Category Mars Wars

Early Mission Planning

In 1952, Dr. Wernher von Braun[36] published the first detailed mission architec­ture for human exploration of the red planet in his classic book, The Mars Project. The manuscript was actually the appendix of an earlier, unpublished work that von Braun had written while interned with his fellow German rocket engineers in El Paso, Texas after the conclusion of World War II (WW1I). Von Braun had a sweeping vision for human travel to Mars. His plan called for ten 400-ton space­craft capable of transporting a crew of 70 to the red planet—almost 1,000 ferry flights would be required to assemble this massive “flotilla” in Earth orbit. The strat­egy incorporated a minimum-energy trajectory that would carry the ships to Mars in approximately eight months. Upon arriving in Martian orbit, a glider would descend for a sliding landing on one of the planets polar ice caps. The crew from that ship would then trek 4,000 miles to the equator to build a landing strip for two additional gliders, which would transport the remainder of the exploratory team to the surface. After setting up an inflatable base camp habitat, the crew would com­mence a 400-day survey of the planet—which, von Braun assumed, would include taking samples of local flora and fauna and exploring the Martian canals—this was more than a decade before Mariner 4 returned the first close-up images of Mars back to Earth. Following a year of exploration, the crew would return to Earth,

Early Mission Planning

These paintings by Chesley Bonestell illustrate von Brauns plan for human exploration of Mars, from construction of the spaceships in Earth orbit, to entering Mars orbit, to exploring the surface itself (Courtesy Chesley Bonestell archives)

completing its three-year journey.[37]

In the early 1950s, Collier’s magazine approached Wernher von Braun and sev­eral other prominent engineers and scientists with an offer to write a series of eight articles about space exploration. The publication of these articles in Collier’s, with its circulation of almost four million, represented the beginning of a concerted “soft­ening up” process for space exploration in general, and Moon and Mars explora­tion in particular—with the express purpose of educating the American public.[38] In April 1954, von Braun and journalist Cornelius Ryan penned an article for Collier’s entitled “Can We Get to Mars?” This piece drew heavily from the mission concept found in The Mars Project, but also included an Earth-orbiting space station that would be used during the projects construction phase. In addition, Von Braun included a discussion that analyzed the potential physical and psychological dif­ficulties that the astronaut crew would face on the voyage. He concluded, “…we have, or will acquire, the basic knowledge to solve all the physical problems of a flight to Mars… [but] psychologists undoubtedly will [have] to make careful plans to keep up the morale of the voyagers.” In 1956, von Braun collaborated with fellow German engineer Willy Ley to expand on the Collier’s articles in a book entitled The

Exploration of Mars. The manuscript introduced a refined, cheaper mission architec­ture that reduced the number of ships going to Mars from 10 to 2, and the number of crew from 70 to 12.[39]

In the mid-1950s, the Collier’s articles served as the basis for three animated films about space exploration produced by Walt Disney. Wernher von Braun served as technical advisor for the shows, while Disney provided artistic direction for the series. The American Broadcasting Company aired the first episode entitled “Man in Space” on 9 April 1955- Disney, introducing the broadcast, stated that the aim of the series was to merge “the tools of our trade with the knowledge of the scientists to give a factual picture of the latest plans for man’s newest adventure.” The epi­sode introduced fundamental scientific principles and concluded with von Braun’s vision for a four-stage orbital rocket ship. The second show, entitled “Man and the Moon,” aired on 28 December 1955 and “present[ed] a realistic and believable trip to the moon in a rocket ship—not in some far-off fantastic never-never land, but in the near foreseeable future.” The final show in the series, entitled “Mars and Beyond,” aired almost two years later on 4 December 1957- During this episode, von Braun and Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger revealed plans for “atomic electric space ships [that] feature [d] a revolutionary new principle that will make possible the long trip to Mars with only a small expenditure of fuel.” The Disney technicians provided dramatic animations of a 13-month voyage employing these nuclear rocket engines. TV Guide stated that “Mars and Beyond” represented “the thinking of the best sci­entific minds working on space projects today, making the picture more fact than fantasy.”[40]

