Category AVIATION &ТНЕ ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

s a result of the industrialization of society and the growth of heavy industry during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, pollution of air and water became a significant by-product of progress. Until the 1950s, prevailing wisdom held that such pollution was the inevitable price of such progress.

Visible air pollution was seen from station­ary sources like manufacturing plants and facto­ries and in “smog” accumulations in places like the Los Angeles Air Basin due to automobile emissions. Industrial and municipality discharges into waterways caused widespread prohibitions against swimming and fishing due to health risks. Catastrophes like the Cuyahoga River fire (the river caught fire) and the Love Canal scan­dal (toxic waste seepage caused a declaration of a federal emergency) were high-profile examples of pollution. When jet transport aircraft were introduced into the air carrier fleet in 1958, the dense, black exhaust emissions created on take­off at ground level and during climbout were vivid evidence of yet another encroachment on air quality levels.

Prior acceptance of pollution as an inevita­ble by-product of progress has now been roundly rejected. Current environmental policy is con­cerned with almost all aspects of the quality
of life on earth. In this chapter we will briefly review the evolution of current policy gener­ally, and we will look at how current policy has attempted to address the specific environmental impacts of aviation.

The Air Pollution Act and the Clean Air Act

The first attempt by Congress to address the problem of air pollution generally came in the Air Pollution Act of 1955.1 Subsequent efforts to strengthen controls on pollution occurred in amendments beginning in 1963 in the Clean Air Act, which was amended almost yearly until 1970. That year proved to be a watershed year for environmentalists, with the passage of the Clean Air Act of 1970 (an amendment to the 1963 Act),2 which created the Environmental Protection Agency as an independent agency reporting directly to the president. Its broad authority is over control of pollution, noise, and radiation.

Although the Clean Air Act mandates a national policy, the statute gives state and local governments primary responsibility for regula­tion of pollution from power plants, factories, and
other stationary sources. The EPA retains primary responsibility for “mobile source” pollution.

The EPA is required to consult with the FAA on any standards sought by the EPA to be made applicable to aircraft engine emissions. The EPA is prohibited by the terms of the Clean Air Act from changing aircraft emission standards if such a change would significantly increase noise or adversely affect safety. The FAA is charged with enforcing EPA standards through FAA regulations.

The EPA coordinates its aircraft engine emission regulation authority with the Interna­tional Civil Aviation Organization, created by the Chicago Convention in 1944, due to its role to develop international civil aviation in a “safe and orderly manner.” ICAO’s responsibilities include developing aircraft technical and operat­ing standards and recommending practices. The United States is currently one of 191 participat­ing member States of ICAO. One of the founding principles of ICAO was to create a high degree of uniformity between nations in the interest of global harmonization. Moreover, any participat­ing member may ban the use of aircraft within its airspace that does not meet ICAO standards. EPA standards do not apply to military aircraft.

ICAO’s Committee on Aviation Environ­mental Protection (CAEP) is responsible for the technical work in the environmental field. CAEP is composed of various work groups from many countries who do the technical research and pro­pose solutions and standards. The FAA repre­sents the United States in this committee. This procedure and practice for creating binding U. S. regulatory law has been judicially upheld in The National Association of Clean Air Agencies v. EPA, 489 F. 3d 1221 (D. C. Cir. 2007).

The approach taken by the EPA and by ICAO is to regulate nitrogen oxides produced in combustion (and some other pollutants) primarily by imposing standards for new engine designs. The imposition of emissions standards for new engine designs is a complex and cautious under­taking in view of the many other considerations inherent in engine manufacture, such as fuel efficiency, safety, and cost. The ICAO standards are found in Annex 16, Environmental Protec­tion, Volume II, “Aircraft Engine Emissions.”

After 9/11, then the sixth largest airline in the country, United applied for a government-guaran­teed loan from the Air Transportation Stabilization Board. In December 2002, the Board voted to deny the application in spite of concessions previ­ously given by its flight attendants and its pilots. The Board believed that United’s labor burden was still too bloated to allow it to compete in the exist­ing business environment. United filed for bank­ruptcy protection on December 9, 2002. In 2003, in bankruptcy court, United cut pilots’ wages 30 percent. Pilots pay then ranged between $33,000 for new hires to a high of $195,000. It also termi­nated its employee pension plan, the second airline to do so. Both of these pension plans were trans­ferred to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora­tion, a federal agency set up to protect, at tax payer expense, employees’ pensions.12

Delta Airlines

After 9/11, Delta Airlines continued its downward spiral, losing $10 billion between 2001 and 2005. The third largest carrier in the United States, Delta entered Chapter 11 on September 14, 2005. Although Delta had been in financial straits for some time, its pilots pay ranged from $48,000 for beginning pilots to $275,000 for Boeing 777 captains. Delta froze its employee pension plan (which allowed Delta to forego any further contributions to the plan) by agreement with its unions. In September 2006, the Bankruptcy Court approved termination of Delta’s pilot pension plan. Delta has preserved ground and flight atten­dants’ pension plans based on the passage of the Pension Protection Act by Congress in 2006. This statute gives Delta (and Northwest) a period of 17 years to fund the employee plans.

Northwest Airlines

Northwest, the fourth largest U. S. carrier, entered Chapter 11 on the same day as Delta, September 14, 2005. Precipitating the filing, Northwest had been unable to win necessary wage concessions from its unions. In fact, Northwest had been operating for almost a month prior to filing with its unionized mechanics on strike. Like Delta, Northwest froze its employee pension plan in bankruptcy. Unlike other airlines in bankruptcy, Northwest preserved all of its pension plans.

As of September 14, 2005, four of the top seven carriers in the United States were in bankruptcy. They were all legacy airlines. See Figure 35-21.

ATA Airlines

AT A was a new entrant airline, receiving its air carrier certificate in 1981, post deregula­tion. As the country’s 10th largest air carrier, it filed for protection on October 22, 2004, citing fuel prices, competition, and lease payments on aircraft. This was necessary in spite of receiv­ing an ATSB loan guarantee in the amount of $168 million in 2002. As part of its restructur­ing under bankruptcy protection, ATA agreed to sell its hub operation at Chicago Midway to AirTran, one of its major competitors. It also sold its slots at LaGuardia and Reagan National to AirTran.

