Category AVIATION &ТНЕ ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

Input from all stakeholders is necessary to design the NextGen system so that it will work for everyone and provide the most benefits.

The FAA is also working with selected air carriers to obtain ADS-B data for operational, training, and experience purposes, including JetBlue along the east coast and United Airlines over the Pacific Ocean. Tests, trials, and experi­ments are on-going at all times in various places in a joint effort between the FAA and stakehold­ers, particularly the airlines, to find better and new ways to utilize the new technology.

Commercial air carriers and the FAA have established an unprecedented system of sharing proprietary information (from the airlines) and internal data from the FAA under the acronym

ASIAS (Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing), from which 65 databases have been created from 43 commercial carriers, accounting for more than 95 percent of commercial opera­tions in the NAS. These databases are used to evaluate safety in emerging systems, and point to the cooperative and joint effort of government and private enterprise to enhance safety in the air transportation system.

Concepts are evaluated and tested for inte­gration at the William J. Hughes Technical Cen­ter in Atlantic City using simulators for aircraft cockpits, air traffic control tower interiors, airline operations centers, and unmanned aircraft system ground control centers. Test bed facilities, which is a term used to describe a platform for experi­mentation, have been established in Florida and

Improved Airport Surface Operations and Airspace Access in 2011

FIGURE 36-2 FAA-designated Metropiex areas.

North Texas, with the Department of Defense Research and Engineering Network being added in 2012. The training of the FAA workforce is also in process.

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, member states of ICAO endorsed a global plan for strengthening aviation security, to include a review of legal instruments in aviation security to identify gaps and inadequacies in relation to emerging threats. It was concluded that the use of aircraft as weapons, suicide attacks, electronic and computer-based attacks, chemical, biological and radioactive attacks, were not adequately cov­ered by existing agreements.

It was also concluded that existing law focused mainly on persons who actually perpe­trated the attacks, usually on board the aircraft or at the airport, without considering the people who might be responsible for organizing, direct­ing, or financing the attack.

The Beijing Convention and the Beijing Pro­tocol may be considered together as two new coun­terterrorism treaties that promote and improve aviation security. These agreements criminalize the act of using civil aircraft as a weapon, and of using dangerous materials to attack aircraft or other targets on the ground. The unlawful transport of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons is a pun­ishable offense, as well as conspiracies to carry out such attacks. Making threats against civil aviation is also covered. The effect of these provisions is to require signatories to criminalize these acts.

After entry into force, the Beijing Con­vention of 2010 will prevail over the Montreal Convention of 1971 and the Protocol signed in Montreal in 1988.

As a part of the SES initiative, SESAR repre­sents the technological dimension of the plan, which will incorporate state-of-the-art innovative technology.

SESAR might be compared to the Next – Gen program in the United States and, like the Joint Planning and Development Office (JDPO), the planning segment of NextGen in the United States, it is a forward-looking program that involves all of the entities that operate within the air transport system. These include civil and mili­tary agencies of government, legislators, indus­try, operators, and users. These entities will be central to the defining, committing to, and imple­menting of a pan-European ATM system.

The SESAR program is separated into three sequential phases:

Definition Phase (2005-2008), now completed Development Phase (2008-2013), like Next­Gen, under development.

Deployment Phase (2014-2020), like Next­Gen, under development.

During the first phase, a European Master Plan was presented, bringing European ATM stakeholders together to produce and validate a common view of the future of European ATM. The updated second phase takes into account the global financial crises that began in 2008 after the Master Plan was published. It pro­poses to seek an impact statement to confirm that the Master Plan is affordable and can be done and to update the Plan in light of devel­opments. This is a work in progress, as is the remainder of the SESAR program. Fast-mov­ing technological developments, as well as global financial developments, will affect the deployment effort. The implementation phase will depend on accomplishing the goals of the second phase.

SESAR will incorporate the European Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) known as Galileo, into the ATM system to be launched. Details of the manner and means by which the new system will operate have not been disclosed, but it might be presumed that it will evolve in a similar manner to the NextGen plan in the United States. Part of the U. S. plan, in fact, is to reach out to the global community so that the several systems now on the drawing boards might be developed with the requirements of the others in mind. It makes sense that these satellite – based air traffic control systems be compatible to the extent possible so that the globalization of the air transport system will extend, not only to marketing and governmental policy develop­ments, like deregulation and Open Skies, but to operational considerations, like air traffic control, to enhance the seamless transition of air transport operations over the globe.

