Category AVIATION &ТНЕ ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

From the time that the RLA was applied to the airline industry in 1936, there were no strikes until 1946, when the first Presidential Emergency Board (PEB) was established in a dispute between TWA and its pilots. Six more PEBs followed dur­ing the late 1940s, and then 19 occurred during

the 1950s—11 during 1957 alone. These 1957 strikes involved Eastern, National, Capital, North­east, Northwest, United, TWA, and American. Most of these involved the mechanics, although two were pilot initiated. Through 1978, domestic airlines had experienced a total of 191 strikes.

The number of strikes decreased signifi­cantly after deregulation. Only 19 strikes of domestic passenger airlines have been called since 1978, 12 of them before 1990. The duration of these strikes ranged from 2 years to 24 min­utes. See Table 29-2 for a summary of strike inci­dences, presidential interventions, and nonstrike work actions between 1978 and 2002.

Presidential interventions may include the convening of a Presidential Emergency Board (PEB), or they may be limited to pressuring or “jawboning” with the parties. The president has also intervened in labor-management disputes to recommend binding arbitration. PEBs are normally not instituted except in circumstances where significant interstate commerce disruption is expected to result. See Table 29-3.

Work actions, which is the term for union organized slowdowns, sickouts, or other nonstrike activity, have increased since deregulation. Many of these disruptions go unheralded, but there have been 10 instances of such activity that have been recognized by various courts as being in violation of the RLA. Some of these nonstrike work actions
are presented by labor in a context of safety con­cerns. One tactic used by Alaska flight atten­dants was a technique called “CE1AOS” (Creating Havoc Around Our System) that involved inter­mittent but unpredictable walkouts. These tactics do not shut down the airline but attempt to make their point by harassment. See Table 29-4.

The concept of the “regional aircraft” was bom after World War II to describe the kind of air­planes used by feeder airlines or local service airlines authorized by the CAB to supplement the mainstay air carrier fleet. These airplanes were thus described to differentiate them from the long-haul aircraft flown by trunk carriers. At first these aircraft were older aircraft previously flown by the trunk lines, like the DC-3; Convair 240, 340, and 440; and the first commercial tur­boprop, the Vickers Viscount.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, a new kind of turboprop was conceived to service the short-haul and feeder market. These were airplanes like the high-winged, 28-seat Fokker F27, delivered in 1958, and larger iterations of the same basic design. The F27 and its successor types would go on to become the most successful turboprop of all time. In 1963, the low-winged Avro 748 turboprop took to the skies, carrying over 20 passengers.

Turboprops worked well in this market, as their operating characteristics allowed them to service smaller airports, and their fuel economy was much better than turbojets. After deregula­tion, and during the 1980s, other manufacturers entered the 30- to 40-seat commuter market, like De Havilland with the Dash 8, also a high – wing turboprop. While these turboprops were well liked by passengers because of their relative roominess, they were slow compared to jets.

The regional jet (RJ) was introduced into the aviation community in 1992 by the Cana­dian aircraft manufacturer, Bombardier, with its 50-seat CRJ100 (Canadair Regional Jet), in part fashioned on its business jet, the Challenger 604. In 1998, the company announced a stretched version holding 64 to 70 seats, designated the CRJ700, Series 701, and the 75-seat CRJ700, Series 705. A 90-seat version, CRJ900, joined the fleet in 2001. Canadair had some 55 percent of the regional jet market in 2002.

The Brazilian aircraft manufacturer, Embraer (Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica, South Amer­ica) entered the field in 1996 with the ERJ145, with 50 seats. The 35-seat ERJ135 was intro­duced into service in June 1999 to begin replac­ing the Brasilia, Embraer’s turboprop workhorse. In 1999, Embraer launched a new family of twin-engine passenger aircraft consisting of the EMB170, 175, 190, and 195 jets with seating in the 70 to 110 range. The first of this new fam­ily, the 170, flew on February 19, 2002. Embraer claimed about 40 percent of the regional jet mar­ket in 2002.

The Embraer 190 received FA A certifica­tion in September 2005. JetBlue Airways took the first delivery of this 106-seat RJ and ordered 100 more. The EMB190 is a state-of-the-art airplane, which relies on digital modeling and virtual reality concepts in its design. This air­plane has an all-digital cockpit and is equipped with fly-by-wire flight controls except for aile­rons. Winglets at the wing tips are standard. The fuselage design features the “double bubble” idea, instead of the traditional circular cross sec­tion, which provides the look and feel of a larger cabin. There are no “middle” seats in its 2 by 2 seating configuration.

The Sukhoi Superjet 100 is a 75- to 95-seat RJ, developed by the Russian aerospace firm Sukhoi in collaboration with Ilyushin and Boeing and with subsidy from the Russian government. Its first flight occurred in May 2008 and on February 3, 2012 the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued a type certificate for the airplane. The first aircraft was delivered to Amavia, an Armenian airline, and eight others have been delivered to the Russian company Aeroflot. Although orders and options are pending with other airlines and leasing com­panies, no other deliveries have been made. On May 9, 2012, a Superjet 100 on a demonstration flight out of Jakarta, Indonesia crashed into the side of a mountain, killing all 45 passengers aboard.

The Chinese are in the developmental stage of an RJ called the ARJ 21, with 80 seats for the first phase production and 100 seats for its next phase. Deployment of this aircraft was originally announced for 2008, but delays of various kinds have now pushed delivery to at least 2013.

