Category AVIATION &ТНЕ ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

Two-Tiered Wage Agreements

Two-tiered wage agreements, or b-scale wages, are a form of concession bargaining that first arose at American Airlines in 1983. The b-scale refers to a wage rate applied to workers solely on the basis of their having been hired after a specified date. The plan is, therefore, prospective in benefit rather than immediate. Once in place at American, the two-tier system rapidly proceeded through the ranks of most carriers, and was readily adopted. By 1986, with the exception of Braniff and Con­tinental, all major carriers had the system in place for at least one craft of employees, and 70 percent of all union contracts carried b-scales.

The agreement typically involves a gradual “payoff,” or a limited period during which the new employee will be paid under the reduced pay scale. The plan typically will be merged with the higher wage scale, usually within five years. The wage reduction historically has ranged from 20 percent to 45 percent.

Exclusive-Use Arrangements

Exclusive-use arrangements typically assign to one airline the right to use and occupy gates and facilities for a specified duration, as well as the right to sublet or assign those gates and facilities conditioned on prior consent of the airport. These types of arrangements are recognized to con­stitute potential barriers to entry based on com­plaints by new entrant carriers that incumbent airlines hoard gates, require substantial sublease premiums, offer access at less preferable times, force the new entrant to use the incumbent’s ground personnel, or refuse to sublease alto­gether. These arrangements also have the effect of hindering airport management from properly exercising its legislative mandate of providing equal, nondiscriminatory access to its federally funded facilities. Moreover, since gate leases are considered assets in law, secured creditors of bankrupt carriers, like banks, can wind up pos­sessing the proprietary rights to airport gates, and preventing recovery and use of those gates by airport management.

The prevalence of exclusive use gates has been in consistent decline since 1968, and because of the effects of deregulation on air­port traffic, that decline has accelerated. U. S. airports increasingly now prefer to maintain more control over gate access. This trend has been buttressed by the Wendell H. Ford Avia­tion Investment and Reform Act (AIR-21) that requires some airports to submit for approval “competition plans” to the FAA, more fully dis­cussed below.

Preferential-Use Arrangements

Preferential-use arrangements normally give the tenant airline the primary right to use the facil­ity only when it has operations scheduled. These arrangements constitute a shared control between the airport and the airline with an explicit con­tractual right remaining in the airport author­ity to allow use of the gate by other airlines. Importantly, this type of arrangement preserves the airports’ ability to honor the legislative man­date of providing nondiscriminatory access to its facilities and to use the tenant’s gates for new entrants.

Preferential-use agreements differ in their specifics, some containing “use-it-or-share-it” or “use-it-or-lose-it” requirements, as well as other types of recapture provisions. These types of gate arrangements have become more prevalent at large hub airports, increasing from 28 percent in 1992 to around 50 percent in 2004. For example, Reagan Washington National has reported a gate composition of all preferential-use gates, and Boston Logan has converted to all preferential – use gates or common-use gates. By 2005, Detroit Metropolitan Airport, with 16 carriers and 114 jet gates, had converted to all preferential-use gates, with the exception of 2 common-use gates.

Mow What?

There has been an on-going shake-out in the air transportation business for 35 years. We have attempted to trace the progress of this evolution in the preceding chapters and what we have seen is not pretty. Economic deregulation has brought chaos to the airline industry.

The air carrier industry has become just about as lean as it is possible to get, mostly at a cost to the airline employee and the comfort of the traveler, yet profits are scarce and undepend­able. Capacity has decreased. Air fares are rising. The last legacy airline has gone into Chapter 11.

There can be no question that the consumer has benefitted greatly—but at what cost? The
entire sector is barely hanging on, trying to sur­vive between one uncontrollable externality and the next. Under deregulation, unfettered com­petition has taken the place of any discernible national transportation policy. Is this sustainable?

One authority on the subject, Robert Cran­dall, former American Airlines CEO, thinks not:

«Three decades of deregulation have demonstrated that airlines have spe­cial characteristics incompatible with a completely unregulated environment. To put things bluntly, experience has established that market forces alone cannot and will not produce a satis­factory airline industry, which clearly needs some help to solve its pricing, cost, and operating problems.»

The airline industry is composed of or affected by at least four main entities: airline labor, airline passengers, airline management,
and airline company shareholders. Their indi­vidual interests are vastly disparate, but their one common interest is airline profitability. Yet, airlines are not reliably profitable; in fact, they are rarely profitable. Under the private enterprise system, a corporation will not long exist if it does not make a profit.

As legacy airlines have slimmed down under Chapter 11 or gone out of business, and as new entrant airlines have picked up the slack in capac­ity and service abandoned by the legacy carriers, a tentative status quo has been maintained. But at some point this process as a means of maintaining an air carrier system must cease, and a sustainable model for a profitable and durable airline system must emerge. Whether this can be done without at least some form of governmental control or eco­nomic re-regulation is now an open question. But there are powerful interests that now suggest that some sort of re-regulation, different from the kind of onerous and inclusive CAB regulation previ­ously in place, must be entertained.

Endnotes

1. Discussed more at length in Chapter 40.

2. Bin Laden was killed by members of United States Navy Seal Team 6 on May 1, 2011 in Pakistan.

3. Pub. L. No. 107-42; 115 Stat. 230.

4. Pub. L. No. 107-71; 115 Stat. 597 (2001).

5. Representative John Mica, Chairman of the House Transportation Committee.

6. Wall Street Journal, April 9, 2012.

7. Pub. L. No. 107-296; 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).

8. The SARS epidemic was the outbreak of a viral respira­tory disease in Hong Kong in late 2002, which spread worldwide during the ensuing months, causing over 900 deaths. Although the death rate of SARS is only 1 percent for people aged 24 or younger, it is 50 percent for those 65 or older. SARS caused a worldwide reduction in airline traffic volumes.