Safe and efficient runway and taxiway use is an integral necessity to the effectiveness of NextGen. The FAA is currently monitoring ground movements at 35 major airports (see Table 36-1) using Airport Surface Detection

Equipment-Model X (ASDE-X), which tracks surface movement by radar, multilateration,3 and ADS-B. Beginning in 2014, the FAA will provide surface data sharing at nine additional complex airports4 using Airport Surface Surveil­lance Capability (ASSC), which collects data from multilateration and ADS-B only. The FAA is working on the best means to use these data and how to convey the information to those who need it, including АТС, flight operations, dispatchers, and ramp operators. This technol­ogy will make an unprecedented amount of data available to facilitate movement and safety,

Surface Traffic Management

Automation optimizes taxi routing. Provides controllers and pilots all equipped aircraft vehicle positions on airport. Real-time surface traffic picture visible to airlines, controllers, equipped aircraft, ramp operators and airports. Surface movement management linked to

FIGURE 36-3 NextGen phases of flight.

including hazards involving runway incursions (see Figure 36-3).

Data Communications

Data Communications (Data Comm) is a new information sharing digital technology for use in both the surface and airborne environments. It represents the first phase in the transition from a voice communication system to a predominately digital textual mode of communication. Data Comm will enable faster departure clearances, trajectory-based routing, and optimized profile descents (see Figure 36-4).

ICAO officially came into being in 1947 as a result of the Chicago Convention, upon ratifica­tion by the requisite number of states. According to the mission statement of the organization, its aims and objectives are to develop the principles and techniques of international air navigation and to foster the planning and development of inter­national air transport, so as to meet the needs of the international civil aviation community. The organization emphasizes its commitment, among other things, to facilitate:

1. The safe and orderly growth of civil air transportation

2. Aircraft design and operation for peaceful purposes

3. The development of airports, airways, and air navigation facilities for international civil aviation

Specifically, ICAO undertook to:

1. Establish international standards for aircraft airworthiness certification, flight crew certi­fication, communications, and radio aids to navigation

2, Establish principles and procedures for the economic regulation of international routes, fares, frequency, and capacity

The use of English as the required language for communication between aircraft and air traffic control authorities in international civil aviation all over the world is an example of ICAO work.

ICAO adopts and publishes technical stan­dards referred to as Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) that govern the interac­tion of civil air transportation the world over. These international standards are incorporated into 18 technical annexes to provide uniformity and consistency that contribute to the safety and smooth operation of international civil aviation. ICAO proposes amendments and additions to SARPs as technology advances and conditions change. ICAO is essential in the coordination of the United States’ NextGen program and the European Union’s complementary SESAR innovations, and with the spreading of com­patible technology throughout worldwide civil aviation. The human element component of the equation is addressed through its TRAINAIR PLUS program, which is aimed at improving the quality and efficiency of aviation training, and the Human Factors program, which is directed toward reducing the impact of human perfor­mance limitations.

Other programs and efforts of the orga­nization relate to education, the environment, including noise issues and emissions affecting the ozone layer, problems involving multiple taxation, airport and route facility management, statistics, economic analysis, legal matters including treaty drafting and interpretation of law, and security.

Security has been a subject of ICAO action since the early 1970s as a result of the hijacking of aircraft beginning in the 1960s. In 1974, ICAO adopted its Standards and Recommended Prac­tices (SARPs) on Security, designated as Annex 17. The Annex is under constant review, and it has been amended multiple times in order to respond to changing needs. The progression of emphasis in Annex 17 has been from hijacking, to sabotage, to baggage reconciliation with pas­sengers, to screening of passengers and baggage and carry-on luggage, and the prevention and suppression of unlawful acts generally against civil aviation worldwide. The latest revision was effective on July 1, 2011.

Another example of ICAO commitment to global civil aviation relates to aviation safety in underdeveloped nations and regions. Due to the disproportionately high aviation accident rate in Africa, beginning in 2008, ICAO began adopt­ing a “new approach” toward carrying out its mandate to improve worldwide aviation safety as it relates to that region. Designated the Com­prehensive Regional Implementation Plan for Aviation Safety in Africa (AFI Plan), ICAO developed a work program to enhance the avia­tion safety culture of African aviation service providers, to enable African countries to estab­lish and maintain a safety oversight system, and to assist them in identifying and resolving defi­ciencies in a reasonable manner.

orldwide, the air transport industry is a major factor in the economic health of nations. There are hundreds of airlines the world over, and they operate tens of thousands of aircraft. Over 2 billion passengers travel on the world’s airlines, with projected increases worldwide in the coming years. Over 40 percent of the world’s manufactured exports travel by air, and in 2006 the air transport industry provided, directly and indirectly, 29 million jobs for the global work­force.1 North American airlines carry about 40 percent of the world’s air passengers, with European carriers accounting for 26 percent, and the Asia/Pacific region’s airlines at 24 percent. Latin American, Middle Eastern, and African carriers account for the remainder.

The aviation transport industry generates wealth, employment, taxes, tourism, and related benefits for each nation with a viable air trans­port system. It is obvious, therefore, that it is in the national interest of such countries to be and remain competitive in the global air transport mar­ket. As we have seen, the airline industry has his­torically been regulated internally by their home governments and, except for the United States, state-owned airlines have been the general rule. Regulation of international air transport has been accomplished as a part of international relations
primarily by means of the bilateral agreement for­mat between nations. Prior to the Airline Deregu­lation Act of 1978 in the United States, therefore, regulation by governments around the world, supplemented by the traffic coordination activi­ties of the International Air Transport Association (IATA), had maintained a more or less stable mar­keting environment in international aviation.

For more than a third of a century in the United States, the cost benefits to air travelers and shippers directly attributable to the com­petitive influences of deregulation have been apparent. The number of enplanements and the number of flights have greatly increased as many more people have taken to the air as the primary means of travel. Although not all of the changes produced by deregulation have been positive (notably the lowering of airline employee wages, crowded airplanes, and long lines) competition in the airlines is here to stay.

We saw in the last chapter how the Airline Deregulation Act has had a ripple effect through­out the world, with the new competitive system brought by the American statute becoming a fact of life for airlines to be dealt with on an inter­national basis. We saw also how difficult it was for the Europeans to break away from their long – held belief in the state-ownership of domestic
airlines and how painful it was to come to grips with the practicalities of global competition, in spite of the fact that this is what their own law required under the Treaty of Rome.

While this was going on in Europe, the United States in 1992, took measures, to force the issue internationally. The United States Department of State announced the policy of “Open Skies,” which is designed to make inter­national travel more seamless and less controlled by nation-states.