There have been few other entrants into the RJ production market. Fairchild Dornier, a sub­sidiary of the U. S.-German partnership, Fairchild Aerospace Corporation, marketed the 329Jet. Production stopped with Fairchild’s financial reverses in the 1990s. The only other manufac­turer of regional jets was Aero International, a consortium composed of Aerospatiale, Ale – nia, and British Aerospace. The BAE 146 series became the Avro RJ series (RJ 70/85/100) and 160 of these were produced before BAE Systems announced their discontinuation in the last quar­ter of 2001.

The history of the regional jet is not quite ready to be written in full, but there are signs that this concept has just about run its course. During the 1990s, RJs began to replace the tur­boprops used by commuter airlines. As airlines reconfigured and modified their hub and spoke concepts to utilize RJs, these small jets became commonplace and relatively popular in that ser­vice. The regional jets are faster, the engines are more reliable, and engine maintenance costs are lower. But compared to turboprops, the original small RJs were much more expensive to oper­ate on a per seat basis. They were also more cramped than the larger turboprops, had less carry-on storage space, had lavatory issues, and minimal flight attendant service.

As seen above, the trend in RJ size has con­sistently been toward larger and larger aircraft. As the new RJ designs have increased their seat­ing capacity, the line between a medium-sized jet and a so-called RJ has been blurred. The Airbus 319, for instance, is normally configured for 124 seats, not much larger than the latest RJs. In 2005, a JetBlue spokesman refused to categorize the EMB190 as an RJ, saying that the aircraft was designed to fill the gap left by the DC-9. Many of these airplanes are being used by JetBlue to overfly hubs on point-to-point service (Orlando-MCO to Buffalo-BUF, for example).

The original RJ concept that emerged during the 1990s of producing jets to replace similar­sized turboprops is being phased out. Bombar­dier, for example, stopped production of its 50-seater in January 2006 and there is only lim­ited production of the ERJ145 under license in China.

Because experience has shown that operat­ing costs of RJs can make sense only on longer routes (400 miles seems to be the minimum), and as per seat operating costs, particularly fuel, have caused so-called “regional jets” to become larger, a market is appearing for a new era of turboprop aircraft to fill that niche. Most short-haul routes are less than 350 miles. Rising fuel prices have only reinforced this idea. Turboprops use about 30 percent less fuel than RJs.

The United States jet fleet is composed of four classes of aircraft: large, twin-aisle, single­aisle, and regional jet. In 1990, RJs accounted for 13 percent of this total, and by 2010 the RJ per­centage had risen to only 15 percent. By refer­ence to the chart in Figure 30-5, you will see that Boeing’s prediction is that RJs in 2030 will have shrunk to only 5 percent of the jet fleet while the total number of jet aircraft will have doubled.

There were only two companies producing turboprops in the 40-seat-plus capacity range as of 2007: Bombardier and ATR. The economic factors discussed above have caused increased orders for these companies’ turboprop aircraft. ATR as of July 2012 planned to boost production by 60 percent, to a rate of more than seven air­craft per month by 2014.

The old De Havilland Dash 8 production unit, which delivered the first Dash 8 in 1984, was sold first to Boeing and then to Bombardier in 1992. Bombardier turboprops are the Q100, first delivered in 1984 (33-37 seats); the Q200, first delivered in 1989 (33-37 seats); the Q300, a stretched version of the 100 (48-50 seats); and the Q400, first delivered in 2000 (68-78 seats). These airplanes have been fitted with a computer controlled noise and vibration suppression sys­tem since 1996 (the “Q” denotes “Quiet”), and produce a cabin decibel level equivalent to the CRJ regional jet. The Q400 has an impressive maximum cruise speed of 360 knots.

The European consortium ATR is a joint venture between EADS and Alenia Aeronautica. It produces the ATR 42-500 (48-50 seats) with a maximum cruise speed of 300 knots, and the ATR 72-500 (68-74 seats) with a maximum cruise speed of 276 knots.

Opening up smaller airports in point-to – point service by the use of RJs could also bring access to airline travel closer to home for the average traveler. Ninety percent of the country’s population lives within 30 miles of an airport, yet only 64 airports (1 percent of all airports) serve 80 percent of passengers enplaned in the United States.7

hroughout the period of Civil Aeronautics Board regulation of air carrier routes and rates, airports competed with each other for the limited amount of traffic that was available. Traffic was limited not only because CAB policy restricted the number of available routes, but also because it mandated high airfares. During the 1950s, 1960s, and most of the 1970s, airports maintained mar­keting departments whose functions included lob­bying the airlines and the CAB for service.

After deregulation, the passenger counts flowing through the airports of the United States increased by a factor of three over those in 1978, with an all-time high of over 726 million in 2007.1 The problem was no longer one of how to secure more service; rather it was one of how to service the existing, and increasing, traffic.

Commercial-service airports were suddenly faced with the need for more gates and runways (airside expansion) and for more groundside support facilities (parking, restaurants, rental car counters, ticket counters, and shops). Meth­ods of funding for renovation and expansion had to be addressed anew. The developing oper­ational practice of the airlines known as hub and spoke, with its concentration of passenger arrivals and departures all at the same time, put severe pressure on airport operations. Control of
existing gates had to be reevaluated in view of the increasing number of airlines requiring access to the limited number of available gates. Envi­ronmental concerns, both from increased aircraft operations and from ground traffic to and from the airports, brought additional pressures on air­port management practices.