9. Hedging refers to the practice of buying crude oil futures contracts. Prices can be locked in at a predetermined (current) price even as the price of oil goes up.

Hedging does carry some risk since to buy a futures contract assumes that the price will rise in the future. If it does not, then the owner of the futures contract will either make no profit or will lose money. Given the history of oil prices, hedging has been a lucrative practice in recent years.

10. Fuel would soon surpass wages as the largest airline cost of doing business.

11. In January 2012, Southwest reported its 39th consecu­tive year of profitable operation.

12. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s (PBGC) single-employer insurance program is a federal program that insures certain benefits of the more than 34 million worker, retiree, and separated vested participants of over 29,000 private sector defined benefit pension plans. Defined benefit pension plans promise a benefit that

is generally based on an employee’s salary and years of service, with the employer being responsible to fund that benefit, invest and manage plan assets, and bear the investment risk. A single-employer plan is one that is established and maintained by only one employer. It may be established unilaterally by the sponsor or through a collective bargaining agreement.

13. Operating loss does not include interest expense and other allowable expenses. The net loss was $23 billion total for all airlines.

14. Alaska Airlines is part of a system of airlines that origi­nated in 1932 and existed as a feeder airline during the period of regulation. It took the name “Alaska Airlines” in 1944. It is the only pre-1978 intrastate airline not to have sought bankruptcy protection.

15. Air Transport Association. “List of Bankruptcies.” http:// www. airlines. org/economics/specialtopics/ USAirlineBankruptcies. htm.

16. This is an unusual result since stockholders of a bank­rupt company, even in Chapter 11, usually get wiped out.

17. U. S. Department of Transportation, FAA Aerospace Fore­cast, Fiscal years 2012-2032.

18. In 1995, the FAA brought regionals flying aircraft with 10 or more seats under the same regulatory scheme as the major airlines.

19. These incidents are taken from Public Broadcasting Corporation website Frontline http://www. pbs. org/wgbh/ pages/frontline/flyingcheap/etc/cronfaa. html#six).

Government Subsidies

Economic Issues Affecting Competition

National airlines of the European countries had been the object of national pride, support, and ownership for many decades, as discussed above. Under the new regulations of the Council effec­tive in 1993, however, subsidization of national
airlines was recognized to be a major problem and impediment to the goal of free competition within the EU. Still, such a long-standing and venerable practice was a difficult subject for the Commission to approach. In 1994, the Commis­sion adopted a complex set of “guidelines” as a statement of policy, and a basis for potential enforcement, on the subject of government aid of airlines.

The guidelines apply not only to carriers but to the operations “accessory to air transport.” These activities would include flight schools, duty-free shops, and airport facilities. Notably, aircraft manufacturing subsidies were not included in the guidelines, an omission that effectively removed any consideration of the

consortium Airbus Industrie from the pol­icy of non-subsidy. State aid to airports and funds for new airport construction were also not included in the scope of the guidelines.

The thrust of the rules governing subsidies is to prevent any operator from achieving a com­petitive advantage over any other operator based in the EU countries by subsidy. The guidelines recognized at least five types of government aid that would be objectionable and contrary to the purpose of the EU. Direct operational subsidies are the most obvious and flagrant form of state aid. State “investment” came under scrutiny by the Commission and became subject to evalua­tion using certain tests and criteria to determine if the aid is really “direct subsidy” in disguise. Other forms of state assistance may include:

• Capital injection

• Loan financing

• Loan guarantees

• The granting of exclusive rights

The NASA Centennial Challenges

In 2003, NASA started a new program known as “The Centennial Challenges” based on a recom­mendation of the National Academy of Engineering in 1999. This recommendation was that Congress should encourage federal agencies to experiment more extensively with inducement prize contests in science and technology. The NASA Centen­nial Challenges were named in recognition of the Wright brothers’ first flight 100 years before.

The “Challenges” set up a monetary prize format similar to that discussed above, and which actually relates back to the British prize of

20,0 pounds sterling offered in 1714 for a reli­able method of determining longitude on a ship at sea. (See Chapter 1.)

The NASA Challenges typically coordinate the competitions with private foundations, like the X Prize Foundation, the Spaceward Foundation, or others, which actually mn the events. The Chal­lenges are announced annually and range over a wide spectrum of scientific and technical issues. Examples from past competitions include the Astro­naut Glove Challenge (to devise the best performing glove for space use), the Moon Regolith Oxygen Challenge (the extraction of oxygen from lunar soil), and the Suborbital Payload Challenge (to achieve suborbital altitudes that provide enough linger time for the kind of microgravity research NASA needs).

The Strong Tether Challenge and the Power Beaming Challenge are designed to produce

FIGURE 41-11 Hybrid rocket engine used by SSI.

technology that will put humans and objects into space without the use of rocket propulsion. These Challenges are subparts of the larger “space elevator” concept that was first mentioned by Konstantin Tsiolkovsky in the late 19th century, and then more specifically proposed by a Rus­sian engineer (Yuri Artsutanov) in the 1960s. The basic idea is to anchor a tether (a ribbon with a diameter half that of a pencil) at a point on earth that will extend into outer space, to a point beyond the geosynchronous orbit. A counterweight positioned at the space end of the tether would provide enough inertia through the rotation of the earth (centripetal force) to keep the length of the tether taut. Payloads would be attached to the tether for delivery into space.

When first proposed, and even in 1960, the idea was assigned to science fiction because there existed no material strong enough to construct a workable tether. In 1991, science discovered a new class of molecule known as the carbon nano­tube, which possesses over twice the strength necessary to make the tether work.