Open Skies embraces full deregulation of inter­national air transportation. This concept includes:

1. Unrestricted access to airlines to operate between international gateways by way of any point and beyond to any point (outside of the destination country) at the discretion of airline management

2. Unrestricted service opportunities, so that airlines are free to decide the frequency, capacity, and equipment necessary to service market demand

3. Freedom of airlines to set prices

Still not included as a part of Open Skies are cabotage rights (freedom to serve domestic traf­fic within the United States from another U. S. city) and foreign control of U. S. airlines (this maintains the current limitation of foreign owner­ship of U. S. carriers).2

The policy of the United States, as estab­lished by the Department of Transportation and the State Department, does support liberaliza­tion of long-standing cabotage rules and the long-standing policy restricting foreign owner­ship of U. S. airlines. The U. S. Congress, on the other hand, has failed to approve any change in these constraints to full deregulation. In 2006, in fact, the United States Congress was opposed to increasing foreign ownership of U. S. airlines,3 and still is today. This disagreement over the future of airline deregulation is an example of the Constitutional separation of powers. In this case, the rift pits the policy-making prerogatives of the Executive Branch against the law-making prerogatives of the Legislative Branch and the requirement that the Senate ratify all treaties.

The policy of the United States also calls for the end of subsidies by foreign governments to national airlines, including state ownership, pro­tectionism, or financial assistance of any kind, since these activities produce market-distorting results in a competitive system.

Within the European Union, the separate governments of the Member States historically insisted on retaining their individual rights to negotiate and enter into old-style bilateral traffic agreements as they chose, particularly with the United States. The European Commission, on the other hand, insisted that the right to negotiate and sign international traffic agreements lay with the EU, not the individual Member States.

Relying on its prior success at consolidating powers, the Commission in 1995 began to lobby hard for authority to regulate all bilaterals affect­ing the EU nations. The Transport Commissioner of the EU threatened to bring the issue before the European Court of Justice. When that threat failed, the Commission sued six Member States.4 That lit­igation was halted by agreement between the Com­mission and the defendants, but when Member States continued to pursue unilateral talks with the United States on the terms of bilaterals, the Com­mission again sued, this time adding Germany and the United Kingdom to the original six defendants.5

A standoff ensued on this issue in the EU. For a time the issue appeared to have been rel­egated to secondary importance, and EU Member States continued to negotiate directly with the United States in Open Skies bilaterals. France and the United States, for instance, signed an Open Skies agreement in January 2002, which con­tained the standard freedoms enumerated above.

In 2002, however, the European Court of Justice ruled that the practice of EU Member States separately negotiating bilaterals directly with the United States was incompatible with EU law. The Court did not, however, strike down the existing bilaterals, so international traffic continued under those preexisting agreements.

This uneasy situation persisted until the “break­through” occurred in 2006, discussed below.

It was only in 1958 that studies and tests con­ducted by government and industry indicated the feasibility of manned space flight. America’s first manned space flight program was named Mercury on October 7, 1958 with the objectives of placing a manned spacecraft in orbital flight around the earth, to investigate man’s capabilities and ability to function in space, and to recover the man and spacecraft safely from space.

The American space program, like that of the U. S.S. R., had to begin from a standing start. This meant that all aspects of the program had to be originated, tested, and approved, including the selection of the launch vehicle, the space­craft, and the selection of the men who were to participate in the program. After the completion of a pervasive and exhausting testing regimen and selection process, seven military pilots were chosen as the original participants in the pro­gram and were introduced to the Congress as astronauts on May 28, 1959. They were quickly accepted as a new kind of hero.

The initial flights for the Mercury mission were conducted on Redstone rockets (subor­bital flights of Shepherd and Grissom in 1961). A modified Atlas rocket carried John Glenn to America’s first manned orbit on February 29, 1962 and to the following orbital missions of the program, ending with Gordon Cooper’s 34-hour,

19- minute final Mercury mission on May 16, 1963.

The project was terminated in 1963.

Gemini

Gemini was the second manned space program, begun in 1962. Its name derived from the third constellation of the Zodiac (the Twins), since the capsule was designed to carry two astronauts into space. Its mission included launching men and equipment for up to two weeks in low earth orbit, to rendezvous and dock, and to refine a system for maneuvering the docked combination by using the target vehicle’s propulsion system. The program’s launch vehicle was the Titan II rocket. The project successfully flew 10 manned missions, achieved the first extra vehicular activ­ity in space (EVA) and a record altitude of 739.2 miles. This project was canceled in 1964.

Apollo

The Apollo Program was designed for lunar exploration using a three-man spacecraft and lunar orbiter and a serially developed Saturn rocket.

The Apollo Program consisted of 33 flights, of which 11 were manned. The 22 unmanned flights were conducted to qualify the launch vehicle and spacecraft for manned space flight. Four of the manned flights were also conducted to man-rate the overall vehicle for lunar explo­ration. The final 7 flights were conducted to explore the lunar environment and lunar surface. During the program, no launch failure occurred to prevent a mission and only one in-flight fail­ure (Apollo 13) occurred to prevent the intended mission from being accomplished.

Testing Phase: The original launch vehicle for the Apollo program was the Saturn I mis­sile, first tested in October 1961 in a suborbital trajectory. The first orbital mission (unmanned) occurred on January 29, 1964 on the Saturn’s fifth launch. Testing progressed using the Sat­urn IB launch vehicle and an unmanned Apollo spacecraft. November 9, 1967 marked the first flight of the Saturn V three-stage rocket, which was to be used for lunar missions.

Manned Phase: On January 27, 1967, a flash fire occurred in the Apollo spacecraft (denomi­nated command module 012) while positioned on the launch vehicle and during a launch pad test of the vehicle for the first manned flight, kill­ing three astronauts. Dead were Lt. Col. Virgil I. Grissom, one of the original seven and a veteran of flights in the Mercury and Gemini programs; Lt. Col. Edward H. White, the first astronaut to conduct an EVA (Gemini Program); and Roger B. Chaffee, who was prepping for his first space flight. As a result of a comprehensive investiga­tion, which caused an 18-month delay in the first manned mission, significant design and engineer­ing modifications were made to the spacecraft.

The first manned mission, known as Apollo 7, flew on October 11, 1968 and began the series of missions that would land men on the moon. Apollo 8 was the first mission designed to leave earth orbit and to circle the moon, and the first manned flight to be launched using the three – stage Saturn V rocket. Aboard this flight were

Frank Borman, Commander; James A. Lovell, Command Module Pilot; and William A. Anders, Lunar Module Pilot.

The mission of Apollo 11 was to land Neil A. Armstrong and Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr. on the surface of the moon, have them exit the lunar module and perform certain minimum tasks, and return safely to the command module for the return to earth. Ed Collins remained in lunar orbit in the command module. The lunar module successfully landed on the lunar surface on July 20, 1969 and six hours later, at 0256 UTC on July 21, Neil Armstrong became the first human to set foot on the moon, followed by Ed Aldrin. Together they spent over 21 hours on the moon’s surface and collected over 47 pounds of lunar material for return to earth. Most of their activi­ties were seen by a live television feed broadcast to a world-wide audience. All three astronauts returned to earth on July 24, 1969.