The commercial air service industry consists of three essential components:

1. Air carriers

2. Air traffic control (АТС)

3. Airports

While all three of these components must combine to function in an orderly and cohesive manner, the provisions of the Airline Deregula­tion Act directly controlled only the air carriers. In other words, only the air carrier portion of this combination had been deregulated. The federal government is solely responsible for the opera­tion of the АТС system, and it is significantly involved in the operation of airports. Airports operate under a matrix of federal regulations, and commercial-service airports are all owned by local, regional, or state governments or their political subdivisions. While deregulation had unleashed the power and innovative potential of

FAA Forecast

Total Operations Not Projected to Return to 2000 Levels in the Foreseeable Future

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Source: FAA Forecast Table 32 (http://www. faa. gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/apl/aviation_forecasts/aerospace_forecasts/ 2012-2032/))

private enterprise in air carrier operations, the inherent limitations of government control in the АТС and airport sectors still overlay, and con­strain, that potential. We will review how these factors have impacted modern airport operations.

In 1990, the first comprehensive airport noise regulation statute, the Airport Noise and Capac­ity Act (ANCA), became law.

ANCA recognized that a national aviation noise policy was vital to the fitness of the coun­try’s air transportation system. Former Secretary of Transportation Samuel Skinner is on record as asserting that ANCA is “the most significant piece of aviation legislation since the deregula­tion act.” ANCA effectively altered the land­scape in matters of aviation noise.

Federal noise regulations in 1990 classified aircraft as Stage 1, Stage 2, or Stage 3 aircraft, with Stage 1 being the loudest. All Stage 1 air­craft have been phased out of service. ANCA mandated that no Stage 2 aircraft could be added to the fleet or imported into the United States after November 5, 1990, and that all unmodi­fied Stage 2 aircraft be phased out of service by December 31, 1999. Stage 2 aircraft include the 727, DC-9, and early versions of the 737 and 747. These airplanes were developed in the 1960s and 1970s.

Stage 3 aircraft must meet separate stan­dards for takeoff, landing, and sideline measure­ments, depending on the aircraft’s weight and number of engines. Stage 3 aircraft are the newer and quieter 757, 767, and MD-80 series, later versions of the 737 and 747, and aircraft that have been retrofitted with quieter engines by the noise reducing “hush kits.”

Under the provisions of ANCA, which apply to aircraft of at least 75,000 pounds certificated weight, airport operators were specifically reg­ulated as to when and how they could restrict Stage 2 and Stage 3 aircraft operations at their local airports, reaffirming the supremacy of the federal government over aviation policy in the

United States. Airport operators were prohibited from issuing unilateral restrictions on Stage 3 aircraft, since such aircraft comprise the state-of – the-art in aircraft noise. To paraphrase, the federal government in effect said, “This is the best we can do in engine noise, these are the airplanes that are necessary to be used in air transportation, and they will be allowed to fly no matter what the locals say.” Any attempted local regulation of Stage 3 aircraft would thus amount to an unlawful usurpa­tion of the federal prerogatives regarding aviation. Subject to due process safeguards, such as notice and opportunity to be heard, airport proprietors were allowed to apply certain reasonable restric­tions on the operation of Stage 2 aircraft as long as such local authorities did not impair the national policy of “phase out” articulated in the statute.

The ICAO standards for aircraft noise are contained in “Chapters” to the above-referenced publication known as Annex 16, Environmen­tal Protection, Volume I, which deals with air­craft noise. The work done at ICAO on aircraft noise is also performed in the aforementioned Committee on Aviation Environmental Protec­tion (CAEP), which was established in 1983. Its Chapters 2 and 3 fairly track the standards found in the FAA’s designation of Stage 2 and Stage 3 aircraft.

In June 2001, ICAO adopted new, more stringent noise standards, as recommended by CAEP, which went into effect on January 1, 2006. These standards mandate a noise reduc­tion level of 10 dB below the standards previ­ously required (Chapter 3). These standards are referred to as Chapter 4 standards by ICAO.

These standards were adopted by the FAA by rule on July 5, 2005, designated as Stage 4 standards by the FAA, which also went into effect on January 1, 2006.4 These noise standards are intended to provide uniform noise certifica­tion standards for Stage 4 airplanes certificated in the United States. There is no weight limitation or exclusion for airplane type designs submitted after January 1, 2006; thus, all aircraft types will be subject to the Stage 4 noise standards.

Care should be taken to note the difference between the requirements of ANCA and the new FAA rule. ANCA, which requires compliance with Stage 3 standards, only applies to aircraft with certificated weight of 75,000 pounds and above. The new FAA rule, which requires new type designs to comply with Stage 4 standards, applies to all new airplane type design submis­sions, regardless of weight.

Although noise control of aircraft is exclu­sively a federal function, airport authorities and local governments do have the option to mitigate noise effects through land use controls, such as zoning and land acquisition, which the FAA agrees is the exclusive domain of state and local governments. Indeed, federal policy respecting Airport Improvement Program (AIP) funding favors the use of such funds for that purpose. Airport operators applying for funds for these purposes must design noise exposure maps and develop mitigation programs consistent with federal requirements to insure that noise levels are compatible with adjacent land uses. Noise compatibility projects include residential and public building sound insulation. They include land acquisition and relocating residents from noise-sensitive areas. Airports have also installed noise monitoring equipment and noise barriers to reduce ground run-up noise.

