Category AVIATION &ТНЕ ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

Frank Lorenzo was obviously not cut from the same airline cloth as were the early aviation chieftains like Jack Frye, Eddie Rickenbacker, and Juan Trippe, people who loved to build things and loved to fly. Lorenzo was first and foremost a financial guy, the quintessential MBA focused on finance, with little thought or care for tradition, history, or national concept. Whereas the airlines had been built by men who expected to make money from their efforts, not every deci­sion they made was a financial one; not every action taken was with a view toward the bottom line. Empire building in the early days was done one step at a time, not in one fell swoop like the hostile takeovers, leveraged buyouts, and unre­strained mergers that became the modus operandi of the deregulated 1980s. Lorenzo had turned the venerable airline industry on its head: Continen­tal had absorbed People Express (and Frontier) and New York Air. Texas Air, in turn, owned Continental, and had then acquired Eastern Air Lines. By 1987, Texas Air controlled 20 percent of the domestic airline market, and it had only 20 employees.

By the late 1980s, Lorenzo and his business methods were wearing thin in most quarters, including labor, the banks, other airlines, and the agencies of the federal government. His reputa­tion was preceding him. It was said that the Ber­lin wall, before it began to come down in 1989, bore Lorenzo’s name in red with a slash through it, signifying the negative. The ultimate indus­try rejection came from the bankruptcy order of Judge Burton Lifland, in his termination of Lorenzo’s status as debtor in possession of East­ern. Judge Lifland noted that Lorenzo was “not competent to reorganize” the company. Lorenzo himself seems to have tired of the game. Pickets from Eastern regularly appeared outside of his home and there was some concern for his safety and that of his family.

Jan Carlzon had built SAS (Scandinavian Airlines System) into a niche airline operation within the continent of Europe, competing with the large state-owned airlines. His vision was to beat his European competition to the markets of America now opening due to deregulation. Thus, he began overtures in the middle 1980s to estab­lish a relationship with a United States carrier. After negotiating unsuccessfully first with East­ern, then TWA, he approached Lorenzo with a proposition for a partnership arrangement with Continental, based out of Newark. This led to an agreement in October 1988 for SAS to purchase a minority interest in Texas Air for $50 million, to be followed the next year with another pay­ment of $40 million. Texas Air, in the late 1980s, was suffering hefty losses, and the experience with Eastern after its purchase by Texas Air was draining.

Lorenzo’s reputation had made its way to Europe, where labor interests looked askance at the prospect of the Texas Air-SAS alliance. One European tabloid ran a cartoon depicting Carlzon and Lorenzo in bed together with the caption “It’s fine if you go to bed just don’t go to sleep.” Even Lorenzo had to acknowledge that his repu­tation detracted from the ongoing success and potential of Texas Air holdings. In 1990, Texas Air was reorganized into Continental Air Hold­ings, and in the summer of that year Lorenzo struck a deal with SAS for the sale of his entire personal stake in the company for $50 million.

Seemingly always at the top of his game, and a master of timing, Lorenzo sold out just before Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. The invasion and resulting worldwide reaction spurred fuel costs and depressed airline travel. Continental was unable to meet the financial strain imposed, and filed for Chapter 11 protec­tion again in December 1990, prompting some wags to suggest that Continental was now in “Chapter 22.”

Lorenzo made one last appearance on the airline scene in 1993. His idea was to inaugu­rate a new carrier called “Friendship Airlines.” He made application to the DOT, as required by law, for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity. Since deregulation, this procedure has been used to determine the “fitness” of an appli­cant to conduct an interstate air carrier operation. The DOT denied the application. Lorenzo was finally gone. [14] [15]

Passenger enplanements since 1978 have increased dramatically. In 1978, 275 million people flew on domestic airlines. By 1995, that figure had doubled, to 548 million. In 2000, the number had increased to 693 million. Because of 9-11, passenger travel dropped significantly, to a low of 641 million in 2002, but by the end of 2005, passenger enplanements were almost 780 million. Between 2006 and 2010, cycling once again primarily due to economic factors, the average annual passenger count declined to 736 million. It is beyond argument that deregula­tion opened up air travel to the vast general popu­lation of the United States primarily because of a falling fare structure.

dumber of Carriers

The number of carriers operating in any given year since deregulation has fluctuated greatly, although there has been an increase overall. This variation has been referred to as the “ebb and flow” of entrants by former CAB chairman John E. Robson. The “flow” of entrants has been marked by high expectations, and the “ebb” of failures in the industry by excuses. A variety of reasons has been given for new entrant fail­ures: inexperienced management, unrealistic business plans, lack of solid financial backing, public doubts about airlines’ reliability, and poorly conceived pricing structures. Recently, new entrant airlines have stabilized their perfor­mance record, with far fewer failures than were seen in the period just after the airlines were deregulated.