The Strong Tether Challenge is held at the Space Elevator Conference sponsored by Microsoft, The Leeward Space Foundation, and the International Space Elevator Consortium. Although as of 2011 there has been no win­ner, the strength of the tethers has continued to increase for the five years of the competition. The prize purse has continued to increase over the years and is now at $2 million.

The Power Beaming Challenge is a competi­tion to build a wireless lifting mechanism, called a climber system, powered by electricity from a ground electrical outlet that is “beamed” (wire­lessly) to the climber apparatus. The beam is a high-power low-intensity laser. The lifting mecha­nism must lift a payload a prescribed height within a prescribed time. Beamed power competitions held since 2005 finally resulted in a winner in 2009. LaserMotive LLC was awarded $900,000 that year for successfully driving the climber up a cable one kilometer high, suspended from a helicopter.

Demise of the Legacy Airlines Business Model and the Evolution of Convergent Practices

Prior to 9-11, the legacy carriers copied the Southwest model only by creating subsidiary operations patterned along the lines of South­west, while maintaining their primary business models that evolved during CAB regulation. During the years following September 11, four of the five largest legacy carriers8 entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization, and in November 2011, the last holdout, American Airlines, also sought Chapter 11 protection. American is now in the process of attempting to slim down its cost structure and secure the benefits that ear­lier came to its competitors as a result of bank­ruptcy. Under Chapter 11, these airlines secured approval to make substantive changes to their basic structure, including eliminating employee pension plans, securing reductions in wages, amending work rules, cutting capacity, and downsizing generally. These changes are dis­cussed in more detail in Chapter 35.

A comparison of relevant indicators, includ­ing cost per available seat mile (CASM), between these carrier groups will disclose that the margin between the two groups is narrowing. As the first full decade of the 21st century closed, the legacy airlines had adopted many of the “no frills” standards of the LCCs, sometimes even exceeding the austere approach of the LCCs. In some instances, legacy airlines are now charg­ing extra fees for services that have always been included in the stated airfare. There appears to be no limit to what services the airlines will charge for: checked bags, snacks, early boarding, seat selection, blankets and pillows, ticket change, unaccompanied minor, pets in the cabin, and water (Spirit Airlines). One short-lived idea was a fee for use of the on-board bathrooms (Ryanair).

The next transformative development in the air transportation industry will be the implemen­tation of the NextGen policy (discussed at length in Chapter 35) now in the planning and earlier implementation stages in the Department of Transportation. Simply put, this complete trans­formation of the Air Traffic Control system from one of land-based navaids to a satellite-based nav­igation system, requiring on-board performance avionics and navigation capabilities, will likely drive new point-to-point operational models.

Endnotes

1. Source Air Transport Association—2012.

2. Kahn, Alfred E., The State of Competition in the Airline Industry, Statement before the U. S. House of Representa­tives Commission on the Judiciary, June 14, 2000.

3. Wall Street Journal, December 29-30, 2012.

4. A full-time equivalent is equal to two part-time employees.

5. The first three waves are suggested by Robert W. Poole,

Jr. and Viggo Butler, “Airline Deregulation: The Unfinished Revolution," Reason Public Policy Institute.

6. Earlier in the decade, before the mergers of Delta and North­west and United and Continental, Southwest was number two in size, measured by the number of passengers carried.

7. Miles, Richard B., Testimony before the Aviation Subcom­mittee, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U. S. House of Representatives, Competition in the U. S. Aircraft Manufacturing Industry, June 26, 2001.

8. United Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Delta Airlines, and US Airways.

Airlines in the 21st Century

ИА recession is when you have to tighten your belt; depression is when you have no belt to tighten. When you’ve lost your trousers—you’re in the airline business, w

Sir Adam Thomson

|l| s the airline industry approached the end of

t I the millennium, during the first half of the 1990s, there was no consensus that deregulation was an overall success. Economic deregulation was clearly a boon for mass transit; air fares had plummeted as predicted. But the industry was in disarray. Between 1990 and 1993, airlines in the United States had lost an amount of money equal to all the money that had ever been made in aviation in this country since the first commercial flight. If this was what deregulation had wrought, then deregulation was obviously a tragic mistake.

Deregulation had clearly exposed the sen­sitive nature of the U. S. airline industry. This sensitivity results primarily from fluctuating eco­nomic conditions, often driven by geopolitical factors that affect fuel prices and travel demand. While deregulation gave air travel to the masses, it did so at the expense of the airlines’ flexibility
and any financial cushion in the industry. Com­petition had shaved profit margins so razor thin that almost any economic hiccup translated into severe problems for air transportation. The industry has high fixed costs (the cost of labor, aircraft, and facilities) that cannot be reduced quickly during these adverse economic times. Since fuel and labor costs account for over 50 percent of all airlines’ expenses, spikes in the cost of fuel are particularly debilitating to the airlines.

The last decade of the 20th century was quite representative of the plight of the airlines: boom or bust. Jet fuel prices doubled in just four months in 1990 due to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Eastern Airlines had been liquidated, fol­lowed by Pan American. Thus deregulation had taken out the venerable airline of Eddie Ricken – backer and as well as the “Chosen Instrument” of America. The remaining legacy airlines took on crushing debt trying to stay in business. The economic downturn produced huge losses for the airlines until 1995. The state of the airline indus­try was so fragile that a presidential commission was established to look into ways to ensure the survival of the industry. There was talk of nation­alizing the airlines.