ANCA also provides for additional funding sources by permitting the use of passenger facil­ity charges (PFCs) for land use control. Airports have collected and used PFC funds for noise stud­ies and mitigation totaling $15 billion as of 2005.

Overall, ANCA provides a framework for the implementation of a national policy of aircraft noise control, and reaffirms that local govern­ments have the continuing obligation to adhere to that policy and to cooperate with federal authori­ties to secure the achievement of such national interests. The policy is working. According to sta­tistics supplied by FAA, exposure to airline noise has decreased significantly and consistently from 1975 to 2001. Airline noise levels are calculated using the number of persons exposed to 65 dbA, in millions. In 1975, some 7 million people were subject to noise levels in excess of that number, while in 2001, the number of persons exposed to 65 dbA had declined to just 0.4 million. (See Figure 34-5.)

Through FAA efforts, under the AIP set – aside programs, residential and school popu­lations in the hundreds of thousands are now exposed to reduced aircraft noise (at or below 65 dbA) as of 2010.

Continuous Lower Emission, Energy, and Noise Program (CLEEN)

The CLEEN program was initiated by the FAA in a partnership format with the aviation industry with the objective of reducing aircraft fuel bum by 33 percent and reducing oxides of nitrogen by 60 percent compared to ICAO emissions standards. This voluntary effort attempts to get out in front of the regulatory scheme favored by the EU (and acceded to by the FAA under ICAO guidelines).

The program also seeks to reduce aircraft noise by 32 decibels from the current ICAO standard. Technologies include lighter and more efficient gas turbine engine components, noise – reducing engine nozzles, adaptable wing trail­ing edges, optimized flight trajectories using NextGen flight management systems, and open rotor and geared turbofan engines. The CLEEN program will accelerate the development of these technologies for potential introduction into air­craft and engines beginning in 2015. [19] [20]

Shortly after American entered Chapter 11, US Airways launched a hostile bid to cause a merger of the two airlines while American is under bank­ruptcy protection. While management at Ameri­can initially resisted this move, the unions of both airlines, the creditors of American, and the stockholders of both airlines ultimately came out in favor of it. In February 2013, the companies

announced agreement to the plan of merger, sub­ject to the approval of the Bankruptcy Judge and the Justice Department.

The merger plan agreed to by the compa­nies’ boards of directors includes combining the airlines under the American Airlines brand, but with the US Airways management team in charge. The US Airways name would cease to exist. Creditors of American would receive the largest part of the stock of the new company, which is expected to reimburse them in full, with interest. US Airways stockholders would receive the balance of new company stock, except for a carve out of 3.5 percent for existing stockholders of American Airways.16

If approved, the new American Airlines company would be the largest airline in the world and would be a commanding presence in eight of the busiest airports in the United States. (See Fig. 35-22.) It would also remain a member of the Oneworld global airline alliance. The new arrangement would give American Airlines a 26 percent U. S. market share, with United at 19.3 percent, Delta at 19.2 percent, Southwest at

18.2 percent, and all other airlines combining for

17.3 percent.

Informed sources uniformly predicted gov­ernment acceptance of the proposed merger plan based on prior merger approvals of United – Continental, Delta-Northwest and Southwest-Air

Tran. But on August 13, 2013, the Department of Justice, joined by six states and the District of Columbia filed suit to block the merger. This action came as a particular surprise since the European Commission had approved the basic plan only a week earlier. The proposed merger partners announced their full intention to fight the lawsuit and they expect to prevail. The most recent conventional wisdom is to expect some sort of compromise with the DOJ to lessen any anti-competitive effects of the proposed merger.

During the period 2000 through 2012 the domestic airline industry went through signifi­cant consolidation, yet airline fares rose at a rate less than food (27 percent), beverage prices (38 percent), and housing costs (30 percent). The average increase in prices of all items monitored by the federal government increased 32 percent. The monitored airline fares, however, do not include the add-on fees that airlines have increas­ingly imposed on travelers in recent years.

This new legislation has also raised the prospect of federal government involvement in state and local law enforcement issues, which may violate long-standing federal law. The Posse Comita­tus Act of 1878 is an arcane statute passed by Congress toward the end of the Reconstruction Era after the Civil War. The Reconstruction Era refers to the period after the defeat of the Con­federate states during which the former rebellious states were reincorporated into the Union. Fed­eral troops had occupied the former Confederate States to enforce federal law and to police state and local elections.

Posse Comitatus is Latin for “power of the county” and the doctrine arose in England in the 15th century to support the common law right of local sheriffs to impress citizens into a posse to enforce the law. In the American colonies, the doctrine referred to the military enforcement of civil or state laws, which was anathema to the colonists due to the use of British military forces in the colonies to enforce laws passed by the Eng­lish Parliament prior to the American Revolution.

The Constitution of the United States spe­cifically limits the role of the military in civil matters, and makes the military at all times sub­ject to the oversight of civilian elected author­ity. The Constitution also limits the role of the federal government generally, reserving unto the states all powers not specifically granted by the Constitution to the federal government. During the Civil War some constitutional protections, like habeas corpus (which is a constitutional safeguard and mechanism to prevent unlaw­ful or secret imprisonment of citizens) were suspended by President Lincoln under claim of “war powers.” After the Civil War ended, the federal military occupied the South as a con­quered territory and became the primary tool of law enforcement.