In 1938 when the CAB took over economic regulation of the airlines, there were 16 trunk carriers; by 1978, that number had shrunk to 10 airlines, although local service airlines and commuters had brought the total number of air­lines to 43. While airlines have been classified in a number of different ways, the Department of Transportation defines airlines based on annual revenues as major airlines, national airlines, and regional airlines. In 2000, there were a total of 90 airlines operating in the United States, of which 10 were classified as “major” airlines, a rough equivalent to the trunk airlines of regulation days. By reason of volume and inflation costs, by 2010 the number of “major” airlines had grown to 18. As of 2012, through mergers and acquisi­tions, the number of incumbent “major” airlines had declined to five. The number of surviving legacy airlines remains a moving target as carri­ers continue to adjust to the factors that seem to control their individual destinies.

Carriers proposing to merge are required to provide notice to the DOJ and to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The DOJ reviews the

proposed merger plan, usually within a period of 30 days, and if no competitive issues are discerned by the DOJ, the parties are free to proceed. In some cases, the DOJ may issue its request for additional information, which pre­vents further action toward merger by the carriers for another 20 days. Often, concerns of the DOJ are addressed in this manner and any issues are resolved without formal action. Other times, liti­gation is required to resolve the issues.

The DOJ normally applies the provisions of Section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, which prohibits the acquisition of stock or assets “where in any line of commerce or in any activ­ity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” The statute provides the means for the proposed action to be prevented or delayed while the objections of the government are heard. The procedure reflects the fact that, once a merger process has begun or has been completed, it is very difficult to undo. Delay or prevention of the proposed merger activity is accomplished by the filing of a complaint in federal court and the seeking of a temporary restraining order or injunction to prohibit the air­lines from proceeding with the proposed action.

The authority of the DOJ extends to instances involving the acquisition of relatively minor assets of one carrier by another, as in the case of gates or slots at airports. In 1989, for example, the DOJ moved to block Eastern’s pro­posal to sell gates to US Air at Philadelphia Inter­national Airport, and again in 1991 when Eastern sought to sell slots and gates to United at Reagan Washington National Airport.

Finally, the DOJ has authority, jointly with the DOT, over airline acquisition of international route authority and mergers between domestic and foreign carriers. The DOT, in turn, works with the Department of State, which has final authority in dealing with foreign governments. The DOJ may challenge these proposals in the same manner as in domestic acquisitions.

s a result of the industrialization of society and the growth of heavy industry during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, pollution of air and water became a significant by-product of progress. Until the 1950s, prevailing wisdom held that such pollution was the inevitable price of such progress.

Visible air pollution was seen from station­ary sources like manufacturing plants and facto­ries and in “smog” accumulations in places like the Los Angeles Air Basin due to automobile emissions. Industrial and municipality discharges into waterways caused widespread prohibitions against swimming and fishing due to health risks. Catastrophes like the Cuyahoga River fire (the river caught fire) and the Love Canal scan­dal (toxic waste seepage caused a declaration of a federal emergency) were high-profile examples of pollution. When jet transport aircraft were introduced into the air carrier fleet in 1958, the dense, black exhaust emissions created on take­off at ground level and during climbout were vivid evidence of yet another encroachment on air quality levels.

Prior acceptance of pollution as an inevita­ble by-product of progress has now been roundly rejected. Current environmental policy is con­cerned with almost all aspects of the quality
of life on earth. In this chapter we will briefly review the evolution of current policy gener­ally, and we will look at how current policy has attempted to address the specific environmental impacts of aviation.

The Air Pollution Act and the Clean Air Act

The first attempt by Congress to address the problem of air pollution generally came in the Air Pollution Act of 1955.1 Subsequent efforts to strengthen controls on pollution occurred in amendments beginning in 1963 in the Clean Air Act, which was amended almost yearly until 1970. That year proved to be a watershed year for environmentalists, with the passage of the Clean Air Act of 1970 (an amendment to the 1963 Act),2 which created the Environmental Protection Agency as an independent agency reporting directly to the president. Its broad authority is over control of pollution, noise, and radiation.

Although the Clean Air Act mandates a national policy, the statute gives state and local governments primary responsibility for regula­tion of pollution from power plants, factories, and
other stationary sources. The EPA retains primary responsibility for “mobile source” pollution.

The EPA is required to consult with the FAA on any standards sought by the EPA to be made applicable to aircraft engine emissions. The EPA is prohibited by the terms of the Clean Air Act from changing aircraft emission standards if such a change would significantly increase noise or adversely affect safety. The FAA is charged with enforcing EPA standards through FAA regulations.

The EPA coordinates its aircraft engine emission regulation authority with the Interna­tional Civil Aviation Organization, created by the Chicago Convention in 1944, due to its role to develop international civil aviation in a “safe and orderly manner.” ICAO’s responsibilities include developing aircraft technical and operat­ing standards and recommending practices. The United States is currently one of 191 participat­ing member States of ICAO. One of the founding principles of ICAO was to create a high degree of uniformity between nations in the interest of global harmonization. Moreover, any participat­ing member may ban the use of aircraft within its airspace that does not meet ICAO standards. EPA standards do not apply to military aircraft.