9 Southwest Airlines

Only Southwest Airlines seemed to understand what was going on. While the major airlines were trying without much success to stop the bleeding, Southwest was raking in record profits; it was also expanding. USAir had acquired PSA in California, and then began to cut back service on the north-south corridor. Southwest came in to fill the void, but at offbeat airports like Oakland and Burbank, and at seemingly ever decreasing fares. Then Southwest entered San Jose to chal­lenge American Airlines. When told that South­west was coming in, American did not even wait for the discount carrier to arrive; it withdrew, anticipating the losses to come in a one-on-one contest with Southwest.

«If the Wright brothers were alive today Wilbur would have to fire Orville to reduce costs. 99

Herb Kelleher, Southwest Airlines, USA Today, 8 June 1994

Southwest was also headed east, for the first time in its history. Now Southwest would be in Baltimore (BWI), next to the seat of power in the District of Columbia. Southwest then was the eighth largest airline in the United States (United was first, followed by American, Delta, Northwest, Continental, and USAir), but it was different in at least one highly signifi­cant way: it had point-to-point routes (the 100 city-pairs most frequently traveled), and did not waste time getting in and out of large hub terminals.

The Fourth Amendment and Case Law

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution also had its genesis in the Brit­ish occupation of the American colonies. The

Amendment provides, in relevant part, that the people have a right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason­able searches and seizures. . and that such right “shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause. .

Since the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791, a large body of law has grown up around the interpretation in various fact situations of what “unreasonable” means, and what “probable cause” means, including opinions of the United States Supreme Court and lower federal and state courts. By prior law, property taken by the police to be used in evidence is not admissible in a criminal proceeding against the accused if the seized evidence has been taken in contravention of the Fourth Amendment or the cases interpret­ing it. A number of exceptions to the require­ment of having a warrant to search have been articulated by the courts (for example, no warrant is necessary to search a person who commits a crime in the presence of an officer of the law, or a person who is under arrest). Similar types of exceptions have been articulated to the question of the sufficiency of the facts necessary to secure a warrant, where a warrant is required before a search of premises can be lawfully made. If the facts supporting the warrant are not legally suf­ficient, then the warrant is unlawful and anything seized is inadmissible in a criminal proceeding.

The question arises, then, whether drones may be used in law enforcement to fly over a person’s property to view what is on the prop­erty, for instance, as a basis to secure a warrant to enter the property in order to seize evidence to be used in a criminal proceeding. There have been two cases that bear on this question.

In Summers of California v. Ciralo, 487 U. S. 207 (1986), the Supreme Court had before it a case where the police had received an anony­mous tip that the accused was growing marijuana in his back yard. The back yard was enclosed by a high fence that precluded viewing what was in the back yard from ground level. A police offi­cer in an airplane flew over the property from a

1,0 foot altitude while in navigable airspace and was able to clearly identify the marijuana from the air. A search warrant was obtained and executed the next day, seizing the marijuana plants on the private property.

Prior law had established that a police offi­cer may look and see whatever is in plain view, and he may use this as a basis to either seize unlawful contraband or as a basis for a lawful search warrant. The court held that since the marijuana was in plain sight, using the naked eye, from a place in the navigable airspace (the NAS, which is in the public domain), the accused had no reasonable right of privacy. The view by the naked eye of the backyard was reasonable (as the same would be from a high truck or double decker bus from the street). Other specific legal analyses of the case are not permissible here, but suffice it to say that the court held that the over flight of the accused’s back yard and the viewing of it from 1,000 feet in the NAS, was a legitimate basis for the search warrant.

In the second case, Florida v. Riley, 488 U. S. 445 (1989), a similar situation was before the Supreme Court. The accused had a green­house on his private property, the contents of which could not be viewed from any ground level public place. Relying on an anonymous tip that marijuana was being grown on the prop­erty, a county sheriff using a helicopter circled twice over the subject’s property at 400 feet. Through openings in the roof of the greenhouse, the officer could see with the naked eye growing plants that he identified as marijuana. A search warrant was obtained and the premises were searched, and the marijuana plants were seized as evidence.

The court held, along the lines of Ciralo above, that helicopter flights at 400 feet above people’s property are routine, and that what is viewable from that position in the NAS is not protected under the Fourth Amendment, in spite of FAA regulations limiting low flight for fixed – wing aircraft in the navigable airspace. The FAA limitation is based on safety considerations, not

privacy expectations, and does not necessarily apply to helicopters.

Both of these cases rely on the police being where they were legally allowed to be, on the “plain view” doctrine that allows police to see what is there to be seen using the naked eye, whether through a window or otherwise, and that they were using normal and routinely used aerial vehicles from which the sightings were made. The use of drones, however, is not normal or routine in many venues, and drones frequently use specialized imaging and sophisticated tech­nologies, like infrared and thermal applications, to view the ground. There will no doubt be many other distinctions that will be argued under Fourth Amendment principles as UAVs become more prevalent and are increasingly used by the government. At this point, it is still safe to say that the incorporation of UAV technology in the NAS, as projected by the recent statutory law and by the plans of the FAA, will result in many legal contests between citizens and the government.

Endnotes

1. P. L. 108-176.

2. Atlanta, Boston, Charlotte, Chicago, Cleveland, DC Metro, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Las Vegas Valley, Memphis, Minneapolis-St. Paul, New York/Philadelphia, Northern California, North Texas, Orlando, Phoenix, Seattle, South­ern California, South Florida, Tampa.

3. Multilateration is a means of navigation using the mea­surement of the difference in distance between two or more stations at known locations that broadcast signals, enabling the determination of a “fix.”

4. Portland, OR; Anchorage; Kansas City, MO; New Orleans; Pittsburgh; San Francisco; Cincinnati; Cleveland; and Andrews Air Force Base.