Subsequent missions in the program, with the exception of Apollo 13, were carried to successful conclusion, ending in the mis­sion of Apollo 17 (launched on December 7, 1972). Apollo 17 brought to a close one of the most ambitious and successful endeavors ever attempted by man.24

“Aerodrome”1

By c. g. abbot

Secretary, Smithsonian Institution

Note—This paper has been submitted to Dr. Orville Wright, and under date of October 8, 1942, he states that the paper as now prepared will be acceptable to him if given adequate publication.

t is everywhere acknowledged that the Wright brothers were the first to make sustained flights in a heavier-than-air machine at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, on December 17, 1903.

Mainly because of acts and statements of former officers of the Smithsonian Institution, arising from tests made with the reconditioned Langley plane of 1903 at Hammondsport, New York, in 1914, Dr. Orville Wright feels that the Institution adoped an unfair and injurious atti­tude. He therefore sent the original Wright Kitty Hawk plane to England in 1928. The nature of the acts and statements referred to are as follows: In March 1914, Secretary Walcott contracted with Glenn H. Curtiss to attempt a flight with the Langley machine. This action seems ill consid­ered and open to criticism. For in January 1914, the United States Court of Appeals, Second Cir­cuit, had handed down a decision recognizing the Wrights as “pioneers in the practical art of flying
with heavier-than-air machines” and pronounc­ing Glenn H. Curtiss an infringer of their patent. Hence, in view of probable further litigation, the Wrights stood to lose in fame and revenue and Curtiss stood to gain pecuniarily, should the experiments at Hammondsport indicate that Langley’s plane was capable of sustained flight in 1903, previous to the successful flights made December 17, 1903, by the Wrights at Kitty Hawk, N. C.

The machine was shipped to Curtiss at Hammondsport, N. Y. in April. Dr. Zahm, the Recorder of the Langley Aerodynamical Labora­tory and expert witness for Curtiss in the patent litigation, was at Hammondsport as official rep­resentative of the Smithsonian Institution during the time the machine was being reconstructed and tested. In the reconstruction the machine was changed from what it was in 1903 in a number of particulars as given in Dr. Wright’s list of differ­ences which appears later in this paper. On the 28th of May and the 2d of June, 1914, attempts to fly were made. After acquiring speed by run­ning on hydroplane floats on the surface of Lake

Abbot, C. G. 1942. The 1914 Tests of the Langley “Aeorodrome.” Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections, 103:8. Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian Institution. (Document supplied to the author by Dr. Larry Jenkins.)

Wings.

7 Center Spar: Cylindrical wooden spar, measuring ІУ2" dia. for half its length and tapering to 1" at its tip. (L. M. p. 204). Located on upper side of wing.

8 Ribs: Hollow box construction. (L. M. Plates 66,67)

9 Lower Guy-Posts: A single round wooden post for each pair of wings (see Fig. 3), 1W in dia. 6У2′ long. (L. M. Plate 62, p. 184).

10 The front wing guy-post was located 28У2" in front of the main center spar. (L. M. Plate 53).

11 The rear wing guy-post was located ЗІУ2" in front of the main center spar. (L. M. Plate 53).

12 Upper Guy-Posts: For each pair of wings a single steel tube %" dia., 43" long. (L. M. p. 184, pi. 62).

13 Front wing upper guy-post located 28Уг" in front of the main center spar. (L. M. pi. 53).

14 The rear wing upper guy-post was located ЗІУ2" in front of the main center spar. (L. M. pi. 53).

15 Trussing: The wing trussing wires were attached to the spars at the 5th, 7th and 9th ribs out from the center (L. M. pi. 54). The angles between these wires and the spars to which they were attached are shown in Fig. 3.

Center Spar: Cylindrical spar about ІУ2" dia. at inner end, tapering to about 1" dia. at outer end. Located on upper side of wing. This center spar was reinforced (1) by an extra wooden member on the under side of the wing, which measured 1" x ІУ2" and extended to the 7th rib from the center of the machine; and (2) by another wooden rein­forcement on the under side extending out about one-fourth of the length of the wing.

Ribs: Most of the original Langley box ribs were replaced with others made at Hammondsport. (Manly letter, 1914). The Hammondsport ribs were of solid construction and made of laminated wood. That part of the rib in front of the forward spar was entirely omitted.

Lower Guy-Posts: Four for each pair of wings (see Fig. 4), two of which were of streamline form mea­suring 1 Va" x ЗУ2" x 54" long; and two measur­ing 2" x 2" with rounded corners, 3’9" long.

The front wing guy-posts were located directly underneath the main center spar, 28У2" further rearward than in 1903.

The rear wing guy-posts were located directly under the main center spar, ЗІУ2" further rear­ward than in 1903.

Upper Guy-Posts: For each pair of wings, two streamline wooden posts each 114" x ЗУ2", 76" long, forming an inverted V. (See Fig. 4).

Front wing upper guy-posts located directly over main spar, 28У2" further rearward than in 1903.

The rear wing guy-posts were located directly over the main center spar, ЗІУ2" further rearward than in 1903.

Trussing: A different system of wing trussing was used, and the wing trussing wires were attached to the spars at the 3rd, 6th and 9th ribs from the cen­ter. The angles between these wires and the spars to which they were attached were all different from those in the original Langley machine. (See Fig. 4).

Langley, 1903. Hammondsport, 1914.

Control Surfaces.

16 Vane Rudder: A split vane composed of two surfaces united at their leading edges and separated 15" at their trailing edges, thus forming a wedge. Each surface measured 2’3" x 4’6", with aspect ratio.5. (L. M. p. 214, pis. 53,54).

17 Operated by means of a wheel located slightly in front of the pilot at his right side and at the height of his shoulder (L. M. p. 216, pis. 53,54).

18 Used for steering only. (L. M. p. 214).

19 Penaud Tail: This was a dart-shaped tail having a vertical and a horizontal surface (Penaud tail), each measuring 95 sq. ft. It was located in the rear of the main frame.

20 Attached to a bracket extending below the main frame.

21 “Normally inactive”, (L. M. p. 216) but adjust­able about a transverse horizontal axis by means of a self-locking wheel located at the right side of the pilot, even with his back, and at the height of his shoulder. (L. M. pis. 51, 53).

Vertical Rudder: The Langley vane rudder was replaced by a single plane vertical rudder which measured 3’6" x 5′, with aspect ratio of.7.