The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 was designed to remove federal military author­ity over the state and local governments of the southern states after 13 years of Reconstruction. The original law specifically prohibits the Army from enforcing civilian law, and by amend­ment in 1956, it also includes the Air Force. By a directive of the Department of Defense, the Navy and the Marines are also prohibited from interfering with or participating in state and local law enforcement. The Coast Guard, which is now lodged in the Department of Homeland Security, is not covered by the Act or by any federal directive because the Coast Guard is actively involved in coastal law enforcement and has a federal complementary mission with the states.

The use of military or federal government drones within the United States, therefore, will be a subject of constitutional and judicial scru­tiny because of the Posse Comitatus Act as well as the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.

The governmental entities created by the Treaty of Rome were entities in name only. They had been created and their responsibilities had been generally articulated. But boxes on an orga­nizational chart must be given life by those who will take up the duty of beginning to per­form the responsibilities assigned to them. The jurisdictional limits of each had to be estab­lished, and then tested one against the other. A pecking order had to be worked out. Bureau­cratic motivations, goals, and energies had to be demonstrated. Results were measured. In the course of starting up a program as ambitious and unique as the European Economic Commu­nity, monumental uncertainties were expected and experienced, but they gradually gave way to a semblance of purpose and order. We will next review these governing entities and their duties, and we will then see how they came together to perform their difficult joint function of pulling together the various disparate Mem­ber States into one cohesive, cooperative, and effective unit.

The Council, composed of representatives appointed from the Member States (one represen­tative from each Member State), has both execu­tive and legislative functions. It is charged with responsibility for ensuring that the objectives of the EC, as an entity, are realized and put into practice. It may issue regulations and directives that are binding on Member States. Regulations are normally adopted based on recommendations of the Commission or Parliament. Work of the Council was compromised, particularly early on, by representatives’ allegiances to their own gov­ernment’s interest, rather than to the collective interests of the EC. National governments still retain some powers not delegated to the EU.

Parliament is composed of elected repre­sentatives from the Member States (754 repre­sentatives elected by citizens of Member States). From the first elections held in 1979, the Parlia­ment has assumed a larger and more powerful role in the EU as a result of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (amended in the Treaty of Lisbon, signed in 2007 and entered into force on December 1, 2009) and the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. The European Parliament, through these treaties, has progressed from a consultative body to a true legislative assembly. The Parliament is the only EU body that meets and debates in public, and it enacts the majority of European laws today. The legislative procedure for enacting legisla­tion depends on a “co-decision” process through which the Parliament and the Council are put on an equal footing, and together they enact laws proposed by the Commission. Unlike similar legislative bodies, the Parliament does not pos­sess the right of legislative initiative or the pro­posing of law. The members of Parliament are committed to act on behalf of the EC rather than at the behest of their constituency or their home governments, and sit in political groups instead of national delegations. Examples of European political groups that represent a particular politi­cal allegiance are: (1) European Conservative and Reformists, (2) European People’s Party, and (3) Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe.

The Commission is headquartered in Brus­sels and is composed of 27 representatives appointed by the Member State governments (one commissioner per State). Due to the breadth of its administrative duties, it is the largest of the

EU institutions, employing about half of all EU employees. The Commission is unique in that it is responsible for proposing all legislation to the European Parliament (for co-decision with the Council). The Commissioners all swear an oath of independence, disclaiming any partisan influ­ence from any source, and undertake to protect the interests of the European citizen, not the national citizen.

The Commission is in the nature of a Secre­tariat, or executive body, having primarily execu­tive duties, and its purpose is to see to it that the development of the EC conforms to the require­ments of the Treaty of Rome. It has considerable autonomy in matters of competition, trade policy, and agriculture. It issues recommendations and opinions to the Council with the view to having the Council adopt binding regulations or directives to enforce compliance, specifically with regard to competition issues. The Commission has taken the lead in forcing compliance with the objectives of the Treaty of Rome (e. g., that the EC act as a cohesive force for the common good of the Mem­ber States rather than in their own national inter­ests). The Commission has gradually accrued more power and responsibility since the 1980s, primarily as a result of decisions of the Court of Justice.

The foregoing were the original political institutions of the EEC, and remain as such in the European Union.

The European Court of Justice, although not political, was an original institution of the Treaty of Rome. It sits in Luxembourg and is the highest court in the EC. It is responsible for inter­preting the treaties that established the EU and its predecessors and the laws, regulations, and direc­tives emanating from its institutions.

The progression of rocketry from literary fancy to scientific reality is generally credited to three men, all of whom worked separately from each other at about the same time. All were inspired by Jules Verne.

Konstantin Tsiolkovsky (1857-1935) was a provincial math teacher who spent most of his life in the small Russian town of Kaluga. Tsiolkovsky was a theoretician in aerodynamic flight, working through some of the same prob­lems the Wright brothers did at about the same time. His theories extended into jet propulsion and rocketry, as well as to the mechanics of liv­ing in space. In 1895 he published Dreams of the Earth and Sky, in which he described the mining of asteroids.