ICAO’s Committee on Aviation Environ­mental Protection (CAEP) is responsible for the technical work in the environmental field. CAEP is composed of various work groups from many countries who do the technical research and pro­pose solutions and standards. The FAA repre­sents the United States in this committee. This procedure and practice for creating binding U. S. regulatory law has been judicially upheld in The National Association of Clean Air Agencies v. EPA, 489 F. 3d 1221 (D. C. Cir. 2007).

The approach taken by the EPA and by ICAO is to regulate nitrogen oxides produced in combustion (and some other pollutants) primarily by imposing standards for new engine designs. The imposition of emissions standards for new engine designs is a complex and cautious under­taking in view of the many other considerations inherent in engine manufacture, such as fuel efficiency, safety, and cost. The ICAO standards are found in Annex 16, Environmental Protec­tion, Volume II, “Aircraft Engine Emissions.”

After 9/11, then the sixth largest airline in the country, United applied for a government-guaran­teed loan from the Air Transportation Stabilization Board. In December 2002, the Board voted to deny the application in spite of concessions previ­ously given by its flight attendants and its pilots. The Board believed that United’s labor burden was still too bloated to allow it to compete in the exist­ing business environment. United filed for bank­ruptcy protection on December 9, 2002. In 2003, in bankruptcy court, United cut pilots’ wages 30 percent. Pilots pay then ranged between $33,000 for new hires to a high of $195,000. It also termi­nated its employee pension plan, the second airline to do so. Both of these pension plans were trans­ferred to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora­tion, a federal agency set up to protect, at tax payer expense, employees’ pensions.12

Delta Airlines

After 9/11, Delta Airlines continued its downward spiral, losing $10 billion between 2001 and 2005. The third largest carrier in the United States, Delta entered Chapter 11 on September 14, 2005. Although Delta had been in financial straits for some time, its pilots pay ranged from $48,000 for beginning pilots to $275,000 for Boeing 777 captains. Delta froze its employee pension plan (which allowed Delta to forego any further contributions to the plan) by agreement with its unions. In September 2006, the Bankruptcy Court approved termination of Delta’s pilot pension plan. Delta has preserved ground and flight atten­dants’ pension plans based on the passage of the Pension Protection Act by Congress in 2006. This statute gives Delta (and Northwest) a period of 17 years to fund the employee plans.

Northwest Airlines

Northwest, the fourth largest U. S. carrier, entered Chapter 11 on the same day as Delta, September 14, 2005. Precipitating the filing, Northwest had been unable to win necessary wage concessions from its unions. In fact, Northwest had been operating for almost a month prior to filing with its unionized mechanics on strike. Like Delta, Northwest froze its employee pension plan in bankruptcy. Unlike other airlines in bankruptcy, Northwest preserved all of its pension plans.

As of September 14, 2005, four of the top seven carriers in the United States were in bankruptcy. They were all legacy airlines. See Figure 35-21.

ATA Airlines

AT A was a new entrant airline, receiving its air carrier certificate in 1981, post deregula­tion. As the country’s 10th largest air carrier, it filed for protection on October 22, 2004, citing fuel prices, competition, and lease payments on aircraft. This was necessary in spite of receiv­ing an ATSB loan guarantee in the amount of $168 million in 2002. As part of its restructur­ing under bankruptcy protection, ATA agreed to sell its hub operation at Chicago Midway to AirTran, one of its major competitors. It also sold its slots at LaGuardia and Reagan National to AirTran.

Safe and efficient runway and taxiway use is an integral necessity to the effectiveness of NextGen. The FAA is currently monitoring ground movements at 35 major airports (see Table 36-1) using Airport Surface Detection

Equipment-Model X (ASDE-X), which tracks surface movement by radar, multilateration,3 and ADS-B. Beginning in 2014, the FAA will provide surface data sharing at nine additional complex airports4 using Airport Surface Surveil­lance Capability (ASSC), which collects data from multilateration and ADS-B only. The FAA is working on the best means to use these data and how to convey the information to those who need it, including АТС, flight operations, dispatchers, and ramp operators. This technol­ogy will make an unprecedented amount of data available to facilitate movement and safety,

Surface Traffic Management

Automation optimizes taxi routing. Provides controllers and pilots all equipped aircraft vehicle positions on airport. Real-time surface traffic picture visible to airlines, controllers, equipped aircraft, ramp operators and airports. Surface movement management linked to

FIGURE 36-3 NextGen phases of flight.

including hazards involving runway incursions (see Figure 36-3).

Data Communications

Data Communications (Data Comm) is a new information sharing digital technology for use in both the surface and airborne environments. It represents the first phase in the transition from a voice communication system to a predominately digital textual mode of communication. Data Comm will enable faster departure clearances, trajectory-based routing, and optimized profile descents (see Figure 36-4).