Operated at Hammondsport through the Curtiss steering wheel in some tests, (Zahm affidavit pp. 5, 6), through the Curtiss shoulder yoke in some oth­ers (Manly letter, 1914), and fixed so as not to be operable at all in still others, (Zahm affidavit p. 7).

Used “as a vertical aileron to control the lateral poise of the machine”, (Zahm affidavit p. 6) as well as for steering, (Zahm affidavit p. 7).

Tail Rudder: Same size and construction as in 1903.

Attached to same bracket at a point about 8" higher than in 1903.

Operable about a transverse horizontal axis and connected to a regular Curtiss elevator control post directly in front of the pilot (Zahm affidavit p. 5).

Control Surfaces (continued).

22 Immovable about a vertical axis. (L. M. p. 214, pi.56, Fig. 1). No means were provided for adjusting this rudder about a vertical axis in flight. “Although it was necessary that the large aerodrome should be capable of being steered in a horizontal direction, it was felt to be unwise to give the Penaud tail and rudder motion in the horizontal plane in order to attain this end”. (L. M. p. 214).

23 Keel: A fixed vertical surface underneath the main frame measuring 3’2" in height by 6′ average length. Area 19 sq. ft. (L. M. pi. 53).

Immovable about a vertical axis on May 28, 1914, only. Thereafter it was made movable about a verti­cal axis and was connected through cables to a Curtiss steering wheel mounted on a Curtiss con­trol post directly in front of the pilot.

Keel: Entirely omitted.

System of Control.

24 Lateral Stability: The dihedral only was used for maintaining lateral balance. (L. M. p. 45).

25 Longitudinal Stability: Langley relied upon the Penaud system of inherent stability for main­taining the longitudinal equilibrium. “For the preservation of the equilibrium [longitudinal] of the aerodrome, though the aviator might assist by such slight movements as he was able to make in the limited space of the avia­tor’s car, the main reliance was upon the Pen­aud tail.” (L. M. p. 215).

26 Steering: Steering in the horizontal plane was done entirely by the split-vane steering rud­der located underneath the main frame. (L. M. p. 214).

Lateral Stability: Three means were used for secur­ing lateral balance at Hammondsport: The dihe­dral angle as used by Langley, a rudder which “serves as a vertical aileron" (Zahm affidavit p. 6), and the Penaud tail rudder. The last two constituted a system “identical in principle with that of Complainant’s [Wright] combined warping of the wings and the use of the vertical rudder”. (Zahm affidavit p. 6).

Longitudinal Stability: At Hammondsport the Pen­aud inherent longitudinal stability was supple­mented with an elevator system of control.

Steering: On one day, May 28, 1914, steering in the horizontal plane was done with the vertical rudder which had been substituted for the original Langley split-vane steering rudder. After May 28th the steering was done by the vertical surface of the tail rudder (Zahm affidavit p. 7), which in 1903 was immovable about a vertical axis, (L. M. p. 214).

Power Plant.

27 Motor: Langley 5 cylinder radial.

28 Ignition: Jump spark with dry cell batteries. (L. M. p. 262).

29 Carburetor: Balzer carburetor consisting of a cham­ber filled with lumps of porous cellular wood satu­rated with gasoline. The air was drawn through this wood. There was no float feed. (L. M. p. 225).

30 Radiator: Tubes with radiating fins.

31 Propellers: Langley propellers (L. M. pi.53, pp. 178-182).

Motor: Langley motor modified.

Ignition: Jump spark with magneto.

Carburetor: Automobile type with float feed.

Radiator: Automobile radiator of honeycomb type.

Propellers: Langley propellers modified “after fash­ion of early Wright blades”.

Launching and Floats.

Launching: Hydroplanes, developed 1909-1914, attached to the machine.

Floats: Two wooden hydroplane floats, mounted beneath and about 6 feet to either side of the center of the machine at the lateral extremities of the Pratt system of trussing used for bracing the wing spars of the forward wings; and one (part of the time two) tin cylindrical floats with conical ends, similar to but larger than the Langley floats, mounted at the center of the Pratt system of truss­ing used for bracing the rear wings. All of the floats were mounted from four to five feet lower than the floats of the original Langley, thus keeping the entire machine above the water.

Weight.

34 Total Weight: With pilot 850 pounds (L. M. p. 256).

35 Center Gravity: 3/8" above line of thrust.

Since I became Secretary, in 1928, I have made many efforts to compose the Smithsonian-Wright controversy, which I inherited. I will now, speak­ing for the Smithsonian Institution, make the following statement in an attempt to correct as far as now possible acts and assertions of for­mer Smithsonian officials that may have been

Total Weight: With pilot, 1170 pounds.

Center Gravity: About one foot below line of thrust.

misleading or are held to be detrimental to the Wrights.

1. I sincerely regret that the Institution employed to make the tests of 1914 an agent who had been an unsuccessful defendant in patent liti­gation brought against him by the Wrights.

2. I sincerely regret that statements were repeat­edly made by officers of the Institution that the Langley machine was flown in 1914 “with certain changes of the machine neces­sary to use pontoons”, without mentioning the other changes included in Dr. Wright’s list.

3. I point out that Assistant Secretary Rathbun was misinformed when he stated that the Langley machine “without modification” made “successful flights”.

4. I sincerely regret the public statement by officers of the Institution that “The tests” [of 1914] showed “that the late Secretary Lang­ley had succeeded in building the first aero­plane capable of sustained free flight with a man.”

5. Leaving to experts to formulate the conclu­sions arising from the 1914 tests as a whole, in view of all the facts, I repeat in substance, but with amendments, what I have already published in Smithsonian Scientific Series, Vol. 12, 1932, page 227:

The flights of the Langley aerodrome at Hammondsport in 1914, having been made

long after flying had become a common art, and with changes of the machine indicated by Dr. Wright’s comparison as given above, did not warrant the statements published by the Smithsonian Institution that these tests proved that the large Langley machine of 1903 was capable of sustained flight carrying a man.

6. If the publication of this paper should clear the way for Dr. Wright to bring back to America the Kitty Hawk machine to which all the world awards first place, it will be a source of profound and enduring gratifica­tion to his countrymen everywhere. Should he decide to deposit the plane in the United States National Museum, it would be given the highest place of honor, which is its due.

Endnotes

1. For an account of early Langley and Wright aeronautical investigations, see Smithsonian Report for 1900 and The Century Magazine of September 1908.

2. Smithsonian Reports: 1914, pp. 9, 219, 221, 222; 1915, pp. 14, 121; 1917, p. 4; 1918, pp. 3, 28, 114, 166. Report of U. S. National Museum, 1914, pp. 46 and 47.