Harmonic Convergence

The United States and the EU are working simul­taneously on the complete transition of their air traffic control systems from land-based naviga­tion to satellite navigation. The fact is that these programs are being carried out separately, under separate management and with distinct chal­lenges; yet the hundreds of flights that travel between the two continents daily demand that these separate systems be compatible and that the flights be operationally seamless and safe.

There are also distinctions between the two systems that reflect the political and cultural dif­ferences between the United States and the coun­tries of Europe. The U. S. system is a federal one, while the EU must still deal with the concerns of 27 sovereign states. The controlling governmental entity for the United States is the FAA, while that for the EU is the SESAR Joint Undertaking (SJU), which consists of Eurocontrol, the European Commission, and 15 more member organizations.

The tentative nature of some aspects of each of the programs, partially because of still unde­veloped technological systems, unknown pricing, and even undetermined commitment, have caused skepticism and doubts among stakeholders (pri­marily airlines, on both sides of the Atlantic, who must equip their aircraft). All of this has been exacerbated by the global financial crisis, which has manifested itself in a very divisive manner in the EU and its separate Member States.

The uncertainties inherent in each of the programs contribute to difficulties in harmo­nization. There can be no doubt that each side understands that the systems must, in fact, be compatible and consistent, but both programs at this point still involve a lot of theory, unproven development, and the possibility of a change in course that will affect the financial conditions of both the private and governmental sectors.

Final developments cannot be stated with certainty under these conditions. There appears to be a bona fide commitment to accomplish the stated goals of both the United States and the EU, and hard work is proceeding in many quarters in the United States and in Europe; indeed, includ­ing private enterprise all over the world. Air traf­fic management systems are obsolete and must be fixed. Exactly what will develop, and when it will develop, remains to be seen.

Endnotes

1. Minestere Public v. Lucas Asjes, 3 C. L.R. 173, Eur. Ct.

R. 1425.

2. Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) p. 202.7 (1978).

3. Agreement between the government of the United States of America and the Commission of the European Communi­ties regarding application of their Competition Laws, 1995 0. J. (L95) 47.

4. See discussion in Chapter 37.

5. Most developed countries have their own regulatory author­ity that is equivalent to the FAA. Here are some world­wide certification agencies: Canada—Transport Canada; Brazil—СТА; EU—EASA (27 countries); Kenya—KCAA; Russia—Aviation Register; China—CAAC; Japan—JCAB; Australia—CASA.

6. Lipinski, William 0., An Evaluation of the U. S.-EU Trade Relationship <http://www. house. gov./lipinski/ aviation. htm>.

7. Competition in the U. S. Aircraft Manufacturing Industry. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U. S. House of Representatives, July 26, 2001, U. S. Govern­ment Printing Office.

8. Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom.

“The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bod­ies,” or the Moon Treaty, is yet another follow-on treaty that proceeds from the first space treaty, the Outer Space Treaty. Each of the treaties that have been adopted since the Outer Space Treaty has added more detail and definition to the gen­eral principles enunciated in the first treaty. The Moon Treaty, however, is considered by most as a “failed” treaty because the specific, additional language used has met with opposition from the major space-faring countries.

The basic stumbling block in the treaty is the use of the words “common heritage of man­kind” to describe the nature of the moon and its resources, as well as the other celestial bodies. The treaty provides for the establishment of an
international regime to govern the exploitation of these resources when such exploitation becomes feasible.

The general interpretation of this language is that all nations of the world have equal rights to the resources of the heavens, irrespective of whether or not they put forth any effort or incur any risk, financial or otherwise, in development of ways and means to recover those resources. Any plan to develop these resources would osten­sibly require approval of all nations on earth, which would be impracticable.

The rejection of the Moon Treaty follows a similar rejection of the terrestrial Law of the Sea Treaty (referred to gleefully by its detractors as LOST). In 1982, the United Nations conceived the Law of the Sea Treaty as a means of con­trol and governance of the world’s oceans. The breadth of the treaty was such that it sought to

biotechnology), physics (including fluid physics, materials science, and quantum physics), astron­omy, and meteorology. The goals of this research include developing an understanding of, and the technology to deal with, long-term human pres­ence in space, developing methods for the more efficient production of materials, developing new ways to treat disease, achieving more accurate measurements than is possible on earth, and a better understanding of the universe.