ICAO officially came into being in 1947 as a result of the Chicago Convention, upon ratifica­tion by the requisite number of states. According to the mission statement of the organization, its aims and objectives are to develop the principles and techniques of international air navigation and to foster the planning and development of inter­national air transport, so as to meet the needs of the international civil aviation community. The organization emphasizes its commitment, among other things, to facilitate:

1. The safe and orderly growth of civil air transportation

2. Aircraft design and operation for peaceful purposes

3. The development of airports, airways, and air navigation facilities for international civil aviation

Specifically, ICAO undertook to:

1. Establish international standards for aircraft airworthiness certification, flight crew certi­fication, communications, and radio aids to navigation

2, Establish principles and procedures for the economic regulation of international routes, fares, frequency, and capacity

The use of English as the required language for communication between aircraft and air traffic control authorities in international civil aviation all over the world is an example of ICAO work.

ICAO adopts and publishes technical stan­dards referred to as Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) that govern the interac­tion of civil air transportation the world over. These international standards are incorporated into 18 technical annexes to provide uniformity and consistency that contribute to the safety and smooth operation of international civil aviation. ICAO proposes amendments and additions to SARPs as technology advances and conditions change. ICAO is essential in the coordination of the United States’ NextGen program and the European Union’s complementary SESAR innovations, and with the spreading of com­patible technology throughout worldwide civil aviation. The human element component of the equation is addressed through its TRAINAIR PLUS program, which is aimed at improving the quality and efficiency of aviation training, and the Human Factors program, which is directed toward reducing the impact of human perfor­mance limitations.

Other programs and efforts of the orga­nization relate to education, the environment, including noise issues and emissions affecting the ozone layer, problems involving multiple taxation, airport and route facility management, statistics, economic analysis, legal matters including treaty drafting and interpretation of law, and security.

Security has been a subject of ICAO action since the early 1970s as a result of the hijacking of aircraft beginning in the 1960s. In 1974, ICAO adopted its Standards and Recommended Prac­tices (SARPs) on Security, designated as Annex 17. The Annex is under constant review, and it has been amended multiple times in order to respond to changing needs. The progression of emphasis in Annex 17 has been from hijacking, to sabotage, to baggage reconciliation with pas­sengers, to screening of passengers and baggage and carry-on luggage, and the prevention and suppression of unlawful acts generally against civil aviation worldwide. The latest revision was effective on July 1, 2011.

Another example of ICAO commitment to global civil aviation relates to aviation safety in underdeveloped nations and regions. Due to the disproportionately high aviation accident rate in Africa, beginning in 2008, ICAO began adopt­ing a “new approach” toward carrying out its mandate to improve worldwide aviation safety as it relates to that region. Designated the Com­prehensive Regional Implementation Plan for Aviation Safety in Africa (AFI Plan), ICAO developed a work program to enhance the avia­tion safety culture of African aviation service providers, to enable African countries to estab­lish and maintain a safety oversight system, and to assist them in identifying and resolving defi­ciencies in a reasonable manner.

orldwide, the air transport industry is a major factor in the economic health of nations. There are hundreds of airlines the world over, and they operate tens of thousands of aircraft. Over 2 billion passengers travel on the world’s airlines, with projected increases worldwide in the coming years. Over 40 percent of the world’s manufactured exports travel by air, and in 2006 the air transport industry provided, directly and indirectly, 29 million jobs for the global work­force.1 North American airlines carry about 40 percent of the world’s air passengers, with European carriers accounting for 26 percent, and the Asia/Pacific region’s airlines at 24 percent. Latin American, Middle Eastern, and African carriers account for the remainder.

The aviation transport industry generates wealth, employment, taxes, tourism, and related benefits for each nation with a viable air trans­port system. It is obvious, therefore, that it is in the national interest of such countries to be and remain competitive in the global air transport mar­ket. As we have seen, the airline industry has his­torically been regulated internally by their home governments and, except for the United States, state-owned airlines have been the general rule. Regulation of international air transport has been accomplished as a part of international relations
primarily by means of the bilateral agreement for­mat between nations. Prior to the Airline Deregu­lation Act of 1978 in the United States, therefore, regulation by governments around the world, supplemented by the traffic coordination activi­ties of the International Air Transport Association (IATA), had maintained a more or less stable mar­keting environment in international aviation.

For more than a third of a century in the United States, the cost benefits to air travelers and shippers directly attributable to the com­petitive influences of deregulation have been apparent. The number of enplanements and the number of flights have greatly increased as many more people have taken to the air as the primary means of travel. Although not all of the changes produced by deregulation have been positive (notably the lowering of airline employee wages, crowded airplanes, and long lines) competition in the airlines is here to stay.

We saw in the last chapter how the Airline Deregulation Act has had a ripple effect through­out the world, with the new competitive system brought by the American statute becoming a fact of life for airlines to be dealt with on an inter­national basis. We saw also how difficult it was for the Europeans to break away from their long – held belief in the state-ownership of domestic
airlines and how painful it was to come to grips with the practicalities of global competition, in spite of the fact that this is what their own law required under the Treaty of Rome.

While this was going on in Europe, the United States in 1992, took measures, to force the issue internationally. The United States Department of State announced the policy of “Open Skies,” which is designed to make inter­national travel more seamless and less controlled by nation-states.