«You learn in this business: If you want a friend, get a dog.**

Carl Icahn

WA was one of the original “Big Four,” cre­ated out of the so-called “Spoils Conference” in 1930 by the edict of Walter Folger Brown, which forced the combination of Western Air­lines and Transcontinental Air Transport (TAT). TWA had participated in the major developments of American airline history under the leadership of Jack Frye, and later under the secretive and unpredictable Howard Hughes. It had pioneered both the early transcontinental routes and the early airliners used on those routes, like the DC-3 and later the Constellation. TWA had contributed significantly to the war effort between 1941 and 1945, flying the only land-based four-engine air­craft in existence at that time (the Boeing 307) on transatlantic routes to Africa from South America and to Europe. By war’s end, TWA had gained transatlantic experience that only Pan Ameri­can could rival. Howard Hughes, then firmly in control of TWA, changed the name of the com­pany. Since 1930, the initials TWA had stood for Transcontinental and Western Airlines, but after the war the company name became Trans World Airlines, still using the TWA brand.

Perhaps owing largely to its war effort, TWA was rewarded after World War II with the first transatlantic routes that went to any estab­lished American airline other than Pan Ameri­can. On February 5, 1946, TWA made its first scheduled international flight, from New York to Paris. TWA was also granted access to London’s Heathrow Airport, known as the “Gateway to the World,” and it continued its international route expansion for years to come, including the polar route in 1957 from Los Angeles to London.

In 1961, TWA severed its relationship with Howard Hughes, who by that time had become a recluse, and by 1965 the company had redeemed all of his shares of stock. New management, led by Charles Tillinghast, made changes within the company that caused it to prosper. TWA’s profits in 1965 were the largest of any airline.

TWA thrived under the regulatory scheme in place during the 1960s and 1970s, but with deregulation, things began to come undone. The very nature of TWA’s routes, including many long distance ones, had mandated that its fleet be composed of large airplanes. The use of large aircraft when smaller ones would have sufficed, with the resulting substantial expense differen­tial, increased the financial burden. TWA was also slow to appreciate the hub concept, and its

labor costs were way out of line. Its unions were not willing to grant the wage and working condi­tion concessions that looked necessary. By the 1980s, TWA was losing money, some $100 mil­lion by the middle of the decade. TWA began to look appealing as a corporate takeover target. All of the symptoms were there, including low stock valuation, troubled management, and relatively high asset value. It had also accumulated $200 million in depreciation, which could be used as a tax deduction directly against income. This scenario drew the Wall Street raider types like sharks to blood in the water.

Carl Icahn (see Figure 27-1), like Frank Lorenzo, grew up in Queens, New York. He received his A. B. degree from Princeton in 1957, and then attended New York University School of Medicine, without graduating. As a young man, he had some talent at chess and, it was rumored, at poker as well. When he left medical school he joined the Army, where he gained a reputation for his gambling skills. By 1961, he was employed on Wall Street in New York in the stock brokerage business and drifted into the super-specialty of arbitrage, the trad­ing of both the long and the short side of stocks and options that allows the taking advantage of slight differentials in price. This led to trading in

issues of companies rumored to be the object of takeover strategies, companies that usually expe­rienced large and volatile price fluctuations.

Icahn went from simply trading the stocks of these companies to practicing strategies to gain actual management control of them. Control of a company can be gained either by outright stock purchase or through proxy fights. Proxy fights involve persuading other stockholders, usually through intensive mailing campaigns, to allow their shares to be voted by someone who is lead­ing the proxy fight. The rationale is usually to effect a change in management through gaining seats on the board of directors.

Icahn’s aggressive corporate acquisition strategies were originally bona fide efforts to win stock proxy fights in order to gain control of undervalued corporations so that their man­agement and value could be improved. In 1979, Icahn won his first proxy fight for a seat on the board of directors of the stove manufacturer, Tappan, by which he subsequently forced the sale of the company, rendering him a profit of $3 million for his stock.

He soon learned that he did not always have to be successful in his takeover bids in order to make money. This tactic usually involved iso­lating a target company, starting to buy up its stock or gaining control through a proxy fight, running up the stock’s price, and then retiring from the field with a nice profit when the target’s management successfully fought him off with counter offers for control. This practice came to be known as “greenmail,” a play on the better understood word “blackmail.” Icahn gained the reputation as a “corporate raider”1 when the busi­ness community realized that he had adopted this practice as a vocation and business lifestyle.

– Icahn followed the Tappan bid with raids I of Marshall Field’s, Anchor Hocking, American m Can, and Owens-Illinois. His image was black­ened forever when he attempted to take over the textile company Dan River in 1982. Dan River was a 100-year-old Danville, Virginia company and mostly locally owned when Icahn began

buying up stock. The employees and the people of Danville got together to fight the takeover, using their retirement money to successfully buy up the stock. When it was all over, Icahn was roundly seen as a villain.

Along the way Icahn developed deep pock­ets for financing his deals, including the invest­ment banking house of Drexel Burnham and junk bond king Michael Milken. Icahn next suc­cessfully acquired the rail car manufacturing and leasing company, ACF Industries, which was fol­lowed by the unsuccessful, but profitable, take­over effort of Phillips Petroleum. Icahn’s targets appeared to be getting bigger and bigger.

Icahn began buying up shares of TWA in 1985, and by April he had acquired enough stock in the company to trigger the mandatory public filings with the Securities and Exchange Com­mission. TWA management sprang into action. By this time one thing was known for sure: Icahn could not be a good steward for any company. Icahn’s corporate raider reputation was seen as having developed from “greenmail” to “acquisi­tion and dismemberment,” and TWA pulled out the stops in mobilizing against him.

At first there was a combined effort by both management and labor against the takeover attempt. Suits for injunctions were filed on vari­ous grounds, the unions conducted campaigns against Icahn, and both groups lobbied Con­gress for help. An Employee Stock Option Plan (ESOP) was considered. TWA sought merger partners, but only Eastern made any attempt to investigate the possiblities. A TWA-Eastern merger would probably not have survived the anticompetitive test by the government anyway, but the unions at Eastern defeated that effort.

By the beginning of the summer of 1985, Icahn had invested over $100 million in TWA. With all defensive stratagems failing to prevent a hostile takeover, management began to consider alternatives to Icahn, including Frank Lorenzo (Texas Air). This is where management and labor parted company. Lorenzo’s use of the bankruptcy court to void labor contracts and cut wages at

Continental, as well as his starting his new shut­tle airline in New York as a nonunion airline, were to have a long legacy. The unions were con­vinced that if Lorenzo won control, TWA would be folded into the Texas Air-Continental opera­tion and would cease to exist. Yet Lorenzo was not about to go away. Management brought in Drexel Burnham to broker a deal between Icahn and Lorenzo that would have paid Icahn $95 million and given control of TWA to Lorenzo. Management believed that they could work better with Lorenzo than Icahn.