1 NASA and the United States
Space Program-А Review

Created by the National Aeronautics and Space Act on July 29, 1958, during the Eisenhower Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration replaced the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) which had been researching flight technology for more than 40 years. NASA’s mission continued the work of aeronautics research, but also specifi­cally assumed the responsibility for research in aerospace and for the overall civilian space pro­gram for the nation, including the human space flight program.

The United States space exploration and development program has included both manned and unmanned launches, and unmanned launches designed specifically as precursors of human space flight. Included in these are Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Apollo-Soyuz, the Space Shut­tle, Skylab, and the International Space Station.23

ince the award of the Langley Medal to the Wright brothers three years ago, there has been great activity in the field of aviation. The war departments of the differ­ent nations have been constantly at work, but little is known concerning the character of the advances made. So far as the public are aware the chief progress has related to details of con­struction and improvement in motive power. The advance has been much greater in the art than in the science.

There has, however, been considerable advance in the science of aerodromics along the lines laid down by our late Secretary, Dr. S. P. Langley, and by M. Gustave Eiffel, Director of the Eiffel Aero-Dynamical Labora­tory in Paris.

In 1907 M/Eiffel published the results of experiments made at the Eiffel Tower; in 1911, he published the results of his experiment at the aerodynamic laboratory in Paris on the resistance of the air in connection with aviation, and these
results have been of great value to aerial engineers in designing and construction flying machines. Indeed his works upon the subject have already become classical.. ..

In spite of the great advances that have been made in the art of aerodromics we are confronted with a long list of fatalities to avia­tors, for whose protection there remains a great deal yet to be done. There has been one very notable development in this direction, made by an American, Mr. Glenn R. Curtiss of Ham – mondsport, N. Y.

In 1908, the Aerial Experiment Associa­tion, of which Mr. Curtiss was a member, dis­cussed the advisability of have flying machines so constructed as to enable them to float, and to rise from the water into the air, as an element of safety. In pursuance of these ideas, the Associa­tion’s aerodrome No. 3, the “Curtiss June Bug” was attached to pontoons and an experiment was made on Lake Keuka on November 6, 1908. Although the speed on the water appeared to be
satisfactory, the machine failed to rise in the air, but the occasion formed the starting point for Mr. Curtiss’ independent researches.

After the dissolution of the Association, March 31, 1909, Mr. Curtiss continued his exper­iments to find a practical solution of the prob­lem, and in May 1910, he made that remarkable flight from Albany to New York City over the Hudson River, a distance of 152 miles in 2 hours 52 minutes, with two light pontoons attached to his machine, to enable it to float should it come down into the water.

In 1911 Mr. Curtiss continued his efforts to construct a machine that would not only float, but would rise from the water into the air, and in January 1912, he succeeded in doing this in San Diego Bay, California. “On January 26, 1912” he says “the first success came”: and on January 27, 1912, the Aero Club of America awarded him the Collier Trophy for his accomplishment.

In February 1912, he demonstrated the use to the Navy of such machines by flying to the U. S. Armored Cruiser “Pennsylvania” . . . alighting in the water beside the vessel. The machine was hoisted up on the vessel’s deck, and then again lowered into the water without damage, showing the possibility of handling such machines without special equipment. He then rose from the water and flew back to the starting point.

By July 1912, he had developed the remark­able machine he calls “the flying boat,” which represents the greatest advance yet made along these lines. It develops great speed upon the water and also in the air, and is equally at home in either element. The world is now following Mr. Curtiss’ lead in the development of flying machines of this type.

Great experience in the handling of aer­ial machines is necessary before aviators can safely make extended flight over land, where a fall might be fatal. The successful develop­ment of the hydro-aerodrome now enables this experience to be gained over water without seri­ous danger to life or limb; and marks a notable advance in the direction of safety that might well be recognized by the Smithsonian Institution by the award of a Langley Medal to Mr. Glenn M. Curtiss.