Open Skies embraces full deregulation of inter­national air transportation. This concept includes:

1. Unrestricted access to airlines to operate between international gateways by way of any point and beyond to any point (outside of the destination country) at the discretion of airline management

2. Unrestricted service opportunities, so that airlines are free to decide the frequency, capacity, and equipment necessary to service market demand

3. Freedom of airlines to set prices

Still not included as a part of Open Skies are cabotage rights (freedom to serve domestic traf­fic within the United States from another U. S. city) and foreign control of U. S. airlines (this maintains the current limitation of foreign owner­ship of U. S. carriers).2

The policy of the United States, as estab­lished by the Department of Transportation and the State Department, does support liberaliza­tion of long-standing cabotage rules and the long-standing policy restricting foreign owner­ship of U. S. airlines. The U. S. Congress, on the other hand, has failed to approve any change in these constraints to full deregulation. In 2006, in fact, the United States Congress was opposed to increasing foreign ownership of U. S. airlines,3 and still is today. This disagreement over the future of airline deregulation is an example of the Constitutional separation of powers. In this case, the rift pits the policy-making prerogatives of the Executive Branch against the law-making prerogatives of the Legislative Branch and the requirement that the Senate ratify all treaties.

The policy of the United States also calls for the end of subsidies by foreign governments to national airlines, including state ownership, pro­tectionism, or financial assistance of any kind, since these activities produce market-distorting results in a competitive system.

Within the European Union, the separate governments of the Member States historically insisted on retaining their individual rights to negotiate and enter into old-style bilateral traffic agreements as they chose, particularly with the United States. The European Commission, on the other hand, insisted that the right to negotiate and sign international traffic agreements lay with the EU, not the individual Member States.

Relying on its prior success at consolidating powers, the Commission in 1995 began to lobby hard for authority to regulate all bilaterals affect­ing the EU nations. The Transport Commissioner of the EU threatened to bring the issue before the European Court of Justice. When that threat failed, the Commission sued six Member States.4 That lit­igation was halted by agreement between the Com­mission and the defendants, but when Member States continued to pursue unilateral talks with the United States on the terms of bilaterals, the Com­mission again sued, this time adding Germany and the United Kingdom to the original six defendants.5

A standoff ensued on this issue in the EU. For a time the issue appeared to have been rel­egated to secondary importance, and EU Member States continued to negotiate directly with the United States in Open Skies bilaterals. France and the United States, for instance, signed an Open Skies agreement in January 2002, which con­tained the standard freedoms enumerated above.

In 2002, however, the European Court of Justice ruled that the practice of EU Member States separately negotiating bilaterals directly with the United States was incompatible with EU law. The Court did not, however, strike down the existing bilaterals, so international traffic continued under those preexisting agreements.

This uneasy situation persisted until the “break­through” occurred in 2006, discussed below.

It was only in 1958 that studies and tests con­ducted by government and industry indicated the feasibility of manned space flight. America’s first manned space flight program was named Mercury on October 7, 1958 with the objectives of placing a manned spacecraft in orbital flight around the earth, to investigate man’s capabilities and ability to function in space, and to recover the man and spacecraft safely from space.

The American space program, like that of the U. S.S. R., had to begin from a standing start. This meant that all aspects of the program had to be originated, tested, and approved, including the selection of the launch vehicle, the space­craft, and the selection of the men who were to participate in the program. After the completion of a pervasive and exhausting testing regimen and selection process, seven military pilots were chosen as the original participants in the pro­gram and were introduced to the Congress as astronauts on May 28, 1959. They were quickly accepted as a new kind of hero.

The initial flights for the Mercury mission were conducted on Redstone rockets (subor­bital flights of Shepherd and Grissom in 1961). A modified Atlas rocket carried John Glenn to America’s first manned orbit on February 29, 1962 and to the following orbital missions of the program, ending with Gordon Cooper’s 34-hour,

19- minute final Mercury mission on May 16, 1963.

The project was terminated in 1963.

Gemini

Gemini was the second manned space program, begun in 1962. Its name derived from the third constellation of the Zodiac (the Twins), since the capsule was designed to carry two astronauts into space. Its mission included launching men and equipment for up to two weeks in low earth orbit, to rendezvous and dock, and to refine a system for maneuvering the docked combination by using the target vehicle’s propulsion system. The program’s launch vehicle was the Titan II rocket. The project successfully flew 10 manned missions, achieved the first extra vehicular activ­ity in space (EVA) and a record altitude of 739.2 miles. This project was canceled in 1964.

Apollo

The Apollo Program was designed for lunar exploration using a three-man spacecraft and lunar orbiter and a serially developed Saturn rocket.

The Apollo Program consisted of 33 flights, of which 11 were manned. The 22 unmanned flights were conducted to qualify the launch vehicle and spacecraft for manned space flight. Four of the manned flights were also conducted to man-rate the overall vehicle for lunar explo­ration. The final 7 flights were conducted to explore the lunar environment and lunar surface. During the program, no launch failure occurred to prevent a mission and only one in-flight fail­ure (Apollo 13) occurred to prevent the intended mission from being accomplished.