Tsiolkovsky’s primary work, Explora­tion of the Universe with Reaction Machines, was published in 1903 and is generally recog­nized as containing the first scientifically prov­able theories on the use of rockets in space. His writings are very detailed, including his specification for a mix of liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen to fuel the engine of his theo­retical spacecraft. Hydrogen was first liquefied in 1898, and it is nothing short of amazing that this mixture propels the Space Shuttle today. Tsiolkovsky was a true theoretician, never attempting to prove his theories by practical applications, like building models or attempt­ing motor or flight tests. In spite of the volume of his publications, his work was not widely known outside of Russia.

Robert Goddard (1882-1945) was inspired not only by Jules Verne’s writings but also by another science fiction tome, H. G. Well’s The War of the Worlds. He dedicated himself to aero­nautics and space issues from an early age, and his first article, “The Use of the Gyroscope in the Balancing and Steering of Airplanes,” was published by Scientific American in 1907.2 After earning a Ph. D. in physics in 1911, he regis­tered two patents describing multistage launchers and liquid and solid propellant rockets, which became central to the progression of rocket sci­ence. By 1916, his work was being partially sub­sidized by the Smithsonian Institution.3

Goddard’s 1919 manuscript entitled A Method of Reaching Extreme Altitudes, pub­lished by the Smithsonian in 1920, is regarded as a seminal work in the pioneering of rocketry. He continued his experimentation with rockets, launching the first liquid-fueled rocket on March 16, 1926, in a cabbage patch near Auburn, Mas­sachusetts. Although it rose only 184 feet in 2.5 seconds, it proved the workability of liquid-fuel propellants in rockets.

Like many who had gone before, much of Goddard’s work was met by mocking and scorn, particularly by the press, and most particularly by The New York Times.4 Although he withdrew from public view and conducted his experiments in as much privacy as possible, Goddard still attracted notoriety with each rocket launch. Launch failures and ensuing ground fires caused the Massachu­setts State Fire Marshal to prohibit Goddard from conducting any further tests in the state.

Charles Lindbergh found Goddard’s work fascinating and full of promise, and contacted him in November 1929. Lindbergh was famous by this time, and the lending of his name and credibility to Goddard’s experimentation was invaluable. Through the influence of Lindbergh, Daniel Gug­genheim agreed to fund Goddard’s research in the amount of $50,000 beginning in 1930. Goddard continued to receive support from the Guggen­heim Foundation in the ensuing years.5

Seeking open space and relative solitude, in July 1930, Goddard relocated to, of all places, Roswell, New Mexico,6 where he continued his research and experimentation until the beginning of

World War II. He experimented with rocket control through movable vanes and rudders, as well as the use of gyroscopes. His rockets carried aloft the first payload, a barometer and a camera. Details of all of his work were published in 1936 in the treatise, Liquid Propellant Rocket Development.

Efforts to interest the United States govern­ment in his work were unsuccessful. But not everyone was unable to grasp the potential of his work. The new government of Germany, which took power in January 1933, was highly inter­ested in Goddard’s work. The National Socialist German Workers Party, also known by its acro­nym, the “Nazi Party,” led by Adolf Hitler, was very interested indeed.

Hermann Oberth (1894-1989) was born in Romania but lived his life in Germany. He was one of the first to discover the works of Konstan­tin Tsiolkovsky, during the 1920s. He published the book, The Rocket into Interplanetary Space, in 1923. This book presented theories very simi­lar to Goddard’s, but Oberth denied that he had had the benefit of Goddard’s work beforehand.7 Oberth conducted his own experiments during the 1920s, and in 1929 published an updated ver­sion of his previous book under the title of The Road to Space Travel.

Largely due to Oberth’s efforts, rocketry became popular in Europe during the 1920s. In 1928, Wernher von Braun, while attending a boarding school in northern Germany, happened on Hermann Oberth’s book (The Rocket into Interplanetary Space). Fascinated, he launched himself into a program of physics and math­ematics that would prepare him for the fledgling science of rocketry. By 1930, von Braun was a student at the Technical University of Berlin, where Oberth was an instructor. An amateur rocketry group inspired by Oberth’s book, known as the “Spaceflight Society,” held meetings on the Berlin campus, and von Braun became a member. It was here that he met Oberth, and as a result von Braun was selected to assist Oberth in his liquid-fueled rocket motor tests. At this time von Braun was introduced to Goddard’s work, and he followed up with his own research into Goddard’s publications through scientific jour­nals and publications.

The German Army began its rocket pro­gram in 1931. When it came to power in 1933, the Nazi government placed the advancement of rocketry high on its military “want list.” At the time, the terms of the Versailles Treaty (the 1918 agreement that ended World War I) prohibited Germany from developing military aircraft, but it said nothing about rocketry, mainly because practical rocketry was unknown to anyone except to a handful of engineers. The German Army began recruiting bright university students with credentials and interest in rocket science.

By 1933, von Braun was working on his doctoral dissertation in physics. Because of a research grant from the German Army, von Braun began collaborating on a secret solid-fuel

program at the ballistic weapons center at Kummersdorf. The Kummersdorf site was moved to Peenemunde on the Baltic coast in 1936. Peenemunde was the secret laboratory and test site for the development of the V-2 rocket, which is recognized as the immediate precursor of the launch vehicles later used in the U. S. space program. The V-2 was the first practical rocket, 46 feet in length and weighing 27,000 pounds. It flew at speeds in excess of 3,500 miles an hour and delivered a 2,200-pound warhead 500 miles away. It was put to use against Allied targets, including London, in September 1944.