Howard McCurdy argues in his book Space and the American Imagination that von Braun’s collaborations with Collier’s and Disney were part of a larger concerted effort to prepare the public for the inevitable conquest of space. He contends that scientists, writers, and political leaders sought to construct a romantic vision of space exploration laid upon images already rooted in the American culture, such as the myth of the frontier. The resulting vision of space exploration had the power to excite, entertain, or frighten (i. e. Cold War)—and it was incredibly successful. In 1949, only 15% of the population believed that we would go to the moon in the 20th century. By the time President Kennedy announced the lunar landing goal, however, the majority of Americans viewed it as inevitable. McCurdy asserts that the primary reason for this shift in national mood was the introduction of space concepts to the mainstream public by von Braun and other visionaries during the 1950s.[41]

Building on the clear rise in interest in space exploration following the launch of Sputnik (and solidified with President Kennedy’s decision to send humans to the Moon), NASA began a series of studies to investigate alternative mission profiles for sending humans to Mars—continuing the softening up process that Wernher von Braun had initiated in the early 1950s and beginning a long-term alternative gen­eration process within the policy stream. In April 1959, Congress approved funding for NASA Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio to conduct the first official architecture study for human exploration of Mars. Under the Lewis plan, a crew of seven would be propelled toward the red planet by an advanced, high-thrust nuclear rocket engine. The strategy called for a 420-day round trip with a 40-day surface stay. The ship design provided substantial living space for the crew and a heavily shielded cylindrical vault in the hub to protect the crew from radiation exposure. This basic model, using nuclear propulsion for the Earth orbit to Mars journey, became the standard within NASA for the next decade.[42]

In 1961, the year in which humans first reached Earth orbit, NASA was largely focused on mission plans for sending humans to explore the surface of the moon— not Mars. However, there was at least one important study of Mars exploration that was produced that year. Authored by Ernst Stuhlinger, who directed advanced propulsion work at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), the study expanded on earlier designs for ion-powered spacecraft. This form of propulsion used an electric current to convert a propellants (e. g. cesium) atoms into positive ions. The engine would then expel these high-speed ions to create a constant low-thrust acceleration. The primary benefit of this vehicle type was that it used relatively little propellant, drastically reducing the amount of launches required to assemble a ship in Earth – orbit. The main drawback, however, was that the low-thrust vehicle would take longer to make the trip to Mars and back. Stuhlinger also introduced a new inno­vation, twirling the spacecraft to generate artificial gravity for the crew. His overall mission plan called for five 150-meter long twirling ion ships to take 15 astronauts on the voyage to the red planet.[43]

In mid-1962, MSFC commenced the Early Manned Planetary Roundtrip Expe­ditions (EMPIRE) study. Wernher von Braun, now director of Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) and the leading advocate pushing for exploration of Mars, recog­nized that his field center would need a post-Apollo goal if it were to survive after completion of the Saturn V rocket program. The goal of the EMPIRE study was to provide a long-term human exploration strategy. The study participants were tasked with creating mission plans that utilized moderate modifications of Apollo tech – nology for Martian flyby and orbiter (but not landing) missions. Three EMPIRE contractors submitted reports to MSFC—Lockheed, Ford Aeronutronic, and Gen­eral Dynamics. The Lockheed and Aeronutronic teams focused primarily on 18 to 22 month flyby missions conducted by spacecraft that utilized a rotating design to create artificial gravity for the crew. The General Dynamics report, on the other hand, focused on orbiter missions conducted by convoys of modular spacecraft. Krafft Ehricke, the principal author of the General Dynamics study, also included options for landing missions. All of the missions proposed under the auspices of the EMPIRE study required launch vehicles capable of lifting 2 Vi to 5 times the weight of the Saturn V being developed for Project Apollo.[44] [45]

In 1963, at the same time MSFC was conducting the EMPIRE study, the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) (later renamed the Johnson Space Center—JSC) started to conduct its own advanced planning for the future of the space program. Assistant Director of MSC, Maxime Faget, favored a phased exploration approach, with a space station and lunar base preceding a human mission to Mars. The MSC study produced the first detailed designs for a Mars Excursion Module (MEM), a piloted craft that would be capable of landing on the Martian surface. The mis­sion plan developed by MSC called for a complicated flyby-rendezvous where two separate spacecraft would be sent toward Mars—Direct and Flyby. The Flyby ship would depart Earth on a 200-day trip to Mars. The piloted Direct ship would leave 50 to 100 days later on a 120-day trip to Mars. Upon arrival, the Direct ship would release the MEM, which would land on the red planet. After completing its mis­sion, the MEM would rendezvous with the Flyby ship as it swung past Mars and headed home. This high-risk approach saved propellant because it utilized a free return trajectory to return the MEM to Earth.11