Testing Phase: The original launch vehicle for the Apollo program was the Saturn I mis­sile, first tested in October 1961 in a suborbital trajectory. The first orbital mission (unmanned) occurred on January 29, 1964 on the Saturn’s fifth launch. Testing progressed using the Sat­urn IB launch vehicle and an unmanned Apollo spacecraft. November 9, 1967 marked the first flight of the Saturn V three-stage rocket, which was to be used for lunar missions.

Manned Phase: On January 27, 1967, a flash fire occurred in the Apollo spacecraft (denomi­nated command module 012) while positioned on the launch vehicle and during a launch pad test of the vehicle for the first manned flight, kill­ing three astronauts. Dead were Lt. Col. Virgil I. Grissom, one of the original seven and a veteran of flights in the Mercury and Gemini programs; Lt. Col. Edward H. White, the first astronaut to conduct an EVA (Gemini Program); and Roger B. Chaffee, who was prepping for his first space flight. As a result of a comprehensive investiga­tion, which caused an 18-month delay in the first manned mission, significant design and engineer­ing modifications were made to the spacecraft.

The first manned mission, known as Apollo 7, flew on October 11, 1968 and began the series of missions that would land men on the moon. Apollo 8 was the first mission designed to leave earth orbit and to circle the moon, and the first manned flight to be launched using the three – stage Saturn V rocket. Aboard this flight were

Frank Borman, Commander; James A. Lovell, Command Module Pilot; and William A. Anders, Lunar Module Pilot.

The mission of Apollo 11 was to land Neil A. Armstrong and Edwin E. Aldrin, Jr. on the surface of the moon, have them exit the lunar module and perform certain minimum tasks, and return safely to the command module for the return to earth. Ed Collins remained in lunar orbit in the command module. The lunar module successfully landed on the lunar surface on July 20, 1969 and six hours later, at 0256 UTC on July 21, Neil Armstrong became the first human to set foot on the moon, followed by Ed Aldrin. Together they spent over 21 hours on the moon’s surface and collected over 47 pounds of lunar material for return to earth. Most of their activi­ties were seen by a live television feed broadcast to a world-wide audience. All three astronauts returned to earth on July 24, 1969.

Subsequent missions in the program, with the exception of Apollo 13, were carried to successful conclusion, ending in the mis­sion of Apollo 17 (launched on December 7, 1972). Apollo 17 brought to a close one of the most ambitious and successful endeavors ever attempted by man.24

“Aerodrome”1

By c. g. abbot

Secretary, Smithsonian Institution

Note—This paper has been submitted to Dr. Orville Wright, and under date of October 8, 1942, he states that the paper as now prepared will be acceptable to him if given adequate publication.

t is everywhere acknowledged that the Wright brothers were the first to make sustained flights in a heavier-than-air machine at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, on December 17, 1903.

Mainly because of acts and statements of former officers of the Smithsonian Institution, arising from tests made with the reconditioned Langley plane of 1903 at Hammondsport, New York, in 1914, Dr. Orville Wright feels that the Institution adoped an unfair and injurious atti­tude. He therefore sent the original Wright Kitty Hawk plane to England in 1928. The nature of the acts and statements referred to are as follows: In March 1914, Secretary Walcott contracted with Glenn H. Curtiss to attempt a flight with the Langley machine. This action seems ill consid­ered and open to criticism. For in January 1914, the United States Court of Appeals, Second Cir­cuit, had handed down a decision recognizing the Wrights as “pioneers in the practical art of flying
with heavier-than-air machines” and pronounc­ing Glenn H. Curtiss an infringer of their patent. Hence, in view of probable further litigation, the Wrights stood to lose in fame and revenue and Curtiss stood to gain pecuniarily, should the experiments at Hammondsport indicate that Langley’s plane was capable of sustained flight in 1903, previous to the successful flights made December 17, 1903, by the Wrights at Kitty Hawk, N. C.

The machine was shipped to Curtiss at Hammondsport, N. Y. in April. Dr. Zahm, the Recorder of the Langley Aerodynamical Labora­tory and expert witness for Curtiss in the patent litigation, was at Hammondsport as official rep­resentative of the Smithsonian Institution during the time the machine was being reconstructed and tested. In the reconstruction the machine was changed from what it was in 1903 in a number of particulars as given in Dr. Wright’s list of differ­ences which appears later in this paper. On the 28th of May and the 2d of June, 1914, attempts to fly were made. After acquiring speed by run­ning on hydroplane floats on the surface of Lake

Abbot, C. G. 1942. The 1914 Tests of the Langley “Aeorodrome.” Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections, 103:8. Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian Institution. (Document supplied to the author by Dr. Larry Jenkins.)

Wings.

7 Center Spar: Cylindrical wooden spar, measuring ІУ2" dia. for half its length and tapering to 1" at its tip. (L. M. p. 204). Located on upper side of wing.

8 Ribs: Hollow box construction. (L. M. Plates 66,67)

9 Lower Guy-Posts: A single round wooden post for each pair of wings (see Fig. 3), 1W in dia. 6У2′ long. (L. M. Plate 62, p. 184).