Frank Lorenzo was obviously not cut from the same airline cloth as were the early aviation chieftains like Jack Frye, Eddie Rickenbacker, and Juan Trippe, people who loved to build things and loved to fly. Lorenzo was first and foremost a financial guy, the quintessential MBA focused on finance, with little thought or care for tradition, history, or national concept. Whereas the airlines had been built by men who expected to make money from their efforts, not every deci­sion they made was a financial one; not every action taken was with a view toward the bottom line. Empire building in the early days was done one step at a time, not in one fell swoop like the hostile takeovers, leveraged buyouts, and unre­strained mergers that became the modus operandi of the deregulated 1980s. Lorenzo had turned the venerable airline industry on its head: Continen­tal had absorbed People Express (and Frontier) and New York Air. Texas Air, in turn, owned Continental, and had then acquired Eastern Air Lines. By 1987, Texas Air controlled 20 percent of the domestic airline market, and it had only 20 employees.

By the late 1980s, Lorenzo and his business methods were wearing thin in most quarters, including labor, the banks, other airlines, and the agencies of the federal government. His reputa­tion was preceding him. It was said that the Ber­lin wall, before it began to come down in 1989, bore Lorenzo’s name in red with a slash through it, signifying the negative. The ultimate indus­try rejection came from the bankruptcy order of Judge Burton Lifland, in his termination of Lorenzo’s status as debtor in possession of East­ern. Judge Lifland noted that Lorenzo was “not competent to reorganize” the company. Lorenzo himself seems to have tired of the game. Pickets from Eastern regularly appeared outside of his home and there was some concern for his safety and that of his family.

Jan Carlzon had built SAS (Scandinavian Airlines System) into a niche airline operation within the continent of Europe, competing with the large state-owned airlines. His vision was to beat his European competition to the markets of America now opening due to deregulation. Thus, he began overtures in the middle 1980s to estab­lish a relationship with a United States carrier. After negotiating unsuccessfully first with East­ern, then TWA, he approached Lorenzo with a proposition for a partnership arrangement with Continental, based out of Newark. This led to an agreement in October 1988 for SAS to purchase a minority interest in Texas Air for $50 million, to be followed the next year with another pay­ment of $40 million. Texas Air, in the late 1980s, was suffering hefty losses, and the experience with Eastern after its purchase by Texas Air was draining.

Lorenzo’s reputation had made its way to Europe, where labor interests looked askance at the prospect of the Texas Air-SAS alliance. One European tabloid ran a cartoon depicting Carlzon and Lorenzo in bed together with the caption “It’s fine if you go to bed just don’t go to sleep.” Even Lorenzo had to acknowledge that his repu­tation detracted from the ongoing success and potential of Texas Air holdings. In 1990, Texas Air was reorganized into Continental Air Hold­ings, and in the summer of that year Lorenzo struck a deal with SAS for the sale of his entire personal stake in the company for $50 million.

Seemingly always at the top of his game, and a master of timing, Lorenzo sold out just before Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. The invasion and resulting worldwide reaction spurred fuel costs and depressed airline travel. Continental was unable to meet the financial strain imposed, and filed for Chapter 11 protec­tion again in December 1990, prompting some wags to suggest that Continental was now in “Chapter 22.”

Lorenzo made one last appearance on the airline scene in 1993. His idea was to inaugu­rate a new carrier called “Friendship Airlines.” He made application to the DOT, as required by law, for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity. Since deregulation, this procedure has been used to determine the “fitness” of an appli­cant to conduct an interstate air carrier operation. The DOT denied the application. Lorenzo was finally gone. [14] [15]

Passenger enplanements since 1978 have increased dramatically. In 1978, 275 million people flew on domestic airlines. By 1995, that figure had doubled, to 548 million. In 2000, the number had increased to 693 million. Because of 9-11, passenger travel dropped significantly, to a low of 641 million in 2002, but by the end of 2005, passenger enplanements were almost 780 million. Between 2006 and 2010, cycling once again primarily due to economic factors, the average annual passenger count declined to 736 million. It is beyond argument that deregula­tion opened up air travel to the vast general popu­lation of the United States primarily because of a falling fare structure.

dumber of Carriers

The number of carriers operating in any given year since deregulation has fluctuated greatly, although there has been an increase overall. This variation has been referred to as the “ebb and flow” of entrants by former CAB chairman John E. Robson. The “flow” of entrants has been marked by high expectations, and the “ebb” of failures in the industry by excuses. A variety of reasons has been given for new entrant fail­ures: inexperienced management, unrealistic business plans, lack of solid financial backing, public doubts about airlines’ reliability, and poorly conceived pricing structures. Recently, new entrant airlines have stabilized their perfor­mance record, with far fewer failures than were seen in the period just after the airlines were deregulated.