In July 1965, Mariner 4 conducted the first flyby of Mars and snapped its historic 21 images of the red planet. The photographs revealed a planet with an exceptionally thin carbon dioxide atmosphere and an apparently lifeless, cratered landscape. These findings had a dramatic impact on planning for planetary explora­

tion. Researchers had always assumed Mars to be an Earthlike planet that would support a human crew. Instead they found a resoundingly hostile environment. As a result, the next major Mars study, conducted the following year by the Office of Manned Spaceflight at NASA Headquarters, called for humans to orbit the planet but counted on robotic landers to conduct actual surface exploration. By 1967, with the Vietnam War heating up, Congress eliminated all funding for studying human exploration of the red planet.[46]

The Battle to Save SEI

“And so as this century closes, it is in America’s hands
to determine the kind of people, the kind of planet, we will become
in the next. We will leave the Solar System and travel to the stars.
Not only because it is democracy’s dream, but because it is
democracy’s destiny. ”

President George Bush, 11 May 1990

Throughout the fall of 1989, President Bush had not been heavily engaged in the evolution of SEI within his administration. He had largely delegated responsibility for the initiative to Vice President Quayle, while he addressed more pressing events on the international stage—most importantly, the virtual implosion of communism in Eastern Europe. International tensions remained a fact of life during the coming months as reunification efforts began in East and West Germany; independence movements gained momentum in several Soviet republics; President Gorbachev proposed that the Communist Party give up its monopoly on power in the U. S.S. R.; and Panamanian dictator General Manuel Noriega overturned democratic elections that had effectively ousted him from power. Regardless, during the early part of the new year, President Bush was able to return his attention to domestic mat­ters—including the fate of the American space program.1 [263]

Post-Apollo Planning

On 8 January 1969, President-elect Richard Nixon received the “Report of the Task Force on Space,” a thirteen-member blue-ribbon panel charged with advis­ing the incoming president regarding options for the American space program. Chaired by Nobel Prize winner Charles Townes of the University of California at Berkeley, the task force issued a number of recommendations. The board favored a more balanced program that promoted expanded utilization of robotic probes and satellites for scientific research and exploration, and in a wide variety of applica­tions (e. g., communications, weather, and earth resource surveys). With regard to planetary exploration, the task force did not support the immediate adoption of a human spaceflight program based on a planetary lander or orbiter. Instead, the panel favored continued lunar exploration that built on Apollo technology to allow for greater mobility and extended stays on the surface.[47]

The following month, President Nixon asked Vice President Spiro Agnew to chair a Space Task Group (STG) created to provide a definitive recommendation regard­ing the course the space program should take during the post-Apollo period. The other members of the STG were Secretary of the Air Force Robert Seamans, NASA Administrator Thomas Paine, and Presidential Science Advisor Lee DuBridge. Joan Hoff argues in Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership that the creation of the STG was “a mixed blessing for NASA because Paine assumed almost imme­diately that Agnews personal and public support of a ‘manned flight to Mars by the end of this century’ would carry the day inside the White House and BOB [Bureau of Budget], when nothing could have been further from the truth.”[48]'[49] At an early STG meeting, Paine pushed forward based on this incorrect assumption by con­tending that the space agency needed a new program to rally around. Agnew was supportive, stating that NASA needed an ‘Apollo for the seventies.”[50]

As the primary policy entrepreneurs supporting a human mission to Mars, Paine and Agnew selected an approach for post-Apollo planning that did not mesh with either President Nixon’s basic ideology or changes in the national mood regarding space exploration. Hoff writes “Nixon was concerned about scientific-technological programs that might stress engineering over science, competition over cooperation, civilian over military, and adventure over applications…[and his] emphasis on fru­gality in government spending prompted caution on his part in endorsing any effort in space.” Public sentiment toward the space program had also begun to shift, with increasing concerns that the government had misplaced priorities. A Gallup Poll conducted in July 1969, at the time of the Apollo 11 mission, indicated that only 39% of Americans were in favor of U. S. government spending to send Americans to Mars, while 53% were opposed.[51] Thus, Paine and Agnew were pushing for a large new Apollo-like commitment despite the fact that there appeared to be little or no support for such an undertaking within the White House or the mass public.[52]