10 The front wing guy-post was located 28У2" in front of the main center spar. (L. M. Plate 53).

11 The rear wing guy-post was located ЗІУ2" in front of the main center spar. (L. M. Plate 53).

12 Upper Guy-Posts: For each pair of wings a single steel tube %" dia., 43" long. (L. M. p. 184, pi. 62).

13 Front wing upper guy-post located 28Уг" in front of the main center spar. (L. M. pi. 53).

14 The rear wing upper guy-post was located ЗІУ2" in front of the main center spar. (L. M. pi. 53).

15 Trussing: The wing trussing wires were attached to the spars at the 5th, 7th and 9th ribs out from the center (L. M. pi. 54). The angles between these wires and the spars to which they were attached are shown in Fig. 3.

Center Spar: Cylindrical spar about ІУ2" dia. at inner end, tapering to about 1" dia. at outer end. Located on upper side of wing. This center spar was reinforced (1) by an extra wooden member on the under side of the wing, which measured 1" x ІУ2" and extended to the 7th rib from the center of the machine; and (2) by another wooden rein­forcement on the under side extending out about one-fourth of the length of the wing.

Ribs: Most of the original Langley box ribs were replaced with others made at Hammondsport. (Manly letter, 1914). The Hammondsport ribs were of solid construction and made of laminated wood. That part of the rib in front of the forward spar was entirely omitted.

Lower Guy-Posts: Four for each pair of wings (see Fig. 4), two of which were of streamline form mea­suring 1 Va" x ЗУ2" x 54" long; and two measur­ing 2" x 2" with rounded corners, 3’9" long.

The front wing guy-posts were located directly underneath the main center spar, 28У2" further rearward than in 1903.

The rear wing guy-posts were located directly under the main center spar, ЗІУ2" further rear­ward than in 1903.

Upper Guy-Posts: For each pair of wings, two streamline wooden posts each 114" x ЗУ2", 76" long, forming an inverted V. (See Fig. 4).

Front wing upper guy-posts located directly over main spar, 28У2" further rearward than in 1903.

The rear wing guy-posts were located directly over the main center spar, ЗІУ2" further rearward than in 1903.

Trussing: A different system of wing trussing was used, and the wing trussing wires were attached to the spars at the 3rd, 6th and 9th ribs from the cen­ter. The angles between these wires and the spars to which they were attached were all different from those in the original Langley machine. (See Fig. 4).

Langley, 1903. Hammondsport, 1914.

Control Surfaces.

16 Vane Rudder: A split vane composed of two surfaces united at their leading edges and separated 15" at their trailing edges, thus forming a wedge. Each surface measured 2’3" x 4’6", with aspect ratio.5. (L. M. p. 214, pis. 53,54).

17 Operated by means of a wheel located slightly in front of the pilot at his right side and at the height of his shoulder (L. M. p. 216, pis. 53,54).

18 Used for steering only. (L. M. p. 214).

19 Penaud Tail: This was a dart-shaped tail having a vertical and a horizontal surface (Penaud tail), each measuring 95 sq. ft. It was located in the rear of the main frame.

20 Attached to a bracket extending below the main frame.

21 “Normally inactive”, (L. M. p. 216) but adjust­able about a transverse horizontal axis by means of a self-locking wheel located at the right side of the pilot, even with his back, and at the height of his shoulder. (L. M. pis. 51, 53).

Vertical Rudder: The Langley vane rudder was replaced by a single plane vertical rudder which measured 3’6" x 5′, with aspect ratio of.7.

Operated at Hammondsport through the Curtiss steering wheel in some tests, (Zahm affidavit pp. 5, 6), through the Curtiss shoulder yoke in some oth­ers (Manly letter, 1914), and fixed so as not to be operable at all in still others, (Zahm affidavit p. 7).

Used “as a vertical aileron to control the lateral poise of the machine”, (Zahm affidavit p. 6) as well as for steering, (Zahm affidavit p. 7).

Tail Rudder: Same size and construction as in 1903.

Attached to same bracket at a point about 8" higher than in 1903.

Operable about a transverse horizontal axis and connected to a regular Curtiss elevator control post directly in front of the pilot (Zahm affidavit p. 5).

Control Surfaces (continued).

22 Immovable about a vertical axis. (L. M. p. 214, pi.56, Fig. 1). No means were provided for adjusting this rudder about a vertical axis in flight. “Although it was necessary that the large aerodrome should be capable of being steered in a horizontal direction, it was felt to be unwise to give the Penaud tail and rudder motion in the horizontal plane in order to attain this end”. (L. M. p. 214).

23 Keel: A fixed vertical surface underneath the main frame measuring 3’2" in height by 6′ average length. Area 19 sq. ft. (L. M. pi. 53).

Immovable about a vertical axis on May 28, 1914, only. Thereafter it was made movable about a verti­cal axis and was connected through cables to a Curtiss steering wheel mounted on a Curtiss con­trol post directly in front of the pilot.

Keel: Entirely omitted.

System of Control.