With the approach of Allied forces toward the end of World War II, von Braun arranged the defection of about 125 of his top rocket sci­entists and engineers, who brought with them their plans, drawings, and test results. Von Braun and his “rocket team” became the backbone of the United States’ ballistic missile program after World War II, and ultimately were largely responsible for the development of the Saturn V super launch vehicle that propelled the Apollo modules to the moon. Although von Braun was central to the perfection of rocket science in its practical aspects, he is considered in the “second generation” of rocket pioneers.

Aside from telecommunications, private enter­prise remained largely on the sidelines of space operations. The “government only” perception began to change during the 1980s. Europe’s Arianespace began offering launch services in 1983. This was followed by President Reagan’s Executive Order 12465 signed in 1984, which authorized U. S. commercial space launch activity with the words “in order to encourage, facilitate, and coordinate the development of commercial expendable launch vehicle (ELV) operations by private United States enterprises.” Up to that time, all U. S. commercial satellites had been launched on rockets owned and operated by the United States government. The Executive Order was followed by passage in Congress of the Commercial Space Launch Act that same year, which directed the Department of Transportation to “encourage, facilitate, and promote commer­cial space launches.” The DOT set up the Office of Commercial Space Transportation to address the transition from government to commercial operations. In 1989, the U. S. government decided to stop launching commercial payloads on the Space Shuttle, in part because of the Challenger disaster that occurred in 1986. This spurred com­mercial launch interest even more.

The Commercial Space Launch Act estab­lished a comprehensive licensing structure that enabled launch operators to comply quickly and efficiently with existing federal regulations. The statute also authorized the licensing of nonfed­eral launch sites, from which commercial space launches would occur, in addition to commercial launches from federal sites. In 1995, the licensing responsibility was transferred from the DOT to the FAA’s Office of Commercial Space Transpor­tation (FAA/AST), which now licenses and regu­lates U. S. commercial space launch and reentry activity, including launch vehicles. It also licenses nonfederal launch sites. But even with the man­date given to FAA/AST, there were at least 12 other federal bureaus identified that could have some jurisdiction in regulating space activities. In fact, it was not clear under existing law that a pri­vate company could legally land a launched vehi­cle back in the United States. There was clearly a need for clarification of the limits of commercial space law and its regulation by FAA/AST.

Jl Wright brothers’ airplane (a model B, modi­fied for the flight) would be the first air­plane to fly coast-to-coast in the United States in 1911, piloted by a nearly deaf, cigar smok­ing 32 year old motorcycle racer and yachtsman of independent means. This was Cal Rodgers, great-grandnephew of Captain Oliver Hazard Perry (who defeated a British squadron at the Battle of Lake Erie in the War of 1812), and the great-grandson of Commodore Matthew Cal­braith Perry (who was in command of the U. S. Navy contingent that sailed into Tokyo Bay in 1853), the latter being credited with the opening of feudalistic and xenophobic Japan to U. S. and international trade for the first time. Cal Rodg­ers wanted to follow in his esteemed forefathers’ footsteps, but he was denied admission to the United States Naval Academy due to the hear­ing deficiency that had resulted from an onset of scarlet fever when he was six years old.

It could be said that Cal Rodgers had been at loose ends for most of his adult life. At six feet four inches tall, he had excelled at football in college, but thereafter he seemed to be unable to find his niche. He was never required to work for a salary due to his financial station, and he spent his days after college in “gentlemen’s” pursuits and in amateur sports adventures. Cal’s cousin, Lt. John Rodgers, was in 1911 a recent graduate of the Naval Academy, and he had been assigned
to take flying lessons at the Wright brothers’ fly­ing school in Dayton, Ohio (Huffman Prairie) as a part of the fledgling Naval Aviation program. It was there during the first half of 1911, while vis­iting with his cousin, that Cal Rodgers encoun­tered his first airplane up close.

Cal received ninety minutes of flight instruc­tion from Orville Wright and considered that he was ready for solo flight. Orville disagreed, so Cal just bought one of the Wright’s Model Bs and took off on his own. He entered his first aer­ial competition in July 1911, and in August, he won $ 11,000 at the International Aviation Meet in Chicago for endurance aloft.

Not quite one year earlier, in October 1910, publisher William Randolph Hearst had offered a prize of $50,000 for any person who could fly coast-to-coast within a period of thirty days from start to finish. In spite of no serious threat to the prize money from anyone else, Rodgers decided that he could win that endurance prize as well. Orville Wright, again, disagreed with the brash Rodgers, believing that the state of the aviation art had not progressed to the point where any fly­ing machine could endure such a trial. Undaunted, Rodgers lined up financial support from the Chi­cago meat packer J. Ogden Armour, who had just inaugurated a new five cent soft drink called the “Vin Fiz.” Armour seized on the idea of a cross­country publicity campaign as being just the right
promotion for his new drink and agreed to finance the venture. (See Figure App 6-1.)

The modified Model В was dubbed the “Vin Fiz” and carried the designation “EX,” which denoted that it was for exhibition fly­ing. The primary distinguishing characteristic of the Model В was the absence of the forward elevator, or canard, which had been the primary vertical control device on all prior Wright mod­els, including the “A.” The Model В was larger than the EX, with a wingspan of 38.5 feet to only 32 feet for the exhibition model. Both craft used twin pusher-type propellers chain driven by the 35 horsepower water-cooled motor, but the EX was built specifically for the stresses of exhibition flying. It carried no instruments, and Rodgers sat in an open chair located on the lower wing structure, completely exposed to the elements.