In 1938 when the CAB took over economic regulation of the airlines, there were 16 trunk carriers; by 1978, that number had shrunk to 10 airlines, although local service airlines and commuters had brought the total number of air­lines to 43. While airlines have been classified in a number of different ways, the Department of Transportation defines airlines based on annual revenues as major airlines, national airlines, and regional airlines. In 2000, there were a total of 90 airlines operating in the United States, of which 10 were classified as “major” airlines, a rough equivalent to the trunk airlines of regulation days. By reason of volume and inflation costs, by 2010 the number of “major” airlines had grown to 18. As of 2012, through mergers and acquisi­tions, the number of incumbent “major” airlines had declined to five. The number of surviving legacy airlines remains a moving target as carri­ers continue to adjust to the factors that seem to control their individual destinies.

Carriers proposing to merge are required to provide notice to the DOJ and to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The DOJ reviews the

proposed merger plan, usually within a period of 30 days, and if no competitive issues are discerned by the DOJ, the parties are free to proceed. In some cases, the DOJ may issue its request for additional information, which pre­vents further action toward merger by the carriers for another 20 days. Often, concerns of the DOJ are addressed in this manner and any issues are resolved without formal action. Other times, liti­gation is required to resolve the issues.

The DOJ normally applies the provisions of Section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, which prohibits the acquisition of stock or assets “where in any line of commerce or in any activ­ity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” The statute provides the means for the proposed action to be prevented or delayed while the objections of the government are heard. The procedure reflects the fact that, once a merger process has begun or has been completed, it is very difficult to undo. Delay or prevention of the proposed merger activity is accomplished by the filing of a complaint in federal court and the seeking of a temporary restraining order or injunction to prohibit the air­lines from proceeding with the proposed action.

The authority of the DOJ extends to instances involving the acquisition of relatively minor assets of one carrier by another, as in the case of gates or slots at airports. In 1989, for example, the DOJ moved to block Eastern’s pro­posal to sell gates to US Air at Philadelphia Inter­national Airport, and again in 1991 when Eastern sought to sell slots and gates to United at Reagan Washington National Airport.

Finally, the DOJ has authority, jointly with the DOT, over airline acquisition of international route authority and mergers between domestic and foreign carriers. The DOT, in turn, works with the Department of State, which has final authority in dealing with foreign governments. The DOJ may challenge these proposals in the same manner as in domestic acquisitions.

s a result of the industrialization of society and the growth of heavy industry during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, pollution of air and water became a significant by-product of progress. Until the 1950s, prevailing wisdom held that such pollution was the inevitable price of such progress.

Visible air pollution was seen from station­ary sources like manufacturing plants and facto­ries and in “smog” accumulations in places like the Los Angeles Air Basin due to automobile emissions. Industrial and municipality discharges into waterways caused widespread prohibitions against swimming and fishing due to health risks. Catastrophes like the Cuyahoga River fire (the river caught fire) and the Love Canal scan­dal (toxic waste seepage caused a declaration of a federal emergency) were high-profile examples of pollution. When jet transport aircraft were introduced into the air carrier fleet in 1958, the dense, black exhaust emissions created on take­off at ground level and during climbout were vivid evidence of yet another encroachment on air quality levels.

Prior acceptance of pollution as an inevita­ble by-product of progress has now been roundly rejected. Current environmental policy is con­cerned with almost all aspects of the quality
of life on earth. In this chapter we will briefly review the evolution of current policy gener­ally, and we will look at how current policy has attempted to address the specific environmental impacts of aviation.

The Air Pollution Act and the Clean Air Act

The first attempt by Congress to address the problem of air pollution generally came in the Air Pollution Act of 1955.1 Subsequent efforts to strengthen controls on pollution occurred in amendments beginning in 1963 in the Clean Air Act, which was amended almost yearly until 1970. That year proved to be a watershed year for environmentalists, with the passage of the Clean Air Act of 1970 (an amendment to the 1963 Act),2 which created the Environmental Protection Agency as an independent agency reporting directly to the president. Its broad authority is over control of pollution, noise, and radiation.

Although the Clean Air Act mandates a national policy, the statute gives state and local governments primary responsibility for regula­tion of pollution from power plants, factories, and
other stationary sources. The EPA retains primary responsibility for “mobile source” pollution.