5. In 2009, 50 percent synthetic fuel blends were created from a process known as Fischer-Tropsch synthesis. In 2011, a biofuel known as Hydroprocessed Esters and Fatty Acids (HEFA) can be mixed up to 50 percent with standard kerosene.

6. As a result of the Freedom of Information suits filed against the DOT, the FAA released information in April 2012 disclosing the identities of holders of Certificates of Authorization (COAs) and Special Airworthiness Certificates in the Experimental Category (SAC-EC).

Space: The New Frontier

From a technical perspective, atmospheres have no “end”; they just get progressively thinner. During the 1950s, it was generally known in the scientific community that, beyond some altitude, the physics of flight changed drastically. The principles for flight in the atmosphere, or the sci­ence of aeronautics, were fairly well understood. The principles for flight without an atmosphere, or the science of astronautics, were less under­stood. Some believed that these two disciplines needed some definition as to their separation.

There is no “bright line” that determines where outer space begins. NASA accords astro­naut status to any individual who travels above 80 kilometers (50 miles). Yet atmospheric drag becomes evident on reentry at 75 miles above the earth’s surface.

The venerable Federation Aeronautique Internationale,8 which was founded in 1905, has ever since that time been accepted worldwide as the arbiter of aeronautical records. Through this private organization, the physicist Theodore von Karman in 1957 proposed a formula for the cal­culation of a boundary that would establish the beginning of space. One of the characteristics of aeronautical flight is the concept of lift, which is a function of speed through the atmosphere, among other things. The thinner the atmosphere, the faster the airplane must fly in order to gain the lift necessary to remain aloft. Karman pro­posed an altitude of approximately (the exact altitude depends on certain variables) 100 kilo­meters (62.1 miles) as the separation point based on his calculations that a space vehicle would have to travel faster than the speed necessary to obtain orbital velocity in order to maintain aero­nautical lift. In other words, aerodynamic lift becomes less than centrifugal force.

This became the internationally accepted boundary to space, and it is known as the “Kar­man line.” The Federation Aeronautique Inter­nationale is now the recognized keeper of all records that are established in astronautics.

Accidents Involving Passenger Fatalities

Ш U. S. Airlines (Part 121) 1982-Present

he NTSB wishes to make clear to all users of si the following list of accidents that the infor­mation it contains cannot, by itself, be used to compare the safety either of operators or of air­craft types. Airlines that have operated the great­est numbers of flights and flight hours could be expected to have suffered the greatest number of
fatal-to-passenger accidents (assuming that such accidents are random events, and not the result of some systematic deficiency). Similarly, the most used aircraft types would tend to be involved in such accidents more than lesser used types. The NTSB also cautions the user to bear in mind when attempting to compare today’s airline sys­tem to prior years that airline activity (and hence exposure to risk) has risen by almost 100% from the first year depicted to the last.

