found increasing their footprint in commercial sector and are also

A. Lele, Asian Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?, DOI 10.1007/978-81-322-0733-7_1, 3

© Springer India 2013

factoring these technologies in their security calculus. Appreciating the usage of space technologies for the purposes of civilian use alone in Asian context is not the core mandate for this book. This book is written with a predisposition to comprehend the strategic significance of space technologies for the Asian states. However, the inherent dual use capability of the space technologies does not allow a ‘strict’ analysis only from a strategic perspective. In view of this, there is a need to read between the lines to appreciate the strategic purpose behind the investments made by these states.

No stringent research methodology has been used for this work. The research scope and methods are adjusted to bring out the ‘character’ of the subject under discussion. The book comprises several interrelated layers of research. Attempt has been made to avoid the repetition of information. However, in certain places, some details could be found repeated in order to emphasise and elicit the exact relevance of the subject under discussion. The book is overwhelmingly based on a study of documents from printed and electronic records with a minor usage of interviews.

The book has four sections. The first section is introductory in nature. It attempts to rationalise and explain the concept of Asia, tries to understand the relevance of technology for Asia, explains the notion of space power and highlights the significance of Asian investments in the field of science and technology, elucidates the Asian response to space age and also identifies key Asian space players.

Second section is about space narratives. Usually, narratives are offered to present an account of a sequence of events. However, it is not necessary that all narratives are full-length stories. One of the fundamental aims of narrative is to present the significant facts of a particular event or an ongoing activity. In some sense, narrative is a history, and obviously like any other historical recitation, it would/could be told differently by different set of people. From individual to state and from religion to society, different narratives have been found told by different set of people mostly based on their perceptions and largely told for the purpose of self-representation.

Years after the launch of first satellite Sputnik (1957), it has been realised that space exploration assumes a critical role in defining the growth, success and at times superiority of the state. Significant achievements in this arena have impacted the feeling of nationalism. Naturally, the narratives of successes (and failures too) in space field in literature could have resulted based on certain prejudices. In some cases, it could be self-congratulatory and in some cases, the treatment could be iniquitous.

The journey in space undertaken by few states so far and the quest of others to join the select group of spacefaring nations demonstrate that a relationship exists between national identity and space technologies. Countries have historically justified space exploration by appealing to one (or a grouping) of five different motivations: human destiny, geopolitics, national security, economic competitive­ness, and scientific discovery [1]. Various nation-states in Asia depending on their country-specific rationale for such investments, available technological expertise, economic status and nature of assistance received from developed nations have started their space programmes. However, at times the narratives of these states are not found carried on in objective and universally valid manners.

Here, the narratives are presented as factual stories; however, any narratives always have an account which is beyond face value. These narratives need to be viewed as a mode of discourse. These narratives do not tell in micro details about the each and every aspects of the space programmes of various states. The basic purpose is to put in context the investments of various states in this field and understand the possible trajectory for the future. The space agenda of Japan-China – India and to certain extent Israel gets significant attention in this book for two reasons: one, their geostrategic and geo-economical importance and two, these are the states with significant investments and achievements into space arena. Various other regional players are also discussed in the book with an aim to understand and highlight their current and futuristic space agendas and policies. Since, the layout of the book is more thematic in nature; at places, some repetition of information was found inevitable. Particularly, the space programmes of Japan-China-India do find very many references in various sections of the book. Hence, care has been taken to provide only the basic information in the narrative section about the space programmes of these three states.

The third section of the book brings out various tenets of strategic significance in context of Asian space programmes. The various chapters in this section attempt to find connection between technology, interests, strategic relevance and power in regard to specific tenet of space agenda. It is important to appreciate that the security challenges faced by various Asian states are to a great extent different than the rest of the world. Investments into space technologies by some of the Asian nations have a definitive security bias. This section analyses the Asian investments by ‘accounting’ for the strategic compulsions of the states. Asian states have realised the importance of satellites for their armed forces. Particularly, the 1991 Gulf War has showcased the importance of space technologies for the militaries. On the other hand, the antisatellite test (ASAT) conducted by China in 2007 has increased the fear battle ground shifting to the outer space. There are concerns about the lack of globally approved space security architecture. Few Asian nations are found contributing towards the evolvement of process in regard to the changing global space order while few others in the region are anxiously monitoring this change. This section in limited sense also endeavours to analyse the ongoing trends in Asian space domain and the developing ambitions of the states in the region.

The fourth and last section offers an analysis in regard to new visions of possible futures (say three/four decades from hence) for Asian states in space arena. It attempts to peep into the future with an aim that it would allow states to be more aware of the possible challenges ahead and help to develop an agenda for response. This section also offers an overall assessment in regard to the basic theme of the book that is ‘the existence or likelihood of Asian Space Race’.

Reference

1. Launius RD. Compelling rationales for spaceflight? History and the search for relevance. In: Dick SJ, Launius RD, editors. Critical issues in the history of spaceflight. Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration; 2006. p. 37-70.