On 16 July, at the launch of Apollo 11, Vice President Agnew told reporters that it was his “individual feeling that we should articulate a simple, ambitious, optimistic goal of a manned flight to Mars by the end of the century.” Up until this point, NASA had been focusing primarily on a large space station as the logical post-Apollo program. The space agency had been unsuccessful in gaining political support for such a program, however, so Administrator Paine decided that it was the appropriate time to make a human Mars mission the center of future planning. On 4 August, Wernher von Braun came to Washington to brief the STG on options for human exploration of Mars by 1982. After the briefing, Paine informed the panel that the mission could be accomplished if NASA’s budget was increased to $9 to $10 billion by the middle of the decade—at a time when the NASA budget was only $4.25 billion.[53] This seemed to be contrary to President Nixon’s fiscal philoso­phy as well as existing budgetary realities.

As it became clear that the STG was seriously considering an early Mars mission, widespread criticism of such an undertaking emerged. What was most troublesome for NASA was that formerly vigorous supporters of the space program were opposed to large new projects. Senator Clinton Anderson, Chairman of the Senate Com­mittee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, stated “now is not the time to commit ourselves to the goal of a manned mission to Mars.” Representative George Miller, Chairman of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, said “five, perhaps ten, years from now we may decide that it would be in the national interest to begin a carefully planned program extending over several years to send men to Mars.” The Washington Post and New York Times both questioned the validity of the enterprise, the latter stating that an early crewed Mars mission was scientifically and technically premature.[54]

In the face of growing opposition to a Mars project, Robert Seamans grew con­cerned that his colleagues were considering recommending a program that had no political support. Seamans, who had been a senior NASA official from I960 to 1968, argued that the space agency should utilize its capabilities to address “prob­lems directly affecting men here on Earth.” He contended that new human explora­tion initiatives should be deferred until their technical feasibility was determined. Budget Director Robert Mayo, who had observer status within the STG, agreed with this position. He believed that from a budgetary viewpoint an Apollo-like program was not practical in the near-term. Due to a lack of consensus regarding the exact direction that the post-Apollo program should travel, it was decided that the panel would present the White House with several future program alternatives. Presidential advisor John Erlichman demanded that the report not include any politically infeasible goals, such as a human mission to Mars by 1982.[55]

On 15 September 1969, the STG report was submitted to President Nixon. The panel recommended that “this Nation accept the basic goal of a balanced manned and unmanned space program conducted for the benefit of all mankind.” To accom­plish this goal, the report stressed five program objectives, including:

• Expansion of space applications

• Enhancement of space technology for national security purposes

• Continuation of earth and space science projects

• Development of a new space transportation capability and a space station

• Promotion of international cooperation in space

Finally, the group recommended that the nation “accept the long-range option or goal of manned planetary exploration with a manned Mars mission before the end of this century as the first target.” The STG report did not, however, support an immediate commitment to any particular future program or initiative. Instead, the panel provided President Nixon with several alternatives and left it to him to choose the best option.[56]

On 7 March 1970, six months after the STG report was submitted, President Nixon offered his first official comments on the future course of the space program. In his statement, the president declared that the space program would be less of a government priority during his administration. Nixon rejected the need for a bold new exploration initiative, arguing “many critical problems here on this planet make high priority demands on our attention and our resources. By no means should we allow our space program to stagnate. But—with the entire future and the entire universe before us—we should not try to do everything at once. Our approach to space must be bold—but it must also be balanced.”[57] This statement formally ended NASA’s attempts to get approval for a mission to Mars and led to the even­tual endorsement of the Space Shuttle program. Joan Hoff argues that there were four major reasons for the failure of NASA to gain approval for a bold post-Apollo initiative. First, President Nixon never “need[ed] to use the space program to prove himself able to deal with the Soviets, as Kennedy and Johnson apparently thought they did. NASA administrators and White House science advisors in 1969-72 failed

to appreciate this important shift____ ” Second, the Nixon administration inherited

economic problems generated by immense spending related to the Vietnam War and Great Society social programs. Third, an anti-technology mood within the American public forced policy makers to question whether large spending for the space program was a proper allocation of scarce government funding. As a result, the president decided that there was no political downside to supporting budget cuts for