Passengers

Date

Location

Operator

Aircraft Type

Fatal

Surv

1/13/82

WASHINGTON, DC

AIR FLORIDA

BOEING 737-222

70

4

1/23/82

BOSTON, MA

WORLD AIRWAYS

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-10-30

2

198

7/09/82

NEW ORLEANS, LA

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS

BOEING 727-235

137

0

11/08/82

HONOLULU, HI

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS

BOEING 747-100

1

274

01/09/83

BRAINERD, MN

REPUBLIC AIRLINES

CONVAIR 580-11-А

1

29

10/11/83

PINCKNEYVILLE, IL

AIR ILLINOIS

HAWKER SIDDELEY HS-748-2A

7

0

01/01/85

LA PAZ, BOLIVIA

EASTERN AIR LINES

BOEING 727-225

21

0

01/21/85

RENO, NV

GALAXY AIRLINES

LOCKHEED 188C

64

1

08/02/85

DALLAS/FT WORTH, TX

DELTA AIRLINES

LOCKHEED

126

26

L-1011-385-1

Continued

Date

Location

Operator

Aircraft Type

Fatal

Surv

09/06/85

MILWAUKEE, Wl

MIDWEST EXPRESS AIRLINES

DOUGLAS DC-9-14

27

0

12/12/85

GANDER,

NEWFOUNDLAND

ARROW AIRWAYS

DOUGLAS DC-8-63

248

0

02/04/86

NEAR ATHENS, GREECE

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES

BOEING 727-231

4

110

02/14/87

DURANGO, MX

PORTS OF CALL

BOEING 707-323B

1

125

08/16/87

ROMULUS, Ml

NORTHWEST AIRLINES

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9-82

148

1

11/15/87

DENVER, CO

CONTINENTAL AIRLINES

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9-14

25

52

12/07/87

SAN LUIS OBISPO, CA

PACIFIC SOUTHWEST

BRITISH AEROSPACE

38

0

AIRLINES

BAE-146-200

08/31/88

DALLAS/FT WORTH, TX

DELTA AIRLINES

BOEING 727-232

12

89

12/21/88

LOCKERBIE, SCOTLAND

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS

BOEING 747-121

243

0

02/08/89

SANTAMARIA, AZORES

INDEPENDENT AIR

BOEING 707

137

0

02/24/89

HONOLULU, HI

UNITED AIRLINES

BOEING 747-122

9

328

07/19/89

SIOUX CITY, IA

UNITED AIRLINES

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-10-10

110

175

09/20/89

FLUSHING, NY

USAIR

BOEING 737-400

2

55

12/27/89

MIAMI, FL

EASTERN AIR LINES

BOEING 727-225B

1

46

10/03/90

CAPE CANAVERAL, FL

EASTERN AIR LINES

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9-31

1

90

12/03/90

ROMULUS, Ml

NORTHWEST AIRLINES

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9-14

7

33

02/01/91

LOS ANGELES, CA

USAIR

BOEING 737-300

20

63

03/03/91

COLORADO SPGS, CO

UNITED AIRLINES

BOEING 737-291

20

0

03/22/92

FLUSHING, NY

USAIR

FOKKER 28-4000

25

22

07/02/94

CHARLOTTE, NC

USAIR

DOUGLAS DC-9-30

37

20

09/08/94

ALIQUIPPA, PA

USAIR

BOEING B-737-300

127

0

10/31/94

ROSELAWN, IN

AMERICAN EAGLE

ATR-72-212

64

0

12/20/95

CALI, COLOMBIA

AMERICAN AIRLINES

BOEING B-757

152

4

05/11/96

MIAMI, FL

VALUJET AIRLINES

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-9

105

0

07/06/96

PENSACOLA, FL

DELTA AIRLINES

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD-88

2

140

07/17/96

MORICHES, NY

TRANS WORLD AIRLINES

BOEING 747

212

0

08/02/97

LIMA, PERU

CONTINENTAL AIRLINES

BOEING 757-200

1

141

12/28/97

PACIFIC OCEAN

UNITED AIRLINES

BOEING 747

1

373

06/01/99

LITTLE ROCK, AR

AMERICAN AIRLINES

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD-80

10

129

01/31/00

POINT MUGU, CA

ALASKA AIRLINES

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD-83

83

0

Date

Location

Operator

Aircraft Type

Fatal

Surv

09/11/01

NEW YORK CITY, NY

AMERICAN AIRLINES

BOEING 767-200

81

0

09/11/01

NEW YORK CITY, NY

UNITED AIRLINES

BOEING 767-200

56

0

09/11/01

ARLINGTON, VA

AMERICAN AIRLINES

BOEING 757-200

58

0

09/11/01

SHANKSVILLE, PA

UNITED AIRLINES

BOEING 757

37

0

11/12/01

BELLE HARBOR, NY

AMERICAN AIRLINES

AIRBUS INDUSTRIE A300-600

251

0

01/08/03

CHARLOTTE, NC

US AIRWAYS EXPRESS

Beech 1900

19

0

10/19/04

KIRKSVILLE, MO

CORPORATE AIRLINES

British Aerospace Jetstream 32

11

2

12/19/05

MIAMI, FL

CHALKS OCEAN AIRWAYS

Grumman G-73T

18

0

08/27/06

LEXINGTON, KY

COMAIR

Bombardier CRJ-100

47

0

The NTSB wishes to make clear to all users of the preceding list of accidents that the information it contains cannot, by itself, be used to compare the safety either of operators or of aircraft types. Airlines that have operated the greatest numbers of flights and flight hours could be expected to have suffered the greatest number

Passengers

Date

Location

Operator

Aircraft Type

Fatal

Surv

02/21/1982

PROVIDENCE, Ri

PILGRIM AIRLINES

DEHAVILLAND DHC-6

1

9

12/09/1982

NEAR KLAWOCK, AK

TYEE AIRLINES, INC.

DEHAVILLAND DHC-2

7

0

08/17/1983

PEACH SPRINGS, AZ

LAS VEGAS AIRLINES

PIPER PA-31-350

9

0

03/05/1984

CUMBERLAND, MD

CUMBERLAND AIRLINES

PIPER PA-31

2

0

07/21/1984

TAU, MANUA

ISL SOUTH PACIFIC ISLAND

DEHAVILLAND

DCH-6-300

1

10

08/02/1984

VIEQUES, PR

VIEQUES AIR LINK, INC. BRITTEN

NORMAN BN-2A ISLANDER

8

0

08/24/1984

SAN LUIS OBISPO, CA

WINGS WEST AIRLINES, INC.

BEECH C-99

13

0

09/07/1984

NAPLES, FL

PROVINCETOWNBOSTON

AIRLINES

CESSNA 402C

1

4

12/06/1984

JACKSONVILLE, FL

PROVINCETOWNBOSTON

AIRLINES

EMBRAER BANDEIRANTE EMBT10P1

11

0

Continued

Date

Location

Operator

Aircraft Type

Fatal

Surv

12/17/1984

BAINBRIDGE, NY

SUSQUEHANNA AIRLINES, INC.

PIPER PA-23-250

2

0

02/04/1985

SOLDOTNA, AK

NORTH PACIFIC AIRLINES

BEECH 65-A80

7

0

02/06/1985

ALTUS, OK

ALTUS AIRLINE, INC.

CESSNA 402B

1

0

04/26/1985

NEW YORK, NY

NEW YORK HELICOPTERS

AEROSPATIALE SA360C DAUPHIN

1

5

08/25/1985

AUBURN, ME

BAR HARBOR AIRLINES

BEECH 99

6

0

09/23/1985

GROTTOES, VA

HENSON AIRLINES

BEECH B99

12

0

11/01/1985

BETHEL, AK

HERMENS AIR, INC.

CESSNA 208

1

2

03/13/1986

ALPENA, Ml

SIMMONS AIRLINES

EMBRAER EMB-110P1

2

5

10/28/1986

ST. CROIX, VI

VIRGIN ISLAND SEAPLANE SHUTTLE

GRUMMAN G-73

1

12

01/15/198-7

KEARNS, UT

SKY WEST AIRLINES INC. (SKY WEST AIRLINES/ WESTERN EXPR)

SWEARINGEN SA-226TC

6

0

03/04/1987

ROMULUS, Ml

FISHER BROTHERS AVIATION INC. (NORTHWEST AIRLINK)

CASA C-212-CC

7

9

04/01/1987

ANCHORAGE, AK

WILBUR’S FLIGHT OPERATIONS (WILBUR’S INC.)

CESSNA 402

1

0

11/23/1987

HOMER, AK

RYAN AIR SERVICE, INC.