During the negotiations, Lorenzo and Icahn were about $7 million apart on the money when the unions, led by the Airline Pilots Associa­tion, began negotiations directly with Icahn. The pilots and the machinists offered concessions to Icahn that they would not offer to Lorenzo and had not offered even to TWA management— they agreed to wage cuts (26 percent) and to work rules changes in exchange for a profit­sharing arrangement and stock ownership. This allowed Icahn to raise his stock offer price to match Lorenzo’s rather than sell out his stock investment in TWA under the Drexel Burnham deal. Lorenzo actually offered slightly more than Icahn for stock control, but by this time Icahn had acquired over 50 percent of the stock, and because of the bitter resentment of the unions against Lorenzo, the board acceded to the deci­sion to go with Icahn.

In the end, it was labor that handed TWA to Icahn.2 Lorenzo, once again, pocketed a nice gain in the value of his stock acquired while pursuing control of the company—in this case $50 million. Icahn meanwhile set out to maximize his invest­ment with further acquisitions by TWA.

TWA’s main competition in St. Louis in 1986 was Ozark Airlines. In the middle 1980s the Department of Transportation under Elizabeth Dole was in charge of reviewing pro­posed mergers, and the stance at DOT at that time was rather relaxed on airline mergers. This was, after all, the era of deregulation. Still, many people, like Alfred Kahn, the so-called father of deregulation, were concerned that the industry was rapidly becoming too centralized, too anti­competitive, and that the benefits of deregulation as they saw it would suffer from such lack of competition. Their views were largely dismissed as the DOT routinely signaled its approval of anticipated combinations in the industry, particu­larly with relatively minor players like Ozark.

Icahn closed the deal for the acquisition of Ozark for $239 million. The Justice Department decried the merger and came out against it. But it was the DOT’S call (the DOJ would not be given authority over mergers until 1988), and the merger was approved as expected. With this deal, Icahn had essentially eliminated competition out of St. Louis. It came as no surprise that St. Louis fares were quickly raised, now that the CAB no longer existed, but it was also clear that this was not what deregulation was supposed to be about. It became obvious that the anticompetitive safe­guards formerly monitored by the CAB, and now by the DOT, were being ignored—another unin­tended consequence.

As TWA proceeded under the new arrange­ment and Icahn’s management practices took hold, the unions at TWA would learn what bitter fruit their deal with Icahn was about to produce. The flight attendants had not been part of the deal with Icahn, and their labor working agree­ment expired in 1986. When no progress was seen in their attempted negotiations with Icahn, they walked out. Icahn hired replacements, at a significant savings to the company, and when the flight attendants called off the strike a few months later and wanted to return to work, Icahn refused to rehire them. Lawsuits abounded.

The wage concessions that the pilots and machinists had earlier agreed to in their deal with Icahn provided for “snap back” wage increases when their labor agreements were to be renewed. To their dismay, Icahn insisted that they extend their contracts at present wage rates. When the unions resisted, Icahn threatened to dismantle the airline—and he meant what he said. The unions folded.

In what might be considered to be less than good faith follow through, Icahn sold all of the Ozark fleet of airplanes and then leased them back to TWA. As majority shareholder, this was like cash in Icahn’s pocket. The airplanes then had to be paid for out of operating expense.

TWA’s assets also included its com­puter reservation system (PARS). Icahn sold a 50 percent interest in the CRS to Northwest Airlines for $140 million, thus raising even more cash. Icahn denied that his management style included “dismemberment,” but it did bear some resemblance to what Lorenzo was doing to East­ern Air Lines at the same time.

In fairness to Icahn, the steps he took to streamline TWA’s operations, including con­verting hard assets to cash, laying off nonunion workers, and fighting union wage and rules demands began to show up at the bottom line. From a stock price of around $14 per share when he took over, TWA stock was trading at $34 two years later.

This was when he decided to take the com­pany private by merging TWA into a newly formed private company, where he would own 90 percent of the stock (he held 73 percent in the public company), and which would free him from many regulatory requirements and much government oversight necessary in a public cor­poration. The company’s cash would go to par­tially pay for shares not controlled by Icahn. The 10 percent of stock not owned by Icahn would be owned by the employees. Since this deal was a leveraged buyout, Icahn was able to recover $469 million personally. TWA assumed over $539 million in debt.

This heavy debt load gave TWA a negative net worth, and it required a lot of money to pay interest on the debt. Profitability was short lived as its domestic and foreign market shares fell to new lows. TWA had failed to appreciate the necessity of the hub concept after deregulation and it did not develop adequate feeder lines to supply its long-range routes, resulting in lower passenger counts.

TWA’s fortunes did not improve over the following years, as competition increased with new entrant airlines amid rising fuel prices. The first Iraq war in 1990 coupled with an economic downturn that resulted in reduced travel demand. Airline losses as a group in 1990 were $1.9 bil­lion, in 1991 $1.8 billion, and in 1992 they were $2.4 billion. Icahn continued the dismemberment of the airline by selling TWA’s most valuable routes. In 1991, he sold the prized Heathrow London routes to New York, Los Angeles, Bos­ton, and Chicago to American Airlines for $445 million.

On January 31, 1992, TWA entered into Chapter 11 reorganization. As debtor in posses­sion, Icahn still had control over TWA’s assets, and he sold its London routes to Philadelphia and Baltimore to USAir for $50 million. All that was left of the proud world-wide network of TWA was the London-St. Louis route.

During reorganization, Icahn agreed to step down and sell his shares to the employees and the creditors. The deal was solidified with TWA’s three primary unions taking a 45 per­cent equity stake in the company in return for concessions. TWA’s creditors would forgive some $1 billion in debt in return for 55 percent of company stock. Icahn would loan the air­line $200 million for operating cash, secured by TWA’s remaining assets, until the company emerged from bankruptcy. Everyone, it seemed, was tired of Icahn, and Icahn was tired of the air­line business.

TWA came out of bankruptcy in November 1993 and a succession of senior executives went through the head office until Jeffrey Erickson, from Reno Air, took over as CEO. Over the next two years, management and the labor groups, the latter of which owned 45 percent of the com­pany, together made extraordinary efforts to see TWA succeed, but it was not enough as share prices continued down, reflecting the lack of profit. TWA entered Chapter 11 for the second time in 1995 under a prearranged deal with its creditors to shed some $500 million in debt, so the company was able to reemerge quickly from reorganization in August 1995.