NASA. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Hoff contended that “institutional obstinacy at NASA when asked to comply with changing government budgeting methods and changing public expectations about the meaning of the space program” led to a deceleration within the space program.[58] John Logsdon agreed with this line of reasoning, writing in Exploring the Unknown: Organizing for Exploration, “…the results of NASA’s attempt to mobilize support behind the manned Mars objective were, from the Agency’s perspective, little short of disastrous…. What happened to NASA plans and the STG report is best viewed, not in terms of NASA winning’ or ‘losing,’ but in terms of what happens when an agency’s plans are significantly at variance with what political leaders judge to be both in the long-term interests of the nation and politically feasible.”[59] The fact that NASA pushed the Mars initiative despite substantial opposition resulted in discussion of sending humans to the red planet being a taboo subject within NASA for the next decade.

Presidential Decisions

During the early months of the new year, the Space Council staff began devel­oping actual policy directives for the implementation of SEI. Based on direction provided by the full Council during two meetings on the subject, the staff was tasked with drafting two documents. The first would provide general policy guid­ance, while the second would introduce a course of action for including interna­tional partners in Moon-Mars missions. In a sign that the Administration had lost complete faith in NASA, the staff turned to the Department of Defense to conduct most of the analytical work necessary to develop these documents. Although NASA leaders had originally been in favor of re-establishing the Space Council, this view had dramatically shifted now that the new organization had turned to the military to comment on and critique the space agency’s plans and projects.[264] Regardless, over the period of several months, the council staff worked closely with military analysts and the ‘deputies committee,’ a group consisting of high-level representatives from each of the Council’s member agencies, to gain a consensus on the wording of the forthcoming policy statements.[265]

On 21 February, President Bush signed a Presidential Decision on the Space Exploration Initiative. Fully supported by Vice President Quayle and the National Space Council, its public unveiling three weeks later was clearly timed to coincide with the release of the NRC review of the 90-Day Study. The NRC panels’ find­ings and recommendations largely validated the policy guidance found within the presidential directive. The objective of the document was to provide the American space program with near-term guidance for carrying out the long-term SEI vision. The policy consisted of the following components:

• The initiative will include both lunar and Mars program elements

• The initiative will include robotic science missions

• Early research will focus on a search for new and innovative approaches and

technologies

— Research will focus on high leverage technologies with the potential to greatly reduce costs

— Mission, concept, and systems analyses will be carried out in parallel with technology research

— Research will lead to definition of two or more significantly different exploration architectures

— A baseline program architecture will be selected from these alternatives

• Three agencies will carry out the initiative, with the National Space Council coordinating all activities

— NASA will be the principal implementing agency

— DOD and DOE will have major roles in technology development and concept definition

Coming eight months after President Bush first announced the initiative, this direc­tive provided the direction that had clearly been needed within a fractious policy making community.[266] It was among the most significant documents in the chronicle of SEI. It represented an outright skirmish in the battle to gain control of strategic space policy planning within the Bush administration. Mark Albrecht said later, “it took us almost a year to go where we wanted to go directly and it cost us time, it cost confusion on the Hill.”[267] Although this was a criticism of NASA, the Administration itself shared equally in the blame for not providing the required direction earlier. It is unclear whether the ultimate fate of SEI would have changed even if policy guid­ance had been provided much earlier, but it seems safe to conclude that the lack of administration leadership significantly reduced the initiatives chances of success. By the time the council finally supplied the needed direction, it was probably too late to resurrect an undertaking Congress presumed would be outrageously expen­sive. Dick Malow recalled that even with of a presidential directive providing policy guidance for SEI, “the general feeling about the program on the Hill continued to weaken.”[268]

At the end of March, the White House made public a second presidential direc­tive announcing President Bush’s decision to commence discussions with foreign nations regarding international cooperation for SEI. This idea had been encour­aged the previous summer by Carl Sagan, who sought to take advantage of warmer relations between the United States and Soviet Union. The Department of Trans­portation’s (DOT) Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee had likewise recommended cooperation with the U. S.S. R. The committee’s chairman,