BEECH 1900C

16

3

12/23/1987

KENAI, AK

SOUTH CENTRAL AIR, INC.

PIPER PA-31-350

5

2

12/23/1987

MAUNALOA, HI

PANORAMA AIR TOURS (PANORAMA AIR TOURS)

PIPER PA-31-350

7

0

01/19/1988

BAYFIELD, CO

TRANS COLORADO AIRLINES (TRANS COLORADO)

FAIRCHILD SA-227-AC

7

8

02/19/1988

CARY, NC

AVAIR, INC. (AMERICAN EAGLE)

FAIRCHILD SA-227-AC

10

0

04/19/1989

PELICAN, AK

CHANNEL FLYING SERVICE

DEHAVILLAND DHC-2

1

0

07/30/1989

HAINES, AK

SKAGWAY AIR SERVICE

PIPER PA-32-301

2

2

10/28/1989

HALAWA, MOLOKAI, HI

ALOHA ISLANDAIR

DE HAVILLAND DHC-6-300

18

0

12/26/1989

PASCO, WA

NPA/UNITED EXPRESS (UNITED EXPRESS)

BRITISH AEROSPACE BAE-3101

4

0

09/03/1990

KALTAG, AK

FRONTIER FLYING SERVICE

PIPER PA-31-325

3

6

02/01/1991

LOS ANGELES, CA

SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC.

FAIRCHILD SA-227-AC

10

0

04/05/1991

BRUNSWICK, GA

ATLANTIC SOUTHEAST AIRLINES

EMBRAER EMB-120RT

20

0

07/10/1991

BIRMINGHAM, AL

L’EXPRESS AIRLINES, INC.

BEECH C99

12

1

08/20/1991

KETCHIKAN, AK

TEMSCO HELICOPTERS, INC. (TEMSCO AIRLINES)

PILATUS BRITTEN – NORMAN BN-2A-26 ISLANDER

3

0

09/11/1991

EAGLE LAKE, TX

CONTINENTAL EXPRESS

EMBRAER 120

11

0

Date

Location

Operator

Aircraft Type

Fatal

Surv

12/10/1991

TEMPLE BAR, AZ

LAS VEGAS AIRLINES, INC.

PIPER PA-31-350

4

0

01/03/1992

GABRIELS, NY

COMMUTAIR (USAIR EXPRESS)

BEECH 1900C

1

1

01/23/1992

CLEWISTON, FL

AIR SUNSHINE INC.

CESSNA 402C

1

0

06/07/1992

MAYAGUEZ, PR

EXECUTIVE AIR CHARTER, INC. (AMERICAN EAGLE)

CASA 212

3

0

06/08/1992

ANNISTON, AL

GP EXPRESS AIRLINES, INC.

BEECH C99

2

2

10/27/1992

SAIPAN, MP

PACIFIC ISLAND AVIATION, INC.

CESSNA 310R

2

0

10/31/1992

GRAND JUNCTION, CO

ALPINE AVIATION (ALPINE AIR)

PIPER PA-42

2

0

11/08/1992

KIANA, AK

BAKER AVIATION INC.

CESSNA 402C

2

0

04/03/1993

NOME, AK

RYAN AIR SERVICE, INC

CESSNA 207

1

0

07/12/1993

LAS VEGAS, NV

AIR NEVADA AIRLINES

CESSNA 402C

2

0

12/01/1993

HIBBING, MN

EXPRESS AIRLINES II, INC. (NORTHWEST AIRLINK)

JETSTREAM BA-3100

16

0

01/07/1994

COLUMBUS, OH

ATLANTIC COAST AIRLINES (UNITED EXPRESS)

JETSTREAM 4101

2

3

12/13/1994

MORRISVILLE, NC

FLAGSHIP AIRLINES (AMERICAN EAGLE)

BAE JETSTREAM 3201

15

5

08/21/1995

CARROLLTON, GA

ATLANTIC SOUTHEAST AIRLINES (DELTA CONNECTOR)

EMBRAER EMB-120RT

7

19

11/19/1996

QUINCY, IL

GREAT LAKES AVIATION (UNITED EXPRESS)

BEECH 1900

10

0

01/09/1997

IDA, Ml

COMAIR

EMBRAER 120

26

0

02/08/1997

ST. THOMAS, VI

AIR SUNSHIHE

CESSNA 402C

2

2

04/10/1997

WAINWRIGHT, AK

HAGELAND AVIATION

CESSNA 208B

4

0

06/27/1997

NOME, AK

OLSON AIR SERVICE

CESSNA 207

1

0

11/08/1997

BARROW, AK

HAGELAND AVIATION SERVICES

CESSNA 208B

7

0

09/05/1999

WESTERLY, Rl

NEW ENGLAND AIRLINES

PIPER PA-32-260

2

2

12/07/1999

BETHEL, AK

GRANT AVIATION

CESSNA 207

5

0

09/18/2000

NUIQSUT, AK

CAPE SMYTHE AIR SERVICE

PIPER PA-31T3

4

5

10/03/2001

DECATUR ISLAND, WA

WEST ISLE AIR

CESSNA 172N

2

0

10/10/2001

DILLINGHAM, AK

PENINSULA AIRWAYS

CESSNA 208

9

0

07/13/2003

TREASURE CAY, BAHAMAS

AIR SUNSHINE

CESSNA 402C

2

7

12/14/2006

PORT HEIDEN, AK

PENINSULA AIRWAYS

PIPER PA-32-301

1

0

The NTSB wishes to make clear to all users of the preceding list of accidents that the information it contains cannot, by itself, be used to compare the safety either of operators or of aircraft types. Airlines that have operated the greatest numbers of flights and flight hours could be expected to have suffered the greatest number of fatal-to-passenger accidents (assuming that such accidents are random events, and not the result of some systematic deficiency). Similarly, the most used aircraft types would tend to be involved in such accidents more than lesser used types. The NTSB also cautions the user to bear in mind when attempting to compare today’s airline system to prior years that airline activity (and hence exposure to risk) has risen by more than 35% from the first year depicted to the last, updated September 2005

[1] In 1900, there were 8,000 automobiles registered in the United States. By 1920, there were 8 million automobiles registered. Wall Street Journal 5/17/03.