In 1996 things looked up for TWA, with plans to purchase new aircraft and to make new hires of around 10 percent. But on July 17, 1996, flight 800, a Boeing 747 bound from JFK to Paris, exploded over Long Island killing all 230 people on board. Theo­ries abounded as to the cause of the explosion of flight 800, including a rocket attack by ter­rorists, conspiracy theories of various kinds, as well as a fuel tank detonation. The cause was ultimately determined by the NTSB to be due to a short-circuit spark in the center wing fuel tank, but that did not really matter to the profit and loss question that controlled the fate of TWA. At the end of 1996, all TWA had to show for its efforts was a $259 million loss. Erickson resigned and was replaced by Gerald L. Gitner, who ironically had previously been with Lorenzo at Texas Air.

The late 1990s were good times for United States airlines, yet TWA was unable to post a profit for 1997, the only airline, in fact, that lost money for the year. It lost money the next year too, the 10th straight year in the red. The board of directors appointed one of their own pilots, William Compton, as president in 1998 to bring a hands-on approach to operations, with Gitner remaining as chairman of the board.

Compton ventured out on an airplane buy­ing spree, concentrating on smaller aircraft like the Boeing 717-200s, to replace TWA’s large aircraft and aging fleet. He ordered 125 planes and took options on 125 more. Still, TWA had not turned a profit since 1988. TWA lost $353 million in 1999 and over $115 million during the first nine months of 2000.

TWA finally threw in the towel and reached an agreement with AMR Corporation, Amer­ican Airlines parent company, to acquire the airline. TWA entered Chapter 11 for the third time in 2001 in order to be able to finalize the AMR takeover. The Justice Department approved the acquisition and the proud and historic Trans

World Airline, the “Lindbergh Line,” became just TWA Airlines, LLC. AMR Corporation now controlled 22.6 percent of the entire air­line market, another unintended consequence of deregulation.

In September 2001, operations of TWA were consolidated with those of American Air­lines, 138,000 TWA employees were let go, and the TWA terminal at JFK was closed. The brand TWA ceased to exist.

After deregulation, and for many years thereafter, the incumbent (legacy) airlines increased mar­ket share over that which existed during CAB regulation. In 1978, for instance, the five largest (incumbent) airlines took in 66 percent of domestic revenues. This excessive control of market share was recited by proponents of deregulation during the Congressional hearings to demonstrate the anti­competitive impact of CAB regulation. The impli­cation was that under a deregulated market, the share of the largest carriers in the overall market would decrease. In 2001, the five-carrier share had actually increased to 72 percent, revealing a central failure of deregulation theory. By 2010, largely because of mergers and acquisitions (American took over TWA, US Airways merged with America West, Delta merged with Northwest, and United merged with Continental), the largest legacy carri­ers still owned 72 percent of market share.

Figure 30-2 is an interesting and informative graphic. Represented here is the period of time between 1975 and 2009, depicting six surviving airlines (four legacy carriers and two low-cost car­riers) as of 2009, along with their merger histories with numerous other airlines over that period. Shown also on a continuum is the market share, based on passengers flown (not revenues), of each surviving airline over the applicable period of time.

Mergers have also altered the rankings of airlines based on measures most tradition­ally used. As of 2012, the largest airlines ranked by passengers carried were 1. Delta Airlines,

2. United Airlines, 3. Southwest Airlines, 4. American Airlines, 5. US Airways, 6. Air Canada, 7. Republic Airways, 8. JetBlue Air­ways, 9. Alaska Airlines, 10. WestJet, 11. Fron­tier Airlines, 12. AeroMexico, 13. Spirit Airlines, 14. Hawaiian Airlines, and 15. Allegiant Air.

Safety

The airline accident rate has been steadily declining since the 1940s. With the introduc­tion of jet aircraft into the civilian airline fleet, the rate of decline increased even faster, so that by the late 1980s, the total annual number of airline accidents had become historically minis­cule. Commuter carriers, flying more turboprop equipment than their larger brethren, have had a proportionately higher accident rate, but over the last two decades even that rate has declined by 90 percent. Since deregulation, the overall fatal accident rate per million miles flown has averaged 0.0009, compared to 0.0135 during the 40 years of regulation. It can be logically surmised that the difference in the accident rate before and after deregulation probably has more to do with the technological advance of aircraft and equipment than with regulation. It should be remembered that economic deregulation did not extend to safety issues. The United States airline industry remains today one of the most heavily regulated endeavors in the world.

Worldwide, the year 2012 marked the low­est rate of fatal accidents since the dawn of the jet age. Including both passenger and cargo flights, in 2012 there were 22 fatal crashes, down from 28 in 2011. The 10-year average is 34. None occurred in the United States. Of those 22 crashes, just 10 involved passenger aircraft and only 3 of those were jets. The remaining 7 involved Western-built or Russian turboprops.

Turboprop operations have significantly higher crash rates, particularly world-wide. Turboprops serve smaller airfields and use less advanced air traffic control equipment than major Western airports.

Russian-built planes historically have accounted for much higher crash rates than Ameri­can or European-built planes. Crash rates in under­developed areas of the world, like Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean are over four times that of the rest of the world. These regions account for only 7 percent of all global passenger traffic but have recorded nearly half of all accidents in 2012.3

I Employment

From the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act through the first year of the 21st century, the number of airline employees had increased by 50 percent, to 536,400 as measured in full­time equivalents (FTEs).4 Due to the effects of September 11, 2001 and other economic factors during the first decade of the new century, airline employment fell to a low of 376,200 FTEs in April 2010, at which point a slow recovery began.

Even though the DOJ now has primary author­ity over domestic airline mergers and acquisi­tions, the DOT retains jurisdiction to regulate and investigate some aspects of domestic air­line operations, including carrier fitness, owner­ship, and advertising. The DOT also has express authority to prohibit unfair and deceptive prac­tices and unfair methods of competition. Section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act, recodified as 49 U. S.C. 41712, provides:

«[The] Secretary may investigate and decide whether an air carrier. . . has been or is engaged in an unfair or deceptive practice or an unfair method of competition in air transpor­tation… If the Secretary, after notice and an opportunity for hearing, finds that an air carrier… is engaged in an unfair or deceptive practice or unfair method of competition, the Sec­retary shall order the air carrier… to stop the practice or method, w

DOT takes the position that it is authorized to prohibit conduct that does not amount to an actual violation of the antitrust laws, but is such that it could be considered anticompetitive under antitrust principles.5 DOT also has authority to approve or immunize from U. S. antitrust laws cooperative agreements between domestic carri­ers and foreign carriers relating to international routes.6