Alan Lovelace, said “cooperation with the Soviets is logical given the great desire of the administration to take steps to support developments in Eastern Europe.” Another potential reason to cooperate was to reduce the U. S. contribution to the expensive initiative. It was suggested that the issue should be placed on the table for the Bush-Gorbachev summit planned for the summer.[269] The policy document itself indicated that the nation should pursue negotiations with Europe, Canada, Japan, and the Soviet Union. It was believed that this decision directive would sup­port three important objectives. First, and most importantly, it would expand the coalition of initiative supporters by adding a foreign policy rationale. Second, it would involve partners capable of contributing financial resources to an expensive undertaking. Third, it would involve partners with important technical capabili­ties—most notably Soviet experience addressing the impacts of prolonged space – flight and constructing nuclear space systems.[270]

The Soviet reaction to President Bush’s call for international cooperation was extremely positive. Four years earlier, President Gorbachev had asked President Reagan to join his nation in a joint mission to the red planet, which would have met a long held ambition within the U. S.S. R. for human space exploration focusing on a voyage to Mars. After the release of the presidential directive, the spokesman for the Soviet embassy in Washington stated, “we have always been for cooperation with the United States in this area.” Despite this encouraging response, by the end of the month, the NRC panel that had been evaluating SEI publicly warned against any cooperative robotic sample return missions to Mars with the Soviets. While the NRC did not address human exploration, it found that a highly interdependent undertaking could make planetary science “a potential hostage to political events.” In the long-run, the potential benefits sought from exploring international coopera­tion were never realized.[271]

While the Space Council was working to provide long overdue policy guid­ance for SEI’s implementation, senior NASA officials were appearing on Capitol Hill to defend the proposed increase in the agency’s budget. In late March, the House Appropriations subcommittee with authority over the NASA budget held two days of hearing on the matter. It became apparent very quickly that the com­mittee, chaired by Representative Bob Traxler (D-MI), was committed to identify­

ing and eliminating all funding associated with SEI. Chairman Traxler began the SEI-related questioning by asking NASA if the net increase in spending associated with the initiative was approximately $300 million—if on-going programs such as the National Aerospace Plane, Space Station Freedom, and Mars Observer were not included. NASA Comptroller Thomas Campbell answered that this was cor­rect. Traxler then asked a series of questions regarding the technologies included in the 90-Day Study, which led to a long response from Admiral Truly defending the report—he concluded that the $188 million in funding for new technologies were dedicated to ascertaining what innovations would be required to efficiently explore the Moon and Mars. An undeterred Traxler followed-up by asking whether Truly agreed with the NRC report, which concluded that SEI as envisioned in the 90-Day Study would be technically challenging and very expensive. After Truly answered in the affirmative, Traxler got to the heart of the Congressional concern by asking whether fully implementing the TSG plan would require more than doubling the NASA budget. Once again answering affirmatively, Truly stated that regardless of what technologies or strategies were selected, exploration of the Moon and Mars would be an expensive undertaking. Truly suggested that the technological, educa­tional, and spiritual benefits derived from such an endeavor was worth the cost.

After a brief foray into technical details, Traxler returned to budgetary concerns, questioning the space agency’s ability to accurately forecast programmatic costs for long term projects. He asked whether Truly was confident in NASA’s estimate for reference approach A ($541 billion). The administrator simply said it was prema­ture to make this determination, but that he believed the program would be “very expensive.” Traxler followed-up by asking when NASA would be able to provide firm numbers, to which Truly said it would take three or four years of focused technology development to provide a more definitive estimate. In essence, Truly was suggesting that Congress should invest billions of dollars in technology development programs before the agency could tell it how much the long-term project would cost. During the second day of testimony, with many Congressional concerns presumably con­firmed, Chairman Traxler only returned to SEI in an attempt to accurately identify exactly where new money for SEI could be found within the NASA budget request. This was an ominous sign, calling into question whether Congress would provide any funding for implementation of the initiative.[272]