The EPA is required to consult with the FAA on any standards sought by the EPA to be made applicable to aircraft engine emissions. The EPA is prohibited by the terms of the Clean Air Act from changing aircraft emission standards if such a change would significantly increase noise or adversely affect safety. The FAA is charged with enforcing EPA standards through FAA regulations.

The EPA coordinates its aircraft engine emission regulation authority with the Interna­tional Civil Aviation Organization, created by the Chicago Convention in 1944, due to its role to develop international civil aviation in a “safe and orderly manner.” ICAO’s responsibilities include developing aircraft technical and operat­ing standards and recommending practices. The United States is currently one of 191 participat­ing member States of ICAO. One of the founding principles of ICAO was to create a high degree of uniformity between nations in the interest of global harmonization. Moreover, any participat­ing member may ban the use of aircraft within its airspace that does not meet ICAO standards. EPA standards do not apply to military aircraft.

ICAO’s Committee on Aviation Environ­mental Protection (CAEP) is responsible for the technical work in the environmental field. CAEP is composed of various work groups from many countries who do the technical research and pro­pose solutions and standards. The FAA repre­sents the United States in this committee. This procedure and practice for creating binding U. S. regulatory law has been judicially upheld in The National Association of Clean Air Agencies v. EPA, 489 F. 3d 1221 (D. C. Cir. 2007).

The approach taken by the EPA and by ICAO is to regulate nitrogen oxides produced in combustion (and some other pollutants) primarily by imposing standards for new engine designs. The imposition of emissions standards for new engine designs is a complex and cautious under­taking in view of the many other considerations inherent in engine manufacture, such as fuel efficiency, safety, and cost. The ICAO standards are found in Annex 16, Environmental Protec­tion, Volume II, “Aircraft Engine Emissions.”

After 9/11, then the sixth largest airline in the country, United applied for a government-guaran­teed loan from the Air Transportation Stabilization Board. In December 2002, the Board voted to deny the application in spite of concessions previ­ously given by its flight attendants and its pilots. The Board believed that United’s labor burden was still too bloated to allow it to compete in the exist­ing business environment. United filed for bank­ruptcy protection on December 9, 2002. In 2003, in bankruptcy court, United cut pilots’ wages 30 percent. Pilots pay then ranged between $33,000 for new hires to a high of $195,000. It also termi­nated its employee pension plan, the second airline to do so. Both of these pension plans were trans­ferred to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora­tion, a federal agency set up to protect, at tax payer expense, employees’ pensions.12

Delta Airlines

After 9/11, Delta Airlines continued its downward spiral, losing $10 billion between 2001 and 2005. The third largest carrier in the United States, Delta entered Chapter 11 on September 14, 2005. Although Delta had been in financial straits for some time, its pilots pay ranged from $48,000 for beginning pilots to $275,000 for Boeing 777 captains. Delta froze its employee pension plan (which allowed Delta to forego any further contributions to the plan) by agreement with its unions. In September 2006, the Bankruptcy Court approved termination of Delta’s pilot pension plan. Delta has preserved ground and flight atten­dants’ pension plans based on the passage of the Pension Protection Act by Congress in 2006. This statute gives Delta (and Northwest) a period of 17 years to fund the employee plans.

Northwest Airlines

Northwest, the fourth largest U. S. carrier, entered Chapter 11 on the same day as Delta, September 14, 2005. Precipitating the filing, Northwest had been unable to win necessary wage concessions from its unions. In fact, Northwest had been operating for almost a month prior to filing with its unionized mechanics on strike. Like Delta, Northwest froze its employee pension plan in bankruptcy. Unlike other airlines in bankruptcy, Northwest preserved all of its pension plans.

As of September 14, 2005, four of the top seven carriers in the United States were in bankruptcy. They were all legacy airlines. See Figure 35-21.

ATA Airlines

AT A was a new entrant airline, receiving its air carrier certificate in 1981, post deregula­tion. As the country’s 10th largest air carrier, it filed for protection on October 22, 2004, citing fuel prices, competition, and lease payments on aircraft. This was necessary in spite of receiv­ing an ATSB loan guarantee in the amount of $168 million in 2002. As part of its restructur­ing under bankruptcy protection, ATA agreed to sell its hub operation at Chicago Midway to AirTran, one of its major competitors. It also sold its slots at LaGuardia and Reagan National to AirTran.