Armour also agreed to commission a three – car train to accompany the cross-country effort and to carry a contingent of mechanics and sup­port personnel, including the famed Charley Tay­
lor, who had built the Wright internal combus­tion engine used in the first successful flight of the Flyer at Kitty Hawk. The train, known as the “Vin Fiz Special,” was pulled by a steam engine, and consisted of a day coach, a Pull­man sleeping car, and a “hangar” car containing tools, spare parts, and a Palmer-Singer automo­bile with which to fetch Rodgers and return him to the Pullman at the end of each day. Both Cal’ s mother and his wife, Mabel, went along for moral support, as did a revolving assortment of friends, dignitaries, and newspaper reporters.

The adventure began on September 17, 1911 at the Sheepheads Bay Race Track on Long Island, where he lifted off to begin the first leg of the 4,000-mile odyssey (See Figure App 6-2.). His route would necessarily follow railroad tracks in order to make use of the “Vin Fiz Spe­cial” maintenance crew, but also because there were no navigation aids to guide his progress, nor were there any aerial charts, airports, or support facilities of any kind. The “iron compass,” the railroad tracks that would still be used to guide

the first airmail pilots later in the decade, ran westerly toward the great city of Chicago, on the far side of the daunting Allegheny Mountains. These same mountains would provide the great­est obstacle to the establishment of successful cross-country airmail in the years to come, but now they lay directly ahead of Rodgers.

Although exact historical sources are scarce, it appears that Rodgers elected to proceed north­west from Sheepheads Bay, to Middletown, New York, for his first leg of 84 miles, which he accom­plished easily and, as he said, he “didn’t even knock the ashes off my cigar.” But this pleasant beginning was not to be a harbinger of good things to come. Although the northwest route would avoid the harshest portions of the vaunted Allegh­enies, flat land it was not. The troubles began as he left Middleton when he crashed on takeoff. Diffi­culties continued as he made his way west toward Elmira, New York, then down into Pennsylvania, and finally on into the flat country of Ohio.

By October 9, 1911, Rodgers had made it only to Chicago. He was just one third of the way across the country and it was becoming obvious that the Hearst time limitation for the prize money
could not be met. He reached an accommodation with the Armour organization, nevertheless, to press on, prize or no prize. At Chicago the route turned south, partly because of the established rail lines and cities lying in that direction and partly to prepare for the southern circumvention of the highest portions of the Rocky Mountains. At stops along the way, crowds increased in size and enthusiasm. In Kansas City, the authorities closed the schools to celebrate the remarkable effort.

Enroute, the mechanics were kept busy refurbishing the Vin Fiz after the constant mis­haps encountered on takeoff and landings. An accurate tabulation of the number of crashes over the course of the journey is not available to us, but estimates range from sixteen to thirty – nine, depending on the prevailing distinction between a “hard landing” and a “crash.” Cal fared little better than the airplane, and he flew in bandages over most of the route and in leg casts over some of it.

By the time he and the Vin Fiz hobbled into Pasadena, California on November 5, 1911, it had been 49 days since he lifted off from the East Coast. A crowd estimated in number from

10,0 to 20,000 was there to greet him. He had made some 69 stops and had logged a total of 82 hours and 4 minutes airborne. But he was not quite through proving his point: he wanted the wheels of the Vin Fiz to kiss the Pacific waters. On November 12 he took off for the 20-mile hop to Long Beach and the Pacific Ocean only to experience after just 8 miles one of his worst crashes of all, at Compton. Rodgers was hospital­ized with internal injuries and a fractured ankle, and his recuperation forced a further delay until December 10, when he finally was able to com­plete his meandering and perilous coast-to-coast expedition. Crowds cheered as Rodgers taxied the weary Vin Fiz into the lapping surf of the Pacific, his ever-present cigar clenched in his teeth. It had been 84 days since he left Sheepheads Bay.

Cal Rodgers had become a celebrity, as his progress had been faithfully heralded by the coun­tries’ newspapers during the course of the journey. As King of the Tournament of Roses Parade on New Year’s Day 1912, he flew over the gathered marching bands and floats, dropping carnations to those assembled there. He was awarded a medal by the Aero Club of New York later that month, with President of the United States Taft in attendance.

Back in California on April 3, 1912, he was observed to take off from Long Beach, not far from where he had brought his continental odys­sey to its tortured end. He proceeded out over the Long Beach pier and was seen flying along with a flock of seagulls when his new Wright Model В suddenly dived into the Pacific Ocean. Calbraith Perry Rodgers did not survive. An investigation concluded that a seagull had been impacted by the airplane and had lodged between the articulating surfaces of the rudder, rendering control hopeless.

Cal Rodgers’ accomplishment has been relegated to the status of a footnote in the annals of aviation history, yet it stands as one of the many similar stories of the sacrifices of the gallant pioneers of flight. He was one of those who placed his love of flying and his capacity to endure ahead of his own safety and comfort.

« If you are looking for perfect safety, you will do well to sit on a fence and watch the birds; but if you really wish to learn, you must mount a machine and become acquainted with its tricks by actual trial.»

-Wilbur Wright, from an address to the Western Society of Engineers in Chicago, 18 September 1901.