24 Lateral Stability: The dihedral only was used for maintaining lateral balance. (L. M. p. 45).

25 Longitudinal Stability: Langley relied upon the Penaud system of inherent stability for main­taining the longitudinal equilibrium. “For the preservation of the equilibrium [longitudinal] of the aerodrome, though the aviator might assist by such slight movements as he was able to make in the limited space of the avia­tor’s car, the main reliance was upon the Pen­aud tail.” (L. M. p. 215).

26 Steering: Steering in the horizontal plane was done entirely by the split-vane steering rud­der located underneath the main frame. (L. M. p. 214).

Lateral Stability: Three means were used for secur­ing lateral balance at Hammondsport: The dihe­dral angle as used by Langley, a rudder which “serves as a vertical aileron" (Zahm affidavit p. 6), and the Penaud tail rudder. The last two constituted a system “identical in principle with that of Complainant’s [Wright] combined warping of the wings and the use of the vertical rudder”. (Zahm affidavit p. 6).

Longitudinal Stability: At Hammondsport the Pen­aud inherent longitudinal stability was supple­mented with an elevator system of control.

Steering: On one day, May 28, 1914, steering in the horizontal plane was done with the vertical rudder which had been substituted for the original Langley split-vane steering rudder. After May 28th the steering was done by the vertical surface of the tail rudder (Zahm affidavit p. 7), which in 1903 was immovable about a vertical axis, (L. M. p. 214).

Power Plant.

27 Motor: Langley 5 cylinder radial.

28 Ignition: Jump spark with dry cell batteries. (L. M. p. 262).

29 Carburetor: Balzer carburetor consisting of a cham­ber filled with lumps of porous cellular wood satu­rated with gasoline. The air was drawn through this wood. There was no float feed. (L. M. p. 225).

30 Radiator: Tubes with radiating fins.

31 Propellers: Langley propellers (L. M. pi.53, pp. 178-182).

Motor: Langley motor modified.

Ignition: Jump spark with magneto.

Carburetor: Automobile type with float feed.

Radiator: Automobile radiator of honeycomb type.

Propellers: Langley propellers modified “after fash­ion of early Wright blades”.

Launching and Floats.

Launching: Hydroplanes, developed 1909-1914, attached to the machine.

Floats: Two wooden hydroplane floats, mounted beneath and about 6 feet to either side of the center of the machine at the lateral extremities of the Pratt system of trussing used for bracing the wing spars of the forward wings; and one (part of the time two) tin cylindrical floats with conical ends, similar to but larger than the Langley floats, mounted at the center of the Pratt system of truss­ing used for bracing the rear wings. All of the floats were mounted from four to five feet lower than the floats of the original Langley, thus keeping the entire machine above the water.

Weight.

34 Total Weight: With pilot 850 pounds (L. M. p. 256).

35 Center Gravity: 3/8" above line of thrust.

Since I became Secretary, in 1928, I have made many efforts to compose the Smithsonian-Wright controversy, which I inherited. I will now, speak­ing for the Smithsonian Institution, make the following statement in an attempt to correct as far as now possible acts and assertions of for­mer Smithsonian officials that may have been

Total Weight: With pilot, 1170 pounds.

Center Gravity: About one foot below line of thrust.

misleading or are held to be detrimental to the Wrights.

1. I sincerely regret that the Institution employed to make the tests of 1914 an agent who had been an unsuccessful defendant in patent liti­gation brought against him by the Wrights.

2. I sincerely regret that statements were repeat­edly made by officers of the Institution that the Langley machine was flown in 1914 “with certain changes of the machine neces­sary to use pontoons”, without mentioning the other changes included in Dr. Wright’s list.

3. I point out that Assistant Secretary Rathbun was misinformed when he stated that the Langley machine “without modification” made “successful flights”.

4. I sincerely regret the public statement by officers of the Institution that “The tests” [of 1914] showed “that the late Secretary Lang­ley had succeeded in building the first aero­plane capable of sustained free flight with a man.”

5. Leaving to experts to formulate the conclu­sions arising from the 1914 tests as a whole, in view of all the facts, I repeat in substance, but with amendments, what I have already published in Smithsonian Scientific Series, Vol. 12, 1932, page 227:

The flights of the Langley aerodrome at Hammondsport in 1914, having been made

long after flying had become a common art, and with changes of the machine indicated by Dr. Wright’s comparison as given above, did not warrant the statements published by the Smithsonian Institution that these tests proved that the large Langley machine of 1903 was capable of sustained flight carrying a man.

6. If the publication of this paper should clear the way for Dr. Wright to bring back to America the Kitty Hawk machine to which all the world awards first place, it will be a source of profound and enduring gratifica­tion to his countrymen everywhere. Should he decide to deposit the plane in the United States National Museum, it would be given the highest place of honor, which is its due.

Endnotes

1. For an account of early Langley and Wright aeronautical investigations, see Smithsonian Report for 1900 and The Century Magazine of September 1908.

2. Smithsonian Reports: 1914, pp. 9, 219, 221, 222; 1915, pp. 14, 121; 1917, p. 4; 1918, pp. 3, 28, 114, 166. Report of U. S. National Museum, 1914, pp. 46 and 47.