By the end of April, with Congress preparing to eliminate all SEI-related funding from the NASA budget, the Space Council set into motion a concentrated lobby­ing effort aimed at garnering support for the space program and SEI. The first step

in the strategy was to hold a “space summit” at the White House. While President Bush met weekly with the senior Congressional leadership to discuss selected sub­jects, this meeting was notable because it was the first time in American history that space policy would be the sole topic on the agenda.11 According to an internal White House memorandum, the primary purpose of the summit was for Bush to show support for the FY 1991 space budget. Secondarily, the gathering provided an opportunity to discuss SEI. Not since the initiation of the Apollo program had a president given such high priority to the space program. During the intervening period, space activities were kept alive by a select group of congressional appropria – tors and top-level NASA officials. The belief within the administration was that this traditional coalition would not be able to deliver on President Bush’s ambitious request for a 24% increase in funding for the space agency or obtain approval to implement SEI. Senator Barbara Mikulski and Senator Jake Garn (chair and rank­ing member of the Appropriation Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies) had confirmed this opinion, warning the White House that the Moon – Mars initiative was particularly vulnerable in the current budgetary environment, absent strong intervention by the White House. Based on this advice, the White House plan was to have President Bush actively promote the initiative, both pub­licly and with top congressional powerbrokers.[273] [274]

On 1 May, after being delayed in mid-April by the death of Senator Spark Mat – sunaga (D-HI),[275] the summit took place at the Old Executive Office Building. The event was attended by sixteen congressional participants[276] and nearly twenty mem­bers of the White House staff.[277] President Bush opened the meeting by affirming his personal commitment to the American space program, which he believed to be of vital importance to the nation’s future. He contended that space leadership was crucial to maintaining national leadership in the high tech world—in particular, he lauded the launch of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) aboard the Shuttle Discovery in late April as an example of U. S. accomplishments in space science. He further argued that there were real and tangible benefits derived from invest­ments in the national space program, including revolutions in communications and computerization, advances in industrial materials and medical knowledge, the cre­ation of millions of high-tech jobs, and inspiring future generations of scientists and engineers. President Bush then appealed for congressional support for his increase in civil space spending—which he asserted would put the nation on the path of recovery from many years of underinvestment in space. He made the case that Mis­sion to Planet Earth and SEI embodied what the space program was all about—to use space to examine Earth from above and to push outward to new frontiers. In conclusion to his remarks, Bush acknowledged that Congress was concerned about the proposed investment in the Moon-Mars initiative. To address these issues, he turned the meeting over to Vice President Quayle.[278]

Vice President Quayle began by emphasizing the Space Councils priorities, including: a balanced mix of human and robotic, scientific and exploratory mis­sions; pursuit of challenging initiatives; and pushing space innovation designed to ensure national leadership in cutting edge technology. He then launched into a defense of SEI. Stating that the Council had dedicated significant effort to creating a strategy for SEI, Quayle argued that it was fundamentally in the national interest to implement a new round of exploration that would produce countless direct and indirect benefits. He told the attendees that the councils approach for SEI was to begin a multi-year technology research effort. The administration was asking Con­gress for the funding ($188 million in FY1991) and the time to examine alternative ways for better, faster, cheaper, safer ways of reaching the Moon and Mars. Quayle made clear to the assembled congressional leaders that this should not be considered a new program start, but an opportunity to investigate what was involved in achiev­ing the initiative and ultimately to save money. He was adamant on this point, stating unequivocally that the White House was not asking Congress to commit to a new program. Quayle argued, however, that it was important to start the technol­ogy research needed to initiate the program immediately, rather than waiting for the program to get bogged down in bipartisan politics during an election year. He also suggested that SEI offered an exceptional opportunity to showcase U. S. leadership during a time of rapid political change around the globe.

Mark Albrecht remembered the congressional position during the summit “hadn’t changed much, it pretty much remained the same—highly skeptical.” The participants indicated that while they were willing to provide money for studies, they did not believe there was enough justification for a major new program start. Instead, they wanted to see more detail regarding what the actual initiative would look like before they got fully behind the program.[279] One senior congressional aide recalled, “By this time, Chairman Traxler was carrying the message around that ‘we can’t afford this given our allocation. We can’t do it.’ He was already negative about it, so coming out of there I don’t think he was convinced differently. Congress had already pretty much made up its mind.’”[280]