Endnote

Endnote

[4] http://www. nasm. si. edu/collections/artifact. cfm7id =A19180001000

[5] September 21, 1908—A record for distance and duration that brought a $1,000 prize from the Aero Club de France.

2. October 7, 1908—The first flight with a female passenger, Mrs. Hart O. Berg.

3. October 10, 1908—A record for distance and duration with a passenger.

4. November 18, 1908—An altitude record of 90 meters, earning a prize of 1,000 French francs from the Aero Club de Saitte.

Endnotes

[7] Shulman, Unlocking the Sky: Glenn Hammond Curtiss and the Race to Invent the Airplane, Harper and Collins, 1903.

2. Dayton History Books Online http://www. daytonhistory books. com/the_wright_brothers_18html.

3. Dayton History Books, ibid.

[8] An account of Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Company, 1925-1950, Frederick B. Rentschler, 1950, Pratt & Whitney Archives, East Hartford, CT.

Endnote

[10] The Post Office, which would continue to award contracts, designate routes, and estab­lish schedules;

Endnotes

[12] Barnum, John, What Prompted Airline Deregulation 20 Years Ago, http://library. findlaw. com/1988/ Sep/l/129304.html.

2. Caves, Richard E., Air transport and its regulators: an industry study, Harvard University Press, 1962.

3. Martha Derthick & Paul J. Quirk, The Politics of Deregula­tion 241 (1985).

[13] Immediate automatic market entry in certain cases.

2. Shifted the burden of proof in route author­ity cases from the requirement to show that public necessity and convenience (PNC) was required (in order to secure the route) to one requiring opponents to show that the new award/entry would be inconsistent with PNC.

3. Allowed carriers to obtain authority to fly unused routes of other carriers.

4. Established a range of fares within which carriers could immediately select fares on their own without CAB approval.

5. Established notice procedures to facilitate abandonment of unprofitable routes.

6. Provided a 10-year Essential Air Service Program to ensure air service to small communities.

7. Provided employee protective measures for workers dislocated by changes in the air­lines’ procedures.

Endnotes

[15] 459 U. S. 1145, 103 S. Ct. 784, 74 L. Ed. 992 (1983).

2. 14 C. F.R. 255; Regulation ER-1385, 49 Fed. Reg. 32540 (Aug. 14, 1984), aff’d United Airlines v. CAB, 766 F. 2d 1107 (7th Cir. 1985).

3. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S.C § 1113, et. seq. Under this amendment to the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor in bankruptcy may petition the Bankruptcy Court to void or modify union contracts and impose lower pay scales or more reasonable work rules. The Court must find (after presentation of evidence) that wage and benefit cuts or changes to work rules are necessary for the debtor (airline) to successfully emerge from bankruptcy and that these changes are equitable and not arbitrary. This was not the case when Lorenzo unilaterally canceled the Continental labor agreements.

[16] Gandt, Robert, Skygods, p. 289.

Endnote

[18] The airport gives up the opportunity to make any profit in its operations since any sur­pluses are credited to the airlines.

2. The airport gives up the right to make auton­omous decisions over capital expenditure programs because of provisions in the agree­ments, called “majority-in-interest” (Mil) clauses.

Endnotes

1. Public Law 84-159.

2. 42 U. S.C. section 7401, et seq.

3. California, Massachusetts, and Texas.

4. Aircraft must be built to meet noise certification standards established by ICAO, found in Annex 16, Environmental Protection, V. 1. The first generation of jet aircraft (707, DC-8) preceded the Annex 16 standards. These are Stage

[20] aircraft. Chapter 2 of the Annex applied to aircraft built before 1977, and these are referred to as Stage 2 aircraft. Chapter 3 of the Annex covered the latest production air­craft, and are referred to by the FAA as Stage 3.

[21] It must be developed and implemented at the same time that the present radar-based sys­tem is running full tilt.

[22] It proposes technology that has yet to be perfected.

[23] It requires significant financial invest­ment in new ground-based equipment by government and new onboard equipment by flying users of the new system, estimated to be in excess of $40 billion.

[24] Airlines are reluctant to invest in the required onboard equipage until the FAA can demonstrate with some confidence when the government-funded technologies will be available for use in the new system.

[25] It requires training in the use of new equip­ment and in procedures by government, mili­tary, and civilian users of the new system.

Endnotes

[27] A large-caliber muzzle-loading gun able to fire heavy projectiles.

2. Refer to Chapter 8 for a review of the impact of Scientific American on the early aviation community.

3. Refer to Chapters 6 and 7 for a review of the Smithson­ian’s impact on the early work in aeronautics by Samuel Langley and the Wright brothers, and to Appendices 1 and 2 for comments by Dr. Alexander Graham Bell at the Smithsonian in 1913 about their experiments.

4. On July 17, 1969, the day after the launch of Apollo 11 for the moon landing, the Times issued a “correction” to its 1920 mocking editorial of Goddard’s 1919 treatise. It concluded: “The Times regrets the error.”

5. Refer to Chapter 13 for a discussion of the Guggenheim family and their contributions to early aviation and research in the United States.

6. Roswell would become famous as the site of the alleged alien space ship crash in 1947.